Justia Mississippi Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

A group of residents (“the Neighbors”) appealed three separate zoning decisions of the City of Ocean Springs Board of Alderman to the Jackson County Circuit Court. The circuit court, sitting as an appellate court pursuant to Mississippi Code Section 11-51-75 (Rev. 2019), consolidated the appeals and reversed the City’s zoning decisions in two of the appeals and remanded the first appeal to the City board. The City then appealed whether the circuit court lacked jurisdiction to review the decisions when W. Lee Brumfield, who was an applicant before the City, was not included as a party to the Neighbors’ appeal. Due to the Mississippi Supreme Court’s intervening decision in Longo v. City of Waveland, 353 So. 3d 437 (Miss. 2022), and the fact that the circuit court did not address the issue in its ruling, the Supreme Court found that Brumfield’s status as a petitioner could not be determined at this point. The case was remanded to the circuit court for a factual determination as to whether Brumfield is a petitioner under Section 11-51-75. View "City of Ocean Springs v. Illanne, et al." on Justia Law

Charlene Thomas sustained several injuries as a result of a fall she suffered while descending stairs leading to the pool deck of the IP Casino Resort Spa (the IP). In an amended complaint, Thomas asserted a negligence claim against Boyd Biloxi LLC (Boyd), owner of the IP, alleging that Boyd had knowledge of a dangerous condition on the pool deck landing of its stairs and failed to warn its patrons or fix the condition. Following discovery, the trial court held that Thomas had failed to present sufficient evidence of causation and granted Boyd’s motion for summary judgment. Thomas appealed. The Court of Appeals affirmed the trial court’s judgment. After granting Thomas’ petition for certiorari review, the Mississippi Supreme Court held that it was error for the trial court to grant summary judgment because genuine issues of material fact remained. Thus, the Court reversed both the appellate and circuit court judgments and remanded for further proceedings. View "Thomas v. Boyd Biloxi, LLC" on Justia Law

At issue in this interlocutory appeal before the Mississippi Supreme Court was whether the statute of limitations has run on Sabrina Fairman’s malpractice claims against Franklin County Memorial Hospital. Fairman alleged she was injured as a result of negligent treatment in the Hospital’s emergency room. She served a timely notice of claim on the Hospital’s CEO that correctly identified the Hospital as the responsible party. But when she filed suit, Fairman named as defendants “The Foundation for a Healthy Franklin County d/b/a Franklin County Memorial Hospital” as well as several John Does. According to the Hospital, it “is not, and never has been, the d/b/a of the Foundation.” Fairman filed an amended complaint naming the Hospital correctly and then voluntarily dismissed the Foundation as a party by agreed order. She then served the amended complaint on the Hospital’s CEO within 120 days of the timely filing of the original complaint. The Hospital moved to dismiss on statute of limitations grounds, but the circuit court denied the motion. This case was presented to the Supreme Court as hinging on the doctrine of misnomer: whether Fairman’s original complaint named the Hospital as the defendant under the wrong name. The Hospital contended that Mississippi Rule of Civil Procedure 21 required Fairman to secure leave of the court before amending her complaint. Ultimately, we conclude that this is not a case of misnomer, but the trial court was nonetheless correct to refuse to dismiss the case. Rule 21 should not be read to require a court order when an amended complaint could otherwise be filed as a matter of course and the amendment merely corrects a misidentification of the defendant by substituting a new defendant for an old one. Under Rule 15, Fairman’s amended complaint related back to the time of the filing of the first complaint for statute of limitations purposes, and the original complaint was timely. The Supreme Court therefore affirmed the trial court’s order denying the Hospital’s motion to dismiss, and remanded the case for further proceedings. View "Franklin County Memorial Hospital v. Fairman" on Justia Law

