Justia Mississippi Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

This case stemmed from a family dispute. Eugene Barriffe, and his wife, Ernie, gave money to Ernie’s brother, Lawson Nelson, to start a landfill business in Jackson County. The Barriffes testified that Lawson approached them for an initial “investment” of $100,000—and later, a second “investment” of $65,000—into his idea to start a landfill business. In return, the Barriffes understood they were to receive two-thirds of the profits from the landfill business, with payments to begin when Eugene retired. Nelson denied the conversation and denied receiving the “investments” from the Barriffes. The Barriffes sued to receive compensation for the money they gave to Nelson to start the business business, and for improvements they made to an apartment on his land. The chancellor found that Nelson held the money and improvements in a constructive trust. But because the Barriffes failed to establish the existence of a constructive trust, the Supreme Court reversed in part and remanded for further proceedings. View "Barriffe v. Estate of Nelson" on Justia Law

Charles Blackmon and Dexter Booth sued Malaco, Inc.; N.J. Pockets, Inc.; and Callop Hampton (owner of Hamp’s Place Night Club) on a premises-liability claim. Plaintiffs settled with Malaco. At trial, the jury returned a verdict in favor of Hampton. Hampton filed a post-trial motion, requesting the trial court to impose sanctions against Blackmon, Booth, and their attorney for filing a frivolous lawsuit and to award attorney fees. The motion was denied, and Hampton appealed that judgment to the Supreme Court. Finding no abuse of discretion, the Supreme Court affirmed. View "Hampton v. Blackmon" on Justia Law

James Forbes settled a personal-injury action while he was represented by Louis St. Martin. Forbes later sued St. Martin, challenging the validity of his contingency-fee arrangement and the associated attorneys’ fees. The Chancery Court granted summary judgment to St. Martin; the Court of Appeals reversed the chancery court’s decision and remanded the case for further proceedings. Upon review of the matter, the Supreme Court reversed the Court of Appeals’ judgment, finding that summary judgment in favor of St. Martin was proper. View "In the Matter of the Estate of Louis St. Martin, Deceased: Forbes v. Hixson" on Justia Law

This case arose out of a fee dispute between associated attorneys arising out of mass-tort cases in Copiah County between 2005 and 2010. The first appeal arose out of a joint-venture agreement between Don Mitchell and the law firm of Sweet & Freeese, PLLC. The second appeal stemmed from an alleged oral referral agreement between McHugh Fuller Law Group, PLLC, and the members of the joint venture. The appellants in this consolidated appeal challenged the County Chancery Court’s denial of their motions to compel arbitration of claims brought against them by Mitchell and the McHugh Fuller Law Group, PLLC. Finding no error, the Supreme Court affirmed. View "Freese v. Mitchell" on Justia Law

In consolidated cases, thirty-two plaintiffs who signed delayed-deposit check agreements with Zippy Check Advance agreed that Zippy Check could pursue judicial remedies against them to collect the debt, while any and all of their claims would be relegated to arbitration. The circuit courts found the arbitration agreements to be unconscionable and denied Zippy Check’s motions to compel arbitration. The Court of Appeals affirmed as to one version of the agreement and reversed as to the other. Upon review, the Supreme Court found that both versions of the arbitration agreement were so one-sided that they were substantively unconscionable and unenforceable. The Court affirmed in part and reversed in part the judgment of the Court of Appeals and affirmed the judgments of the Circuit Court of Clarke County and the Circuit Court of Newton County. View "Caplin Enterprises, Inc. v. Arrington" on Justia Law

