Justia Mississippi Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

Robert Crawford was admitted to a hospital in August 2018 in critical condition. The next day, his daughter Carol obtained a general power of attorney (POA) allegedly signed by Robert and notarized by Lindsay, though Robert’s condition raised questions about the validity of the POA. Carol attempted to use the POA to access Robert’s bank accounts; one bank and a hospital refused to honor it, but First Security Bank (FSB) allowed significant withdrawals, despite having prior instructions from Robert to prohibit such transactions unless he appeared in person. Robert died intestate in September 2018, and Dasie Mae Richmond was appointed administratrix of his estate.Dasie filed suit in the Quitman County Chancery Court in August 2021 against FSB, Carol, and Lindsay, alleging improper procurement of the POA, conversion, conspiracy, negligence, and breach of contract. After initial discovery, proceedings were stayed due to Carol’s indictment and plea related to exploitation of a vulnerable person. Lindsay filed a motion for summary judgment, which was denied. Later, Lindsay moved to dismiss for failure to prosecute under Rule 41(b), with FSB and Carol joining. The chancery court granted dismissal as to Lindsay only, citing ongoing restitution by Carol and unresolved issues with FSB, but denied the motion as to FSB and Carol.The Supreme Court of Mississippi reviewed only FSB’s appeal of the denial of dismissal. The Court held that the facts justifying dismissal for Lindsay applied equally to FSB and found no sound basis in the record for treating FSB differently. The Supreme Court of Mississippi concluded that the chancery court abused its discretion in denying the Rule 41(b) dismissal as to FSB. The Supreme Court reversed the lower court’s decision and rendered judgment dismissing the claims against FSB. View "First Security Bank v. Richmond" on Justia Law

Monica Sparrow accompanied her daughter to a hospital appointment during the COVID-19 pandemic, when special entry and exit procedures were in place. After her daughter’s appointment, Sparrow was instructed by a nurse to exit the hospital through an employee parking garage to retrieve her car. While leaving through this route, which she was unfamiliar with, Sparrow slipped on a wet, partially concealed, and allegedly slick drainage grate that shifted under her weight. Sparrow sustained a serious knee injury requiring surgery. She claimed that the hospital required her to use an unreasonably dangerous route and failed to warn her of its dangers.The case was first heard in the Lauderdale County Circuit Court. Rush Health Systems, the hospital operator, moved for summary judgment, arguing that the drainage grate was an obvious, non-dangerous condition and that Sparrow was a licensee to whom limited duties were owed. The hospital contended that the grate's presence and condition were not unreasonably dangerous and that Sparrow was at fault for not watching where she was walking. Sparrow presented evidence, including her own and expert testimony, suggesting the grate was slick, poorly lit, shifted under weight, and that she was directed by hospital staff to use that exit. The trial court denied summary judgment, finding that genuine factual disputes remained as to whether the condition was dangerous and whether Sparrow was an invitee or licensee.On appeal, the Supreme Court of Mississippi reviewed the denial of summary judgment de novo. The Court held that Sparrow had presented sufficient evidence to create genuine issues of material fact regarding whether the drainage grate constituted a dangerous condition and her status as an invitee or licensee at the time of her fall. The Supreme Court of Mississippi affirmed the trial court’s denial of summary judgment and remanded the case for further proceedings. View "Rush Health Systems, Inc. v. Sparrow" on Justia Law

