Justia Mississippi Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

Matthew Gilmer filed his notice of appeal thirty-one days after entry of the judgment he appealed. Because Mississippi law required strictly enforced appeals deadlines, the Mississippi Supreme Court dismissed his appeal. This appeal was seen as an attempt to get around the Court's mandate and resurrect a dismissed appeal. While the motion to dismiss Gilmer’s untimely appeal was pending before the Supreme Court, Gilmer returned to the trial court and moved for an extension under Mississippi Rule of Appellate Procedure 4(g). Gilmer cited contracting COVID-19 and his original notice of appeal getting lost in the mail as reasons for his untimely notice of appeal. Gilmer asked the trial court to accept his day-late notice of appeal as timely filed due to excusable neglect. The Supreme Court found Gilmer did not move for this extension within the time period permitted by Rule 4(g). "Rule 4(g) is equally hard edged" —"[t]he trial court may extend the time for filing a notice of appeal upon motion filed not later than 30 days after the expiration of the time otherwise prescribed by this rule." The issue this appeal presented for the Mississippi Supreme Court was the fact that Gilmer did not file his motion for an extension until fifty days after the prescribed time to appeal had already expired. At that point, the trial court had no authority to grant Gilmer his requested relief. So the trial judge denied Gilmer’s motion on that basis. Because the relief Gilmer requested was outside trial court’s authority to grant, the Supreme Court affirmed the order denying an extension. View "Gilmer v. Biegel, et al." on Justia Law

Charles McCollum was convicted by jury on one count of grand larceny for stealing several items from property owned by Brian Mangum. He appealed, claiming the trial court erred by refusing to suppress evidence obtained from the search of his residence, allowing prejudicial hearsay, and denying McCollum’s motion for a mistrial. Finding no error, the Mississippi Supreme Court affirmed. View "McCollum v. Mississippi" on Justia Law

Joshua Dukes was convicted of capital murder and was sentenced to life without parole in the custody of the Mississippi Department of Corrections. Dukes appealed, contending: (1) the trial court erred when it allowed the State to rebut Dukes’s alibi witness with a rebuttal witness who had not been disclosed as required by Mississippi Rule of Criminal Procedure 17.4; (2) his trial was rendered unfair when the State violated the trial court’s order in limine pertaining to his other crimes; and (3) hearsay rendered his trial unfair and denied him due process of law. Finding no reversible error, the Mississippi Supreme Court affirmed Dukes’ conviction. View "Dukes v. Mississippi" on Justia Law

Defendant Alex Herrgott, was driving a four-seat Polaris all-terrain vehicle at night down a gravel road when he “overcorrected” trying to avoid a pothole. The ATV overturned, and Joseph MacNabb, a passenger, was severely injured. Since MacNabb was a state employee in the course and scope of his employment, he received workers’ compensation benefits from the Mississippi State Agencies Self-Insured Workers’ Compensation Trust. The Trust later initiated this litigation in an attempt to recover more than $300,000 in benefits paid for MacNabb’s injury. The circuit court ultimately granted summary judgment to Herrgott because the Trust’s Mississippi Rule of Civil Procedure 30(b)(6) representative could not articulate a legal theory entitling it to recover. The Mississippi Supreme Court found there was sufficient evidence of Herrgott’s negligence for the case to go to trial, and the deposition testimony of a lay witness should not have bound the Trust as to which legal theories it could pursue. The Supreme Court therefore reversed the summary judgment and remanded the case for trial. View "Mississippi State Agencies Self-Insured Workers' Compensation Trust v. Herrgott" on Justia Law

The General Council of the Assemblies of God (General Council) governed the Assemblies of God denomination. Its affiliate, the Mississippi District Council for Assemblies of God (District), governed the denomination’s local churches in Mississippi, including Gulf Coast Worship Center (GCWC) in Long Beach. In January 2017, Kevin Beachy, the pastor of GCWC, did not renew his credentials as an ordained pastor with the General Council, ultimately informing the District that he and GCWC intended to disaffiliate from the General Council. The District then informed Beachy that GCWC was being placed under District supervision. On March 19, 2017, the GCWC congregation voted to disaffiliate from the General Council. The congregation voted also to remove a reverter clause from its constitution and bylaws; this clause would have caused the GCWC’s property to revert to the District in the event that GCWC ceased operating as a “church body.” In November 2017, the District filed a chancery court petition for declaratory judgment and injunctive relief against Beachy and the GCWC board of trustees, Eddie Kinsey, Andre Mulet, and Kris Williams (collectively, Defendants). Both the District and Defendants moved for summary judgment. The trial court granted the District’s motion for summary judgment and denied Defendants’ motion. Defendants appealed. After review, the Mississippi Supreme Court determined that issues concerning disaffiliation, i.e., actions taken at the congregational meeting on March 19, 2017, and whether GCWC was under the District’s supervision, were church-governing matters. Thus, the ecclesiastical abstention doctrine deprived the chancellor of jurisdiction to address those claims. But the Supreme Court found genuine issues of material fact remained regarding ownership of property. Therefore, the Court reversed the chancellor’s grant of summary judgment to the District and remanded all issues concerning ownership of property for further proceedings. View "Beachy, et al. v. Mississippi District Council for Assemblies of God" on Justia Law

