Justia Mississippi Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

This action was brought by Inn By the Sea Homeowner’s Association, Inc. (“IBTS”) against various defendants involved in the development, design, and construction of Inn By the Sea Condominiums when the condominiums were rebuilt after being destroyed by Hurricane Katrina. Within a year of reconstruction, significant problems with the building began to manifest, problems allegedly related to defects in the design and construction of the property. The trial court granted summary judgment to the defendants after excluding the damages testimony of IBTS’s expert witnesses. IBTS hired Michael Bailey of Kyle Associates, LLC, as its expert structural engineer and Alfred Hayes of Hayes Architect as its expert architect to investigate and identify defects in the design and construction of the property. IBTS timely designated its experts and produced a copy of the witnesses’ reports and cost estimates. In late August 2012, IBTS learned that Michael Bailey had suddenly left his job, moved out town, and could not be located or further made available as an expert on this case. At a subsequent hearing, the trial court orally continued the case without a new trial date in order for IBTS to find a new engineering expert. IBTS hired Ashton Avegno to replace Bailey. Avegno provided his report on November 2, 2012. In addition to largely agreeing with Bailey’s original report, Avegno also expressed concern that the foundation pilings “as designed” were overloaded by as much as “2.82 times its safe capacity and the as built piling would be loaded 2.16 times its capacity.” Avegno was unwilling, however, to provided exact itemized cost estimates for the items of engineering defects he identified. IBTS informed the court that IBTS had been unable to depose any of the defendants’ witnesses, including any of the defendants, and that a new scheduling order should be issued to allow IBTS to conduct depositions and to seasonably supplement its expert reports. The defendants objected to the proposed new scheduling order, arguing that the deadline for expert designations had passed and that Avegno should not be allowed to offer any new opinions, including his opinion that the foundation piles were overloaded. The court granted the motion to exclude Avegno. At some point, Hayes was asked to supplement his report. The defendants moved to strike Hayes’s supplementation and renewed their motion for summary judgment. The court granted the defendants’ motion to exclude Alfred Hayes’s damages testimony as well as the defendant’s motion for summary judgment and final judgment. Inn By the Sea timely appealed. Upon review, the Supreme Court concluded that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in excluding the plaintiff’s witnesses, and therefore affirmed the grant of summary judgment. View "Inn By The Sea Homeowner's Association, Inc. v. SeaInn, LLC" on Justia Law

Plaintiffs Jourdan Rivers Estates, LLC (JRE) and Jourdan River Resort and Yacht Club (Yacht Club), filed suit for damages in December 2011 against Defendants Scott Favre, Cindy Favre, Jefferson Parker, and CB Partners, LLC d/b/a Cinque Bambini. CB Partners, LLC d/b/a Cinque Bambini was later dismissed from the action without prejudice. The complaint alleged multiple claims against Defendants, including slander of title; slander and/or defamation; trespass; nuisance; tortious interference with use of property; tortious interference with contractual relationships; harassment and intimidation of plaintiffs' agents and intentional infliction of emotional distress upon plaintiffs' agents; assault upon plaintiffs' agents; willful destruction of plaintiffs' property; negligence; gross, willful, and wanton negligence; malicious prosecution; unjust enrichment; false imprisonment; and any other applicable theory of law giving rise to a cause of action. Defendants moved to dismiss for failure to state a claim under Rule 12(b)(6) of the Mississippi Rules of Civil Procedure. The circuit court granted the motion in part and denied it in part. The circuit court dismissed all of Yacht Club's claims in relation to the claim(s) that Defendants made false representations to the Hancock County Board of Supervisors and/or Hancock County employees, finding that such allegations fell under the "Noerr-Pennington" doctrine, expressly adopted by the Mississippi Supreme Court. The circuit court dismissed JRE's claims of slander of title, slander and/or defamation; harassment; assault; and false imprisonment and intentional infliction of emotional distress because each claim constituted an intentional tort and was barred under the statute of limitations. The circuit court denied Defendants' motion to dismiss as to JRE's claims for trespass; nuisance; tortious interference with use of property; tortious interference with contractual relationships; willful destruction of property; negligence; gross, willful, and wanton negligence; malicious prosecution; and unjust enrichment. Plaintiffs thereafter petitioned for an interlocutory appeal. Because the Supreme Court found that Defendants' Rule 12(b)(6) motion should have been converted into a motion for summary judgment, as provided in Rule 56 of the Mississippi Rules of Civil Procedure, it reversed the circuit court's order granting the Rule 12(b)(6) motion and remanded for further proceedings. View "Jourdan River Estates, LLC v. Favre" on Justia Law

