Justia Mississippi Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

This case involved a residence that the plaintiff homeowners allege contained "major structural defects." After discovering these defects and notifying the builder, the parties entered a "tolling agreement" to toll the applicable limitations period, so they could "engage in a review and analysis of the structural settlement issues to determine an agreed upon repair." After the builder refused to correct the defects, the plaintiffs filed suit averring breach of the New Home Warranty Act (NHWA); breach of the implied warranty of merchantability and fitness for a particular purpose; implied warranty of construction performed in a workmanlike manner; negligence; and fraud/misrepresentation/and/or omission of fact. In response, the defendant builder asserted the claims were time-barred and that the tolling agreement was void. This appeal arose from the trial court's grant of summary judgment in favor of the defendant. Upon review, the Supreme Court reversed the trial court's ruling that the tolling agreement was void: "Parties should not be discouraged from honest efforts to settle and/or compromise disputes, and thereby avoid incurring the attendant expenses and uncertainty of litigation and further burdening the courts – all laudable and desired goals. . . .parties should be allowed to agree to extend statutes of limitations (or repose) if they believe this to be in their best interest; however, the limitation period should not be shortened, absent an act of the Legislature." View "Townes v. Rusty Ellis Builder, Inc." on Justia Law

In July 2001, Kaye Hankins entered into a home-construction contract with Elite Homes, Inc. ("Elite"). An August 2001 soil-test report on the subject property recommended that "a stabilizing blanket of natural silty clays . . . and/or compacted fill soils having a maximum 7-foot thickness" was required "to minimize the Yazoo Clay . . . swell or heave potential to within limits tolerable to a strong slab foundation . . . ." Hankins received assurances from Elite that the Yazoo clay "was nothing to be concerned about." She moved into the new home in April 2002. During Hankins's first year in the home, she reported to Elite numerous cracks, leaks, and difficulties in closing doors and windows. In September 2009, Hankins filed a complaint against Elite averring "that the damage which has occurred to said house . . . would not have occurred except for the negligence" of Elite. Thereafter, a "Default Judgment" of was entered against Elite. In August 2010, Hankins filed a "Suggestion for Writ of Garnishment" against Elite's commercial general liability ("CGL") insurer, Maryland Casualty Company/Zurich American Insurance Company ("Maryland Casualty"). In October 2010, a default judgment was entered against Maryland Casualty. Subsequently, Maryland Casualty filed a "Motion to Suspend Execution of Default Judgment against Maryland Casualty and For Leave to File Answer to Writ of Garnishment," which argued, inter alia, that because its CGL policy "exclud[ed] coverage for property damage caused by earth movement," then it "has no property or effects in its possession belonging to" Elite. Maryland Casualty then filed a "Motion for Summary Judgment" on the same basis. The circuit court concluded that the "earth movement" endorsement "excludes the damages suffered by [Hankins] from coverage under the policy." Based thereon, the circuit court granted summary judgment in favor of the insurance company, and set aside the default judgment. Upon review, the Supreme Court found Maryland Casualty's "earth movement" endorsement was unambiguous and operated to exclude the property damage Hankins suffered from coverage under the CGL policy. Accordingly, the Court affirmed the circuit court's order granting summary judgment to the insurance company, and the setting aside of the default judgment. View "Hankins v. Maryland Casualty Company" on Justia Law

The plaintiffs (collectively "Tellus") alleged that they owned the "shallow gas" rights in a tract of land known as the Bilbo A Lease. While ownership of the shallow gas was disputed, all parties agreed that the defendants (collectively "TPIC") owned the gas rights below 8,000 feet and the oil rights in both the shallow and deep zones. In 2004, Tellus sued TPIC, alleging that it had produced Tellus's shallow gas through one if its wells known as the A-1 well. After much pretrial litigation and a two-month jury trial, the trial judge declared that the plaintiffs were the rightful owners and submitted the plaintiffs' conversion and negligence claims to a jury. The jury returned a general verdict in favor of the defendants, and both sides appealed. Finding no reason to reverse, the Supreme Court affirmed the jury verdict and the trial court's declaratory judgment. View "Tellus Operating Group, LLC, v. Texas Petroleum Investment Co." on Justia Law

