Justia Mississippi Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

Cook Timber Company sued Georgia Pacific Corporation, claiming breach of contract and antitrust violations, both unilaterally and through a conspiracy with other market participants. The circuit judge granted Georgia Pacific a directed verdict on Cook Timber’s conspiracy and breach-of-contract claims, but the jury returned a verdict for Cook Timber on its unilateral antitrust claim. The Supreme Court reversed in part and remanded. Because Cook Timber failed to present sufficient evidence to support its unilateral antitrust claims, the jury’s verdict on that claim was reversed. Further, the Court reversed the directed verdict on Cook Timber’s breach-of-contract claim. The Court affirmed the circuit judge’s decision to grant Georgia Pacific a directed verdict on the conspiracy claim. View "Georgia Pacific Corporation v. Cook Timber Company, Inc." on Justia Law

Cherri Porter’s beachfront vacation home was completely destroyed during Hurricane Katrina. Porter claimed the destruction was the result of a barge, owned by Grand Casino of Mississippi, Inc.–Biloxi, breaking free from its moorings and alliding with her home. Because Porter’s all-risk insurance policy excluded from coverage damage caused by water or windstorm, State Farm Fire and Casualty Company denied Porter’s claim. Porter filed suit against the insurance agent who maintained the policy, Max Mullins, against State Farm, and against Grand Casino. The trial court granted summary judgment in favor of each defendant, and the Court of Appeals affirmed. Porter filed a petition for writ of certiorari claiming genuine issues of fact existed as to each defendant, and the Mississippi Supreme Court granted her petition. Because Porter’s all-risk insurance policy unambiguously excluded from coverage loss that would not have occurred absent water damage, no genuine issue of material fact existed as to Porter’s bad-faith denial of coverage claim against State Farm. Additionally, Porter failed to produce sufficient evidence showing a genuine issue of fact as to whether Grand Casino breached its duty to take reasonable measures to prevent foreseeable injury. The Court therefore affirmed the decisions of the trial court and of the Court of Appeals as to all issues. View "Porter v. Grand Casino of Mississippi, Inc.- Biloxi" on Justia Law

Sand Specialties & Aggregates, LLC, and Lampkin Construction Company entered into a contract under which Sand Specialties was to sell certain sand mining equipment to Lampkin Construction. The equipment was delivered, but the full contract price was never paid. Sand Specialities filed suit against Lampkin Construction for replevin and damages. After a trial, the judge entered a directed verdict in favor of Sand Specialities as to ownership of the equipment, and the jury awarded Sand Specialities damages. Lampkin Construction appealed, arguing that the trial court misinterpreted the terms of the sales contract, and that the trial court made several prejudicial errors, including allowing the jury to consider evidence of damages for missing equipment. Finding no reversible errors, the Supreme Court affirmed the judgment against Lampkin. View "Lampkin Construction Co., Inc. v. Sand Specialties & Aggregates, LLC" on Justia Law

Expro Americas, LLC ("Expro") filed a complaint seeking, inter alia, a temporary restraining order and preliminary injunction against Eddie Walters, a former Expro employee, and H&H Welding, LLC. Expro offered "oil and gas well and pipeline services," including providing "specially designed flaring products and services to pipeline transmission companies and refineries along the Gulf Coast." Expro's six-inch, trailer-mounted flare stacks were at the heart of this dispute. Eddie Walters was an Expro employee until August 5, 2013. Thereafter, Walters was employed by Clean Combustion, a competitor of Expro's that was created in 2013 by former Expro employees. Expro filed its application for a restraining order against H&H and Walters, alleging that both defendants stole the design for its flare stack. Expro specifically alleged that "[t]he information used to design and create the trailer-mounted flaring system is a ‘trade secret' of Expro's." Furthermore, it alleged breach of contract against H&H, claiming that the terms of Expro's purchase orders with H&H contained a "Proprietary Rights" section "in which H&H ‘warrants to keep all design, information, blueprints and engineering data with respect to the Goods confidential and to not make use of but to assign to Expro each invention, improvement and discovery relating thereto (whether or not patentable) conceived or reduced to practice in the performance of the Purchase Order by any person employed by or working under the directions of the Supplier Group.'" The trial court granted the restraining order, but after conducting an evidentiary hearing, the chancellor dissolved the temporary restraining order and found no facts to justify the issuance of a preliminary injunction. The chancellor awarded the defendants attorneys' fees and expenses in excess of the $5,000 injunction bond that Expro had posted. After determining that Expro's suit against H&H was meritless, the chancellor sua sponte dismissed H&H from the suit with prejudice. Expro appealed, and the Supreme Court affirmed in part and reversed in part. The Court found that the chancellor did not err by awarding the defendants attorneys' fees and expenses, because Expro's application for a preliminary injunction was frivolous and was made in bad faith. However, the Court found the chancellor misapplied Mississippi Rules of Civil Procedure Rule 4, and therefore erred by dismissing H&H from the suit with prejudice. View "Expro Americas, LLC v. Walters" on Justia Law

The administrator of the Pearl River County Hospital entered into a contract with Wellness, Inc., for Wellness to provide furnishings, fixtures, equipment, and systems for the Hospital’s renovation. The Hospital subsequently sued Wellness (and other defendants not party to this appeal) alleging fraud, conspiracy, breach of contract, and other causes of action. Before trial commenced, Wellness moved to compel mediation and arbitration and to stay proceedings. After a hearing on the motion, the circuit court denied the motion in its entirety. Wellness appealed. Finding no reversible error, the Supreme Court affirmed. View "Wellness, Inc. v. Pearl River County Hospital" on Justia Law