Phillip and Paige Faucheux were a military couple who moved frequently during the early years of their marriage. In early 2002, Phillip got a job as a pilot with FedEx in Memphis, so the couple moved to Southaven, Mississippi (a suburb of Memphis just south of the Tennessee border). Phillip also served as a naval reserve pilot, often training at the Naval Air Station in Belle Chasse, Louisiana. Because of his frequent trips to Louisiana, he kept a Louisiana-registered pick-up truck parked at the New Orleans airport. On a trip to Louisiana during Carnival Season in January 2004, that Phillip met and began an extramarital affair with Francesca Munne Nordness. In June 2004, Paige discovered the affair. Eventually the couple reconciled their marriage, yet Phillip secretly continued his relationship with Francesca in New Orleans. In October 2004, Francesca moved from New Orleans to Fayetteville, North Carolina, and Phillip stopped seeing her. But several months later in early 2005, Phillip hopped a FedEx flight to North Carolina and showed up unannounced at the hospital where Francesca worked, professing his love for her and begging her to see him again. From 2005 to 2009, Francesca and Phillip continued to rendezvous at locations across the country, including Louisiana, Florida, North Carolina, Nevada, and Colorado (but never Mississippi). And although the two exchanged e-mails, phone calls, and text messages, Francesca never knowingly communicated with Phillip while he was in Mississippi. Phillip also sent Francesca several FedEx packages during this time, but according to Phillip’s uncontroverted testimony, he always used a Memphis return address. Phillip’s continued infidelity proved too much for Paige and, in August 2010, she was granted an irreconcilable-differences divorce from Phillip. Following the couple’s divorce, Paige (now a resident of Texas) sued Francesca in Mississippi for alienation of affections, intentional and negligent infliction of emotional distress, invasion of privacy, and punitive damages. Francesca immediately challenged the suit by moving the court to dismiss for lack of personal jurisdiction over her. Francesca ultimately lost at the trial court level, and she appealed. The Mississippi Supreme Court reversed, finding she did not have enough minimum contacts with Mississippi for a Mississippi court to have jurisdiction over her. View "Nordness v. Faucheux" on Justia Law

More than three years after learning his insurance policy had expired and his agent had not procured a replacement, Joe Tally sued his insurance agent, Ronald McMorris, claiming he “breached a standard of care recognized in the State of Mississippi to the insured for not notifying [him] of the cancellation of [his insurance] policy.” Because Tally failed to bring his claims within the three-year statute of limitations, his claims were time-barred. The Supreme Court therefore reversed the circuit court’s denial of McMorris’s motion for summary judgment and rendered judgment in his favor. View "McMorris v. Tally" on Justia Law

After Nekole Bennett and her children suffered personal injuries during a home-invasion robbery, they filed this premises-liability action against their apartment complex (Highland Park) and the complex's manager (Sharon Sampson). The plaintiffs claimed that the defendants' failure to provide adequate security measures at Highland Park proximately caused the plaintiffs' injuries in the robbery. To support that claim, the plaintiffs designated John Tisdale as an expert in security measures. The circuit court granted summary judgment for the defendants, finding that the plaintiffs' expert testimony failed to establish a triable issue on proximate causation. The Court of Appeals reversed the summary judgment and affirmed the circuit judge's refusal to recuse. The Supreme Court granted certiorari to expand on the Court of Appeals' analysis on the summary-judgment issue, and to explain why the expert testimony created a triable issue. The Court affirmed the Court of Appeals and reversed the trial court judgment and remanded this case to the circuit court for further proceedings. View "Bennett v. Highland Park Apartments, LLC" on Justia Law

Kyle and Marla Moore timely filed a medical malpractice suit against St. Dominic Hospital, Jackson Neurosurgery Clinic, and several physicians, claiming that the physicians and hospital had been negligent in treating Kyle in May 2004. Kyle complained of lower back pain. Kyle was diagnosed with an epidural abscess. Kyle went to the emergency room at St. Dominic on the morning of May 23, 2004; within a 24-hour period, Kyle was seen by a series of doctors at the hospital before getting an operation on May 24. The Moores contended that surgery should have been done sooner and that the delay in treatment resulted in neurological injury to Kyle. In March 2011, the Moores added Dr. Howard Holaday as a defendant. Dr. Holaday moved for summary judgment, asserting that the two-year statute of limitations had expired. The trial court denied summary judgment, and Dr. Holaday petitioned the Supreme Court for an interlocutory appeal. The issue this appeal presented for the Court's review was whether the discovery rule tolled the statute of limitations against Dr. Holaday. The Court held that whether the discovery rule tolls the statute of limitations required a determination by the trier of fact (here, the jury) regarding the “date the alleged act, omission or neglect shall or with reasonable diligence might have been first discovered.” The trial court, therefore, properly denied summary judgment to Dr. Holaday. View "Holaday v. Moore" on Justia Law

After the Lowndes County Board of Supervisors voted to abandon a railroad crossing, the county put up a barricade. Residents affected by the barricade filed two separate motions for reconsideration, and the Board held a second meeting in which it affirmed the abandonment but ordered the barricade removed. The residents filed a bill of exceptions which reversed the Board’s decision to abandon the crossing. The Court of Appeals reversed the circuit court, holding it had no jurisdiction to hear the bill of exceptions. After review, the Supreme Court found that, although the circuit court had appellate jurisdiction to review the Board’s second decision, it lacked jurisdiction to consider the Board’s original decision. So the judgments of the Court of Appeals and the circuit court were reversed, and the case remanded for the circuit court to consider only whether the Board’s second order complied with the statutory procedure for abandoning a road. View "Lowndes County v. McClanahan" on Justia Law

