Justia Mississippi Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

A jury awarded Elsie Smith more than three million dollars in damages after an asbestos-related wrongful death trial in 2009, but the trial judge granted the defendants’ motion for judgment notwithstanding the verdict (“JNOV”). Elsie appealed, and the Mississippi Supreme Court reversed and remanded for further proceedings. Following remand, the trial judge again entered a JNOV, and Elsie appealed that ruling. The Supreme Court reversed and remanded. The trial judge reaffirmed JNOV for the sole reason that Elsie presented insufficient evidence of Larry (her husband’s) exposure to the defendants’ asbestos products. But the Court found that Smith did present sufficient evidence to make the exposure issue a question for the jury. And because the trial judge did not address any of the other arguments that the defendants reasserted after the Court’s prior ruling, it declined to address any of the other issues raised in the briefing and in the defendants’ cross-appeals. View "Smith v. Union Carbide Corporation f/k/a Union Carbide Plastics & Chemicals Company, Inc." on Justia Law

Sharel Kenney appealed the trial court’s grant of summary judgment in favor of USAA Casualty Insurance Company (USAA-CIC) and Foremost Insurance Company (Foremost). Kenney purchased a motorcycle in Slidell, Louisiana. Kenney, a Louisiana resident, completed a Louisiana Motorcycle Insurance Application with Foremost, which included an Uninsured/Underinsured Motorist Bodily Injury Coverage Form (“UMBI Form”). Pursuant to the Form, Kenney elected not to purchase UMBI coverage. Following receipt of the application and the UMBI Form, Foremost issued a policy to Kenney. Daniel Steilberg, Kenney’s fiancé, was listed as an operator on the insurance policy. While riding the motorcycle, Kenney and Steilberg were involved in an accident with an uninsured motorist on Highway I-90 in Bay St. Louis, Mississippi. After the accident, Kenney made claims for uninsured-motorist coverage under three separate policies. Kenney did receive payments from Foremost representing the actual cash value for property damage to the motorcycle. Kenney also filed a claim with USAA-CIC, the insurer for Kenney’s Dodge Charger, but she was denied payment for medical expenses and uninsured/underinsured-motorist coverage. After the denials of coverage, Kenney filed suit against the uninsured motorise, Foremost, USAA-CIC and Steilberg, Finding that the trial court erred in granting summary judgment as to Foremost but not as to USAA-CIC, the Supreme Court affirmed the trial court in part and reversed and remanded in part. View "Kenney v. Foremost Insurance Co." on Justia Law

Tommy and Kelli Murray’s action accrued in Louisiana. But by the time they filed their action in Mississippi, Louisiana’s one-year statute of limitations had passed. Because they could no longer file an untimely action in Louisiana, they were likewise barred from filing suit in Mississippi. The Supreme Court therefore reversed the trial court’s denial of the defendants’ motion to dismiss the complaint, in which they asserted Mississippi Code Annotated Section 15-1-65’s clear bar. View "North American Midway Entertainment, LLC v. Murray" on Justia Law

Edward Love filed a complaint against Wesley Health System, LLC (“Wesley”) alleging negligence, medical malpractice, and wrongful death of his wife, Jackie Katherine Love. A default judgment was entered against Wesley. The trial court denied Wesley’s motion to set aside the default judgment and entered a final judgment against Wesley awarding Love $1,784,715.18 in compensatory and punitive damages and attorney’s fees. Because the trial court erred by prohibiting Wesley from cross examining the process server on the disputed issue of whether process was served upon Wesley’s registered agent, the Mississippi Supreme Court reversed and remanded. Although the trial court’s prohibition of cross examination was reversible error and dispostive to the Supreme Court's decision, it further held that the trial court also erred by failing to apply the three-part balancing test articulated in "Woodruff v. Thames," (143 So. 3d 546, 552 (Miss. 2014)). View "Wesley Health System, LLC v. Estate of Jackie Katherine Love" on Justia Law

During the construction of Jeff Anderson Regional Medical Center’s (“ARMC”) expansion, scaffolding built by W.G. Yates & Sons Construction Company collapsed, injuring plaintiffs David McKean, Francesco Medina, Donald Arrington, and Wayne Robertson. The trial court granted summary judgment and dismissed plaintiffs’ claims against all defendants. The Court of Appeals affirmed the decisions of the trial court. Although the Mississippi Supreme Court agreed with the Court of Appeals’ decision to affirm the trial court, it nevertheless granted certiorari to clarify two issues: (1) whether the Mississippi Supreme Court adopted the seven-factor test used in "Hanna v. Huer, Johns Neel, Rivers, & Webb," (662 P.2d 243 (Kan. 1983) superceded by statute, as recognized in "Edwards v. Anderson Engineering, Inc.," (166 P.3d 1047 (Kan. 2007)), to determine whether an architect’s supervisory powers go beyond the provisions of the contract; and (2) to clarify the Court’s position on the effect of an “undocumented immigrant” status on recovery for workplace injuries. View "McKean v. Yates Engineering Corp." on Justia Law