Dr. Steven Hayne appealed the trial court’s grant of summary judgment in favor of his former medical malpractice insurer, The Doctors Company and The Doctors Company Insurance Services (collectively, “The Doctors”). The Doctors refused to cover Hayne for lawsuits brought by exonerated criminal defendants against whom Hayne had testified as a State’s witness. Kennedy Brewer sued Hayne for malicious prosecution, fraud, and negligent misrepresentation in the Circuit Court of Noxubee County, Mississippi, and later in federal district court. Hayne sought coverage under a medical malpractice insurance policy he had purchased from The Doctors. The Doctors declined to provide coverage, arguing that Brewer was not a "patient" under Hayne’s medical malpractice insurance policy, and that the company therefore was under no obligation to cover Hayne in relation to the suit brought by Brewer. Hayne argued in his suit against The Doctors that The Doctors knew when it issued the policy exactly what kind of medicine he practiced, and that the insurance policy covered him for the types of medical malpractice suits he might face, including the suit filed by Brewer. The Doctors moved for summary judgment, arguing that the policy language was clear and unambiguous in the kind of coverage provided, and that the suit by Brewer did not fall within the policy’s coverage. The Circuit Court agreed, and, despite a lack of in-depth discovery, granted the motion for summary judgment. Finding no reversible error, the Supreme Court affirmed. View "Hayne v. The Doctors Company" on Justia Law

In 1987, Joseph Bagley purchased a cancer and dread-disease policy through his friend and insurance agent, Jackie McPhail. The policy was issued by American Heritage Life Insurance Company. McPhail worked as an independent insurance broker, and she was a registered agent with American Heritage at the time the policy was written. The policy indicated that Bagley purchased coverage concerning cancer and dread disease, a home-recovery rider, and a hospital intensive-care rider. Bagley also had an option to purchase life insurance; however, McPhail testified that Bagley did not purchase life insurance under this policy because he had purchased a separate life-insurance policy. In 2008, Bagley was diagnosed with cancer. Bagley contacted McPhail to file a claim under the policy and to "change the beneficiary" of the policy from his estate to Michael and Betty Strait. McPhail testified that she had ceased writing policies for American Heritage; however, she still retained the authority to service Bagley's policy, and she acquired his written consent to receive information regarding his policy from the insurance company. While Bagley was in the hospital, McPhail presented an American Heritage change-of-beneficiary form, which Bagley ultimately signed. The signature was witnessed by Bagley's physician, a nurse, and McPhail. Bagley orally communicated that he wished for the beneficiary to be changed from his estate to the Straits. At the time that Bagley signed the form, the Straits had yet to be listed as beneficiaries on the form. McPhail met with the Straits after the form was signed to confirm their correct legal names to be placed on the change-of-beneficiary form at a later time. McPhail provided that she did not fully complete the form because she was attempting to contact American Heritage to confirm the correct procedure for completing the process; however, American Heritage's office was closed because of Hurricane Fay, and McPhail never succeeded in speaking with American Heritage regarding the matter. Bagley's physician, who witnessed Bagley signing the form, later communicated to Betty Strait that his attorney advised that the form could not be used because the Straits' names were not listed on the form prior to Bagley's signature. Betty Strait relayed this to McPhail, who then attempted to contact American Heritage's legal department. McPhail called the company on multiple occasions, but she never received a return phone call. Soon thereafter, Bagley passed away, and the form was never completed. The estate was probated and the Straits did not contest the passage of the policy proceeds to the estate at the time that the estate was being settled. The executor of Bagley's will, William Kinstley, petitioned for the approval of the estate's final accounting, which included the policy proceeds. The Straits initiated legal action against McPhail and American Heritage in Hinds County Circuit Court, arguing that Bagley intended for them to receive the proceeds from the cancer policy. The Straits alleged breach of contract, tortious breach of contract, negligence and gross negligence, breach of fiduciary duties and the duty of good faith and fair dealing, bad-faith refusal to pay benefits and to promptly and adequately investigate the claim, misrepresentation and/or failure to procure, promissory and/or equitable estoppel, and they sought a claim for declaratory relief. McPhail filed a motion to dismiss, which was granted by the circuit court. The circuit court found that the issue had been previously litigated and resolved in chancery court, and that no appeal had been taken from the chancery court judgment. Likewise, the circuit court granted American Heritage's motion for summary judgment, finding that there were no genuine issues of material fact to be resolved. The Court of Appeals reversed the judgment and remanded the case, finding that genuine issues of material fact did exist and that res judicata and collateral estoppel did not bar the Straits' claims. Because the Straits failed to raise any issues upon which relief may be granted, the circuit court's grant of McPhail's motion to dismiss was proper. However, the circuit court erred in granting the motion to dismiss based on res judicata and collateral estoppel. Furthermore, the circuit court properly granted American Heritage's motion for summary judgment: the Straits were never eligible to be third-party beneficiaries under the policy, and they have failed to show any equitable entitlement to reimbursement. For those reasons, the Supreme Court reversed the judgment of the Court of Appeals and reinstated the circuit court's judgment. View "Strait v. McPhail " on Justia Law

