Justia Mississippi Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

Articles Posted in Civil Procedure
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In 2006, David and Jill Landrum, along with Michael and Marna Sharpe, purchased land in Madison County to develop a mixed-use project called the Town of Livingston. The project stalled due to the 2008 financial crisis and legal issues. In 2010, Jill and Marna formed Livingston Holdings, LLC, which owned the development properties. Marna contributed more financially than Jill, leading to a disparity in ownership interests. In 2014, Marna sold her interest to B&S Mississippi Holdings, LLC, managed by Michael Bollenbacher. Jill stopped making her required monthly contributions in December 2018.The Madison County Chancery Court disqualified Jill as a derivative plaintiff, realigned Livingston Holdings as a defendant, and dismissed several claims. The court found that Jill did not fairly and adequately represent the interests of the company due to personal interests and economic antagonisms. The court also granted summary judgment in favor of several defendants and denied the Landrums' remaining claims after a bench trial.The Supreme Court of Mississippi reviewed the case and affirmed the lower court's decision to disqualify Jill as a derivative plaintiff and exclude the Landrums' expert witness. The court found that Jill's personal interests and actions, such as failing to make required contributions and attempting to gain control of the company, justified her disqualification. The court also affirmed the dismissal of claims for negligent omission, misstatement of material facts, civil conspiracy, fraud, and fraudulent concealment due to the Landrums' failure to cite legal authority.However, the Supreme Court reversed and remanded the case on the issues of remedies and attorneys' fees under the Second Memorandum of Understanding (MOU) and the alleged breach of fiduciary duty between B&S and Jill. The court found that the chancellor erred in interpreting the Second MOU as providing an exclusive remedy and remanded for further proceedings to determine if Livingston is entitled to additional remedies and attorneys' fees. The court also remanded for factual findings on whether B&S breached its fiduciary duty to Jill regarding property distribution and tax loss allocation. View "Landrum v. Livingston Holdings, LLC" on Justia Law

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Joel Phillip McNinch, Jr., a dementia patient with other serious health issues, was admitted to Brandon Nursing and Rehabilitation Center, LLC in June 2019. He was later admitted to Merit Health Rankin due to combative behaviors related to his dementia. He developed a decubitus ulcer and was admitted to St. Dominic Hospital, where he died the next day. His widow, Cheryl McNinch, requested her husband's medical records from Brandon Nursing and Merit Health soon after his death and received them in mid-December 2019. She filed a complaint in January 2022, alleging negligence, medical malpractice, gross negligence, and reckless disregard, claiming that substandard care had accelerated her husband's health deterioration and led to his death.The defendants moved to dismiss the case, arguing that the action was barred by the two-year statute of limitations. Mrs. McNinch argued that the discovery rule operated to toll the statute of limitations until she received the medical records. The trial court converted the defendant’s motion to dismiss into a motion for summary judgment and granted the motion without holding a hearing.The Supreme Court of Mississippi reversed the trial court's decision, finding that the trial court erred by granting summary judgment to the defendants. The Supreme Court held that there were genuine issues of material fact regarding whether Mrs. McNinch had knowledge of negligent conduct through personal observation or other means prior to or at the time of Mr. McNinch’s death. The court found that the discovery rule could operate to toll the statute of limitations when the medical records are necessary to discover the negligence. The court concluded that Mrs. McNinch exercised reasonable diligence in requesting the medical records promptly, and therefore, the complaint was filed within the statute of limitations. The case was remanded to the circuit court for further proceedings. View "McNINCH v. BRANDON NURSING & REHABILITATION CENTER" on Justia Law

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Felissa Jones, the mother of an elementary school student, reported to the Mississippi Department of Child Protection Services (MDCPS) that her son had suffered abuse and neglect by staff at his school. MDCPS responded that it does not investigate reports of abuse at school. Jones then sued MDCPS, seeking declaratory and injunctive relief related to MDCPS’s policy that the agency does not investigate allegations of abuse in out-of-home settings such as schools.The Hinds County Chancery Court denied Jones's motion for a judgment in her favor on the pleadings and granted MDCPS's motion for a judgment on the pleadings, dismissing Jones's complaint. The court ruled that Jones's request for declaratory relief related to MDCPS’s former intake policy was moot because the policy was no longer in effect. It also ruled that the current intake policy does not violate the relevant statutes, but instead conforms to the statutory mandate to refer allegations of child abuse in out-of-home settings to local law enforcement.In the Supreme Court of Mississippi, Jones appealed the lower court's decisions. The court affirmed the lower court's rulings, stating that MDCPS does not have a duty to investigate reports of abuse in out-of-home settings, such as schools, because children who are mistreated by school staff do not fall under the youth court’s limited jurisdiction. The court also found that Jones's claim for declaratory relief from the amended policy had no merit because the policy tracks the relevant statutes. View "Jones v. Department of Child Protection Services" on Justia Law