For four years, subcontractor Precision Welding, Inc. provided construction services to Denbury Onshore, LLC, under an oral agreement. Denbury, claiming its contract with Precision was terminable at will, terminated the relationship in 2006. Precision filed suit, claiming Denbury had breached its obligation to keep Denbury on the job until the completion of the project. A jury found for Precision and awarded it $1,500,000 in damages. But because the oral contract between Denbury and Precision was for a particular hourly rate for work performed and not for any particular or definite time period, the Supreme Court held that the contract was terminable at will, and reversed the jury verdict. The Court remanded for a new trial on the issue of whether, under the circumstances, Denbury provided Precision reasonable notice of the termination and, if not, the damages it proximately caused. View "Denbury Onshore, LLC v. Precision Welding, Inc." on Justia Law

Business Communications, Inc. (BCI) asserted two breach-of-contract claims against its former employee, Albert Banks: breach of BCI's business-protection agreement (BPA), which included a noncompetition provision, and breach of BCI's reimbursement-of-costs agreement (RCA). At trial, the jury awarded BCI $1,000 for breach of the BPA and $9,000 for breach of the RCA. Thereafter, the Circuit Court of Madison County granted Banks’s motion for judgment notwithstanding the verdict (JNOV). Subsequently, the Mississippi Court of Appeals affirmed the circuit court's grant of JNOV as to the RCA, but reversed regarding the BPA, "reinstat[ing] the jury's verdict [of $1,000], and remand[ing the] case to the trial court to consider BCI's motion for attorney's fees." The Supreme Court granted Banks's petition for writ of certiorari to address the elements of a breach-of-contract claim involving a noncompete agreement and the nature of the damages to which BCI was entitled. Regarding the elements of a breach-of-contract claim, the Court held that monetary damages were a remedy for breach of contract, not an element of the claim. As to damages for breach of the BPA, BCI acknowledged it had sustained no identifiable loss. But because (1) the jury was instructed on both compensatory and nominal damages, (2) the special-verdict form did not specify the type of damages awarded, and (3) the jury's award of $1,000 was well within the continuum of legitimate nominal damage awards, the Court affirmed the Court of Appeals' reinstatement of that jury verdict. The Court also affirmed the Court of Appeals' decision to remand to the circuit court to consider BCI's motion for attorney's fees. View "Business Communications, Inc. v. Banks" on Justia Law

Carolyn Epperson filed a complaint against SOUTHBank in circuit court alleging that the bank had breached its contract with her by failing to give her the funds from certain certificates of deposit upon her request. The bank had denied Epperson's request because she did not present the original certificates. The trial court granted summary judgment for SOUTHBank, finding that contractual language required presentation of the original certificates for withdrawal. Epperson appealed the trial court's judgment, and the Supreme Court assigned the case to the Court of Appeals. The Court of Appeals reversed the trial court’s judgment and rendered judgment in favor of Epperson. SOUTHBank filed a petition for writ of certiorari, which the Supreme Court granted. Upon review, the Court found that the contractual language pertaining to withdrawals gave SOUTHBank discretion to require certain forms to be used for withdrawal, to refuse or restrict early withdrawals, and to assess penalties for early withdrawal. These terms were consistent and allowed SOUTHBank to require presentation of the original CD or CDs for withdrawal. The contract was unambiguous, and the trial court's grant of summary judgment was therefore appropriate. View "Epperson v. SouthBank" on Justia Law

Two appeals are were consolidated from chancery-court cases. In the first case, Diamondhead Country Club and Property Owners Association, Inc. sued Thomas R. Alfonso, III, and Anne Scafidi Cordova,1 d/b/a Bay Jourdan Publishing Co. (BJP) for breach of a contract to publish "The Diamondhead News." In 1997, the chancery court entered a preliminary injunction order preventing BJP from publishing "The Diamondhead News," selling advertising, collecting or disposing of advertising revenues derived from the publication the paper, and interfering with the printing, publication, or distribution of "The Diamondhead News." The chancery court also found that an arbitration clause in the publishing contract was inapplicable to the lawsuit. The chancery court denied BJP’s two subsequent motions to compel arbitration of the breach-of-contract dispute. BJP appealed the chancery court’s latest denial of arbitration. In the second case, BJP sued Diamondhead and Gulf Publishing Co., Inc., d/b/a "The Sun Herald" (“Gulf Publishing”), for intentional interference with the publishing contract. Gulf Publishing filed a motion for summary judgment. The court granted summary judgment to Gulf Publishing and directed the entry of a final judgment as to Gulf Publishing pursuant to Mississippi Rule of Civil Procedure 54(b). BJP appealed the grant of summary judgment. Upon review, the Supreme Court affirmed the chancery court’s order denying BJP’s third motion to compel arbitration because the issue was ruled upon previously, and no appeal was taken. Finding genuine issues of material fact for trial, the Court reversed the chancery court’s order granting summary judgment to Diamondhead and Gulf Publishing, and remanded the second case for further proceedings. View "Alfonso v. Gulf Publishing Co., Inc." on Justia Law