A divorced couple with one child became embroiled in post-divorce litigation over visitation and the enforcement of prior court orders. After the divorce, the mother had primary physical custody, but the father was granted substantial visitation. In 2015, a chancellor found the mother had interfered with visitation and ordered her to pay the father for medical debt related to her other child. Years later, the father again sought to enforce visitation and recover the debt, leading to a series of contentious proceedings. The mother failed to comply with orders regarding visitation and payment. The court ultimately found her in contempt, incarcerated her, and awarded custody to the father. During these proceedings, allegations arose that the mother’s attorney had advised her not to follow the court’s orders.The case was heard in the Hinds County Chancery Court, where the new chancellor enforced the previous order for payment, found the mother in contempt, and sanctioned her attorney, Matthew Thompson, for his actions related to the case and his failure to appear at a show-cause hearing. The mother and her attorney appealed several orders, including the contempt finding against the attorney and the enforcement of the 2015 order.The Supreme Court of Mississippi reviewed the appeals. It held that the chancellor improperly sanctioned Thompson for constructive criminal contempt without affording him due process, specifically notice and a hearing before a different judge. The court vacated the sanction against Thompson, remanded for further proceedings before another chancellor, and ordered the return of the $1,500 fine. The court affirmed the enforcement of the 2015 order against the mother and denied her requests for permanent recusal of the chancellor and referral to the judicial commission. All other issues related to visitation and custody were deemed moot after the father relinquished his parental rights. View "Jones v. Jones" on Justia Law

An employee who suffered a workplace injury sued his employer’s workers’ compensation insurance carrier and related entities, alleging failure to authorize timely medical treatment and misrepresentation of his injuries to the Mississippi Workers’ Compensation Commission. The plaintiff filed the lawsuit in Hinds County, Mississippi, though the only resident defendant lived in Rankin County. The defendants, all nonresidents except one, removed the case to federal court, invoking diversity jurisdiction and asserting that the resident defendant was improperly joined. While in federal court, the defendants filed a motion to dismiss based on failure to exhaust administrative remedies but did not raise a venue objection.The United States District Court for the Southern District of Mississippi found that it lacked subject-matter jurisdiction because the defendants had not met their burden to show improper joinder and remanded the case to the Hinds County Circuit Court. After remand, and before filing an answer or conducting discovery, the defendants moved to transfer venue to Rankin County. The plaintiff argued that any venue objection was waived because it was not raised in federal court, and the Hinds County Circuit Court denied the motion to transfer based solely on waiver, relying on the Mississippi Supreme Court’s decision in Breal v. Downs Law Group.The Supreme Court of Mississippi held that the defendants did not waive their objection to venue by failing to raise it in federal court, as the issue of proper state-court venue was not available while the case was pending in federal court. The court distinguished the facts from those in Breal and clarified that the defense of improper venue was timely asserted at the first opportunity in state court. The Supreme Court of Mississippi reversed the trial court’s denial of the motion to transfer venue and remanded the matter for further proceedings. View "Benchmark Insurance Company v. Harris" on Justia Law

A dispute arose between two competing billboard companies after one company constructed an electronic billboard in Gulfport, Mississippi. The company that operated existing billboards nearby filed suit, claiming that the new billboard violated a city ordinance enacted as part of a settlement resolving earlier litigation involving the city and the plaintiff. The defendant, along with related entities, countered with claims for declaratory and injunctive relief and challenged the plaintiff’s standing to bring the suit. The property owner on whose land the disputed billboard was constructed also became a party to the litigation.The litigation began in the Chancery Court of Harrison County, which denied the defendants’ motion for summary judgment, specifically rejecting their standing argument. The defendants removed the case to federal court, which remanded it and awarded costs to the plaintiff. After the defendants’ interlocutory appeal was denied by the Supreme Court of Mississippi, the case was transferred to circuit court. There, the court again denied summary judgment, and further unsuccessful dispositive motions were filed by the defendants. Over several years, the case involved multiple motions, removal, transfer, and appeals, with no claims proceeding to trial. Eventually, after the defendants transferred their interest in the billboard to a third party who settled with the plaintiff, the plaintiff moved to dismiss the case with prejudice. The Circuit Court of Harrison County granted the motion and denied the defendants’ subsequent request for attorney’s fees and costs, finding that much of the litigation expense was due to the defendants’ own aggressive litigation strategies, and declined to impose sanctions, concluding the suit was not frivolous.The Supreme Court of Mississippi reviewed the appeal, focusing on whether the trial court erred in denying attorney’s fees and sanctions to the defendants. The court held that the decision to award attorney’s fees or impose sanctions was within the trial court’s discretion, and found no abuse of discretion in denying fees or sanctions, affirming the dismissal with prejudice. View "Busby v. The Lamar Company, LLC" on Justia Law

