Justia Mississippi Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

In this slip-and-fall case, the trial court denied the defendant business Dolgencorp’s summary judgment motion. The judge found there “may be a question of fact.” After de novo review, the Mississippi Supreme Court found clear that plaintiff Patsy Payton failed to present sufficient evidence to establish a material fact issue as to whether the alleged dangerous condition, Carpet Fresh powder on the floor of the main aisle of a Dollar General store, had existed long enough on the ground for the store to have constructive knowledge of the spill. The only evidence Payton produced was her deposition testimony that no other customer was in the store when she arrived. And soon after arriving, she slipped and fell, implying that the substance must have been spilled sometime before she entered the store. Payton admitted she had only been in the store less than a minute when she fell. On these facts, the Supreme Court found Payton's claims failed, and reversed the trial court's denial of Dolgencorp's motion. View "Dolgencorp, LLC v. Payton" on Justia Law

Gulf South Pipeline Company, LLC owned an underground natural gas storage facility in Rankin County, Mississippi. It owned additional properties that ran through thirty-two Mississippi counties. As a public service corporation with property situated in more than one Mississippi county, property belonging to Gulf South was assessed centrally by the Mississippi Department of Revenue rather than by individual county tax assessors. After conducting the central assessment, MDOR apportions the tax revenues among the several counties in which the property is located. A significant amount of the natural gas stored in Gulf South’s Rankin County facility is owned by Gulf South’s customers and, therefore, it is excluded from MDOR’s central assessment. The Rankin County tax assessor requested that Gulf South disclose the volume of natural gas owned by each of its customers. Following Gulf South’s refusal to provide these data, in September 2021 the Rankin County tax assessor gave notice of its intention to assess Gulf South more than sixteen million dollars for approximately four billion cubic feet of natural gas stored by Gulf South but owned by its customers. Gulf South filed suit at the Chancery Court in Hinds County, seeking to enjoin the assessment and seeking a declaratory judgment that MDOR was the exclusive entity with the authority to assess a public service corporation with property located in more than one Mississippi county. On interlocutory appeal, the Mississippi Supreme Court was asked to determine whether venue was proper in Hinds County when Rankin County was named as a defendant and MDOR was joined as a necessary party. The Court held that, under the venue provisions of Mississippi Code Section 11-45-17 and the Court’s consistent construction of these statutory provisions as mandatory and controlling, venue was proper only in Rankin County. Therefore, the chancellor erred by denying Rankin County’s motion to transfer venue. View "Rankin County v. Boardwalk Pipeline Partners, L.P., et al." on Justia Law

The plaintiffs were the wrongful-death beneficiaries of a man killed in an apartment fire and two other people injured in the same fire. The fire occurred at an apartment complex in Pike County, Mississippi. The plaintiffs sued the apartment complex’s management company, Alpha Management Corporation, which had its principal place of business in Madison County. And they also named as a defendant the purported property owner, Community Park Apartments, Inc. (CPA). At the time the complaint was filed, the Mississippi Secretary of State’s website listed CPA as having its principal office in Hinds County. So the plaintiffs filed suit in Hinds County. The controlling issue in this interlocutory appeal is fraudulent joinder—did the plaintiffs join a defendant for the sole purpose of establishing venue in Hinds County? Alpha Management asserted that CPA did not own the apartments. And because CPA was not a proper defendant, Alpha Management moved that venue be transferred from Hinds County to Pike County or Madison County. CPA similarly filed a motion to dismiss, attaching a copy of the same warranty deed showing it had sold the apartments in 1975 and then ceased to operate as a nonprofit corporation. Hinds County Circuit Court denied both motions. The Mississippi Supreme Court reversed the trial court’s ruling and remanded with instructions to dismiss CPA as a defendant and transfer the case to either Madison County or Pike County. View "Alpha Management Corporation, et al. v. Harris, et al." on Justia Law

The Board of Supervisors for Lowndes County appealed the trial court’s grant of summary judgment in favor of the Lowndes County School District. The Board argued that the trial court erred in its interpretation of Mississippi Code Section 37-57-107(1) (Rev. 2014) and that the trial court lacked jurisdiction to review the Board’s September 15, 2020 decision to exclude $3,352,0751 from the District’s requested ad valorem tax effort. The Mississippi Supreme Court found that the District appealed the decision of a county board of supervisors. As such, the District’s exclusive remedy was Section 11-51-75. Because the District failed to meet these requirements and because Section 11-51-75 was the District’s exclusive remedy, the chancery court was without jurisdiction to hear this matter and issue a declaratory judgment. Therefore, the trial court’s grant of summary judgment was reversed, and the matter remanded to the chancery court for it to enter an order dismissing the case for lack of jurisdiction. View "Board of Supervisors for Lowndes County v. Lowndes County School District" on Justia Law

The taxpayer, Saltwater Sportsman Outfitters, LLC (SSO), was a one-man operation that sold clothing online and at trade shows, conventions, and other events. SSO kept few records of what it had sold or where, though its sole member testified that most of its sales occurred out of state. After an audit, the Mississippi Department of Revenue (MDOR) assessed additional sales tax liability, ultimately settling on about $80,000 based on the disparity between SSO’s wholesale purchases and the sales taxes it had paid in Mississippi and other states. MDOR’s assessment was appealed to the circuit court, which granted summary judgment in favor of MDOR. SSO appealed. The Mississippi Supreme Court concluded that SSO’s failure to keep adequate records rendered MDOR’s assessment presumptively correct. The Court found no merit to SSO’s various arguments on appeal, including that the promoters of the events at which SSO sold were the true parties liable for the taxable sales. The Court therefore affirmed the circuit court’s grant of summary judgment. View "Saltwater Sportsman Outfitters, LLC v. Mississippi Dept. of Revenue" on Justia Law

