Justia Mississippi Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

After Hurricane Katrina hit the Mississippi Gulf Coast in August 2005, W. C. Fore entered into a contract with Harrison County, Mississippi, to remove the large amount of debris that was left behind. The Mississippi State Tax Commission (MSTC) then assessed a fee of $1.00 per ton of debris removed. Fore appealed the assessment to the MSTC Board of Review, claiming that the fee did not apply to emergency waste removal. The Board of Review upheld the assessment. Fore appealed the Board of Review’s decision to the MSTC Full Commission, which also affirmed the assessment. Fore then appealed to the Harrison County Chancery Court, First Judicial District. The chancery court upheld the assessment, and Fore appealed to the Supreme Court. Finding that the MSTC's and chancery court's findings were supported by substantial evidence and that there was no misapprehension of the law, the Supreme Court affirmed. View "W. C. Fore, Inc. v. Miss. Dept. of Revenue" on Justia Law

Lamar Hooker appealed a chancery court's grant of Stephen Greer's Motion for Partial Summary Judgment, in which the court awarded attorney's fees to Greer based on Hooker's improper filing of a lis pendens, and Greer's Motion for Summary Judgment on Hooker's counterclaim. Greer and Hooker knew each other for more than thirty years, having worked together in multiple business ventures. In early 2002, Greer and Hooker entered into an agreement for the purchase, development, and sale of two tracts of land to which each made monetary contributions and participated in certain decisions regarding the development and marketing of the properties. In September 2003, Greer sent a letter to Hooker in which he cancelled their business arrangement. In this letter, he characterized the relationship as a "proposed joint venture" and declared such proposed venture "null and void." Greer claimed the venture was predicated on Hooker's ability to put up one half of the initial capital investment to purchase the properties, and that Hooker had failed to do so. Upon review, the Supreme Court affirmed the trial court's finding that the lis pendens was improperly filed. However, because the trial court based the attorney's fees award on an improper interpretation of the Litigation Accountability Act, the Court reversed the judgment, vacated the award, and remanded for further consideration. Finally, the Court affirmed the trial court's grant of summary judgment for Greer on Hooker's counterclaim, holding that his claim was subject to a three-year statute of limitations and was thus time-barred. View "Hooker v. Greer" on Justia Law

Dr. Carroll Meador filed a complaint against Mississippi Baptist Health Systems, Inc. (MBHS), Trustmark National Bank (Trustmark), and Doe Defendants 1 through 10, for breach of fiduciary duties, interference with fiduciary duties, interference with contract rights, interference with prospective business advantage, intentional infliction of emotional distress, deceit, fraud, and retaliatory discharge. The complaint stemmed from the doctor's employment with MBHS and a large line of credit he obtained from Trustmark. A dispute between the parties ended with the bank suing the doctor for defaulting on the loan, and the doctor declaring bankruptcy. Several defendants sought to remove the case to the federal district court. The district court granted remand of the case, finding the federal bankruptcy proceedings in the case had been concluded and only state claims remained. Then Defendants Trustmark, MBHS and several codefendants filed a motion for summary judgment and motion to dismiss. The doctor appealed the ultimate outcome of the trial court's decision in favor of Defendants. Upon review, the Supreme Court found that the trial court abused its discretion in refusing to strike portions of the doctor's affidavit, and in denying Trustmark and MBHS' motions for summary judgment. The Court reversed the trial court's decision and remanded the case for further proceedings. View "Trustmark National Bank v. Meador" on Justia Law

This case came before the Supreme Court on interlocutory appeal from the Circuit Court of Warren County in which the circuit court affirmed in part and reversed in part the county court's grant of summary judgment for Plaintiff James Hobson, Jr. Defendants Chase Home Finance, LLC, and Priority Trustee Services of Mississippi, LLC (collectively, Chase) appealed the circuit court's affirmance of their liability. Plaintiff cross-appealed the circuit court's order that vacated the county court's award and ordered trial on damages. The dispute arose from Plaintiff's purchase of real property at a foreclosure sale. He tendered a cashier's check to Chase's agent, for which Chase gave Plaintiff a receipt. Approximately two weeks later, Chase returned Plaintiff's check and refused to tender a deed to the property, stating that the foreclosure sale had been cancelled due to the original borrower's reinstatement. Plaintiff sued for breach of contract, arguing that Defendants breach was grossly negligent, and requested actual and punitive damages along with attorney's fees. Upon review, the Supreme Court found that the borrower's alleged reinstatement prior to the foreclosure sale created a genuine issue of dispute regarding Chase's liability, and, therefore, the Court held that the circuit court erred in affirming the county court's grant of summary judgment as to liability. Accordingly, the Court reversed the circuit court's judgment and remand to the county court for further proceedings. View "Chase Home Finance, L.L.C. v. Hobson" on Justia Law