Clayton Hinton invested substantial personal resources into a used-car business. Hinton sued his business partner, Nate Rolison, claiming that Rolison was keeping profits from that business that should have been divided equally. Hinton also sought an injunction against the financing company that was paying Rolison some of the disputed profits. Both Rolison and the financing company filed motions to dismiss. The trial court granted Rolison's motion based on res judicata and granted the finance company's motion finding Hinton had failed to state a viable claim. Finding that res judicata did not bar Hinton's claims against Rolison, and that Hinton failed to state a viable claim for injunctive relief against the financing company, the Supreme Court affirmed in part, reversed in part, and remanded. View "Hinton v. Rolison" on Justia Law

Randy Braswell sued Ergon Oil Purchasing, Inc. in Amite County over some oil contracts. Two days later, Ergon brought a declaratory judgment action against Braswell in Rankin County over those same contracts. Ergon removed the Amite County action to federal court, where it remained for eighteen months before it was remanded. In the meantime, Ergon obtained summary judgment against Braswell in Rankin County. Braswell appealed, arguing that the Rankin County judge erred when he granted summary judgment in Ergon's favor and when he refused to transfer the action to Amite County. The Supreme Court agreed with Braswell that the action should have been transferred to Amite County, and reversed the judgment of the Rankin County circuit judge based on the doctrine of priority jurisdiction, and remanded the case to the circuit court. View "Braswell v. Ergon Oil Purchasing, Inc." on Justia Law

"For more than one hundred and thirty years," the Mississippi Supreme Court has held that an insurance company may void a policy when the insured made material misrepresentations during the application process. While driving his mother’s 2003 Chevy Silverado in Rankin County, sixteen-year-old William Busby crashed into Kenneth Tarlton’s car, which in turn collided with a car driven by Katrice Jones-Smith. When William’s mother, Michelle, applied to Safeway Insurance Company for an insurance policy on the Silverado, the application required her to warrant that she had provided the names of all regular frequent drivers of the covered vehicles, as well as all residents of her household fourteen years old or older. Michelle failed to disclose that fifteen-year-old William resided in her home, and Safeway issued her a policy on the Silverado at a premium that was lower than the premium would have been had Safeway known about William. When Safeway learned that Michelle made a material misrepresentation when she applied for the motor-vehicle-liability policy at issue here, it had the policy declared void. The Supreme Court found no reason to disturb the trial court's grant of summary judgment in this case in favor of Safeway, so it affirmed. View "Jones-Smith v. Safeway Insurance Company" on Justia Law

A lease agreement included a five-year renewal provision but failed to specify the rent to be paid during the renewal period. The circuit judge granted a judgment on the pleadings, finding the renewal provision unenforceable. Finding no reversible error in that decision, the Supreme Court affirmed. View "Intrepid, Inc. v. Bennett" on Justia Law

Plaintiffs Jourdan Rivers Estates, LLC (JRE) and Jourdan River Resort and Yacht Club (Yacht Club), filed suit for damages in December 2011 against Defendants Scott Favre, Cindy Favre, Jefferson Parker, and CB Partners, LLC d/b/a Cinque Bambini. CB Partners, LLC d/b/a Cinque Bambini was later dismissed from the action without prejudice. The complaint alleged multiple claims against Defendants, including slander of title; slander and/or defamation; trespass; nuisance; tortious interference with use of property; tortious interference with contractual relationships; harassment and intimidation of plaintiffs' agents and intentional infliction of emotional distress upon plaintiffs' agents; assault upon plaintiffs' agents; willful destruction of plaintiffs' property; negligence; gross, willful, and wanton negligence; malicious prosecution; unjust enrichment; false imprisonment; and any other applicable theory of law giving rise to a cause of action. Defendants moved to dismiss for failure to state a claim under Rule 12(b)(6) of the Mississippi Rules of Civil Procedure. The circuit court granted the motion in part and denied it in part. The circuit court dismissed all of Yacht Club's claims in relation to the claim(s) that Defendants made false representations to the Hancock County Board of Supervisors and/or Hancock County employees, finding that such allegations fell under the "Noerr-Pennington" doctrine, expressly adopted by the Mississippi Supreme Court. The circuit court dismissed JRE's claims of slander of title, slander and/or defamation; harassment; assault; and false imprisonment and intentional infliction of emotional distress because each claim constituted an intentional tort and was barred under the statute of limitations. The circuit court denied Defendants' motion to dismiss as to JRE's claims for trespass; nuisance; tortious interference with use of property; tortious interference with contractual relationships; willful destruction of property; negligence; gross, willful, and wanton negligence; malicious prosecution; and unjust enrichment. Plaintiffs thereafter petitioned for an interlocutory appeal. Because the Supreme Court found that Defendants' Rule 12(b)(6) motion should have been converted into a motion for summary judgment, as provided in Rule 56 of the Mississippi Rules of Civil Procedure, it reversed the circuit court's order granting the Rule 12(b)(6) motion and remanded for further proceedings. View "Jourdan River Estates, LLC v. Favre" on Justia Law