Gary Fordham, David Thompson, and Venture Sales, LLC appealed a chancery court order that dissolved Venture Sales pursuant to Mississippi Code Section 79-29-802 (Rev. 2009). Walter Ray Perkins owned 27.7 acres of land. Sometime in the late 90s, he was approached by Fordham and Thompson about a potential business venture involving his land. Perkins, Fordham, and Thompson eventually agreed that Fordham and Thompson would acquire the 438 acres of land that adjoined Perkins's land; the parties would combine their respective land, along with some cash, and form a venture to develop the land. Following the contributions, the operating agreement of Venture Sales was revised to reflect the arrangement. The parties signed the new operating agreement in 2000. In February 2010, Perkins filed an application for judicial dissolution of Venture Sales. Following a trial, the chancellor found that, based on the property's history, the company's inability to get funding for development, and the uncertainty regarding the economic climate in the area, it was not reasonably practicable to carry on the business of Venture Sales. The chancellor therefore ordered the company dissolved. Upon review, the Supreme Court determined that the chancellor's decision to order the dissolution of Venture Sales was not an abuse of discretion: substantial evidence existed supporting the chancellor's determination that it was not reasonably practicable for Venture Sales to carry on business in conformity with its operating agreement. View "Venture Sales, LLC v. Perkins" on Justia Law

Precious Martin and Associates, PLLC (Martin) contracted with T. Jackson Lyons & Associates, P.A. (Lyons) to handle appeal work on several of Martin's cases. After Martin stopped paying for the work, Lyons filed a complaint in the County Court alleging breach of contract and claiming $14,543.19 owed on open account. The county court awarded Lyons $14,543.19 in damages and $4,847.73 in attorney's fees. Martin appealed to the Circuit Court claiming that the trial court erred in awarding attorney's fees. The circuit court reversed the county court judgment on the basis that the agreement between the law firms was an oral contract, not an open account, such that attorney's fees should not have been awarded. Aggrieved, Lyons appealed to the Supreme Court. Upon review, the Court found that the circuit court's reversal of the award of attorney's fees was not supported by the evidence. The county court's award of attorney’s fees was supported by the credible evidence and was not an abuse of discretion. The judgment of the Circuit Court was reversed, and the judgment for attorney's fees entered by the County Court was reinstated and affirmed. View "T. Jackson Lyons & Associates, P. A. v. Precious T. Martin, Sr. & Associates, PLLC" on Justia Law

Roxco, Ltd., was hired as the general contractor for several public-construction projects for the State of Mississippi, including four building projects at the University of Mississippi, Jackson State University, and Alcorn State University. State law requires that a certain percentage of the cost of construction be retained to ensure completion. However, Mississippi Code Section 31-5-15 (Rev. 2010) allows the contractor to access that retainage by depositing with the State other acceptable security. Pursuant to Section 31-5-15, Roxco substituted securities valued at $1,055,000, deposited in a safekeeping account at Trustmark National Bank. Upon being notified of Roxco's default, the State instructed Trustmark to transfer the funds from the treasury bills into the state treasury account. By letter, Roxco directed Trustmark not to transfer the funds from the treasury bills to the State's account. Notwithstanding Roxco's letter, Trustmark deposited the funds into the State's account. Roxco filed suit against Trustmark for breach of contract and conversion. Trustmark argued that Section 31-5-15 permitted the release of the funds in the safekeeping account. A jury found in favor of Roxco and awarded $3,720,000 in damages. Aggrieved, Trustmark appealed. Finding that the trial court should have granted the motion for judgment notwithstanding the verdict, the Supreme Court reversed and remanded for further proceedings. View "Trustmark National Bank v. Roxco Ltd." on Justia Law