Justia Mississippi Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

Expro Americas, LLC ("Expro") filed a complaint seeking, inter alia, a temporary restraining order and preliminary injunction against Eddie Walters, a former Expro employee, and H&H Welding, LLC. Expro offered "oil and gas well and pipeline services," including providing "specially designed flaring products and services to pipeline transmission companies and refineries along the Gulf Coast." Expro's six-inch, trailer-mounted flare stacks were at the heart of this dispute. Eddie Walters was an Expro employee until August 5, 2013. Thereafter, Walters was employed by Clean Combustion, a competitor of Expro's that was created in 2013 by former Expro employees. Expro filed its application for a restraining order against H&H and Walters, alleging that both defendants stole the design for its flare stack. Expro specifically alleged that "[t]he information used to design and create the trailer-mounted flaring system is a ‘trade secret' of Expro's." Furthermore, it alleged breach of contract against H&H, claiming that the terms of Expro's purchase orders with H&H contained a "Proprietary Rights" section "in which H&H ‘warrants to keep all design, information, blueprints and engineering data with respect to the Goods confidential and to not make use of but to assign to Expro each invention, improvement and discovery relating thereto (whether or not patentable) conceived or reduced to practice in the performance of the Purchase Order by any person employed by or working under the directions of the Supplier Group.'" The trial court granted the restraining order, but after conducting an evidentiary hearing, the chancellor dissolved the temporary restraining order and found no facts to justify the issuance of a preliminary injunction. The chancellor awarded the defendants attorneys' fees and expenses in excess of the $5,000 injunction bond that Expro had posted. After determining that Expro's suit against H&H was meritless, the chancellor sua sponte dismissed H&H from the suit with prejudice. Expro appealed, and the Supreme Court affirmed in part and reversed in part. The Court found that the chancellor did not err by awarding the defendants attorneys' fees and expenses, because Expro's application for a preliminary injunction was frivolous and was made in bad faith. However, the Court found the chancellor misapplied Mississippi Rules of Civil Procedure Rule 4, and therefore erred by dismissing H&H from the suit with prejudice. View "Expro Americas, LLC v. Walters" on Justia Law

Clayton Hinton invested substantial personal resources into a used-car business. Hinton sued his business partner, Nate Rolison, claiming that Rolison was keeping profits from that business that should have been divided equally. Hinton also sought an injunction against the financing company that was paying Rolison some of the disputed profits. Both Rolison and the financing company filed motions to dismiss. The trial court granted Rolison's motion based on res judicata and granted the finance company's motion finding Hinton had failed to state a viable claim. Finding that res judicata did not bar Hinton's claims against Rolison, and that Hinton failed to state a viable claim for injunctive relief against the financing company, the Supreme Court affirmed in part, reversed in part, and remanded. View "Hinton v. Rolison" on Justia Law

Limestone Products, Inc., jointly owned by Ronald (Ronnie) Lampkin and James Oldrum (J.O.) Smith, Jr., operated with a line of credit personally guaranteed by Lampkin and Smith. Limestone was in the business of selling rock, predominantly to Lampkin's company, Lampkin Construction. Following Smith's death and his estate's subsequent refusal to guarantee Limestone's line of credit, Lampkin formed Delta Stone, a new corporation which operated on the same property, made use of the same facilities, and sold rock to the same clients to whom Limestone had sold. Lampkin sought a declaratory judgment against the Smith estate's executors that he was violating no fiduciary duties in continuing to sell Limestone's inventory. The executors counterclaimed, seeking lost profits and attorneys' fees. The chancellor bifurcated the trial and determined, in the liability stage, that Lampkin had breached his fiduciary duty to Limestone by usurping a corporate opportunity. In the damages phase of the trial, the chancellor heard expert testimony, assigned an award of damages to the Smith estate, and denied the executors' request for attorneys' fees, expert witness fees, and punitive damages. The executors appealed, and the case was assigned to the Court of Appeals, which affirmed. Finding that the chancellor erred in his calculation of damages, the Supreme Court reversed and remanded. View "Lane v. Lampkin" on Justia Law

