Justia Mississippi Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

Robert Sherman was indicted for willfully, unlawfully, and feloniously possessing pseudoephedrine and sodium hydroxide with the unlawful intent to manufacture a controlled substance. He was tried and convicted then sentenced to twelve years in the custody of the Mississippi Department of Corrections, with eight years to serve and four years suspended, plus five years of post-release supervision. Sherman appealed, arguing that his conviction: (1) was based upon insufficient evidence; or (2) was against the overwhelming weight of the evidence. Finding no reversible error, the Supreme Court affirmed Sherman's conviction and sentence. View "Sherman v. Mississippi" on Justia Law

Dexter Fulton was convicted for receiving stolen property. The Court of Appeals affirmed Fulton’s conviction and sentence on direct appeal. The Supreme Court granted Fulton’s petition for writ of certiorari to determine whether Fulton’s indictment was fatally defective and whether the trial court erred in allowing an amendment of substance to Fulton’s indictment. The Supreme Court found error as to both issues and reversed the judgments of the Court of Appeals and the circuit court. The conviction was vacated. View "Fulton v. Mississippi" on Justia Law

Lyndon Myers was charged and convicted on multiple counts of armed robbery stemming from the 2012 robbery of a Madison Dollar Tree store. Myers raised five alleged errors from trial on appeal of his conviction. The Supreme Court found none and affirmed his convictions and sentences. View "Myers v. Mississippi" on Justia Law

Daryl Shinn was convicted of armed robbery for the 2011 robbery of Tiya's Market in Columbus. He was sentenced to twenty years in prison. He appealed, arguing that his conviction was contrary to the overwhelming weight of the evidence. The Supreme Court disagreed and affirmed his conviction. View "Shinn v. Mississippi" on Justia Law

A jury convicted Angela Johnson of one count of possession of methamphetamine, one count of possession of precursor chemicals, and one count of false pretense. The Court of Appeals affirmed Johnson's convictions, and the Supreme Court granted certiorari to resolve the question of whether the admission of two search warrants and an underlying facts-and-circumstances affidavit which included hearsay statements attributed to a confidential informant constituted reversible error. Because the Court concluded that the warrants and affidavits were admitted in error, the Court reversed the trial and appellate courts and remanded the case for a new trial. View "Johnson v. Mississippi" on Justia Law

Based on a citizen’s complaint that "young men . . . young black men . . . are standing out on the sidewalks, corners, selling drugs" on a street corner in Greenville, police proceeded to that area, where they spotted Tazarius Cooper, a young, black male. The police officer turned on his blue lights, exited his vehicle, and attempted to conduct an investigatory stop by ordering Cooper to "come here and let me talk to you." Before the officers could restrain him, Cooper ran. The officers gave chase, following Cooper into a home, where Cooper abandoned a bag containing a blue substance that tested positive for the drug known as ecstasy. The trial court denied Cooper’s motion to suppress the evidence, and Cooper was convicted. Upon review, the Supreme Court found that the citizen’s complaint was insufficient to establish a reasonable suspicion of Cooper, or to conduct a Terry stop. But because Cooper was not stopped, and because Cooper lacked standing to challenge the search of a home which did not belong to him, the Court affirmed the trial court’s decision. View "Cooper v. Mississippi" on Justia Law

Troy Chaupette was convicted of fondling his four-year-old great-niece. He appealed, arguing the trial court erred by: (1) allowing two fact witnesses to provide expert testimony; (2) permitting an improper comment on the victim’s truthfulness; and (3) admitting cumulative, hearsay testimony from six witnesses under the tender-years exception. Finding no reversible error, the Supreme Court affirmed Chaupette's convictions.View "Chaupette v. Mississippi" on Justia Law

