Justia Mississippi Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

A standing order in the Third Chancery Court District (Mississippi) set motion days in advance and assigns the particular judge who will preside that day. H. R. Garner, a practitioner in the Third Chancery Court District, knew the directives of this standing order. Yet Garner still claimed that his opposing counsel was judge shopping by filing a contempt petition against Garner’s client and issuing a Rule 81(d) summons that noticed a hearing before a judge who had not been assigned the case. Although his opponent’s actions were authorized by Rule 1.06(C) and the District’s standing order, Garner filed what amounted to a hopeless motion to quash and for sanctions against him. In a twist, the Honorable Vicki Daniels, the judge actually assigned the contempt case, heard Garner’s motion to quash and request for sanctions, which Garner continued to pursue even though he was in front of his preferred judge. After reviewing the motion, Judge Daniels found what Garner’s opposing counsel had done was a “common practice” and was not improper. This prompted Garner’s opposing counsel to urge Judge Daniels to instead sanction Garner for filing a hopeless and frivolous motion, which she did: Garner and his client were sanctioned $1,000 under Rule 11 and the Litigation Accountability Act. Finding no abuse of discretion in Judge Daniels awarding sanctions against Garner, the Mississippi Supreme Court affirmed the sanction. View "Garner v. Smith" on Justia Law

Mar-Jac Poultry MS, LLC (Mar-Jac), appealed the denial of its motion for summary judgment on the Plaintiffs’ claims for negligence, negligence per se, and wrongful death under the theory of respondeat superior after a Mar-Jac employee’s vehicle collided with a school bus on the way to work, killing his two passengers, who were also Mar-Jac employees. Based on the evidence presented, the Mississippi Supreme Court found the trial court erred in denying Mar-Jac’s motion for summary judgment, because it was undisputed that the driver was not acting in the course and scope of his employment with Mar-Jac when the accident occurred. Thus, the Court reversed and entered judgment in favor of Mar-Jac. View "Mar-Jac Poultry MS, LLC v. Love" on Justia Law

Following a disciplinary proceeding, Meloney Harbour’s minor son, T.D.H., was suspended from school and placed in an alternative school. The chancery court initially reversed and rendered the decision of the Tupelo Public School District Board of Trustees after finding that the deprivation of an attorney at the initial disciplinary hearing, as well as the failure to state the applicable standard of proof, violated T.D.H.’s due process rights. After a Mississippi Rule of Civil Procedure 59(a) motion, the chancery court amended its judgment to remand the case instead of rendering it. Harbour then filed a Mississippi Rule of Civil Procedure 60(b) motion and, for the first time, challenged the constitutionality of Mississippi Code Section 37-9-71. Harbour contended the statute contained an unconstitutional standard of proof: substantial evidence rather than clear and convincing evidence. Harbour did not notice the attorney general of the constitutional challenge to the statute. Finding that Harbour failed to meet her burden under Rule 60(b), the chancery court denied the motion. Harbour then appealed that ruling. Finding no reversible error, the Mississippi Supreme Court affirmed the chancery court’s denial of the Rule 60(b) motion. View "Harbour v. Tupelo Public School District" on Justia Law

Hinds County, Mississippi appealed an administrative order signed by two Hinds County Court judges that appointed and set the salaries of the county court administrator and the deputy county court administrator. The county judges sought to set the salaries of their administrators at an amount greater than the budgeted amount set by the Hinds County Board of Supervisors. In this direct appeal, Hinds County asked the Mississippi Supreme Court that the order be vacated. The Supreme Court found this appeal was not properly before it Court. Therefore, the appeal was dismissed, and the matter remanded to the Circuit Court of the First Judicial District of Hinds County for consideration. View "In Re: In the Matter of the Appointment and Setting Salary for County Court Administrator and Deputy Court Administrator: Hinds County, Mississippi v. Skinner" on Justia Law

At issue in this case before the Mississippi Supreme Court was a dispute between an automobile manufacturer and one of its dealerships. Specifically, the issue reduced to whether the dealer filed a timely complaint under Mississippi Code section 63-17-73(1)(d)(iii) after the dealer received the manufacturer’s notice it would terminate the applicable dealership agreement. The Court determined the statute was unambiguous, and its plain meaning provided a dealer may file its verified complaint within the sixty day notice period, i.e., the sixty days preceding the effective date of termination. Because the statute was unambiguous and conveyed a clear and definite meaning, the Court did not resort to the rules of statutory construction. The Court found the dealer’s complaint was timely filed within the sixty days immediately preceding the effective date of termination. View "Nissan North America, Inc. v. Great River Nissan, LLC d/b/a Great River Nissan" on Justia Law