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Joe Tubwell had been living in a house in DeSoto County, Mississippi, since 2005. In 2016, the mortgage loan on the house went into default, and foreclosure proceedings were initiated. Tubwell filed a complaint against the mortgage companies in an attempt to stop the foreclosure. The case was moved to a federal court where the mortgage companies were granted summary judgment. Tubwell, Morgan Stanley, and Specialized Loan Servicing LLC (SLS) entered settlement negotiations and reached an agreement. Tubwell agreed to vacate the property by April 30, 2020, in exchange for a confidential sum of money. The property was sold to FV-1, Inc., in trust for Morgan Stanley Mortgage Capital Holdings LLC. However, Tubwell refused to vacate the property by the agreed deadline and did not return the settlement funds.The mortgage companies filed a complaint against Tubwell in the DeSoto County Circuit Court to enforce the terms of the settlement agreement. The circuit court granted summary judgment ordering Tubwell to relinquish possession to the plaintiffs and dismissed Tubwell’s counterclaims for lack of jurisdiction. Tubwell appealed the decision to the Court of Appeals, which affirmed the circuit court's decision.The Supreme Court of Mississippi granted Tubwell’s petition for certiorari to address the issue of whether it was error to dismiss his counterclaims for lack of jurisdiction. The Supreme Court found that the circuit court had jurisdiction to entertain Tubwell’s counterclaims and erred when it declined to do so based on a lack of jurisdiction. The Supreme Court reversed the judgments of the circuit court and the Court of Appeals with regard to the dismissal of Tubwell’s counterclaims for lack of jurisdiction and remanded the case to the circuit court for further proceedings. The Supreme Court affirmed the judgments of the circuit court and the Court of Appeals on the remainder of the issues raised. View "Tubwell v. FV-1, Inc." on Justia Law

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In 2009, Leverne Brent was injured while working for the Mississippi Department of Human Services (DHS) in a building owned by Madated, LCC. The Mississippi State Agencies Workers’ Compensation Trust (Trust), the carrier for DHS, provided Brent with compensation and medical expenses for her injury. In 2012, Brent and her husband sued the building owner and reached a settlement of $750,000. The DHS and the Trust intervened, claiming $358,210.77 for compensation and medical expenses paid to Brent. Brent challenged this amount, arguing that it included expenses that were not legally recoverable, such as surveillance and investigation costs. The Intervenors reduced their demand to $335,216.27, and the disputed amount was held in escrow pending further order.The trial court ordered the Intervenors to produce invoices and checks for each claimed expenditure. Brent continued to dispute the accuracy of the reduced demand and filed a motion for contempt, arguing that the Intervenors had failed to provide legitimate costs and total amount requests for reimbursement. Brent specifically challenged the reimbursement of $2,887.50 for an Employer Medical Evaluation (EME) conducted by a non-treating medical provider, arguing that this was not medical treatment. The trial court granted the Intervenors' Motion to Establish and Settle Lien, finding that the EME was a medical expense within the meaning of the Act. Brent appealed this decision.The Supreme Court of Mississippi reviewed the case and disagreed with the lower court's interpretation of the statute. The court found that the EME was not a medical expense as defined by the Workers’ Compensation Law, which requires medical treatment to be necessary and reasonable. The court ruled that the EME, conducted by a non-treating medical provider for the purpose of obtaining a second opinion, did not meet this definition. Therefore, the court reversed the judgments of the lower courts and ruled in favor of Brent, finding that she was not required to repay the $2,887.50 for the EME. View "Brent v. Mississippi Department of Human Services" on Justia Law

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Heather Walters, a Direct Support Professional at Brandi’s Hope Community Services, a long-term care facility for people with intellectual and developmental disabilities, noticed that a resident had been physically abused. She attempted to report the incident to her supervisors but received no response. Walters then took a photograph of the resident's injuries and shared it with a former coworker. After an internal investigation, Walters was fired for violating company policy and HIPAA regulations by taking and sharing the photograph. Walters filed a lawsuit against Brandi’s Hope and its CEO, Danny Cowart, for retaliatory discharge and malicious interference with employment.The County Court of Lee County found in favor of Walters, awarding her $100,000 in damages. The defendants appealed to the Lee County Circuit Court, which affirmed the lower court's decision. The defendants then appealed to the Court of Appeals, which reversed the lower courts' decisions, finding that the Mississippi Vulnerable Persons Act and the public policy exception established in McArn v. Allied Bruce-Terminix Co., Inc. were in conflict.The Supreme Court of Mississippi reversed the Court of Appeals' decision, finding no conflict between the Mississippi Vulnerable Persons Act and the public policy exception established in McArn. The court held that Walters was eligible to claim wrongful termination under McArn, as she was fired for reporting illegal activity. The court affirmed the jury's verdict that Brandi’s Hope terminated Walters because she reported the abuse. The case was remanded to the County Court of Lee County for further proceedings. The Court of Appeals' decision to render judgment in favor of Cowart on the malicious-interference-with-employment claim was not reviewed and thus stands. View "Brandi's Hope Community Services, LLC v. Walters" on Justia Law