Amanda Bryant filed suit against State Farm Automobile Insurance Company (State Farm) and its attorneys, Henley, Lotterhos & Henley, PLLC (HLH), claiming negligence, malicious prosecution, abuse of process, and intentional infliction of emotional distress based on HLH’s actions in a prior subrogation claim. HLH argued in a Motion to Dismiss or, In the Alternative, Motion for Summary Judgment that it was not a proper party to this lawsuit because it was the legal representative of the adverse party in the prior subrogation matter. For this reason, HLH argued it did not owe a duty to Bryant that could give rise to tort liability. The trial court disagreed with HLH and denied its motion. The Mississippi Supreme Court granted HLH’s petition for interlocutory appeal. Based on caselaw, the Supreme Court reversed the trial court’s order and rendered judgment in favor of HLH. Because State Farm was still party to the action, the case was remanded to the trial court for continuation of the proceedings. View "Henley, Lotterhos & Henley, PLLC v. Bryant" on Justia Law

Kia Jones filed a letter of intent with the Mississippi Democratic Party to seek that party’s nomination for a seat in the Mississippi House of Representatives for District 64 on February 1, 2023. Shanda Yates filed a residency challenge to determine whether Jones qualified to seek office. Because Jones did not reside in the district for two years, the Mississippi Supreme Court affirmed the trial court’s decision disqualifying her. View "Jones v. Yates" on Justia Law

Amanda Gunasekara sought to run in the Republican primary election for Public Service Commissioner, District 3 (Northern District). Matthew Barton, a candidate for district attorney in Desoto County, challenged her qualifications to run for commissioner and, specifically, whether she had been a citizen of Mississippi for five years prior to the election date. The trial court found that Gunasekara had not met the citizenship requirement and disqualified her as a candidate. The Mississippi Supreme Court found that the trial court did not manifestly err by holding that Gunasekara failed to meet the residency requirements for the office of Public Service Commission. Therefore, it affirmed the circuit court's decision. View "Gunasekara v. Barton, et al." on Justia Law

James Hal Ross created a series of trusts prior to his death to benefit his wife, Suzanne Dickson Ross, and sons from a previous marriage. He left some personal effects to Suzanne in his will but bequeathed the remainder of his estate to the James Hal Ross Revocable Trust, created on November 28, 2000. The revocable trust specified that Ross and Suzanne were the beneficiaries during Ross’s lifetime but that, upon his death, its assets would be transferred to two different trusts. The will of Ross was probated, and the estate was closed on July 29, 2005. Eight years later in 2013, the Ross sons petitioned to reopen the estate due to “maladministration” by Suzanne, individually and as executrix, and to require an inventory and accounting of all Suzanne’s activities as executrix of the estate. The action was dismissed in 2014. In 2016, Matthew Ross, through his conservator, Roy Hal Parker Jr., filed a complaint alleging mismanagement of the trusts and the improper selling of trust property by Suzanne. The complaint later was amended to include as Plaintiffs Matthew’s other brothers. Defendants responded by filing or joining another Defendant’s motion to dismiss; alternatively, Defendants sought to transfer the case to the Rankin County Chancery Court. Venue was ultimately transferred and defendants' motion to dismiss was granted based on a general three year statute of limitations. The Court of Appeals agreed with the Ross sons that a ten year statute of limitations applied to some of their claims and ultimately reversed and remanded the case for the chancellor to determine which of the Ross sons’ causes of action dealt with mismanagement of the trusts and with the recovery of land. The Mississippi Supreme Court determined the Court of Appeals erred by ruling on issues not properly pled before the chancery court, so the chancellor's judgment as to the ten year statute of limitations was reinstated. However, the Supreme Court found the Ross sons did sufficiently raise genuine issues of material fact as to Matthew’s soundness of mind, so it affirmed the Court of Appeals in this respect, and remanded the case to the chancery court for further proceedings. View "Parker, et al. v. Ross, et al." on Justia Law

A group of residents (“the Neighbors”) appealed three separate zoning decisions of the City of Ocean Springs Board of Alderman to the Jackson County Circuit Court. The circuit court, sitting as an appellate court pursuant to Mississippi Code Section 11-51-75 (Rev. 2019), consolidated the appeals and reversed the City’s zoning decisions in two of the appeals and remanded the first appeal to the City board. The City then appealed whether the circuit court lacked jurisdiction to review the decisions when W. Lee Brumfield, who was an applicant before the City, was not included as a party to the Neighbors’ appeal. Due to the Mississippi Supreme Court’s intervening decision in Longo v. City of Waveland, 353 So. 3d 437 (Miss. 2022), and the fact that the circuit court did not address the issue in its ruling, the Supreme Court found that Brumfield’s status as a petitioner could not be determined at this point. The case was remanded to the circuit court for a factual determination as to whether Brumfield is a petitioner under Section 11-51-75. View "City of Ocean Springs v. Illanne, et al." on Justia Law