The Mississippi Supreme Court remanded this case for further proceedings to determine child custody. On remand, the chancery court awarded custody of the children to the father. Aggrieved, the mother appealed, arguing that the instructions given by the Mississippi Supreme Court were simply to review the determination of the mother's fitness without the hearsay evidence, not to conduct a new trial on custody. Finding that the chancellor was not manifestly wrong or clearly erroneous in granting custody of the three minor children to the father, the Supreme Court affirmed. View "Ballard v. Ballard" on Justia Law

Jeremy Fogelman was convicted by jury of felony failure to stop his motor vehicle for police. Because Fogleman fled at a high rate of speed, showing an indifference to the consequences and to causing injury, the trial judge designated Fogleman’s offense a crime of violence under Mississippi Code Section 97-3-2(2) (Rev. 2014). This finding resulted in Fogleman’s parole-ineligibility period increasing from one-fourth to one-half of his five-year sentence—a sentence allowed by statute and authorized by the jury’s verdict. The appellate court held that the resulting parole-ineligibility increase violated the Sixth Amendment because it was based on facts found by a judge, not a jury. The United States Supreme Court has held that the Sixth Amendment required factual determinations that increase maximum or minimum sentences be submitted to a jury and found beyond a reasonable doubt. The Mississippi Supreme Court found the judge’s crime-of-violence designation merely impacted the minimum time Fogleman had to serve before becoming parole eligible. It did nothing to affect Fogleman’s sentence. Thus, no Sixth Amendment violation occurred. The Mississippi Supreme Court reversed the Court of Appeals and reinstated the trial court's judgment. View "Fogleman v. Mississippi" on Justia Law

Defendants in this case were, inter alia, former officers, directors, employees, and investors of KiOR Inc., a startup biofuels company. The State of Mississippi lent KiOR $75 million to construct its first commercial-scale production facility in Columbus, Mississippi. The facility was completed in 2012. Operations were suspended in early 2014, however, and KiOR filed for bankruptcy later that year. In January 2015, the State sued Defendants, alleging fraudulent and negligent misrepresentation, fraudulent and negligent omission, civil conspiracy, aiding and abetting, and respondeat superior. The case was assigned randomly to Judge Gowan. In late 2017, three weeks after briefing had ended on the last motion to dismiss, Judge Gowan sua sponte reassigned the case to Judge Green. In response to the order, Defendants petitioned the Mississippi Supreme Court for a writ of mandamus, which was treated as a petition for interlocutory appeal. The Supreme Court granted review and a stay of the trial court proceedings and deconsolidated three cases, with a separate decision handed down for each. The “Cannon” defendants argued Judge Gowan did not have the authority to transfer or reassign Cannon to Judge Green. The Supreme Court found no abuse of discretion and affirmed the transfer from Judge Gowan to Judge Green. View "Khosla v. Mississippi ex rel. Hood" on Justia Law

Derrick Nelson was convicted by jury of murder. The Court of Appeals held that the trial court erred by refusing an imperfect self-defense jury instruction; it reversed Nelson’s conviction and remanded for a new trial. The State filed a petition for a writ of certiorari, which the Mississippi Supreme Court granted. Because no evidentiary basis in the record supported the grant of an imperfect self-defense jury instruction, the Supreme Court reversed the judgment of the Court of Appeals. While the Court of Appeals did not reach Nelson’s argument that the State deprived him of a fair trial, the Supreme Court found no reversible error, thus affirming Nelson’s murder conviction and sentence of life imprisonment. View "Nelson v. Mississippi" on Justia Law

This case arose from Hurricane Katrina insurance litigation. After the hurricane had destroyed many homes, policyholders and insurance companies began litigating whether the hurricane losses were caused by flood damage or wind damage. The distinction determined whether the insurance companies would pay claims on those polices that did not cover flood damage. This case is before the Court on interlocutory appeal. Safeco Insurance Company (Safeco) and Liberty Mutual Insurance Company individually challenged the circuit court’s reassignment of their respective cases and the appointment of a special master. The Mississippi Supreme Court found no abuse of discretion in reassigning judges, but vacated the order appointing the special master, finding an abuse of the trial court’s discretion. “The order itself acknowledged a blind-billing provision was “unusual.” But the Supreme Court found it was more than that: requiring both parties, one of which is the State of Mississippi, to pay an attorney in Louisiana to act as a judge, allowing either side to meet with him ex parte, and not requiring this special master to mention these meetings or even justify or detail his bill far exceeded the discretionary authority to appoint special masters.” View "Safeco Insurance Company of America v. Mississippi, ex rel. Hood" on Justia Law

