Justia Mississippi Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

In 2006, David and Jill Landrum, along with Michael and Marna Sharpe, purchased land in Madison County to develop a mixed-use project called the Town of Livingston. The project stalled due to the 2008 financial crisis and legal issues. In 2010, Jill and Marna formed Livingston Holdings, LLC, which owned the development properties. Marna contributed more financially than Jill, leading to a disparity in ownership interests. In 2014, Marna sold her interest to B&S Mississippi Holdings, LLC, managed by Michael Bollenbacher. Jill stopped making her required monthly contributions in December 2018.The Madison County Chancery Court disqualified Jill as a derivative plaintiff, realigned Livingston Holdings as a defendant, and dismissed several claims. The court found that Jill did not fairly and adequately represent the interests of the company due to personal interests and economic antagonisms. The court also granted summary judgment in favor of several defendants and denied the Landrums' remaining claims after a bench trial.The Supreme Court of Mississippi reviewed the case and affirmed the lower court's decision to disqualify Jill as a derivative plaintiff and exclude the Landrums' expert witness. The court found that Jill's personal interests and actions, such as failing to make required contributions and attempting to gain control of the company, justified her disqualification. The court also affirmed the dismissal of claims for negligent omission, misstatement of material facts, civil conspiracy, fraud, and fraudulent concealment due to the Landrums' failure to cite legal authority.However, the Supreme Court reversed and remanded the case on the issues of remedies and attorneys' fees under the Second Memorandum of Understanding (MOU) and the alleged breach of fiduciary duty between B&S and Jill. The court found that the chancellor erred in interpreting the Second MOU as providing an exclusive remedy and remanded for further proceedings to determine if Livingston is entitled to additional remedies and attorneys' fees. The court also remanded for factual findings on whether B&S breached its fiduciary duty to Jill regarding property distribution and tax loss allocation. View "Landrum v. Livingston Holdings, LLC" on Justia Law

Jessica Walker was convicted by a jury of knowingly possessing methamphetamine with a firearm enhancement in the Newton County Circuit Court. The incident occurred on October 21, 2020, when Walker and her then-boyfriend, Richard Buckley, approached a safety checkpoint. Buckley, who initially drove Walker's vehicle, switched seats with her because he lacked a driver's license. During the stop, Deputy Donna Chapman smelled unburned marijuana and found a handgun and a small amount of marijuana in the vehicle. A subsequent search revealed 0.245 grams of methamphetamine between the driver’s seat and the center console. Walker was arrested, while Buckley was released and not investigated further.Walker was indicted on one count of possession of methamphetamine with a firearm enhancement. She pled not guilty, asserting that the methamphetamine belonged to Buckley and that she was unaware of its presence. During the trial, Walker sought to introduce evidence of Buckley’s prior drug-related offenses, but the circuit judge ruled this evidence inadmissible under Mississippi Rule of Evidence 404(b). The jury found Walker guilty, and she was sentenced to six years’ imprisonment, with three years suspended. Her motion for a new trial was denied, leading to her appeal.The Supreme Court of Mississippi reviewed the case and found that the State failed to present sufficient evidence connecting Walker to the methamphetamine. The court noted that while Walker owned the vehicle and was in proximity to the drugs, there were no additional incriminating circumstances to establish constructive possession. The court held that the evidence was insufficient to support Walker’s conviction and reversed and rendered the judgment. View "Walker v. State of Mississippi" on Justia Law

On September 7, 2019, Kemond Jones shot Ethan Powell eight times with a 9 mm handgun in the Beechwood Estates neighborhood in Warren County. Powell died from his injuries later that morning. Witness Danny Guice identified Jones as the shooter, and Jones turned himself in later that day. At trial, Guice testified about a prior disagreement between Jones and Powell, and forensic evidence confirmed the cause of death. Jones claimed self-defense, stating Powell slapped him and reached for a gun before he shot him.The Warren County Circuit Court convicted Jones of murder and sentenced him to forty years, with ten years suspended. Jones's motion for a judgment notwithstanding the verdict or a new trial was denied. He appealed, arguing that the trial court erred by allowing improper evidence and that the verdict was against the overwhelming weight of the evidence.The Supreme Court of Mississippi reviewed the case and affirmed the lower court's decision. The court held that the prosecutor's statement during the opening was not evidence and did not prejudice the jury. Additionally, the court found that the jury's verdict was supported by sufficient evidence, including eyewitness testimony from Guice. The court also determined that the Weathersby rule, which requires the acceptance of the defendant's version of events if they are the only eyewitnesses, did not apply because there was conflicting eyewitness testimony from the prosecution. The court concluded that the trial court did not commit reversible error and upheld the conviction and sentence. View "Jones v. State of Mississippi" on Justia Law