Previous opinions in this case were withdrawn. John and Cindy Henderson sued Copper Ridge Homes and First Bank regarding the construction of their new home in Magnolia, Mississippi. The case spiraled into foreclosure proceedings; the trial court granted First Bank’s motion for judicial foreclosure. On appeal, the Hendersons argued the trial court erred in granting First Bank a judicial foreclosure, by granting Copper Ridge’s and First Bank’s motions for summary judgment, and by denying their motions for leave to amend and add wrongful disclosure to their complaint. The Mississippi Supreme Court agreed the trial court erred in granting Copper Ridge’s and First Bank’s post-foreclosure motions for dismissal of the Hendersons’ claims. The Court affirmed the grant of judicial foreclosure, but reversed the grant of summary judgment to both parties, and remanded the case back to the trial court for a determination of the Hendersons’ claims. View "Henderson v. Copper Ridge Homes, LLC" on Justia Law

The Chancery Court set aside an interviews gift of about forty acres of land fronting Highway 6 near Oxford, Mississippi. Ninety-year-old grantor Mary Saunders Waller, hard of hearing and legally blind, allegedly granted the land to Waller’s daughter and son-in-law, Brenda and Craig Gordon. A conservator for Waller’s estate petitioned the probate court to set aside the deed to the Gordons. The chancellor found the Gordons were unable to rebut the presumption of undue influence. On appeal, the Gordons contended the Chancery Court erred in excluding certain testimony of Waller’s attorney and her physicians. The Mississippi Supreme Court found, however, the Gordons failed to make an offer of proof: since the Supreme Court would have no way of knowing what the physicians would have said had they testified, the Court could not conclude excluding their testimony was an error. The Court determined the Chancery Court did not abuse its discretion denying the Gordons’ motion for a new trial “based on arguments that could have, and should have, been raised at trial.” View "In The Matter of The Last Will & Testament of Mary Saunders Waller" on Justia Law

The Lamar County Mississippi School District denied a request by Smith Petroleum to erect and construct an LED advertising billboard on its Sixteenth Section leasehold located on Old Highway 11 in Hattiesburg. Smith Petroleum filed its Notice of Appeal and Bill of Exceptions with the Chancery Court of Lamar County. The chancellor affirmed the School District’s denial of Smith Petroleum’s request to erect and construct the LED billboard. Finding no error, the Mississippi Supreme Court affirmed the chancery court. View "Smith Petroleum, Inc. v. Lamar County School District" on Justia Law

Larry Seward worked for Illinois Central Railroad Company from 1961 to 2004. In 2005, Seward settled an asbestosis claim with Illinois Central. He subsequently developed and passed away from anaplastic oligodendroglioma, a type of brain cancer. In 2012, Andrew L. Ward sued Illinois Central on behalf of Seward. Ward alleged that Illinois Central breached its duty of care and failed to provide Seward with a safe place to work. The complaint detailed specific issues with the work environment, including Seward’s exposure to chemicals and hazardous conditions. The complaint alleged that the working environment “caused, in whole or in part,” Seward’s brain cancer. Illinois Central filed a motion for summary judgment based on a previous settlement and release that Seward had entered into with Illinois Central before his death. The trial court granted Illinois Central’s motion for summary judgment. Ward appealed the trial court’s grant of summary judgment. The Mississippi Supreme Court determined there were no remaining issues of material fact, therefore, affirmed the trial court's judgment. View "Ward v. Illinois Central Railroad Company" on Justia Law

This case involved three consolidated interlocutory appeals; each arose from litigation filed by Franklin Collection Service, Inc. (Franklin), against BancorpSouth Bank. Franklin and BancorpSouth had been in litigation for approximately forty months. After Franklin determined that BancorpSouth had failed to file a responsive pleading to the second amended complaint, Franklin applied for and obtained an entry of default by the clerk. Franklin also filed a motion to deem admitted the allegations of the second amended complaint. BancorpSouth filed a motion to set aside the entry of default and a motion for leave to file a responsive pleading to the second amended complaint. The trial court heard each motion and decided to deny Franklin’s motion to deem admitted the allegations of the second amended complaint; to grant BancorpSouth’s motion for leave to file a responsive pleading to the second amended complaint; and to deny BancorpSouth’s motion to set aside the entry of default. Franklin appealed and BancorpSouth cross-appealed. The Mississippi Supreme Court concluded that in light of the colorable defenses presented by BancorpSouth and the lack of prejudice to Franklin, the trial court did not abuse its discretion in allowing BancorpSouth to file an answer to Franklin’s second amended complaint. Therefore, the Court concluded the trial court properly denied Franklin's motion to deem admitted the allegations in the second amended complaint. The Court affirmed two interlocutory orders at issue in Franklin's appeal reversed the order at issue in BancorpSouth's cross-appeal, and remanded this case for further proceedings. View "Franklin Collection Service, Inc. v. BancorpSouth Bank" on Justia Law