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The case revolves around the dispute over whether the main roads within the Deerfield Estates subdivision in Newton County, Mississippi, are private or public. In 2001, the Newton County Board of Supervisors voted to accept the two main roads of the subdivision into the county road system. However, the roads were never added to the official county road registry. In 2020, the subdivision filed a complaint seeking a declaratory judgment that the roads are public and an injunction mandating the county to add them to the registry and perform repairs.The Newton County Chancery Court held that the roads had become public roads via express common law dedication and ordered that the roads be added to the county map and road register. The county appealed this decision, arguing that the subdivision's claims were barred by the doctrine of laches or the general three-year statute of limitations.The Supreme Court of Mississippi affirmed the lower court's decision. It held that the county's 2001 acceptance of the roads was effective and that the roads served public interest or convenience. The court also found that the county's failure to add the roads to the registry and the map in a timely manner did not negate the county's explicit acceptance of the dedication. Furthermore, the court ruled that the county could not invoke the doctrine of laches or the general three-year statute of limitations to bar the subdivision's request for a declaratory judgment that the roads are public roads. View "Newton County, Mississippi v. Deerfield Estates Subdivision Property Owners Association, LLC" on Justia Law

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The case revolves around a contested municipal general election for the Ward 4 Alderman seat in Coldwater, Mississippi. Levon Hayes was declared the winner, but his opponent, Alice Thomas, filed an election contest, suspecting irregularities in the vote count. Hayes was served with the contest and a Rule 4 summons but did not respond or appear in court. Almost a year later, Thomas applied for a default judgment, which the Tate County Circuit Court granted, declaring Thomas the winner and ordering her immediate swearing in.The case was initially heard in the Tate County Circuit Court, where Thomas applied for a default judgment due to Hayes' failure to respond to the election contest. The court granted the default judgment, declared Thomas the winner, and ordered her immediate swearing in.The case was then brought to the Supreme Court of Mississippi. The court was tasked with determining whether a default judgment was permissible in this general election contest under Mississippi Code Section 23-15-951 and the Mississippi Rules of Civil Procedure. The court found that a default judgment was not permissible and that Thomas's failure to diligently prosecute her contest required its dismissal with prejudice. The court reversed the default judgment and remanded the case to the circuit court to dismiss Thomas's contest with prejudice and to reinstate Hayes as the elected candidate. The court also noted that the Rule 4 summons served to Hayes was improper and that Thomas's delays in prosecuting her contest violated the public's interest in having elections promptly decided. View "In Re: Contest of the Municipal General Election for the Ward 4 Alderman Seat" on Justia Law

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In the Supreme Court of Mississippi, two interlocutory appeals were consolidated, both arising from the same wrongful-death lawsuit. Beverly Butts, on behalf of the wrongful-death beneficiaries of John Albert Hemphill, Sr., alleged that four years prior to Hemphill's death, Dr. Reese Lindsey failed to remove part of a bladder catheter, leading to recurring infections and ultimately Hemphill's death. Additionally, she claimed that the staff at Greenwood Leflore Hospital, where Lindsey treated Hemphill, provided substandard care.Regarding Lindsey, the court found that he had not been lawfully served with process. Despite multiple summons, Butts failed to comply with the Mississippi Rule of Civil Procedure 4, which outlines the requirements for serving process. As a result, the trial court lacked jurisdiction over Lindsey, leading the Supreme Court to reverse the trial court's decision and render judgment dismissing Lindsey from the lawsuit.Concerning the Hospital, the court found that Butts had failed to provide the necessary medical expert testimony to support her medical negligence claim against the Hospital. Despite her argument that the Hospital's summary judgment motion was preemptive as no scheduling order had been set, the court noted that a defendant can file for summary judgment at any time. Given Butts's failure to present necessary expert testimony, the Supreme Court reversed the denial of summary judgment and rendered judgment in favor of the Hospital. View "Lindsey v. Butts" on Justia Law

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The case before the Supreme Court of Mississippi involved the Estate of Christian Andreacchio, who died under circumstances that his family believes were suspicious. Dissatisfied with the official ruling that Andreacchio took his own life, his family sought to compel the Circuit Court of Lauderdale County to appoint a district attorney pro tempore to investigate his death. The Circuit Court denied the petition, in part because it concluded that Andreacchio's Estate and family did not have standing.The Supreme Court of Mississippi agreed with the Circuit Court's ruling. It noted that the Estate's argument that it has standing under the Mississippi Crime Victims' Bill of Rights fails because all the rights under that law assume that there is an ongoing investigation or prosecution. In this case, there was no ongoing investigation or proceeding. The Meridian Police Department had already conducted two separate investigations into Christian's death, both of which were completed. The Attorney General's Office also presented the case to a grand jury, which returned a no true bill, thus ending the process due to a lack of reasonable grounds to indict.The court also pointed out that the victims' rights statutes cited by the Estate do not confer standing to allow its petition, and all indications from Mississippi's prosecutorial structure and case law suggest that allowing private direction of prosecutions, which must be brought on behalf of the state, is disallowed. Therefore, the court affirmed the Circuit Court's decision, finding that the Estate lacks standing to file the petition. View "In Re: Death Investigation of Christian Andreacchio" on Justia Law

Posted in: Civil Procedure