Justia Mississippi Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

Brian Cole was killed in a motor vehicle accident in 2001. Brian Cole’s Estate had a court-approved contingency fee contract with Eugene Tullos, and only Eugene Tullos, to represent the Estate in wrongful death litigation. The Ferrell Group claimed this contract rendered it an interested party entitled to notice of the Estate’s final accounting under Mississippi Code Section 91-7-295. The trial court found that the Ferrell Group was not an interested party pursuant to the notice statute. Because the Ferrell Group did not probate a claim or have a contract with the Estate, or otherwise show a direct pecuniary interest in the Estate, the Mississippi Supreme Court affirmed the trial court’s judgment. View "In the Matter of the Estate of Brian K. Cole, Deceased" on Justia Law

The City of Clarksdale solicited sealed bids for a public construction project. The City received sealed bids from Landmark Construction Company, GCI (“Landmark”), and Hemphill Construction Company, Inc. (“Hemphill”). When unsealed, both bids exceeded the project’s allocated funds by more than ten percent. Rather than rebidding the contract, the City conditionally awarded a contract to Landmark, dependent upon the City’s obtaining additional public funds to match Landmark’s bid. The Mississippi Supreme Court found the City’s actions were not provided for in the public bidding laws, reversed the circuit court which held to the contrary, and remanded the case to the trial court for further proceedings. View "Hemphill Construction Company, Inc. v. City of Clarksdale" on Justia Law

In 2017, R.M. and C.W., were committed to the South Mississippi State Hospital (SMSH) to be treated for mental illness. As required under the commitment statute, both R.M. and C.W. were evaluated by court-appointed physicians, one a medical doctor, the other a psychologist. In the cases of both individuals, the evaluating physicians were the same two physicians. And in both cases, the physicians’ recommendations were the same: the medical doctor found that both individuals were, to some degree, mentally ill and thus needed treatment; the psychologist found that both individuals were not mentally ill and did not need treatment. The issue this case presented for the Mississippi Supreme Court’s review centered on whether Mississippi Code Section 41-21-77 allows a director of a state hospital independently to override a commitment order of a chancery court for treatment of mental illness. The Court held it does not. Because this statutory question came to the Court by way of a citation of contempt, this case also required the Court to review the citation of contempt to determine whether the chancery court’s classification of the contempt was correct and whether correct procedures were followed in the finding of contempt. To this, the Court found the chancery court erred in its contempt determination. Accordingly, the Court reversed the chancery court’s contempt finding, remanded the case for an entry of an order of recusal, and otherwise ordered further proceedings. View "In the Matter of C. W." on Justia Law

This matter stemmed from a lawsuit filed by the State of Mississippi against the defendant pharmacies. The State alleged deceptive trade practices and fraudulent reporting of inflated “usual and customary” prices in the defendant’s reimbursement requests to the Mississippi Department of Medicaid. The State argued that Walgreens, CVS, and Fred’s pharmacies purposefully misrepresented these prices to obtain higher prescription drug reimbursements from the State. Finding that the circuit court was better equipped to preside over this action, the DeSoto County Chancery Court transferred the matter to the DeSoto County Circuit Court in response to the defendants’ request. Aggrieved, the State timely filed an interlocutory appeal disputing the chancellor’s decision to transfer the case. After a thorough review of the parties’ positions, the Mississippi Supreme Court found that though the chancery court properly could have retained the action, the chancellor correctly used his discretion to transfer the case, allowing the issues to proceed in front of a circuit-court jury. As a result, the Supreme Court affirmed the chancellor’s decision. View "Mississippi v. Walgreen Co." on Justia Law

