Following a disciplinary proceeding, Meloney Harbour’s minor son, T.D.H., was suspended from school and placed in an alternative school. The chancery court initially reversed and rendered the decision of the Tupelo Public School District Board of Trustees after finding that the deprivation of an attorney at the initial disciplinary hearing, as well as the failure to state the applicable standard of proof, violated T.D.H.’s due process rights. After a Mississippi Rule of Civil Procedure 59(a) motion, the chancery court amended its judgment to remand the case instead of rendering it. Harbour then filed a Mississippi Rule of Civil Procedure 60(b) motion and, for the first time, challenged the constitutionality of Mississippi Code Section 37-9-71. Harbour contended the statute contained an unconstitutional standard of proof: substantial evidence rather than clear and convincing evidence. Harbour did not notice the attorney general of the constitutional challenge to the statute. Finding that Harbour failed to meet her burden under Rule 60(b), the chancery court denied the motion. Harbour then appealed that ruling. Finding no reversible error, the Mississippi Supreme Court affirmed the chancery court’s denial of the Rule 60(b) motion. View "Harbour v. Tupelo Public School District" on Justia Law

Louisiana Hospice Corporation, otherwise known as LHC, sought to acquire Gulf Coast Hospice LLC in D’Iberville, Mississippi. LHC and Gulf Coast Hospice executed a letter of intent outlining the basic terms of the proposed acquisition. Ultimately, the parties failed to consummate the transaction. Gulf Coast Hospice LLC and its members, Jyoti Desai, Krupa Desai, and Iqbal Savani sued LHC Group Inc., LHCG XXVI LLC, and Mississippi Health Care Group LLC, raising several theories of liability stemming from the failed acquisition. The trial court granted LHC’s motion for summary judgment and dismissed Gulf Coast Hospice’s claims. Gulf Coast Hospice appealed, arguing that genuine issues of material fact should have prevented summary judgment. Gulf Coast Hospice’s chief argument was that LHC entered into an enforceable contract to acquire its hospice operations. Alternatively, Gulf Coast Hospice argued that if no enforceable contract to purchase existed, its claims for breach of contract and duty of good faith with respect to the letter of intent and tortious interference should have survived summary judgment. The Mississippi Supreme Court held there was no enforceable contract, that the doctrine of estoppel was inapplicable, and that no genuine issue of material fact existed regarding Gulf Coast Hospice’s misrepresentation claims. The Court also held no genuine issue of material fact existed regarding Gulf Coast Hospice’s alternative claims. As such, the Court affirmed View "Gulf Coast Hospice LLC v. LHC Group Inc." on Justia Law

At issue in this case before the Mississippi Supreme Court was a dispute between an automobile manufacturer and one of its dealerships. Specifically, the issue reduced to whether the dealer filed a timely complaint under Mississippi Code section 63-17-73(1)(d)(iii) after the dealer received the manufacturer’s notice it would terminate the applicable dealership agreement. The Court determined the statute was unambiguous, and its plain meaning provided a dealer may file its verified complaint within the sixty day notice period, i.e., the sixty days preceding the effective date of termination. Because the statute was unambiguous and conveyed a clear and definite meaning, the Court did not resort to the rules of statutory construction. The Court found the dealer’s complaint was timely filed within the sixty days immediately preceding the effective date of termination. View "Nissan North America, Inc. v. Great River Nissan, LLC d/b/a Great River Nissan" on Justia Law

A Mississippi circuit court denied Anthony Carr’s petition for post-conviction relief, finding that Carr did not prove he was intellectually disabled. Carr was convicted on four counts of capital murder and sentenced to death. He argued the Eighth Amendment to the federal constitution prohibited the execution of intellectually disabled persons. Finding no clear error in the circuit court’s judgment, the Mississippi Supreme Court affirmed. View "Carr v. Mississippi" on Justia Law

