Justia Mississippi Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

Based on a citizen’s complaint that "young men . . . young black men . . . are standing out on the sidewalks, corners, selling drugs" on a street corner in Greenville, police proceeded to that area, where they spotted Tazarius Cooper, a young, black male. The police officer turned on his blue lights, exited his vehicle, and attempted to conduct an investigatory stop by ordering Cooper to "come here and let me talk to you." Before the officers could restrain him, Cooper ran. The officers gave chase, following Cooper into a home, where Cooper abandoned a bag containing a blue substance that tested positive for the drug known as ecstasy. The trial court denied Cooper’s motion to suppress the evidence, and Cooper was convicted. Upon review, the Supreme Court found that the citizen’s complaint was insufficient to establish a reasonable suspicion of Cooper, or to conduct a Terry stop. But because Cooper was not stopped, and because Cooper lacked standing to challenge the search of a home which did not belong to him, the Court affirmed the trial court’s decision. View "Cooper v. Mississippi" on Justia Law

Troy Chaupette was convicted of fondling his four-year-old great-niece. He appealed, arguing the trial court erred by: (1) allowing two fact witnesses to provide expert testimony; (2) permitting an improper comment on the victim’s truthfulness; and (3) admitting cumulative, hearsay testimony from six witnesses under the tender-years exception. Finding no reversible error, the Supreme Court affirmed Chaupette's convictions.View "Chaupette v. Mississippi" on Justia Law

In 2011, defendant was pulled over for suspicion of driving under the influence (DUI) after an officer observed him weaving between lanes. He resisted arrest and subsequently was indicted on two counts of assaulting a law-enforcement officer, possession of marijuana, possession of cocaine, and a first DUI. The indictment later was amended to reflect his habitual-offender status. The assault charges eventually were dropped. Defendant engaged Gerald Green, a Tennessee attorney, to represent him. Green submitted a verified application and affidavit to appear pro hac vice, listing the enumerated requirements of Mississippi Rule of Appellate Procedure 46(b)(5), including the statement that Green "has associated Attorney Daniel O. Lofton, a member in good standing of the Mississippi Bar as local counsel in this case . . . ." The application included a Certificate of Local Attorney signed by Daniel Lofton and a Certificate of Payment for the pro hoc vice fee of $200 to the Clerk of the Mississippi Supreme Court. Green submitted a Motion to Dismiss Prosecution and a Request for Discovery on defendant's behalf. These two motions were signed and submitted only by Green. Additionally, Green's bar number as listed next to his signature on these motions did not indicate in which state Green was licensed. Green represented defendant at an August 7, 2012, hearing in which the court denied the Motion to Dismiss and granted the State's Motion to Amend the Indictment charging defendant as a habitual offender under Mississippi Code Section 99-19-81. Green had not at that time been approved to proceed pro hac vice, and associated attorney Lofton was not present at the hearing. The court subsequently denied an August 17, 2012, Motion to Continue Trial filed by Green. After the jury was selected, the court approved Green's application to proceed pro hac vice and waived the requirement that local counsel be present during trial. The State had no objection to the trial proceeding without the presence of local counsel. After a one-day trial, defendant was convicted of possession of marijuana, possession of cocaine, and first-offense DUI. The Supreme Court never received an order approving Green's admission to proceed pro hac vice. Green stated at the post-trial motions hearing that "I didn't submit any order. I didn't think anything else was required after we had our proceedings in this court. They [Mississippi Supreme Court Clerk] sent back the cases that I had been in, and they approved that I had paid the money." Daniel Lofton, the associated attorney, testified at the post-trial motions hearing that he understood his role and obligations to be limited to certifying that Green was an attorney in good standing in Tennessee on Green's pro hoc vice application, and that he would be notified if his involvement was further required. Lofton never met or communicated with defendant. At the post-trial motions hearing, defendant asserted that he never knew Green was not licensed to practice in Mississippi. Defendant hired a new attorney immediately following the trial and was represented by the new attorney at the post-trial motions hearing, sentencing hearing, and on this appeal. The Supreme Court reversed defendant's convictions and remanded for a new trial due to the trial court's and counsel's failure to comply with Mississippi Rule of Appellate Procedure 46 governing the admission of foreign attorneys to practice pro hoc vice. Most significantly, the trial court erred in waiving the now-mandatory requirement that associated local counsel be present at trial. View "Newberry v. Mississippi" on Justia Law

Hattie Hawkins was a nursing assistant at Heritage House Nursing Center. Deserie Edwards, a resident at Heritage House, suffered injuries while under Hawkins’s care. An investigation revealed that Hawkins had lifted Edwards by herself, knowing that two people were required to lift Edwards. Hawkins then improperly placed Edwards into a lift/sling and left her unattended. Edwards fell from the sling and suffered injuries, but Hawkins did not call for assistance. Hawkins was indicted for simple assault of a vulnerable person. Several days before trial, defense counsel demurred to the indictment on the grounds that it did not comport with Mississippi Code Section 97-3-7(1) and was an improper statement of the law. The circuit court dismissed the case saying the indictment failed to state a cause of action against the defendant. The State filed a motion to reconsider, which was denied. The State appealed. Upon review, the Supreme Court held the indictment was sufficient and that the trial judge erred by granting the demurrer. View "State of Mississippi v. Hattie Hawkins a/k/a Hattie M. Hawkins" on Justia Law