In 2013, Tarinika Smith and twelve minor children (collectively Plaintiffs) were involved in an automobile accident with a vehicle driven by Adlai Johnson. Smith was operating a passenger van owned by Mount Vernon Missionary Baptist Church (Mt. Vernon), located in Rossville, Tennessee, which was transporting the children. The accident occurred in Marshall County, Mississippi. At the time of the collision, Smith was pregnant. Plaintiffs and Johnson were all Tennessee residents. The Marshall County Circuit Court entered an order dismissing Johnson from the suit for Plaintiffs’ failure to timely serve him. Church Mutual Insurance Company (“Church Mutual”), Mt. Vernon's insurer, moved to have the trial court declare that Tennessee substantive law controlled the case. After the trial court so declared, Church Mutual moved for summary judgment based on Tennessee law prohibiting direct actions against insurers for uninsured motorist (“UM”) claims. The trial court then entered summary judgment in favor of Church Mutual. Plaintiffs sought interlocutory review of all three rulings. The Mississippi Supreme Court found no error in the dismissal of Johnson for Plaintiffs’ failure to serve. Furthermore, the Supreme Court found no error with the trial court applying Tennessee law to determine whether the contract provided UM coverage to Plaintiffs. However, the Court determined the trial court erred in applying Tennessee substantive law. Therefore, the Court reversed those judgments of the Marshall County Circuit Court and remand for further proceedings. View "Smith v. Church Mutual Insurance Company" on Justia Law

In 2008, an undetected flammable gas ignited and caused an explosion at the Elliotts’ home. Because the Elliotts believed the flammable gas was natural gas from a broken municipal pipeline, they filed suit against the city of Holly Springs, Mississippi, and the chain of vendors that supplied the city with natural gas and related products. A few years into litigation, the defendants began pointing to the propane gas tank in the Elliotts’ yard, insisting propane gas, not natural gas, was the source and cause of the explosion. While the Elliotts and their experts denied that propane gas caused the explosion, the Elliotts amended their complaint, adding claims against the propane gas vendor, "to avoid the risk of fault being apportioned to a nonparty or, as they put it, to cut off an 'empty chair defense.'" The Elliotts negotiated a settlement with the municipality, and summary judgment was previously granted to all of the Natural Gas Defendants. So the Elliotts had no need to assert an empty chair defense. However, they attempted to change course to pursue the propane gas defendant, a defendant they admitted they did not believe caused the explosion. The Mississippi SUpreme Court surmised that the decade the Elliotts spent pursuing only their natural gas claims, they were determined to be bound by their cumulative admissions. Accordingly, the propane gas defendant was granted summary judgment. The Elliotts appealed the latter ruling, arguing that they should have been allowed to take that inconsistent position. But finding no error in the trial court's ruling, the Supreme Court affirmed it. View "Elliott v. Amerigas Propane, L.P." on Justia Law

This case arose from the tragic 2014 death of nine-year-old Patrauna Hudson, who drowned in flash-flood waters that swept through a drainage ditch that ran alongside her family’s residence. Patrauna’s estate (the “Estate”) filed suit against Yazoo City for wrongful death under the Mississippi Tort Claims Act (MTCA). The circuit court granted summary judgment in favor of Yazoo City (the “City”) on all claims filed against it by the Estate, having found Yazoo City immune from liability under both the discretionary-function exception and the open-and-obvious exception contained in Mississippi Code Section 11-46-9. The Estate appealed, maintaining that Yazoo City violated numerous city ordinances, along with certain federal regulations, when the City converted a portion of the drainage ditch downstream from the Hudson residence into a covered tunnel with two side-by-side culverts in 2007. The Estate argued that these laws imposed a ministerial duty upon Yazoo City, and the City breached that duty by failing to comply with all the mandatory requirements prescribed by these laws when the city implemented and carried out the 2007 project. Therefore, the Estate contended, the City was not immune from liability. The Mississippi Supreme Court found the Estate’s claim that Yazoo City is liable for the wrongful death of Patrauna failed as a matter of law for failure to state a cause of action. The Court also found the Estate abandoned its claim for negligently failing to maintain its drainage ditches. The Estate, however, abandoned this claim under the auspices of the test adopted by this Court in However, the Court found “slight evidence,” which if developed further, could create a genuine issue of fact with regard to this claim, and that the Estate should have been given the opportunity to do so. The Supreme Court found the trial court’s ruling as to the open-and-obvious exception provided by Section 11-46-9(1)(v) was premature in this case because factual questions remained. Accordingly, the Court reversed and remanded for further proceedings. View "Hudson v. Yazoo City, Mississippi" on Justia Law