Wilburn Lord, Jr. agreed to sell SEL Business Services, LLP and Skip Lloyd (collectively, SEL) a building in Rolling Fork, Mississippi, for $60,000. SEL moved into the building and alleged to have begun making improvements and paying the taxes. But Lord never followed through with the sale. Instead, Lord sold the building to Sharkey Issaquena Community Hospital, a community hospital operated by Sharkey and Issaquena Counties (collectively, Hospital Defendants). SEL initially sought to enjoin the sale. In an amended complaint, in addition to seeking the injunction, SEL alleged Lord breached his contract with SEL to sell the building. SEL requested specific performance. Alternatively, SEL alleged detrimental reliance and promissory estoppel. SEL finally requested, “should the Court find that specific performance, promissory estoppel and/or equitable estoppel are somehow inapplicable and/or the Contract should not otherwise be enforced based on the principles of equity and/or other grounds/for other reasons, . . . [that] the Court disgorge all funds paid to Defendants and/or otherwise award all monetary damages available under Mississippi law.” Both Lord and the Hospital Defendants moved for summary judgment, claiming the statute of frauds barred not only SEL’s contract-based claim for specific performance but also any “derivative” equitable claims. Both the chancery and Court of Appeals relied on Barriffe v. Estate of Nelson, 153 So. 3d 613 (Miss. 2014) to conclude that the statute of frauds barred not just claims for equitable liens but all potential equitable remedies. The Mississippi Supreme Court granted SEL’s petition for writ of certiorari to overrule the erroneous Barriffe decision and to reinstate the Supreme Court’s long-standing equitable principles. Consequently, the Supreme Court affirmed in part and reversed in part the judgment of the Court of Appeals. Specifically, the Court reversed the chancellor’s dismissal of SEL and Lloyd’s equitable claims against Lord. The Court affirmed the chancellor’s judgment of dismissal as to the remaining defendants. The case was remanded to the chancery court for further proceedings. View "SEL Business Services, LLC v. Lord, et al." on Justia Law

Robert and Gloria Brewer (the Brewers) alleged Luxe Homes, LLC failed to comply with the terms of their construction contract, and they filed suit at the Hinds County Chancery Court for specific performance, damages, fees and a declaratory judgment. Luxe Homes claimed in a motion to transfer venue that, according to the terms of the contract, the parties agreed to Rankin County Circuit Court as their exclusive forum. The chancellor denied the motion to transfer venue, and Luxe Homes petitioned for interlocutory appeal. The Mississippi Supreme Court granted the petition, and found the chancellor abused her discretion by denying Luxe Homes’ motion to transfer venue when the venue clauses, agreed to by the parties, unambiguously required that the parties resolve their disputes exclusively in Rankin County Circuit Court. Accordingly, the Supreme Court reversed the order of the chancellor and remanded this case with instructions to transfer venue to Rankin County Circuit Court. View "Luxe Homes, LLC v. Brewer" on Justia Law

In 2017, Charles Green was stabbed and killed. His body was found in a parking lot in front of an abandoned building. Deepak Jasco, LLC, owned and operated a convenience store in the adjacent lot. Luretha Green Palmer, Green’s sister and the executrix of his estate, filed a wrongful-death lawsuit and asserted a claim for premises liability based on negligent security. The circuit judge denied the motion for summary judgment, and the Mississippi Supreme Court granted an interlocutory appeal. Palmer did not allege that defendants had actual knowledge of the violent nature of Green’s attacker and offered no affidavit or evidence to establish this element. Instead, Palmer argued that Defendants were aware of an atmosphere of violence on their premises. Further, Palmer insisted that summary judgment was properly denied because there was a genuine issue of a material fact in dispute about whether Green was killed on Defendant’s premises at 1034 West Woodrow Wilson Drive and whether Deepak Jasco, LLC, exercised possession and control over the portion of the common parking lot where Green died from his injuries. The Mississippi Supreme Court did not agree with Palmer's contentions, finding she failed to establish an atmosphere of violence through police records of other instances of crime at or near the property in question, and that defendants owned or operated the property. With no genuine issue of material fact in dispute, the Court found defendants were entitled to summary judgment. View "Deepak Jasco, LLC, et al. v. Palmer" on Justia Law

