Justia Mississippi Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

Zachary Polk was indicted on three counts for the sale of methylenedioxymethamphetamine (MDMA), hydrocodone, and alprazolam. Polk entered a plea of guilty as to Count I for the sale of MDMA, and he was sentenced to serve ten years in the Mississippi Department of Corrections and ordered to pay a $5,000 fine. The district attorney “retired to files” Count II and Count III, based upon Polk entering a plea of guilty as to Count I. In 2012, Polk received a “full, complete, and unconditional pardon” from Governor Haley Barbour. Thereafter, Polk filed a petition for expungement seeking to have all records expunged relating to his earlier arrest and indictment. The trial court determined that it was without statutory or constitutional authority to expunge Polk’s record. There being no statutory basis for expungement of the record of the criminal conviction for which Polk was pardoned, the Supreme Court concluded the trial court correctly denied Polk’s petition to expunge the record(s) pertaining to his criminal conviction. As to Polk’s criminal records pertaining to Counts II and III, the Court found that those records were eligible for expungement pursuant to Mississippi Code Section 99-15-26(5). View "Polk v. Mississippi" on Justia Law

Danielle Hingle was convicted of sale of morphine, and sentenced to fifteen years in the custody of the Mississippi Department of Corrections. On appeal, Hingle argued that admission of the testimony of a crime laboratory analyst who reviewed and signed the lab report but did not test the pills violated her Sixth Amendment right of confrontation. Furthermore, she argued that the trial court erred by admitting the pills due to flaws in the chain of custody. Upon further review, the Supreme Court held that the trial court did not err by allowing the reviewing analyst to testify or by allowing the pills to be admitted. View "Hingle v. Mississippi" on Justia Law

Marlon Howell was convicted of capital murder and sentenced to death. On direct appeal, the Mississippi Supreme Court affirmed. Howell then sought post-conviction relief (PCR), claiming he was entitled to a new trial. The Court granted Howell’s petition for PCR in part, holding that he was entitled to an evidentiary hearing on certain delineated issues. The trial court held the evidentiary hearing and, finding no merit in the issues, denied Howell’s request for a new trial. Howell appealed. Howell’s claims regarding recanted testimony and witness statements were without merit, and the Supreme Court concluded the trial court did not err in denying his motion for a new trial. Howell was not under arrest for capital murder at the time of a police lineup, and he was not entitled to counsel at the pre-indictment lineup (even if Howell had been entitled to counsel, the failure to provide counsel during the lineup would have been harmless error because the lineup was not suggestive, and the witness' identification was reliable). Howell’s claims about Attorney General Hood participating in his trial lacked merit, and the trial court did not err in allowing him to participate. And finally, the Supreme Court concluded the trial judge did not err in denying Howell’s motion to supplement the record with new evidence after the evidentiary hearing. View "Howell v. Mississippi" on Justia Law

Plaintiffs Frank Schmidt Sr. and other former parishioners of the St. Paul Catholic Church in Pass Christian appealed the second dismissal with prejudice of their claims against the Catholic Diocese of Biloxi, Inc., Most Reverend Thomas J. Rodi, and Rev. Dennis Carver. In 2005, Hurricane Katrina ravaged the Mississippi Gulf Coast. The storm caused extensive damage to the St. Paul Catholic Church and its ancillary properties. The actual church building was also damaged, although the extent of the damage is disputed by the parties. Plaintiffs insisted that the church remains structurally sound, that many of its sacred articles were unharmed, and that repair costs should be less than $2.5 million. Church Defendants maintain that the church and its most sacred places were “destroyed in large part.” Bishop Rodi issued a decree merging the St. Paul and Our Lady of Lourdes Parishes to form a new parish called the Holy Family Parish. The decree stated that the Holy Family Parish would maintain two church edifices, St. Paul Church and Our Lady of Lourdes Church. A number of St. Paul’s former parishioners, including some of the Plaintiffs in this case, filed a canonical appeal through the Roman Catholic Church’s ecclesiastical tribunals. In 2007, the Vatican issued a decree which stated that Bishop Rodi had acted in accordance with the requirements and procedures set forth under canon law. While the canonical appeal was pending, 157 former parishioners filed suit asserting, in part, that Bishop Rodi held the St. Paul Church property in trust for the members, that any financial contributions designated for reconstruction of the church were held in trust for that particular purpose, that Church Defendants had violated said trusts, and that Father Carver had made misrepresentations in soliciting donations for the rebuilding efforts. The Mississippi Supreme Court affirmed in part, finding that Plaintiffs lacked standing to assert the St. Paul property was held in trust for their benefit. However, the Court reversed and remanded the chancellor’s dismissal of the diversion-of-designated funds claim, as well as the claim against Father Carver for intentional misrepresentation, finding subject-matter jurisdiction existed over these claims. On remand, the chancellor denied Plaintiffs’ motions for additional discovery and granted Church Defendants’ motion for summary judgment, dismissing Plaintiffs’ claims with prejudice. Plaintiffs argued on appeal that the chancellor erred in dismissing their claims for diversion of designated funds and intentional misrepresentation. Because none of the Plaintiffs established the requisite elements for a diversion of designated funds, the Supreme Court affirmed the grant of summary judgment on this issue. In addition, because no Plaintiffs could establish a claim for intentional misrepresentation, the Court affirmed the grant of summary judgment on this issue. Therefore, the Court affirmed the Chancery Court's judgment. View "Kinney v. Catholic Diocese of Biloxi, Inc." on Justia Law