S.C. Anderson Group International, Inc. (“AGI”) filed two motions–one for leave to amend its complaint and one to transfer to the Circuit Court of Madison County. The County Court of Madison County granted AGI’s motion to transfer based on AGI’s averments and argument that it was seeking more in damages than it originally pleaded, specifically an increase in attorney’s fees. If the amendment were allowed, the ad damnum clause would have exceeded the $200,000 jurisdictional limit of the county court. Based on the facts and record presented in today’s case, the Mississippi Supreme Court held that the jurisdiction of the county court attached at the time the original complaint was filed. The Court reversed the transferred order. The case was remanded back to the circuit court with instructions to transfer AGI’s claims against Ram-Kabir of America, LLC, back to the county court. View "Ram-Kabir of America, LLC v. S.C. Anderson Group International" on Justia Law

Mark Roberts filed various claims against multiple defendants, all of which were dismissed on summary judgment. Roberts began working for Warrior Energy Services Corporation in February 2012. He was an at-will, full-time salesman for the company. But in late March 2013, Warrior let him go. According to Roberts, his termination was the result of a conspiracy by Warrior; Bill Jenkins, a Warrior officer; Jason Smith, Jenkins’s close friend; and Boots Smith Oilfield Services, LLC. Roberts believed these four conspired to retaliate against Roberts for doing two things: (1) reporting illegal activity; and (2) buying the assets of a pipeline company to compete with Boots Smith. When the defendants filed their motions for summary judgment, discovery was not yet complete. Roberts had been deposed. But the depositions of the defendants, as well as a key factual witness, were still pending. So Roberts responded to the summary judgment motions with a motion to defer under Mississippi Rule of Civil Procedure 56(f). Because completing discovery is often preferable and sometimes necessary to rule on a summary-judgment motion, Rule 56(f) permits a trial court to continue its ruling until discovery is complete. Roberts asserted in his Rule 56(f) motion that, to oppose the motions for summary judgment, he needed specific information in the defendants’ possession, namely, the defendants’ sworn deposition testimony about their involvement in terminating Roberts’s employment. And because those depositions had already been scheduled to take place, the Supreme Court found the trial court’s denial of Roberts’ Rule 56(f) motions was an abuse of discretion. Consequently, the Court reversed the judgments in favor of the defendants as prematurely granted. View "Roberts v. Boots Smith Oilfield Services, LLC" on Justia Law

Walter Griffith, Jr., a licensed master electrician, was critically injured while attempting to attach a ten-foot piece of metal conduit to an electrical pole owned by Entergy Mississippi, Inc. (“Entergy”). Griffith later filed a complaint against Entergy, alleging grossly negligent and willful conduct and requesting compensatory and punitive damages. The trial judge ultimately granted Entergy’s motion for summary judgment, and Griffith appealed to the Supreme Court, raising three alleged errors by the trial court in its grant of summary judgment to Entergy. Finding no reversible error, the Supreme Court affirmed. View "Griffith v. Entergy Mississippi, Inc." on Justia Law

Henry Kinney filed several record requests under the Public Records Act regarding Leonard Bentz II's selection as Southern Mississippi Planning and Development District’s (District) executive director; however, some of Kinney’s requests were never fulfilled. As a result, Kinney filed a complaint seeking a declaratory judgment that the District be declared a public agency subject to the Mississippi Public Records Act, Mississippi Public Procurement laws, Open Meetings laws, Mississippi law regarding salaries/compensation of public officials, Mississippi Ethics in Government laws, Mississippi auditing requirements, Mississippi laws regarding removal of officers from public office, and other general provisions applicable to public office. Kinney also sought the selection of Bentz to be deemed invalid because it did not comply with Mississippi’s laws governing public agencies. As a result of Kinney’s suit, the District, joined by the Mississippi Association of Planning and Development District, Inc. (MAPDD), who intervened in the suit, filed motions for summary judgment. The chancery court granted the motions for summary judgment. Kinney appealed the chancery court’s decision. Finding no reversible error, the Supreme Court affirmed the chancery court’s decision in the case. View "Kinney v. So. Mississippi Planning & Development District, Inc." on Justia Law

The City of Jackson was unable to serve notice to Willie Jordan by certified mail that his property was subject to condemnation and demolition. The City tried notice by publication, and set a hearing for twelve days after the first publication date. The applicable statute required two weeks’ notice. Jordan did not appear at the condemnation hearing. The property was declared condemned, and the house on the property was ordered demolished. After the house was demolished, Jordan filed a notice of tort claim with the city. When he filed his complaint, he alternatively asserted a constitutional claim for deprivation of property without due process. After a bench trial, the trial court awarded Jordan $12,513.53. The city appealed. Finding no reversible error, the Supreme Court affirmed. View "City of Jackson v. Jordan" on Justia Law