B&B Management Company, LLC (“B&B”) and Terence McGee (“McGee”) appealed the circuit court’s denial of their Motion to Dismiss and Transfer Venue. Y.X. first filed a premises-liability case in Madison County, Mississippi against B&B and five John Does, alleging she was injured on a treadmill in the fitness room of an apartment complex located in Madison County. Prior to B&B making an appearance, Y.X. voluntarily dismissed that case and refiled essentially an identical case in Hinds County, adding McGee, a former employee of B&B and resident of Hinds County, as a defendant. Accepting Y.X.’s testimony that she saw McGee leaving the complex, despite McGee’s denial of being there that on the day Y.X. was injured, does not change the fact that no evidence was presented which established that McGee owed an individual, legal duty to Y.X., or that he personally breached any legal duty that day. No actions imposing legal liability on McGee individually were developed during discovery. Applying principles set forth in the controlling Mississippi case law, the Mississippi Supreme Court found that McGee was joined fraudulently and/or frivolously with the intention of depriving B&B of its right to be sued in Madison County and that no reasonable claim of liability was established against McGee. Thus, the Court concluded, venue was improper in Hinds County. View "B&B Management Company, LLC v. Y.X." on Justia Law

Joe and Dianne McGinty sued Grand Casinos of Mississippi Inc.-Biloxi alleging negligence and breach of implied warranty of merchantability for serving unfit food. The McGintys ate breakfast at the Island View Café inside the Grand Casinos. Mr. McGinty ordered “Mama’s Eggs and Chops,” which included two grilled pork chops. Mr. McGinty took a bite of the pork chop and “didn’t like it.” Mrs. McGinty finished the remainder from his plate. Hours later, after only consuming water following the "bad" chop, Mrs. McGinty began to feel nauseated, and she experienced diarrhea at the airport. They then caught a flight to Los Angeles, California. About an hour into the flight, Ms. McGinty began vomiting. Mr. McGinty also fell ill. He began to sweat profusely, feel nauseous, and become incontinent. The flight attendants gave him oxygen and moved the couple to the back of the plane. Mr. McGinty vomited and had diarrhea as well. The McGintys did not eat or drink anything on the airplane. When the plane landed in Los Angeles, Mr. McGinty was carried off the airplane on a stretcher by emergency medical technicians. The McGintys were transported to a local hospital by ambulance. On the way to the hospital, Mrs. McGinty began to vomit a large amount of blood. At the hospital, she received two blood transfusions and was treated for an esophageal tear. Mr. McGinty was discharged from the hospital the same day, but Mrs. McGinty stayed for three days. No tests were conducted for food poisoning at the hospital. Upon returning home, Mrs. McGinty saw her general doctor. Prior medical records from her general doctor show Mrs. McGinty had a history of digestive problems. Two months before the alleged food poisoning, her medical records noted that she suffered from “abdominal pain within 30 minutes after eating which is chronic/recurring frequently, . . . [c]rampy/colicky abdominal pain, diarrhea 15-30 minutes after eating which is chronic.” Further, Mrs. McGinty’s medical records show that she had vomited blood in March 2003, which also occurred prior to the alleged food poisoning. Mrs. McGinty’s treating physician from the California hospital concluded Mrs. McGinty’s “upper gastrointestinal bleeding was caused by the severe vomiting, which related to food and drink [she] had prior to the event.” The trial court granted summary judgment in favor of Grand Casinos as to both McGinty claims, and the Court of Appeals affirmed as to negligence, but reversed as to breach-of-implied-warranty. The Mississippi Supreme Court agreed with the appellate court and affirmed. View "McGinty v. Grand Casinos of Mississippi, Inc. - Biloxi" on Justia Law

The issue this case presented for the Mississippi Supreme Court's review was whether Robert Hammons Jr. properly named fictitious parties in his original complaint so his amended complaint related back to the filing of the original complaint to avoid the statute-of-limitations bar. The Circuit Court ruled that Hammons had failed to comply with the fictitious-party rules and granted summary judgment for the defendants. The Court of Appeals, in an evenly divided decision, affirmed the circuit court’s judgment. Hammons’s amended complaint, fifteen pages longer than his original complaint, added new parties and new claims against those parties. As the amendment was not a substitution under Mississippi Rule of Civil Procedure 9(h), the Supreme Court determined it did not relate back to the time of filing of the original complaint under Mississippi Rule of Civil Procedure 15(c)(2). Further, the amended complaint was filed outside the statute of limitations, and Hammons’s claim was time-barred. Thus, the Court affirmed the judgment of the circuit court and the decision of the Court of Appeals. View "Hammons v. Navarre" on Justia Law