Justia Mississippi Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

This appeal stemmed from the grant of summary judgment and a final judgment against Melanie Bosarge. The trial court found that Bosarge was individually liable for the deficiency balance after foreclosure under the terms of a personal guaranty she executed in relation to a secured loan made to her company, Indian Head Station, LLC ("Indian Head"). On appeal, Bosarge argued that a material issue of fact existed, inter alia, as to the value of the property securing the debt, that LWC MS Properties, LLC (LWC) should not have been permitted to maintain suit as a dissolved corporation, and that Bosarge should have been allowed to amend her pleadings and answer under Mississippi Rule of Civil Procedure 15. After review, the Supreme Court agreed that material facts indeed existed, and reversed and remanded the case with respect to summary judgment. Further, the Court found the second and third issues should have been addressed by the trial court upon remand. View "Bosarge v. LWC MS Properties, LLC" on Justia Law

Tallahatchie General Hospital moved to dismiss a medical malpractice claim filed against it because the plaintiffs failed to provide it with proper presuit notice before the expiration of the one-year statute of limitations. The trial court denied the motion, finding that the filing of the complaint tolled the statute of limitations, despite the plaintiffs’ failure to provide proper presuit notice. Finding no reversible error to the trial court's judgment, the Supreme Court affirmed. View "Tallahatchie General Hospital v. Howe" on Justia Law

In October 2010, Clara Dees filed a medical malpractice suit against Heritage House Nursing Home and its employees and against River Region Medical Center and its employees. River Region was owned by Vicksburg Healthcare, LLC. Dees also filed, with her complaint, a certificate of consultation. Dees filed an amended complaint in January 2011, also accompanied by a certificate. No summonses were issued until after February 16, 2011, the same date Dees moved the court for an enlargement of time (which was granted). Dees issued a number of summonses from February 22 to March 3, 2011. In May, an agreed order staying the proceedings and compelling binding arbitration was entered concerning defendants Heritage House Nursing Home and its employees. Vicksburg Healthcare moved to set aside the order allowing additional time to serve process. Vicksburg Healthcare also moved to dismiss and, alternatively, moved for summary judgment, while also asserting its affirmative defenses and answering the amended complaint. In February 2012, Heritage House Nursing Home filed its motion to confirm the arbitrator’s ruling. Dees failed to submit a response, and failed to request additional time in which to respond, and did not request a continuance of the scheduled hearing. The circuit court confirmed the decision of the arbitrator, dismissing with prejudice all claims against Heritage House Nursing Home and its employees. Subsequently, a notice of service of discovery requests was filed by Vicksburg Healthcare in September of 2012. In December, Vicksburg Healthcare filed a motion to compel discovery and for sanctions, and shortly thereafter filed a new a motion for summary judgment on the basis that Dees had failed to designate any expert witness and had failed to provide expert-witness testimony to establish a prima facie case in support of her claim. Dees then responded, requesting that the motion for summary judgment be denied, and designating her expert. No affidavit signed by the expert was attached. The motion for summary judgment was heard by the circuit court in January 2013, and was denied based on Dees’s designation. The circuit court granted Dees an additional sixty days in which to provide a sworn affidavit of the expert’s testimony. The circuit court provided that Vicksburg Healthcare could renew its motion for summary judgment once the expert opinion had been submitted. Vicksburg Healthcare petitioned the Supreme Court for interlocutory appeal, arguing (1) that the trial court erred in denying its motion for summary judgment; and (2) that the trial court erred in granting Dees additional time to submit her expert's affidavit establishing her claim. The Supreme Court concluded the record was clear that the trial court erred in not granting Vicksburg Healthcare’s motion for summary judgment. The trial court was reversed and the matter remanded for further proceedings. View "Vicksburg Healthcare, LLC v. Dees" on Justia Law

In 1999 the County Court of Lauderdale County determined that Brian Bronk was the natural father of Margaret Hobson's minor child. In that same judgment, the court granted sole custody to Hobson. Soon after the child's birth, the county court entered a judgment ordering Bronk to pay child support to Hobson in the amount of $400 per month. In 2013, Bronk presented an ore tenus motion in which he contended that all of the orders and judgments related to child custody were invalid because the county court never had jurisdiction to determine custody in the first place. Upon review of this matter, the Supreme Court agreed: county courts do not have jurisdiction to make child custody determinations ab initio. Accordingly, the Court reversed the custody determination of the County Court of Lauderdale County and remanded the case to the county court with instructions to transfer the proceedings to chancery court. View "Bronk v. Hobson" on Justia Law

In June 2011 the Department of Revenue assessed additional individual, sales, and corporate taxes against taxpayers Southside, Inc. d/b/a Wines, Etc. and Barry and Sarabeth Artz. They appealed a Board of Tax ruling without satisfying the statutory requirements of paying the disputed taxes under protest before appealing or posting a surety bond with their appeal. Because the chancery court lacked appellate jurisdiction to hear the appeal, the chancellor granted the Department of Revenue’s motion to dismiss. Finding no reversible error, the Supreme Court affirmed. View "Southside, Inc. d/b/a Wines, Etc. v. Mississippi Department of Revenue" on Justia Law