D.C., a minor foster child, alleged that Jason Case, his foster parent, sexually abused him. The Mississippi Department of Human Services ("DHS") removed D.C. from Case’s home and a subsequent investigation substantiated the alleged abuse. DHS did not contest that Case abused D.C. In his complaint, D.C. alleged negligence and gross negligence on behalf of DHS and the Department's executive director, Richard Berry, in the licensing of the foster home and the lack of care and treatment to D.C., both during his placement and after DHS removed D.C. from the foster home. After a period of discovery, DHS filed a motion for summary judgment. It maintained that it was entitled to immunity under Mississippi Code Section 43-15-125 (Rev. 2015) and Mississippi Code Section 11-46-9(1)(d) (Rev. 2012). Without any noted reference to Section 43-15-125, the circuit court denied DHS’s motion for summary judgement. DHS filed a petition for interlocutory appeal, which a panel of the Mississippi Supreme Court granted. After review of the record, the Supreme Court affirmed in part and reversed in part the circuit court’s denial of summary judgment: the circuit court erred in denying DHS summary judgment for D.C.’s claims that stemmed from DHS’s licensing of the foster home, given the immunity DHS and its officers have under Section 43- 15-125. The circuit court, though, did not err in denying DHS summary judgment under Section 11-46-9(d)(1) of the Mississippi Tort Claims Act, because DHS did not meet its burden to show that no genuine issue as to any material fact existed. View "Mississippi Department of Human Services v. D.C." on Justia Law

Mississippi Sand Solutions (MSS) and its predecessors hauled gravel and sand off its property via a private road on property belonging to the Fisher heirs. At some point, any agreement between the parties ended, and MSS sued in chancery court, asking the chancery court to find that it had an easement over the Fisher property. The chancery court ruled that MSS did not have an easement, and MSS appealed that decision. The Mississippi Supreme Court unanimously affirmed the chancery court’s ruling that MSS did not have an easement over the Fisher heirs’ property. Settlement negotiations between the parties broke down, and the Fisher heirs demanded that MSS cease and desist traversing their property. The Fisher heirs placed “no trespassing” signs on their property and put up a gate. MSS ignored the signs and tore down the gate. The Fisher heirs reported that MSS was damaging their property by dumping trash and gravel on the property and in waterways on the property. Additionally, the Fisher heirs were cited by the Mississippi Department of Environmental Quality for the dumping and burning of household waste on the Fisher property and were required to clean the site. The Fisher heirs then sued MSS in chancery court alleging trespass, and asked for an Emergency Motion for Temporary Restraining Order and/or Preliminary Injunction. After the hearing on the emergency motion, the chancery court issued a decree on the merits of the trespass complaint in favor of the Fisher heirs and awarded the Fisher heirs damages and attorneys’ fees. However, because MSS did not receive notice the case was being tried or heard on the merits, the Mississippi Supreme Court reversed the chancery court decree on the merits and remanded for further proceedings. View "Mississippi Sand Solutions, LLC v. Otis" on Justia Law

Chevelle McAlister was convicted by jury of the murder of Johnna Norris and of possession of a firearm as a convicted felon. McAlister appealed his conviction, arguing that his counsel provided constitutionally ineffective assistance. The Mississippi Supreme Court determined the trial court record did not support a finding of ineffective assistance of counsel. Also, the Court found no indication from the record or the briefs that an evidentiary hearing would enable McAlister to further develop any evidentiary proof of the alleged errors. Thus, McAlister's conviction was affirmed. View "McAlister v. Mississippi" on Justia Law

Bruce Martin was found guilty of second-degree murder for the death of James Brown and was sentenced to serve forty years in the custody of the Mississippi Department of Corrections. Martin argued on appeal the trial court abused its discretion in allowing two autopsy photographs to be published to the jury. Finding no error, the Mississippi Supreme Court affirmed Martin’s conviction and sentence. View "Martin v. Mississippi" on Justia Law

Loren Ross was convicted of felony driving under the influence (DUI), fourth offense. The Circuit Court imposed the maximum sentence of ten years in the custody of the Mississippi Department of Corrections (MDOC). Ross appealed, arguing that the trial court erred by not polling the jury to assure that the jurors had been unanimous in specifying the particular subsection of the DUI statute Ross had violated. He also argued the trial court erred by sentencing him to the maximum statutory penalty instead of ordering rehabilitative treatment for his alcoholism. Finding no error, the Mississippi Supreme Court affirmed Ross’ conviction and sentence. View "Ross v. Mississippi" on Justia Law