In 2008, Rehab Solutions, PLLC (Rehab) received notice of tax liens assessed against its property. Thereafter, Chad Willis and Renee Willis (collectively, the Owners) employed the Nail McKinney Accounting firm to assess the financial viability of their business. As a result, numerous financial shortcomings of Rehab’s in-house accountant became apparent. When the inspection of Rehab’s finances began, the accountant left work and did not return. Rehab eventually sued the accountant in tort and in contract, seeking the return of one-half of his wages while employed by Rehab, as well as punitive damages. The jury returned a verdict in favor of Rehab and awarded Rehab $133,543.17 in compensatory damages and $50,000 in punitive damages. The accountant appealed the jury’s award, asserting that it was not supported by the evidence and that unjust enrichment was not the proper measure of damages. Additionally, the accountant contended that the trial court erred in finding that Rehab’s claims were not barred by the statute of limitations and for submitting the issue of punitive damages to the jury. After a thorough review of the record, the Supreme Court determined that there was not a viable cause of action against the accountant in this matter. Accordingly, the Court reversed the trial court and remanded the case for further proceedings. View "Willis v. Rehab Solutions, PLLC" on Justia Law

As a result of Hurricane Katrina, the Mississippi Windstorm Underwriting Association (MWUA) sustained great losses well in excess of its reinsurance. MWUA assessed its members to cover the loss. Members are required to share in MWUA’s expenses, profits, and losses based on their percentages of wind and hail insurance premiums written in the previous calendar year. After the initial assessments, several member companies complained that they had incorrectly reported the previous year's figures. The Board of Directors gave the members a one-time opportunity to submit corrected data (a true-up). Some members (most of whom did not submit corrected data) appealed the assessment following the true-up. The Board denied their appeals. The members appealed their claims to the Insurance Commissioner, and the Commissioner denied their requested relief. Thereafter, the members appealed the Commissioner’s decision to the chancery court, which granted the members relief on all but one issue. Aggrieved, MWUA appealed the chancery court's judgment, and the members filed a cross-appeal. MWUA presented eight issues on appeal to the Supreme Court. Upon review, the Supreme Court affirmed the chancellor's judgment on two issues: grouping and reinsurance allocation. But the Court reversed and remanded the chancellor's judgment on the remaining issues. View "Mississippi Windstorm Underwriting Assn. v. Union National Fire Ins. Co." on Justia Law

A fire destroyed a cotton-picking machine owned by Arcadia Farms Partnership. Though insurance coverage initially was denied, Audubon Insurance Company eventually paid Arcadia for the loss. Arcadia then filed suit against Audubon, asserting that Audubon's failure to submit prompt payment constituted a "bad faith breach of the policy terms." Audubon filed a motion for summary judgment. Audubon asserted that, since Arcadia had been paid on its claim prior to filing suit, Arcadia's only potential form of compensatory damages would be prejudgment interest. Yet according to Audubon, Section 75-17-7 of the Mississippi Code prohibited Arcadia from recovering prejudgment interest prior to the filing of the complaint. The trial court granted summary judgment for Audubon and denied Arcadia's motion for reconsideration or in the alternative, motion to amend its complaint to plead specifically for prejudgment interest. The Court of Appeals reversed, holding that Arcadia could seek prejudgment interest from the date of breach, prior to the filing of the complaint, and that the trial court had abused its discretion in denying Arcadia's motion to amend. Upon review, the Supreme Court agreed with the Court of Appeals, but granted certiorari to address some uncertainty in the law surrounding Section 75-17-7. The Supreme Court clarified that in contract cases, Section 75-17-7 does not restrict prejudgment interest to the post-complaint period; prevailing parties in a breach-of-contract suit may seek interest from the date of breach. View "Arcadia Farms Partnership v. Audubon Insurance Company" on Justia Law