At trial, a defendant referred to a document that should have been produced in discovery but was not. In view of this revelation, the plaintiff filed two post-trial motions: one asking for new trial, judgment as a matter of law, or to reconsider; and one asking for sanctions for the discovery violation. The trial judge granted the motion for a new trial and recused from it, but he declined to rule on the sanctions issue, leaving that open for the next judge to determine. The defendants subsequently admitted liability, leaving damages the sole issue for the new trial. Plaintiff appealed, claiming the trial judge ruled on the case after he had recused from it. The plaintiff also argued that the trial court abused its discretion by not granting judgment as a matter of law as a sanction for alleged discovery violations. Finding no merit in either argument, the Mississippi Supreme Court affirmed the order of the trial court and remanded for further proceedings. View "Barnes v. Jefferson Davis Cty Sch. Dist." on Justia Law

Greater Fairview Missionary Baptist Church’s pastor, Danny Ray Hollins, was placed on paid administrative leave after he was accused of inappropriate sexual contact with a minor. The church decided to hold a vote on whether to retain Hollins as pastor. That vote originally was scheduled to take place in early 2013. But tensions arose in the church about Hollins’s status, giving rise to a “chaotic situation,” and the vote did not take place as planned. Instead, the church voted to allow the Deacons’ Ministry to form a legal committee and to hire outside legal counsel for assistance in resolving the internal conflict. On March 1, 2013, the day before the vote, Hollins filed a petition with the Chancery Court seeking “to enjoin any unauthorized and improper meetings and/or actions taken outside a properly called membership meeting.” The petition named the church and five deacons as defendants. Hollins asserted that the church planned to have a meeting on March 2 “to vote on a resolution discharging [him] as pastor.” He claimed that the vote would be invalid because (1) “there ha[d] been no certification of the list of members in good standing who would be entitled to vote . . .”; (2) absent such certification, adequate notice to eligible members could not be accomplished; and (3) the state denominational guidelines had not been followed because “there ha[d] been no attempts at Conciliation or other notice given to Plaintiff as pastor as required.” Hollins also claimed that he would be irreparably harmed if he was “voted out as Pastor,” in that his reputation would suffer, he would lose his income, and he would suffer emotionally. Finally, Hollins asserted that there was “a high likelihood [that he would succeed] in the merits of his case, namely that any meeting of church membership without proper certification of voter rolls and notice and adherence to all established guidelines is void . . . .” Hollins’s counsel certified that a temporary restraining order (“TRO”) was needed, that he had been unable to notice the defendants, that the defendants would not be prejudiced by the TRO, and that on “information and belief [the church] is not represented by counsel duly hired by the church membership.” The chancellor issued the TRO, "apparently without reading it." Five deacons and the church were named as defendants, the TRO was served on only four of the deacons (the agent for service of process for the church was deceased and could not be served). The TRO purported to enjoin “any membership meeting,” but the chancellor later explained it was intended to “restrain any vote that may take place.” The chancellor issued the TRO, but the church voted anyway and dismissed Hollins. The chancellor then vacated the vote and ordered the church to conduct another vote, this time with certain court-ordered procedures regarding notice, eligibility, vote-counting, and security. The Supreme Court granted the defendants’ motion for interlocutory appeal, and vacated Chancery Court’s orders in this case. Because Hollins’s request for a TRO presented a purely ecclesiastical controversy, the chancery court was without jurisdiction to hear it. As such, the Chancery Court erred in issuing the TRO and in vacating the vote and ordering a new one. View "Greater Fairview Missionary Baptist Church v. Hollins" on Justia Law

Willie Kinzie sued Belk Department Stores, L.P., Belk, Inc., David Flowers, Shanay Grant, Kathy Coffey, Donald Smith, Nikki Daggins, Ray Faja, Staffmark Investment, LLC, and John Does 1-5 (Belk Defendants) for injuries he sustained while unloading a trailer that had transported merchandise to a Belk retail store. The trial court dismissed Kinzie’s lawsuit with prejudice, finding that Kinzie had misrepresented his injuries during discovery. The Court of Appeals reversed the judgment of the trial court and remanded the case, holding that Kinzie had not misrepresented his injuries and that the ultimate sanction of dismissal with prejudice was not warranted. "Dismissal is appropriate only under the most extreme circumstances and only where lesser sanctions will not suffice." The Supreme Court, after review, concluded that this was not an extreme case, and lesser sanctions could deter misleading responses without dismissing Kinzie’s claims altogether. The Court therefore affirmed that portion of the judgment of the Court of Appeals which held that dismissal with prejudice was not warranted. However, the Court reversed the Court of Appeals’ finding that the trial court abused its discretion when it determined that Kinzie had committed a discovery violation. The Court reversed the circuit court's judgment and remanded the case for trial. View "Kinzie v. Belk Department Stores, L.P." on Justia Law