Kenyatta Cheeks was entering an AutoZone store when he was struck by a vehicle driven by Jason Johnson. The jury returned a verdict for Cheeks in the amount of $2.5 million, finding that AutoZone was forty-five percent at fault and Johnson was fifty-five percent at fault. Later, the trial court granted AutoZone’s motion for judgment notwithstanding the verdict (JNOV). Cheeks appealed, arguing that granting AutoZone's motion was made in error. Viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to non-movant Cheeks, the jury had credible evidence to determine that an injury was reasonably foreseeable. The Supreme Court therefore reversed the trial court’s grant of JNOV in favor of AutoZone and remand the case to the trial court for further proceedings. View "Cheeks v. AutoZone, Inc." on Justia Law

The Supreme Court granted review of this personal-injury negligence action to clarify state law on the doctrine of claim-splitting. After new defendants were identified during discovery on her original complaint, Plaintiff Jeanette Carpenter filed a motion to amend her complaint to include the newly discovered defendants. A hearing could not be scheduled in time for the trial court to approve the amendment before the expiration of the three-year statute of limitations. In an effort to avoid losing the opportunity to bring the new defendants into the litigation, Carpenter filed a second action before the statute of limitations ran, based on the exact same set of facts, in the same court, and naming the same new defendants named in the motion to amend. The trial court dismissed both cases. The cases were consolidated for purpose of appeal. After review, the Supreme Court held that Carpenter’s procedural actions constituted impermissible claim-splitting as outlined in "Wilner v. White," (929 So. 2d 315 (Miss. 2006)). The Court reversed the Court of Appeals and affirmed the judgments of the Circuit Court. View "Carpenter v. Kenneth Thompson Builder, Inc." on Justia Law

Charlotte Perkins appealed a Circuit Court’s decision to dismiss her appeal claiming the Mississippi Department of Human Services (DHS) wrongly deprived her of receiving food stamps and that such deprivation was the result of a DHS hearing in which Perkins was deprived of procedural safeguards. The appeal was dismissed for lack of jurisdiction. The circuit court found no statutory authority created a right of appeal to the circuit court from an administrative decision by DHS regarding food-stamp qualification(s) or disqualification(s). The Supreme Court found that the circuit court was correct in dismissing the case for lack of jurisdiction. Mississippi caselaw provides, however, that where there is no statutory scheme for appeal from an agency decision and the injured party does not have a full, plain, complete and adequate remedy at law, the chancery court has jurisdiction for judicial review of the agency decision. Accordingly, the case was reversed and remanded with instructions to the circuit court to transfer the case to the Monroe County Chancery Court. View "Perkins v. Mississippi Department of Human Services" on Justia Law

In June 2011, fourteen-year-old Jean-ah Leon was seriously injured while operating a Bad Boy Buggy ( an off-road vehicle used for outdoor recreation). A year later, Jean-ah’s parents, Vincent and Mandi Leon, filed a products liability and personal injury lawsuit in Louisiana against the owner of the Bad Boy Buggy, a Louisiana resident. They also named the owner’s insurer, the Textron Parties, and several other entities and individuals. Within a few days, the Leons dismissed all parties except the vehicle owner and his insurer from the Louisiana case. The Leons filed suit in Adams County, Mississippi, against the Textron Parties and the others previously named in the Louisiana suit, seeking damages of “an amount not yet determined” but greater than $10,000,000. The Leons served that complaint and summonses on the Textron Parties through their registered agents in Mississippi. They amended their complaint, adding claims for gross negligence and punitive damages. The Leons did not issue new summonses to the Textron Parties with the amended complaint; instead, they sent copies to the Textron Parties’ headquarters by certified mail with accompanying letters addressed “To Whom it May Concern.” The Textron Parties’ attorney in the Louisiana case also requested and received a copy of the amended complaint by email. The Textron Parties’ answer was due thirty days after they were served with the original complaint. They did not file an answer to the original complaint or the amended complaint. The Leons then sought a default judgment against the Textron Parties based on the amended complaint. An entry of default and default judgment were entered the same day. The issue this case presented for the Mississippi Supreme Court's review arose from that default judgment: the Textron Parties claimed that the default judgment was void and should have been set aside because they did not receive proper service of the amended complaint, they were not given notice of the default judgment, and the plaintiffs failed to state a claim against them. Additionally, the Textron Parties asserted that a three-pronged balancing test for relief from default judgments required that it be set aside because they had a colorable defense and the plaintiffs would not be prejudiced. The Supreme Court held that the default judgment was not void, but it should have been set aside under the three-pronged test. View "BB Buggies, Inc. v. Leon" on Justia Law