A resident of Madison County, Mississippi, received medical treatment at a hospital in Hinds County and later filed a claim with her health insurer, a foreign corporation doing business in the state. The insurer partially paid the claim but later, through its third-party administrator, asserted the hospital was out of network before eventually admitting it was in network. Despite repeated efforts by the insured to resolve the dispute, the insurer failed to pay the remaining balance or provide an explanation, ultimately stating the claim was untimely. The insured then sued the insurer and the administrator in Hinds County, seeking damages for breach of contract and related claims.The Circuit Court of Hinds County denied the insurer’s motion to dismiss or transfer venue to Madison County. Only the insurer sought and was granted an interlocutory appeal from this order. The administrator did not join the appeal.The Supreme Court of Mississippi reviewed the case, applying de novo review to the interpretation of the venue statute and abuse of discretion to the trial court’s venue ruling. The Court held that, under Mississippi Code Section 11-11-3(1)(a)(i), venue is proper where a substantial act or omission by the defendant caused the injury for which the plaintiff seeks redress. The Court found that the medical treatment in Hinds County was not a substantial event caused by the insurer that resulted in the alleged injury; rather, the alleged injury arose from the insurer’s acts or omissions related to the insurance contract, which were not tied to Hinds County. The Court overruled prior precedent to the extent it conflicted with this interpretation and concluded that venue was proper in Madison County. The judgment of the Hinds County Circuit Court was reversed and the case remanded for further proceedings in Madison County. View "National Health Insurance Company v. Lever" on Justia Law

A patient underwent a laparoscopic bilateral tubal ligation and endometrial ablation performed by a physician at a women’s clinic. About a week after the procedure, she experienced severe abdominal pain and was hospitalized for sepsis. An exploratory surgery revealed a perforated small bowel, which was surgically repaired. The patient subsequently recovered.The patient filed a medical negligence lawsuit in the Hinds County Circuit Court against the clinic and the physician, attaching the required certificate of expert consultation to her complaint. The defendants moved for summary judgment, supporting their motion with an expert affidavit. The plaintiff did not timely file an expert affidavit or testimony in response. On the day before the scheduled summary judgment hearing, she filed a response without any expert affidavit. The circuit court denied the summary judgment motion and granted her an additional thirty days to obtain an expert affidavit. After she submitted an expert affidavit and a second hearing was held, the circuit court again denied summary judgment, finding that the competing expert affidavits created a genuine issue of material fact.On interlocutory appeal, the Supreme Court of Mississippi reviewed the circuit court’s denial of summary judgment de novo and its grant of additional time for abuse of discretion. The Supreme Court held that, in medical malpractice cases, a plaintiff must produce sworn expert testimony to survive summary judgment. The court found that the plaintiff failed to provide such testimony before the initial hearing and that the circuit court abused its discretion by granting additional time without a specific finding of diligence or good faith. The Supreme Court reversed the circuit court’s judgment and rendered summary judgment in favor of the defendants. View "Lakeland Premier Women's Clinic, PLLC v. Jackson" on Justia Law