Joel Phillip McNinch, Jr., a dementia patient with other serious health issues, was admitted to Brandon Nursing and Rehabilitation Center, LLC in June 2019. He was later admitted to Merit Health Rankin due to combative behaviors related to his dementia. He developed a decubitus ulcer and was admitted to St. Dominic Hospital, where he died the next day. His widow, Cheryl McNinch, requested her husband's medical records from Brandon Nursing and Merit Health soon after his death and received them in mid-December 2019. She filed a complaint in January 2022, alleging negligence, medical malpractice, gross negligence, and reckless disregard, claiming that substandard care had accelerated her husband's health deterioration and led to his death.The defendants moved to dismiss the case, arguing that the action was barred by the two-year statute of limitations. Mrs. McNinch argued that the discovery rule operated to toll the statute of limitations until she received the medical records. The trial court converted the defendant’s motion to dismiss into a motion for summary judgment and granted the motion without holding a hearing.The Supreme Court of Mississippi reversed the trial court's decision, finding that the trial court erred by granting summary judgment to the defendants. The Supreme Court held that there were genuine issues of material fact regarding whether Mrs. McNinch had knowledge of negligent conduct through personal observation or other means prior to or at the time of Mr. McNinch’s death. The court found that the discovery rule could operate to toll the statute of limitations when the medical records are necessary to discover the negligence. The court concluded that Mrs. McNinch exercised reasonable diligence in requesting the medical records promptly, and therefore, the complaint was filed within the statute of limitations. The case was remanded to the circuit court for further proceedings. View "McNINCH v. BRANDON NURSING & REHABILITATION CENTER" on Justia Law

The case revolves around a dispute between American Compensation Insurance Company (ACIC) and Hector Ruiz, who operates Los Primoz Construction. Ruiz's employee, Raul Aparacio, suffered severe injuries after falling more than fifteen feet at a worksite. ACIC, which provided workers' compensation insurance for Ruiz's company, began paying benefits to Aparacio. However, when the payouts exceeded a quarter of a million dollars, ACIC sought to retroactively void the policy, alleging that Ruiz had materially misrepresented in his application that his company did not perform work more than fifteen feet above ground.The insurer filed for a declaratory judgment in federal court, but the federal district judge dismissed the insurer's lawsuit, concluding that Mississippi’s workers' compensation law does not permit an insurer to rescind a workers' compensation policy. The insurer appealed to the Fifth Circuit, which certified the question to the Supreme Court of Mississippi.The Supreme Court of Mississippi held that the Mississippi Workers’ Compensation Act (MWCA) does not allow insurers to void a workers' compensation policy based on an employer's material misrepresentation. The court reasoned that the MWCA makes no provision for an insurer to void a workers' compensation policy based on a material misrepresentation and exists to ensure injured workers are compensated. The court concluded that allowing rescission would go against the purpose of the MWCA. View "American Compensation Insurance Company v. Ruiz" on Justia Law