Walter Tard was convicted of armed robbery and sentenced to serve forty-five years, with ten years suspended and five years of post-release supervision, in the custody of the Mississippi Department of Corrections. Tard appealed a Court of Appeals judgment affirming his conviction and sentence, arguing: (1) the trial court erred by failing to review his entire videotaped interrogation and by failing to suppress his statement; and (2) the Court of Appeals erred by not reviewing the videotaped interrogation on appeal and by affirming the trial court’s judgment. Because the record failed to indicate upon what evidence the trial court based its decision to deny Tard’s motion to suppress his interrogation, the Supreme Court reversed the conviction and sentence and remanded the case to the circuit court for a new trial. View "Tard v. Mississippi" on Justia Law

Nancy Downey was convicted by a jury of burglary of a dwelling and first-degree and was given two concurrent twelve-year sentences. Following the denial of Downey’s motion for judgment notwithstanding the verdict or for a new trial, she appealed. The Court of Appeals affirmed her convictions and sentences. In her petition for writ of certiorari, Downey argued that the trial court erred by failing to suppress her statement to law enforcement officers after she had invoked her Miranda rights. Finding that Downey’s constitutional rights were violated, the Supreme Court reversed her convictions and sentences and remanded this case for a new trial. View "Downey v. Mississippi" on Justia Law

Mark Matthews was convicted of simple assault and disorderly conduct in Madison County Municipal Court. The decision was affirmed on appeal by the County Court of Madison County and the Madison County Circuit Court. The Court of Appeals found no error and also affirmed. While the Supreme Court also found no error in the Court of Appeals' decision, the Court took the opportunity of this case to clarify the proper burden of proof when the "Castle Doctrine" is asserted as a defense. View "Mathews v. City of Madison" on Justia Law

Jeffrey Yeatman pled guilty to one count of simple assault on a law-enforcement officer and two counts of third-offense driving under the influence. Each of the three counts had a separate cause number. The Circuit Court sentenced him: for simple assault on a law-enforcement officer (cause number 2006-0161-CR), five years imprisonment and a fine of $5,000 as a habitual offender; for third-offense DUI (cause number 2006-0327-CR), five years imprisonment and a fine of $5,000 as a habitual offender; and for third-offense DUI (cause number 2006-0328-CR), one year imprisonment, four years of post-release supervision, and a fine of $100. All sentences were to run consecutively. Yeatman sought post-conviction relief from his convictions for simple assault on a law-enforcement officer and third-offense DUI. The trial court denied post-conviction relief, and the Court of Appeals affirmed. The Supreme Court granted Yeatman's petition for a writ of certiorari. Because, by statute, the fine for simple assault on a law-enforcement officer was a maximum of $1,000, the Supreme Court vacated the $5,000 fine imposed on Yeatman for that crime, and remanded that case to the trial court for a determination of whether the criminal information in cause number 2006-0327-CR charged Yeatman as a habitual offender. The Supreme Court affirmed the trial court in all other respects. View "Yeatman v. Mississippi" on Justia Law

Alisha Vanwey pled guilty in 2007 to three counts of selling hydrocodone, and the trial court sentenced her as a habitual offender to eleven years on each count, to run concurrently, in the custody of the Mississippi Department of Corrections. Vanwey filed a petition for post-conviction relief (PCR) arguing, inter alia, that one of the two prior predicate felonies listed in her indictment alleging habitual-offender status did not meet the requirements of Section 99-19-81. The trial court denied the motion, and the Court of Appeals affirmed the trial court's decision based on the finding that Vanwey's motion was procedurally barred as a successive writ and time-barred. After its review, the Supreme Court found Vanwey waived whatever contention she might have had with her habitual-offender status when she failed to challenge the sufficiency or validity of her two prior felony convictions and sentences at her plea hearing and then voluntarily and intelligently entered her guilty plea to three counts of selling hydrocodone as a habitual offender. View "Vanwey v. Mississippi" on Justia Law

Edward Myers appealed his conviction for the armed robbery of Gabriel Lewis. Upon review of the trial court record, the Mississippi Supreme Court found that the trial court abused its discretion in excluding the testimony of a defense witness where there was no evidence of a willful discovery violation. Accordingly, the Court reversed Myers’s conviction and remanded for a new trial. On remand, the Court directed the trial court to conduct a hearing to determine whether Myers’s right to a speedy trial was violated. View "Myers v. Mississippi" on Justia Law