This case was an interlocutory appeal from a circuit court which granted the "Motions to Compel Arbitration" of Pass Marianne, LLC (Pass) and Alfonso Realty, Inc. (Alfonso). On appeal, the Supreme Court considered: (1) whether Pass waived its right to arbitration, and (2) whether a principal’s waiver of its contractual right to arbitrate operates to waive that right for its agent. In 2005, Pass entered into a contract with Carl E. Woodward, LLC (Woodward) for the construction of a new condominium development, Pass Marianne Condominiums, in Pass Christian, Mississippi. In February, Pass and Lemon Drop Properties, LLC (Lemon Drop) entered into a "Preconstruction Sales and Purchase Agreement" for Unit No. 209 within the Pass Marianne Condominiums. Because of Hurricane Katrina, construction of the Pass Marianne Condominiums was not completed until 2007. On October 3, 2007, Pass executed a warranty deed conveying Unit No. 209 to Lemon Drop, and Woodward furnished a "Warranty of Completion of Construction" to Lemon Drop. On October 28, 2008, Lemon Drop filed a Complaint in the circuit court against Pass and Woodward, which sought, inter alia, rescission of the Agreement due to alleged defects in design and construction. Upon review, the Supreme Court concluded that while Pass waived its right to compel arbitration, that waiver was not imputed to its agent, Alfonso. As there was no evidence of waiver by Alfonso, it should have been entitled to proceed in arbitration. Therefore, as to Alfonso the Court affirmed the circuit court's order granting arbitration was affirmed. But regarding Pass, Court reversed and remanded the circuit court's order for further proceedings. View "Lemon Drop Properties, LLC. v. Pass Marianne, LLC" on Justia Law

The Bank of Commerce (Bank) brought an action against SouthGroup Insurance and Financial Services, LLC (SouthGroup) and Norman White, an agent of SouthGroup, for negligent misrepresentations made by White regarding the type of liability insurance coverage they would need to purchase. The trial court granted summary judgment for SouthGroup and White on two grounds: (1) that the Bank’s claims are barred by the statute of limitations; and (2) that the damages sought by the Bank constituted a voluntary payment which may not be recovered under Mississippi’s voluntary payment doctrine. The Bank appealed the trial court’s decision. Upon review, the Supreme Court concluded that the three-year statute of limitations began to run when the Bank first received notice that it did not have entity coverage on January 18, 2005. When the Bank filed its claim against Defendants on July 17, 2008, the statute of limitations already had run, therefore barring the Bank’s claims against them. The Court affirmed the trial court's grant of summary judgment dismissing the Bank's case. View "Bank of Commerce v. Southgroup Insurance & Financial Services, LLC" on Justia Law

This case was an interlocutory appeal. Riverbend Utilities alleged that the trial court erred by: (1) adding Arch Insurance Company as an involuntary counterplaintiff, and (2) ordering Riverbend to make four individuals available for deposition. In August 2006, sewage backed up into a home occupied by Hugh Brennan, Shanda Brennan, Meranda Brennan, Diana Marut, and Sarah Marut1 (“the Brennans”) in Saucier. During discovery, Riverbend learned that the Brennans’ home had suffered damage from Hurricane Katrina in August 2005. In August 2009, with leave of the trial court, Riverbend counterclaimed, alleging that the Brennans had submitted the same invoices to Riverbend that they previously had submitted to their homeowner’s insurance provider and that they had been paid by that insurer. Upon review of the trial court record, the Supreme Court found that the trial court erred in ordering that Arch be made a party to the counterclaim. Furthermore, the Court held that the individuals noticed for depositions were not parties, Mississippi residents, or Riverbend employees, and concluded the trial court abused its discretion in ordering Riverbend to make them available for deposition. The Court reversed the trial court and remanded the case for further proceedings. View "Riverbend Utilities, Inc. v. Brennan" on Justia Law