K.S. gave birth to her daughter, Jane, in August 2018 and struggled with ongoing methamphetamine abuse before, during, and after her pregnancy. Jane’s early life was marked by instability, with K.S. frequently leaving her in the care of relatives and exposing her to unsafe environments. After a series of rehabilitation attempts and relapses, Jane was adjudicated a neglected child by the Rankin County Youth Court in November 2019, and custody was transferred among family members. By early 2022, Jane was in the durable legal custody of M.F.D. and M.D., K.S.’s cousin and her husband.M.D. and M.F.D. filed a petition in the Rankin County Chancery Court in August 2022 to terminate K.S.’s parental rights and adopt Jane. Before trial, they requested the youth court to transfer jurisdiction to the chancery court, which the youth court granted, finding all matters resolved and the transfer in Jane’s best interest. The chancery court then held a trial, denied K.S.’s motion to dismiss for lack of jurisdiction, and terminated her parental rights based on abandonment, desertion, unfitness, and failure to provide for Jane’s needs. The court also found reunification was not in Jane’s best interest and subsequently granted the adoption. K.S. appealed the termination and later filed a Rule 60(b) motion to set aside the adoption, arguing lack of subject-matter jurisdiction, which was denied.The Supreme Court of Mississippi reviewed the consolidated appeals. It held that the chancery court had subject-matter jurisdiction to terminate K.S.’s parental rights because the youth court had formally relinquished jurisdiction, and no statute prohibited such transfer. The Court also found no manifest error in the termination decision, as substantial evidence supported the chancellor’s findings. Finally, the Court declined to adopt a rule requiring automatic stays of adoption proceedings pending appeals of termination orders. The judgments of the chancery court were affirmed. View "K.S. v. M.D. and M.F.D." on Justia Law

In 2008, the former Attorney General of Mississippi entered into a retention agreement with the Kilborn Firm to sue Entergy Corporation over electricity rates. The Kilborn Firm then agreed to split any compensation with Roedel Parsons, a Louisiana law firm. After years of litigation, the trial judge granted Entergy’s motion for summary judgment, dismissing the case with prejudice. The State did not appeal. Roedel Parsons then sued the State, claiming it was entitled to $34,625,000 as a third-party beneficiary under the retention agreement or, alternatively, for unjust enrichment and quantum meruit recovery.The Hinds County Circuit Court granted the State’s motion to dismiss under Mississippi Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) for failure to state a claim. The court found that Roedel Parsons was not a third-party beneficiary under the retention agreement, as the agreement specified that any associated attorneys would be at the Kilborn Firm’s expense and at no cost to the State. The court also found that Roedel Parsons failed to state a claim for unjust enrichment and quantum meruit recovery, as the State had no obligation to compensate Roedel Parsons under the terms of the agreement.The Supreme Court of Mississippi reviewed the case and affirmed the lower court’s decision. The court held that Roedel Parsons was not a third-party beneficiary under the retention agreement and had no standing to sue the State for breach of contract. The court also held that Roedel Parsons failed to state a claim for unjust enrichment and quantum meruit recovery, as the State had no reasonable expectation to compensate Roedel Parsons. The court further found that the common-fund doctrine did not apply, as Roedel Parsons failed to identify a specific fund or class of beneficiaries. View "Roedel Parsons Blache Fontana Piontek & Pisano v. State of Mississippi" on Justia Law

Lea and Ann Brent were married in 1953 and divorced in 1983. As part of their divorce, Lea agreed to pay Ann $5,600 per month in permanent periodic alimony until her death or remarriage. Ann died in 2015, never having remarried. Lea began paying less than the required amount in 2002, but Ann never filed a contempt action for the unpaid alimony. Lea died in 2021, and Ann’s Estate filed a probate claim against Lea’s Estate for unpaid alimony totaling $358,700, covering the period from 2002 to 2015.The Washington County Chancery Court found that the claim for unpaid alimony was valid but limited it to the period from July 2014 to November 2015 due to the seven-year statute of limitations. The court awarded Ann’s Estate $139,104, which included the unpaid alimony for that period plus 8 percent interest per annum. However, the court denied Lea’s Estate credit for partial alimony payments totaling $51,000 made between July 2014 and November 2015 and for a $75,143.28 life insurance proceeds payment made to Ann’s Estate in 2019.The Supreme Court of Mississippi reviewed the case and found that the chancery court erred in denying Lea’s Estate credit for the partial alimony payments and the life insurance proceeds payment. The Supreme Court held that the total amount of credit exceeded the total amount owed for the relevant period, leaving no unpaid alimony to award Ann’s Estate. Consequently, the Supreme Court reversed the chancery court’s decision and rendered judgment in favor of Lea’s Estate. View "In re The Estate of Brent v. The Estate of Brent" on Justia Law