Helen McNeal, who had been appointed administratrix of Delores Mason’s estate, brought a wrongful death claim against a physician, Dr. Eniola Otuseso. Upon learning that McNeal did not satisfy the qualifications to serve as an administratrix, Otuseso moved to intervene in the estate matter and to strike the letters of administration. The chancellor denied her motion. But the chancellor, upon learning that McNeal was not related to the decedent and that she was a convicted felon, removed McNeal as administratrix and appointed the decedent’s two siblings, who were Delores Mason’s heirs at law, as coadministrators of the estate. Otuseso appealed the chancellor’s decision to deny her motion to intervene and the decision to replace McNeal, with the decedent’s actual heirs at law. Otuseso argued she had a right to intervene in the estate matter and that the chancellor was without authority to substitute the decedent’s heirs as the new administrators. The Mississippi Supreme Court affirmed the chancellor’s decision to substitute and appoint the decedent’s siblings and heirs as the coadministrators of Mason’s estate. Because Otuseso sought to intervene in the estate matter to challenge McNeal’s qualifications as admininstratrix, the Supreme Court found that the question of intervention was moot as it no longer was at issue, due to the chancellor’s rightful removal of the unqualified administratrix and his appointment of successor coadministrators. View "Otuseso v. Estate of Delores Mason, et al." on Justia Law

Former City of Clarksdale Commissioner Charles Moton alleged that his December 2013 and May 2015 arrests at Clarksdale city commissioners meetings were in violation of "a litany" of his state constitutional rights. The trial court dismissed Moton’s claims because he failed to file suit within the statute of limitations. Finding no reversible error, the Mississippi Supreme Court affirmed the trial court's judgment. View "Moton v. City of Clarksdale" on Justia Law

In 2019, after Roosevelt Jones paid his annual rent more than thirty days late, the North Bolivar Consolidated School District, pursuant to a late penalty provision contained in the lease between the parties, assessed Jones a late fee for $11,028.60. Jones filed suit arguing, amongst other things, that the district should be estopped from enforcing the late payment penalty provision because it had a custom of accepting late rent payments without penalty. Jones argued he relied on the custom to his detriment when making his rent payment late. In August 2021, the school district moved for summary judgment, arguing that it could not be estopped by the unauthorized acts of its officials. The chancellor found that the district had failed to show the acts of its officials in accepting the late payments were not authorized. The school district sought interlocutory appeal of the denial of summary judgment, and was granted. The Mississippi Supreme Court concluded the school district was a trustee of sixteenth section school lands and, consequently, bore a statutory duty to collect all funds due from the sixteenth section properties that it leased. Any past failure by it to collect such funds was unauthorized as a matter of law and could not form the basis for estoppel. Therefore, the Supreme Court reversed the chancery court’s judgment and rendered judgment in favor of the school district. View "North Bolivar Consolidated School District v. Jones" on Justia Law

Following a vehicular accident, Martin Peteet entered into a release and settlement agreement with the driver of the other vehicle and her insurer. Peteet did not seek a waiver of subrogation or consent from his own automobile insurer, Mississippi Farm Bureau Casualty Insurance Company (Farm Bureau), prior to executing the release and settlement agreement. After the release and settlement agreement was executed, Peteet filed a complaint against Farm Bureau, seeking damages under the uninsured motorist (UM) provision in his auto policy with Farm Bureau. Farm Bureau moved to dismiss the complaint, and the county court denied the motion. Farm Bureau sought an interlocutory appeal, which the Mississippi Supreme Court granted. After a careful review of the law, the Supreme Court reversed the denial of the motion to dismiss and rendered judgment in favor of Farm Bureau. View "Mississippi Farm Bureau Casualty Insurance Company v. Peteet" on Justia Law