This case involves a dispute over a tax sale of a property in Jackson County, Mississippi. The property was owned by Deborah Hallford, who failed to pay property taxes in 2014, leading to the property being sold at a tax sale in 2015. Pierre Thoden, a resident of New York, purchased the property at the sale. Hallford failed to redeem the property within the redemption period, and Thoden later received title after he paid the delinquent taxes for 2015-18. After learning of the tax sale, Hallford filed a complaint to set aside the tax sale, claiming that due to a lack of proper notice, the sale was void. The chancery court found in Hallford’s favor and voided the tax sale based on insufficient notice.Thoden appealed the chancery court's decision, arguing that he was entitled to a statutory lien and reimbursement for appliances, costs, and expenses on the property. The Supreme Court of Mississippi affirmed the chancery court’s finding that the tax sale was void but held that Thoden was entitled to a hearing to present proof of his damages. The case was remanded for a hearing to determine the amount Thoden was owed as damages.On remand, the chancery court found that Thoden was unjustly enriched by the rent he collected from tenants and that he could not keep money he collected on property where he was in the nature of a trespasser. The court also found that Thoden was entitled to the amount he paid in taxes, plus interest. However, the court denied Thoden’s claim to reimbursement for his repairs on, improvements to, and maintenance of the property. Thoden appealed these findings.The Supreme Court of Mississippi affirmed in part and reversed and rendered in part. The court held that Thoden was entitled to a refund of his purchase price and interest on that price, and that he was not entitled to reimbursement of the cost of repairs, improvements, and maintenance. The court also held that Hallford was entitled to a $4,500 set-off. However, the court reversed the chancery court's determination that Thoden was not entitled to the taxes he paid on the property for 2015-18, and awarded Thoden $2,231.06. View "Thoden v. Hallford" on Justia Law

The case revolves around Katherine Harris, who was convicted for aggravated DUI. While driving with a blood-alcohol concentration (BAC) twice the legal limit, Harris crashed into a deputy sheriff and his patrol vehicle, causing severe injuries to the deputy. Before trial, Harris requested public funds to hire her own experts, a toxicologist and an accident reconstructionist, to counter the State’s evidence. However, her blood sample, which she had not requested to be preserved, had been destroyed according to routine procedure nine months after testing. The judge denied her requests for expert funding, finding them broad and theoretical, and Harris failed to articulate concrete reasons how these proposed independent experts would specifically assist her defense.In Mississippi, the discretion to grant or deny an indigent defendant funds to retain an independent expert lies with the trial court. The court found that Harris failed to articulate how her own experts would actually assist her defense. Furthermore, the State’s case did not rely exclusively on these two experts and her BAC. The State called additional witnesses who established the patrol car was clearly visible with its blue lights flashing, and multiple other vehicles successfully passed the patrol car before Harris slammed into it. Witnesses also testified Harris smelled like alcohol, failed a field sobriety test, admitted she had been drinking, and tested positive for alcohol on a portable breathalyzer at the scene.The Supreme Court of Mississippi affirmed Harris’s conviction and sentence, discerning no abuse of discretion in the judge’s denial of Harris’s request for expert funds. Based on the overwhelming evidence supporting Harris’s aggravated DUI conviction, the judge’s discretionary denial, even if erroneous, was not so prejudicial as to render her trial fundamentally unfair. View "Harris v. State of Mississippi" on Justia Law

The case involves Katherine Cassell (Kathy) and William Cassell (Bill), who were married in 1991 and separated in 2021. Prior to their marriage, Bill and his siblings inherited land in Mississippi from their mother and formed Waterloo Farms, Inc. (Waterloo), which held title to the inherited land. Waterloo also owned two tracts of land in Claiborne County. During their marriage, Bill began farming as Valley of the Moon Farms, LLC (VOM), which was owned 50% by Bill and 50% by Moon Planting Company, Inc. (MPC). MPC was formed by Bill’s father, who transferred 99% of MPC’s ownership to Kathy and 1% to Bill. Kathy and Bill maintained two bank accounts—one personal joint account and one account for VOM. Revenue from VOM was deposited into the VOM account and from there, money would be transferred into Kathy and Bill’s joint personal account for monthly expenses.The couple separated in 2021, and Kathy filed for divorce on the grounds of uncondoned adultery and, alternatively, habitual cruel and inhuman treatment and irreconcilable differences. Kathy sought an equitable division of the marital estate, permanent periodic alimony, lump sum alimony and for Bill to maintain her medical and dental insurance and his own life insurance for which she was the sole beneficiary. Kathy also requested reasonable attorneys’ fees. The chancery court entered a final judgment of divorce and his findings of fact and conclusions of law. The chancellor granted the divorce on the ground of uncondoned adultery. Among other assets, the chancellor classified Tract Two and the Turley Property as Bill’s separate property, and classified the Thompson Property and the VOM account as marital property. In total, Bill’s separate property was valued at $5,341,640.14. After classifying and equitably dividing the various marital assets applying the Ferguson factors, the chancellor considered Kathy’s alimony request weighing the Armstrong factors and awarded her permanent periodic alimony in the amount of $7,500 per month. In total, Kathy was awarded permanent periodic alimony and 40 percent of the marital estate, and the court ordered Bill to maintain life insurance for which Kathy was the sole beneficiary in the amount of $500,000 and to maintain Kathy’s health insurance until she turned sixty-five or was able to obtain Medicare. Kathy’s portion of the marital estate amounted to a lump sum payment of $667,557, whereas Bill’s portion of the marital estate was valued by the chancellor at $1,861,629.53. From this final judgment and findings of fact and conclusions of law, Kathy appeals.The Supreme Court of Mississippi affirmed the chancery court's decision. The court held that the burden of proof to rebut the presumption of marital property is by a preponderance of the evidence. Furthermore, the party claiming property excluded from marital property has been commingled and transformed into marital property bears the burden of proof, likewise by a preponderance of the evidence. Finally, the court overruled Cheatham insofar as it has any bearing on a chancellor’s decision to award alimony and reaffirmed the factors enumerated in Ferguson—awarding alimony during the division of the estate—and Armstrong—awarding alimony subsequent to the division of the estate—as the appropriate factors to be considered. View "Cassell v. Cassell" on Justia Law