Plaintiffs Jourdan Rivers Estates, LLC (JRE) and Jourdan River Resort and Yacht Club (Yacht Club), filed suit for damages in December 2011 against Defendants Scott Favre, Cindy Favre, Jefferson Parker, and CB Partners, LLC d/b/a Cinque Bambini. CB Partners, LLC d/b/a Cinque Bambini was later dismissed from the action without prejudice. The complaint alleged multiple claims against Defendants, including slander of title; slander and/or defamation; trespass; nuisance; tortious interference with use of property; tortious interference with contractual relationships; harassment and intimidation of plaintiffs' agents and intentional infliction of emotional distress upon plaintiffs' agents; assault upon plaintiffs' agents; willful destruction of plaintiffs' property; negligence; gross, willful, and wanton negligence; malicious prosecution; unjust enrichment; false imprisonment; and any other applicable theory of law giving rise to a cause of action. Defendants moved to dismiss for failure to state a claim under Rule 12(b)(6) of the Mississippi Rules of Civil Procedure. The circuit court granted the motion in part and denied it in part. The circuit court dismissed all of Yacht Club's claims in relation to the claim(s) that Defendants made false representations to the Hancock County Board of Supervisors and/or Hancock County employees, finding that such allegations fell under the "Noerr-Pennington" doctrine, expressly adopted by the Mississippi Supreme Court. The circuit court dismissed JRE's claims of slander of title, slander and/or defamation; harassment; assault; and false imprisonment and intentional infliction of emotional distress because each claim constituted an intentional tort and was barred under the statute of limitations. The circuit court denied Defendants' motion to dismiss as to JRE's claims for trespass; nuisance; tortious interference with use of property; tortious interference with contractual relationships; willful destruction of property; negligence; gross, willful, and wanton negligence; malicious prosecution; and unjust enrichment. Plaintiffs thereafter petitioned for an interlocutory appeal. Because the Supreme Court found that Defendants' Rule 12(b)(6) motion should have been converted into a motion for summary judgment, as provided in Rule 56 of the Mississippi Rules of Civil Procedure, it reversed the circuit court's order granting the Rule 12(b)(6) motion and remanded for further proceedings. View "Jourdan River Estates, LLC v. Favre" on Justia Law

More than three years after learning his insurance policy had expired and his agent had not procured a replacement, Joe Tally sued his insurance agent, Ronald McMorris, claiming he “breached a standard of care recognized in the State of Mississippi to the insured for not notifying [him] of the cancellation of [his insurance] policy.” Because Tally failed to bring his claims within the three-year statute of limitations, his claims were time-barred. The Supreme Court therefore reversed the circuit court’s denial of McMorris’s motion for summary judgment and rendered judgment in his favor. View "McMorris v. Tally" on Justia Law

Charles William White (“Bill”) and his son Charles Thomas White (“Tommy”), were partners in a business that owned and operated convenience stores. In 2000, during the course of the partnership, Bill married Anita White. In 2005, Tommy bought his father’s share of the partnership for $42,600, but in dissolving the partnership, Bill and Tommy neglected to execute and file deeds transferring the partnership’s real property. In early 2009, Bill’s health declined rapidly, and Anita and Tommy began to clash over Bill’s healthcare. During this time, Tommy realized that he and his father had failed to execute deeds transferring the partnership’s real-property assets. Tommy used a durable power of attorney his father had given him years before to execute quit-claim deeds transferring the partnership property to himself. Bill and Anita continued to clash over who had authority to make healthcare decisions for Bill, so Tommy filed a petition for a conservatorship for his father’s benefit and sought appointment as his father’s conservator. Anita filed a counterclaim to challenge Tommy’s fitness to serve as his father’s conservator and sought to have Tommy return all assets he had transferred to himself using his father’s power of attorney. The chancellor agreed that a conservatorship was appropriate, but he appointed a third party as Bill’s conservator. Bill died in 2009, and at that time, the conservator filed a motion asking to be discharged from his duties and to be allowed to distribute the assets of the conservatorship to Bill’s estate. The parties agreed to an order discharging the conservator and to a distribution of funds held by the conservator to Bill’s estate. The chancellor’s order made no mention of Anita’s action to set aside the deed transfers. In 2010, Anita filed suit to set aside the quit-claim deeds and to redeem the real property Tommy had acquired using his father’s power of attorney. The parties filed cross-motions for summary judgment. The chancellor held that Anita’s action was barred by res judicata, granted Tommy’s motion, and denied Anita’s cross-motion. The Supreme Court found that the judgment dismissing the conservatorship was not a final judgment on the merits, and reversed. View "In the Matter of the Estate of Charles William White" on Justia Law