Frank Gideon Whitaker IV and Cynthia Ann Grantham were involved in a car accident. The Circuit Court found Whitaker guilty of aggravated driving under the influence pursuant to Mississippi Code Section 63-11-30(5), sentenced him to twenty-five years and ordered Whitaker to pay Grantham $25,000. Whitaker argued two issue on appeal, in both, contending a blood sample taken from Whitaker following the collision while he remained unconscious should not have been admitted into evidence. The majority of the Supreme Court concluded that Whitaker failed to raise any issue of merit: his blood was not drawn pursuant to the Mississippi Implied Consent Act, and he failed to satisfy his burden of showing that the evidence was tampered with or substituted, defeating his chain-of-custody argument. Furthermore, the Court found Whitaker failed to present any evidence supporting his claim that the blood sample was not properly authenticated. View "Whitaker v. Mississippi" on Justia Law

Carey Witten was convicted in Sacramento County, California, of oral copulation and rape of a person “. . . unconscious of the nature of the act . . .” in violation of the California Penal Code. Witten was granted five years’ probation, and he received an order of dismissal after successful completion of his probation. Witten relocated to Mississippi and filed a petition for relief from the duty to register in Mississippi Code. At the hearing on the matter, Witten argued that his order of dismissal from California satisfied the requirements of Mississippi Code Section 45-33-47(4), such that Witten should have been relieved of the duty to register as a sex offender in Mississippi. The assistant district attorney agreed with Witten. The trial court also agreed and subsequently entered an order relieving Witten of the duty to register as a sex offender in Mississippi. R. Steven Coleman, on behalf of the Mississippi Department of Public Safety, Criminal Information Center, Sex Offenders Registry, filed a Mississippi Rule of Civil Procedure 60(b) motion to set aside and render as void the trial court’s order relieving Witten of the duty to register, based on Mississippi and California statutes that were not presented to the trial court at the hearing and that had bearing on whether or not Witten was required to register as a sex offender. The trial court ultimately granted the motion to set aside and render as void the earlier judgment. Witten appealed the Supreme Court, arguing the trial court erred as a matter of Mississippi law in its assessment of Mississippi Code Sections 45-33-23 and 45-33-47(4). The Court affirmed the trial court’s ruling, finding that Witten’s conviction had not been set aside or dismissed in accordance with Mississippi Code Section 45-33-47(4) and that Witten was required to continue registration as a sex offender in the State of Mississippi. View "Witten v. Mississippi" on Justia Law

Caleb Corrothers was convicted of two counts of capital murder, with the underlying felony of robbery, for the murders of Frank Clark and Taylor Clark. He was convicted on a third count of aggravated assault for the shooting of Tonya Clark. The jury sentenced Corrothers to death for the two counts of capital murder and to life imprisonment without the possibility of parole for the aggravated assault. The trial court denied Corrothers’s post-trial motions. He appealed. Finding no reversible error, the Supreme Court affirmed Corrothers’s convictions and sentences. View "Carothers v. Mississippi" on Justia Law

Because Rudy Quilon was homeless following his release from prison, defendant Harvill Richardson permitted Quilon to move into his home while he got back on his feet. Over the next five months, Quilon "became increasingly unwelcome" as he bragged about having been convicted for murder and armed robbery, his previous experiences as a gang member, and killing a “snitch” in prison. On numerous occasions, Richardson attempted to persuade Quilon to leave the home, but Quilon claimed that he could not leave because he had no transportation or place to go. The situation culminated when Quilon, who had begun watching pornography on Richardson’s computer, stated that he wanted to have sex with Richardson’s wife. Despite having been asked to leave, Quilon refused and walked out to a shed behind the home where Richardson kept axes and other tools that could be used as weapons. Richardson armed himself with a pistol. As Quilon returned from the shed, he approached Richardson in a threatening manner, with one arm concealed behind his back. Quilon kept coming toward him, so Richardson shot Quilon in the stomach. Richardson was prodecuted for murder. The trial judge ruled in limine that Richardson would not be allowed to support his self-defense claim with evidence of the victim’s prior bad acts, including a violent criminal history. Because Richardson's knowledge of this evidence would be highly probative of the reasonableness of his conduct and fear of the victim, the Supreme Court reversed and remanded the case for a new trial. View "Richardson v. Mississippi" on Justia Law

Defendant Joe Cotton was convicted of murder for the shooting death of Fannie Lee Burks. He appealed his conviction, challenging the sufficiency and the weight of the evidence. Finding no error, the Mississippi Supreme Court affirmed defendant's conviction and sentence. View "Cotton v. Mississippi" on Justia Law

Roger Gillett was convicted of two counts of capital murder for which he was sentenced to death. Gillett petitioned for post-conviction relief, raising six issues for the Supreme Court's review: (1) the underlying capital-murder aggravator of robbery was improperly expanded; (2) conviction of capital murder under the “continuous-action doctrine” was unconstitutional; (3) Gillett’s trial counsel was ineffective in failing to investigate Gillett’s background and to present an adequate mitigation case; (4) Gillett’s trial counsel were ineffective in failing to object to prosecutorial misconduct during the sentencing portion of his trial; (5) Gillett’s due-process rights were violated when the Mississippi Supreme Court reweighed the aggravating and mitigating factors; and, (6) cumulative error. Upon review of the briefs submitted by Gillett and the state, the Supreme Court found issues one and two were without merit; however, under issue five, Gillett’s due-process rights were violated in sentencing. Therefore, the Court granted Gillett’s petition in part and denied in part, vacated his death sentences and remanded the case to the circuit court for a new sentencing hearing. View "Gillett v. Mississippi" on Justia Law