Previous opinions in this case were withdrawn. John and Cindy Henderson sued Copper Ridge Homes and First Bank regarding the construction of their new home in Magnolia, Mississippi. The case spiraled into foreclosure proceedings; the trial court granted First Bank’s motion for judicial foreclosure. On appeal, the Hendersons argued the trial court erred in granting First Bank a judicial foreclosure, by granting Copper Ridge’s and First Bank’s motions for summary judgment, and by denying their motions for leave to amend and add wrongful disclosure to their complaint. The Mississippi Supreme Court agreed the trial court erred in granting Copper Ridge’s and First Bank’s post-foreclosure motions for dismissal of the Hendersons’ claims. The Court affirmed the grant of judicial foreclosure, but reversed the grant of summary judgment to both parties, and remanded the case back to the trial court for a determination of the Hendersons’ claims. View "Henderson v. Copper Ridge Homes, LLC" on Justia Law

The Chancery Court set aside an interviews gift of about forty acres of land fronting Highway 6 near Oxford, Mississippi. Ninety-year-old grantor Mary Saunders Waller, hard of hearing and legally blind, allegedly granted the land to Waller’s daughter and son-in-law, Brenda and Craig Gordon. A conservator for Waller’s estate petitioned the probate court to set aside the deed to the Gordons. The chancellor found the Gordons were unable to rebut the presumption of undue influence. On appeal, the Gordons contended the Chancery Court erred in excluding certain testimony of Waller’s attorney and her physicians. The Mississippi Supreme Court found, however, the Gordons failed to make an offer of proof: since the Supreme Court would have no way of knowing what the physicians would have said had they testified, the Court could not conclude excluding their testimony was an error. The Court determined the Chancery Court did not abuse its discretion denying the Gordons’ motion for a new trial “based on arguments that could have, and should have, been raised at trial.” View "In The Matter of The Last Will & Testament of Mary Saunders Waller" on Justia Law

A grand jury indicted, and a jury convicted, Gerome Montreal Moore for the capital murder of Carolyn Temple during the commission of a robbery. He was sentenced to life without parole. On appeal, the Mississippi Supreme Court affirmed the conviction, but vacated the sentence. The Court determined Moore needed to be resentenced by a jury under Mississippi Code Section 99-19-101. "The jury will determine if Moore should be sentenced to life imprisonment without parole or life imprisonment with eligibility for parole. If the jury determines that Moore should be eligible for parole, Moore is to be sentenced to life imprisonment with eligibility for parole, notwithstanding the provisions of Mississippi Code Section 47-7-3(1)(e)." View "Moore v. Mississippi" on Justia Law

The Lamar County Mississippi School District denied a request by Smith Petroleum to erect and construct an LED advertising billboard on its Sixteenth Section leasehold located on Old Highway 11 in Hattiesburg. Smith Petroleum filed its Notice of Appeal and Bill of Exceptions with the Chancery Court of Lamar County. The chancellor affirmed the School District’s denial of Smith Petroleum’s request to erect and construct the LED billboard. Finding no error, the Mississippi Supreme Court affirmed the chancery court. View "Smith Petroleum, Inc. v. Lamar County School District" on Justia Law

Larry Knight was convicted of one count of molestation and was sentenced to serve fifteen years in the custody of the Mississippi Department of Corrections (MDOC). Knight appealed, and his attorneys filed a brief under Lindsey v. Mississippi, 939 So. 2d 743 (2005), stating they searched the record but were unable to find any arguable issues for appellate review. Knight was given the opportunity to file a pro se brief, asked for more time, but ultimately filed nothing. The Mississippi Supreme Court reviewed the record and found no error. Accordingly, it affirmed the trial court's judgment. View "Knight v. Mississippi" on Justia Law

Larry Seward worked for Illinois Central Railroad Company from 1961 to 2004. In 2005, Seward settled an asbestosis claim with Illinois Central. He subsequently developed and passed away from anaplastic oligodendroglioma, a type of brain cancer. In 2012, Andrew L. Ward sued Illinois Central on behalf of Seward. Ward alleged that Illinois Central breached its duty of care and failed to provide Seward with a safe place to work. The complaint detailed specific issues with the work environment, including Seward’s exposure to chemicals and hazardous conditions. The complaint alleged that the working environment “caused, in whole or in part,” Seward’s brain cancer. Illinois Central filed a motion for summary judgment based on a previous settlement and release that Seward had entered into with Illinois Central before his death. The trial court granted Illinois Central’s motion for summary judgment. Ward appealed the trial court’s grant of summary judgment. The Mississippi Supreme Court determined there were no remaining issues of material fact, therefore, affirmed the trial court's judgment. View "Ward v. Illinois Central Railroad Company" on Justia Law