This appeal arose over a contract dispute between a yacht owner, an independent contractor hired to paint the yachts, and an unpaid paint supplier. The owner challenged a lien the unpaid paint supplier established and enforced on two multimilliondollar yachts under construction at the owner’s Gulfport shipyard. Upon review of the dispute, the Supreme Court affirmed the trial court’s grant of summary judgment in favor of the owner on a finding that privity did not exist between the owner and the unpaid paint supplier. View "In RE: Lien against M/Y Areti and M/Y Lady Linda: Trinity Yachts, LLC" on Justia Law

The Circuit Court granted summary judgment in favor of Columbia Casualty Company and Continental Casualty Company, finding there was no wrongdoing in denying coverage to four former insureds (Ex-Agents) and Minnesota Mutual Life Insurance Company. The trial court also denied the Ex-Agents’ and Minnesota Life’s motion to strike certain affidavits and exhibits submitted by Columbia in support of its motions for summary judgment and in defense of the Ex-Agents’ and Minnesota Life’s summary judgment motions. The dispute arose over the Agents' purchase of Errors & Omissions insurance coverage. The Agents sold Minnesota Life insurance products, and found that one of their colleagues was embezzling funds from their agency. The Mississippi Secretary of State’s office began investigating the records of the Agency and, from that investigation, determined that an agent had misappropriated client funds. Cases were filed against the agent, the Agency, Minnesota Life, and the Ex-Agents. Each complaint alleged that the wrongful acts occurred while the Ex-Agents were employed by Minnesota Life. Each complaint alleged causes of action for breach of fiduciary duty, misrepresentation and concealment, breach of implied covenant of good faith, continuing breach of contract, negligence, negligent infliction of mental and emotional distress, misrepresentation, and malpractice. As to Minnesota Life, each complaint specifically alleged that Minnesota Life participated in and/or had knowledge of the intentional taking of monies. As to the Ex-Agents, the complaints specifically alleged that they should have known that Minnesota Life and/or the colleague were misappropriating funds. The agents and Minnesota Life made a claim on their E&O insurance policy to defend the suit. Upon review, the Supreme Court found that the trial court properly denied the motion to strike and properly granted summary judgment in favor of Columbia as to Minnesota Life’s claim but erred in granting summary judgment as to the Ex-Agents’ claims. Therefore, the Court affirmed in part and reversed in part and remanded. View "Minnesota Life Insurance Company v. Columbia Casualty Company" on Justia Law

Columbus Cheer Company ("CCC") entered into a rental contract for the use of school facilities. Subsequently, CCC was informed that Columbus Municipal School District ("CMSD") would not honor the contract with CCC. CCC filed a complaint against CMSD. The complaint read in part: "[p]laintiff Columbus Cheer Company is a profit corporation licensed to due [sic] business in the state of Mississippi . . . ." The prayer sought judgment for plaintiff (CCC). Defendants filed their motion to dismiss or for summary judgment, asserting that CCC was an administratively dissolved corporation; therefore, CCC could not have entered into a valid contract with CMSD, and CCC did not possess the requisite legal status to initiate suit. The trial court entered an order granting Defendants' motion for summary judgment. CCC appealed, and the issues on appeal were: (1) whether a dissolved corporation could pursue a legal action; and if not, (2) could the corporation's shareholders pursue the same action in their own name? The Supreme Court answered both questions "no." View "Columbus Cheer Company v. City of Columbus" on Justia Law

EDW Investments, LLC, obtained a judgment against Techtronics, Inc. in 2007. In 2011, EDW sued Michelle Barnett ("Michelle"), the wife of Techtronics' president, Kevin Barnett ("Kevin"); Spectrum Wireless, LLC; MWB Holdings, LLC; and L4, LLC, claiming that: (1) these limited liability companies "are alter ego entities created solely to conceal the assets and income of Techtronics, Inc. from EDW" and that "Michelle Barnett knowingly participated in these efforts"; (2) "[t]he assets and income of Techtronics, Inc. were fraudulently conveyed to Michelle Barnett and the shell entities to avoid paying EDW"; and (3) "[t]he actions of the [Defendants] were grossly negligent, willful and/or intentional and constitute violation of common law duties under Mississippi law." The trial judge granted Defendants' motion to dismiss, and EDW appealed. Finding no error, the Supreme Court affirmed the decision to dismiss. View "EDW Investments, LLC v. Barnett" on Justia Law