In 2011, defendant was pulled over for suspicion of driving under the influence (DUI) after an officer observed him weaving between lanes. He resisted arrest and subsequently was indicted on two counts of assaulting a law-enforcement officer, possession of marijuana, possession of cocaine, and a first DUI. The indictment later was amended to reflect his habitual-offender status. The assault charges eventually were dropped. Defendant engaged Gerald Green, a Tennessee attorney, to represent him. Green submitted a verified application and affidavit to appear pro hac vice, listing the enumerated requirements of Mississippi Rule of Appellate Procedure 46(b)(5), including the statement that Green "has associated Attorney Daniel O. Lofton, a member in good standing of the Mississippi Bar as local counsel in this case . . . ." The application included a Certificate of Local Attorney signed by Daniel Lofton and a Certificate of Payment for the pro hoc vice fee of $200 to the Clerk of the Mississippi Supreme Court. Green submitted a Motion to Dismiss Prosecution and a Request for Discovery on defendant's behalf. These two motions were signed and submitted only by Green. Additionally, Green's bar number as listed next to his signature on these motions did not indicate in which state Green was licensed. Green represented defendant at an August 7, 2012, hearing in which the court denied the Motion to Dismiss and granted the State's Motion to Amend the Indictment charging defendant as a habitual offender under Mississippi Code Section 99-19-81. Green had not at that time been approved to proceed pro hac vice, and associated attorney Lofton was not present at the hearing. The court subsequently denied an August 17, 2012, Motion to Continue Trial filed by Green. After the jury was selected, the court approved Green's application to proceed pro hac vice and waived the requirement that local counsel be present during trial. The State had no objection to the trial proceeding without the presence of local counsel. After a one-day trial, defendant was convicted of possession of marijuana, possession of cocaine, and first-offense DUI. The Supreme Court never received an order approving Green's admission to proceed pro hac vice. Green stated at the post-trial motions hearing that "I didn't submit any order. I didn't think anything else was required after we had our proceedings in this court. They [Mississippi Supreme Court Clerk] sent back the cases that I had been in, and they approved that I had paid the money." Daniel Lofton, the associated attorney, testified at the post-trial motions hearing that he understood his role and obligations to be limited to certifying that Green was an attorney in good standing in Tennessee on Green's pro hoc vice application, and that he would be notified if his involvement was further required. Lofton never met or communicated with defendant. At the post-trial motions hearing, defendant asserted that he never knew Green was not licensed to practice in Mississippi. Defendant hired a new attorney immediately following the trial and was represented by the new attorney at the post-trial motions hearing, sentencing hearing, and on this appeal. The Supreme Court reversed defendant's convictions and remanded for a new trial due to the trial court's and counsel's failure to comply with Mississippi Rule of Appellate Procedure 46 governing the admission of foreign attorneys to practice pro hoc vice. Most significantly, the trial court erred in waiving the now-mandatory requirement that associated local counsel be present at trial. View "Newberry v. Mississippi" on Justia Law

A mother sued the Department of Human Services (DHS) after the death of her son in the home in which DHS placed him. Austin Watkins was removed from the home of his mother, Tammy Watkins, and placed in the home of his paternal grandmother, Janice Mowdy. Approximately a year and a half after Mowdy was awarded durable legal custody of Austin, Austin died from starvation. The trial court granted DHS’s motion for summary judgment, determining that DHS enjoyed sovereign immunity from liability for the acts alleged in the complaint. Upon review of the facts and circumstances of this case, the Supreme Court concluded the trial court erred in granting summary judgment. Accordingly, the Court reversed the trial court and remanded the case for further proceedings. View "Watkins v. Mississippi Dept. of Human Services" on Justia Law

Zachariah Stennis sued Moss Point School District (MPSD) and several school-district officials for injuries she sustained in an off campus assault by a fellow student and the student’s mother. MPSD filed a motion for summary judgment and a motion to dismiss, which were denied by the circuit court. Upon denial of its motion for reconsideration, MPSD filed this interlocutory appeal. The Supreme Court reversed and remanded, finding that the circuit court erroneously found that MPSD’s duty of ordinary care to provide a safe school environment applied in this case. However, the student handbook evidence presented at trial arguably imposed a duty on the school to report the threat. Based on the record before it, the Supreme Court could not make that determination. As such, the case was remanded for consideration of whether the student handbook imposed such a duty. View "Moss Point School Districtv. Stennis" on Justia Law