Felissa Jones, the mother of an elementary school student, reported to the Mississippi Department of Child Protection Services (MDCPS) that her son had suffered abuse and neglect by staff at his school. MDCPS responded that it does not investigate reports of abuse at school. Jones then sued MDCPS, seeking declaratory and injunctive relief related to MDCPS’s policy that the agency does not investigate allegations of abuse in out-of-home settings such as schools.The Hinds County Chancery Court denied Jones's motion for a judgment in her favor on the pleadings and granted MDCPS's motion for a judgment on the pleadings, dismissing Jones's complaint. The court ruled that Jones's request for declaratory relief related to MDCPS’s former intake policy was moot because the policy was no longer in effect. It also ruled that the current intake policy does not violate the relevant statutes, but instead conforms to the statutory mandate to refer allegations of child abuse in out-of-home settings to local law enforcement.In the Supreme Court of Mississippi, Jones appealed the lower court's decisions. The court affirmed the lower court's rulings, stating that MDCPS does not have a duty to investigate reports of abuse in out-of-home settings, such as schools, because children who are mistreated by school staff do not fall under the youth court’s limited jurisdiction. The court also found that Jones's claim for declaratory relief from the amended policy had no merit because the policy tracks the relevant statutes. View "Jones v. Department of Child Protection Services" on Justia Law

The case revolves around Christopher Smith, who was convicted of first-degree murder for the death of Nakisa Benson. Smith was initially deemed incompetent to stand trial but was later found competent. During the jury selection process, Smith's counsel exercised ten peremptory strikes on potential jurors, nine of whom were white. The State raised a reverse-Batson challenge, arguing that the strikes were racially motivated. The circuit judge conducted a Batson hearing and disallowed several of Smith's strikes, finding that the reasons provided were not race-neutral.Smith appealed his conviction to the Court of Appeals, arguing that the trial court erred by admitting certain autopsy photographs and by overruling five of his peremptory strikes. The Court of Appeals found no error and affirmed the conviction. Smith then filed a petition for writ of certiorari, contending that the Court of Appeals erred in its Batson analysis with respect to two jurors. He requested that the case be remanded for a proper Batson hearing.The Supreme Court of Mississippi reviewed the case and the Batson challenge. The Court gave great deference to the trial court's findings, stating that it would not overrule a trial court on a Batson ruling unless the record indicated that the ruling was clearly erroneous or against the overwhelming weight of the evidence. The Court found that Smith's counsel had shown a clear pattern of striking jurors because of their race, which was evident from his choice of words during the trial court’s Batson hearing. The Court affirmed the judgments of the Court of Appeals and of the Copiah County Circuit Court, denying Smith's request for a Batson hearing on the two jurors. View "Smith v. State" on Justia Law