Sam Woodruff owned land in Rankin County. He agreed to sell a part of that land to Rita Thames, his first cousin’s daughter, who was also a neighbor. Woodruff claimed that he agreed to sell Thames one acre from a tract of land for the purchase price of $9,750. Thames claims that Woodruff agreed to sell her 6.53 acres from a different tract of land for that amount. Woodruff claimed that Thames then brought him a blank contract of sale to sign, which he did. Thames appears to claim that the blank contract of sale included attachments that described the land; however, the appellate record contained no evidence of this. The trial court entered a default judgment awarding specific performance in favor of the Thames. Woodruff moved to have the default judgment set aside, and the trial court denied the motion, finding that Woodruff lacked good cause for the default and lacked a “compelling defense.” The Supreme Court concluded after its review of the trial court record that serious question remained regarding whether a valid contract existed between the parties, giving the seller a colorable defense. Because the trial court abused its discretion by failing to set aside the default judgment, the Supreme Court reversed the trial court’s judgment and remanded the case for proceedings on the merits. View "Woodruff v. Thames" on Justia Law

Machon Lyons suffered severe injuries as the result of an automobile accident. The accident occurred when a vehicle operated by Roderick Holliday left the road and collided with a tree. As a result, Lyons obtained a default judgment of $72,500 against Holliday. Holliday's mother, Daisy Lang, insured the vehicle through Direct General Insurance Company of Mississippi. Lang's policy included a provision specifically excluding Holliday from any coverage under the policy. Accordingly, Direct denied coverage for the judgment. Lyons sought a declaratory judgment, asking the Circuit Court to hold that Lang's policy covered the judgment against Holliday. Lyons acknowledged the policy exclusion, but argued that Lang's policy covered the judgment against Holliday because Mississippi law required minimum-liability coverage for all permissive drivers, and because Lang's insurance card failed to mention any permissive-driver exclusions. The circuit court granted summary judgment in favor of Direct, finding that the policy clearly and specifically excluded coverage of Holliday. The Court of Appeals reversed, finding that 63-15-4(2)(a) required liability insurance for all vehicles operated in Mississippi and that Mississippi Code Section 63-15-43 required that the liability insurance policy "pay on behalf of the named insured and any other person, as insured, using any such motor vehicle or motor vehicles with the express or implied permission of such named insured." Although the Court of Appeals reached the right result, it cited as its authority the incorrect statute, so the Supreme Court granted certiorari. The Court concluded the policy exclusion violated Mississippi law: even though Holliday was an excluded driver under the Direct General policy issued to Daisy Lang, the exclusion did not operate to eliminate liability coverage in the minimum amounts required by statute. The trial court's grant of summary judgment was reversed and the case remanded for further proceedings. View "Lyons v. Direct General Insurance Company of Mississippi " on Justia Law

In 2007, Plaintiff Chris Snopek proposed working on the concept of a multi-use sports complex to be built on land in Madison. The parties collaborated over the designs and plans for the complex, and entered into a letter of intent. The letter of intent expired, but Snopek alleged that the parties continued to move forward with the project. Years later, Snopek contacted D1 TN, a Tennessee company, with regard to working on the project. Snopek introduced D1 TN to St. Dominic. In late 2011, D1 TN published its collaboration with D1 TN in the building of the facility in Madison, with no mention of Snopek (or his companies, Joshua Properties, LLC and Performance Sports Academy, LLC). Snopek filed suit against St. Dominic, D1 TN, alleging breach of fiduciary duties, misappropriation of trade secrets, tortious interference with prospective advantage, unfair competition, civil conspiracy and usurpation of business opportunity. On interlocutory appeal to the Supreme Court, Snopek argued the trial court erred in dismissing D1 TN for lack of personal jurisdiction. Finding that personal jurisdiction existed over D1 TN, the Supreme Court reversed the trial court’s order. View "Joshua Properties, LLC v. D1 Sports Holdings, LLC" on Justia Law