The Mississippi Department of Transportation hired Joe McGee Construction Company, Inc., for a road construction and bridge replacement project. The Department designed the temporary traffic control plan for the project, which provided for the placement of temporary traffic signs. McGee Construction then subcontracted with Riverside Traffic Systems, Inc. for the placement of the signs leading up to and around the site. Hattie Brown drove down the closed portion of Highway 245 and collided with a stationary crane, resulting in her death. Responding Mississippi Highway Patrol Trooper Jonathan Ragan’s report stated Brown’s vehicle “collided with the barricade on the southbound lane and traveled approximately 200 yards colliding head on with a crane parked on a bridge.” His report also noted that “[t]here was adequate warning signage of the road being closed with barricades across both lanes” and that “[t]he southbound side barricade was destroyed.” Dianne Brown-Bowens, Hattie Brown’s daughter, filed a wrongful death suit against McGee Construction, and later amended the complaint to include the Department and Riverside as defendants, asserting claims of negligence and strict liability, and sought to recover punitive damages. McGee Construction moved for summary judgment, asserting it “provided legally sufficient notice to motorists, including [Hattie] Brown, that the section of Highway 245 South where the accident occurred was closed and that McGee Construction therefore, breached no duty owed to [Hattie] Brown” and that it was not negligent because none of its actions proximately caused the accident. The trial court entered an order granting Riverside’s motion for summary judgment and granting in part and denying in part the Department’s and McGee Construction’s motions for summary judgment, ruling that the Department’s and McGee Construction’s summary judgment motions were denied as to Brown-Bowens’s negligence claim but granted as to her claims for strict liability and for punitive damages. On appeal to the Mississippi Supreme Court, defendants argued the trial court erred by denying their motions for summary judgment because Brown-Bowens failed to present evidence that either party, by act or omission, contributed to the death of Hattie Brown. The Court agreed with this and reversed the trial court. View "Joe McGee Construction Company, Inc. v. Brown-Bowens" on Justia Law

Le Papillon Homeowner’s Association Inc. sought to collect homeowners’ association fees from Loblolly Properties LLC for the nine lots it owned in the Le Papillon development. Loblolly argued that it did not have to pay HOA fees because a nonjudicial foreclosure sale extinguished all restrictive covenants on the subject lots. The trial court disagreed, finding that the covenants were on record when Loblolly purchased the subject lots in the Le Papillon property. The trial court also held that Loblolly’s Special Warranty Deed’s language clearly stated that the “conveyance and the warranty hereof is subject to any and all Covenants and Restrictions of record.” The trial court later granted summary judgment for Le Papillon. Loblolly appealed, raising two issues: (1) whether the foreclosure sale made the covenants and restrictions not binding, despite the language of the Special Warranty Deed; and (2) whether the foreclosure extinguished the covenants and restrictions. The Court of Appeals affirmed the judgment of the trial court, holding that Loblolly was bound to the covenants through the language in the Special Warranty Deed and that the foreclosure did not extinguish the covenants and restrictions. Upon a review of the record and law in this state, the Mississippi Supreme Court affirmed the trial and appellate courts. View "Loblolly Properties LLC v. Le Papillon Homeowner's Association Inc." on Justia Law

Plaintiffs Jackie and Debra Aycock sued the University of Mississippi Medical Center for medical negligence, alleging injuries Jackie suffered occurred as a result of the hospital’s negligence. The medical center sought summary judgment seeking dismissal of the negligence action based on the Aycocks’ failure to serve its chief executive officer with their notice of claim as required by Mississippi Code Section 11-46-11(2)(a)(ii) (Rev. 2019). The hospital argued that the Aycocks’ failure to serve proper notice resulted in the running of the one-year statute of limitations under Mississippi Code Section 11-46-11(3)(a) (Rev. 2019). The circuit court denied summary judgment, finding that genuine issues of material fact existed. The hospital appealed. but the Mississippi Supreme Court affirmed the trial court's denial of UMMC's motion for summary judgment. View "University of Mississippi Medical Center v. Aycock" on Justia Law

Larry Stuart was convicted of felony filming a person without her knowledge when she had an expectation of privacy. He was sentenced to serve five years, day for day, in the custody of the Mississippi Department of Corrections, and he was ordered to register as a sex offender. He appealed. Finding no reversible error, the Mississippi Supreme Court affirmed Stuart's conviction. View "Stuart v. Mississippi" on Justia Law

Aggrieved by a chancellor’s decision, Pamela Brownlee (Pam) appeals to the Mississippi Supreme Court, averring that the chancellor erred by failing to extend in loco parentis visitation rights to her as a former live-in romantic partner. Jessica Powell had two children, A.M.P. and E.R.L., born to different fathers. A.M.P.’s father maintained no relationship with the child; E.R.L.’s father was an active parent in his child’s life. Pam and Jessica began their romantic relationship in early 2014, just before E.R.L.’s birth, and the couple lived together throughout their relationship until their breakup in 2019. Even though Pam and Jessica cohabited from 2014 to 2019, they did not marry. On December 19, 2019, approximately two months after the couple’s breakup in October 2019, Pam filed her Petition to Establish Custody and Visitation, in which Pam initially sought custody of E.R.L. and visitation with A.M.P. At the initial hearing in October 2020, Pam withdrew her request for custody of E.R.L., revising her request to seek only visitation with Jessica’s children under the doctrine of in loco parentis. Although the chancellor did not find any legal basis for Pam’s request, given her status as an unmarried non-parent and former live-in partner to the children’s natural mother. The Mississippi Supreme Court reversed: “we also recognize special circumstances exist…in which justice so requires and the child’s well-being demands a relationship with a person who has stood in loco parentis in his or her life. The floodgates are not open for any third party visitation if the circumstances do not rise to this level, but Pam deserves an opportunity, at least, to provide proof of whether she meets this ‘very limited, unique situation.’” View "Brownlee v. Powell, et al." on Justia Law