Justia Mississippi Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

In October 2006, Defendant Rachel Nelson was involved in an automobile collision. The City of Richland charged her with driving under the influence. In November Defendant pled “nolo contendere” in the Municipal Court of Richland. Later that month, Defendant filed a notice of appeal in the Rankin County Circuit Clerk’s office stating that a sufficient cash appeal and cash bond had been posted, and requesting a jury trial in county court de novo. The trial date was set for April 2, 2007. On March 27, 2007, Defendant filed a motion to dismiss the appeal on writ of procedendo and to return the cause of action to the Municipal Court of Richland for imposition of sentence. On the same day, the Rankin County Court granted Defendant’s Motion to Dismiss and ordered the matter back to the Municipal Court of Richland on writ of procedendo. On March 30, 2007, a Richland city prosecutor filed a motion to set aside the order of dismissal, to reinstate Defendant’s appeal, and to stay the proceedings. Defendant argued to the Supreme Court that: (1) the county court had no jurisdiction to set aside the order of dismissal and remand on writ of procedendo; and (2) double jeopardy was invoked because the county court “nolle prossed” the charge after the appeal was taken. Upon review, the Supreme Court found that the decision to hear the city’s arguments on the motion to dismiss in this case was within the county court’s sound discretion: “the entry of a nolle prosequi does not bar another prosecution for the same offense under a new indictment . . [Here, Defendant] did not claim she had been twice placed in jeopardy for the same offense. Rather, she contended that she may be prosecuted in the future for felony DUI. Therefore, the question of whether the municipal court proceedings would bar a subsequent prosecution under double-jeopardy considerations was not ripe for determination.” The Court affirmed the county court’s decision. View "Nelson v. Mississippi" on Justia Law

Appellant Jeremy Davis was convicted of aggravated assault on a law-enforcement officer, escape, burglary and possessing a firearm as a felon. Appellant's attorney filed an appeal, the briefs to which provided only generalized assertions that the State had violated Appellant's constitutional rights by exercising all of its six peremptory strikes against African-American jurors. After reviewing the briefs and the trial court's record, the Supreme Court found no error and upheld the trial court's decision and Appellant's convictions. View "Davis v. Mississippi" on Justia Law

Defendant Kenneth Keys was eligible for parole on a life sentence, but ineligible for parole on a fie-year sentence for a later, simple assault conviction. The circuit court held that Defendant was not eligible for parole on either conviction because Defendant could not begin serving the five-year sentence until he completed the life sentence. The Court of Appeals reversed the trial court's holding, finding that the trial court lacked jurisdiction to consider the issue. Upon review of the lower courts' records, the Supreme Court concluded that the trial court indeed had jurisdiction, and that Defendant remained parole-eligible on his life sentence. The Court reversed the Court of Appeals and affirmed the trial court's decision. View "Keys v. Mississippi" on Justia Law

A grand jury indicted Vanessa Decker under the Mississippi Vulnerable Adults Act for using her mother's money without the mother's consent. At trial, the evidence established that she had obtained her mother's consent to use the money, so the State requested (and the trial judge granted) a jury instruction that allowed the jury to find Ms. Decker guilty even if she had permission to use the money. Ms. Decker was sentenced to a four year jail term and sentenced to pay restitution, fines and court costs. On appeal, Ms. Decker argued that the jury instruction was a material mistake. Upon review, the Supreme Court found the instruction materially changed the grand jury's indictment. Accordingly, the Court reversed the lower courts' decisions in this case and remanded it for further proceedings.

When prosecutor Charles Graves was not prepared to proceed to trial and had not produced a video to defense counsel, a circuit court judge held him in criminal contempt and ordered him to be incarcerated. Upon review of the trial court record, the Supreme Court found that the trial judge denied the prosecutor due process of law and that the record contained insufficient evidence of criminal contempt. The Court reversed the prosecutor's convictions and the order of the circuit court was vacated.

Since his conviction in 1979 for capital murder, Defendant Robert Jackson filed multiple unsuccessful motions and applications for post-conviction relief. Based on the Supreme Court's dispositions of his 2002, and 2004 applications, the circuit court summarily dismissed the application underlying this case, and the Court of Appeals affirmed. Undeterred, Defendant petitioned the Supreme Court arguing that his capital murder indictment was constitutionally insufficient. The Supreme Court granted Defendant's pro se petition for the writ of certiorari in this instance because the Court found that the trial court erroneously dismissed Defendant's PCR motions: "we recognize that the trial court dismissed the motion as a successive writ based on our 2002 and 2004 denials of [Defendant's] applications, and the Court of Appeals interpreted our denials as rejections of [Defendant's] arguments." the Court set aside its own decisions in 2002 and 2004, and reversed the trial court's dismissal and the Court of Appeals' decision. The Court remanded the case back to the trial court for further post-conviction-relief proceedings.

This case stems from an interlocutory appeal by Kelly Blossom regarding the issuance of a protective order by the Rankin County Chancery Court that denied her attempt to take two depositions in her divorce case. In 2009, Michael Blossom filed a complaint and obtained a temporary restraining order, preliminary injunction and permanent injunction against Ms. Blossom enjoining her from any contact with their children. At the time the trial court issued the protective order, Ms. Blossom was being prosecuted for sexual battery in the circuit court. One of the witnesses was the minor victim in the criminal case. In the criminal case, Ms. Blossom eventually pled guilty to having committed sexual battery. The other potential deponent, another minor, was identified by Ms. Blossom as having knowledge about the the sexual battery from the criminal case. Upon review of the trial court record, the Supreme Court found that the chancellor of the court below erred by granting the protective orders without meeting the requirements set out in the Mississippi Rules of Civil Procedure: "the fact that a witness is an 'alleged minor victim of a crime' alone does not constitute sufficient grounds to deny a party the right to depose that witness." Therefore, the Court reversed the decision of the lower court and remanded the case back to the trial court for further proceedings.

In this wrongful death case, a prisoner escaped from the custody of the Hinds County sheriff. While evading capture, the prisoner struck a pedestrian with a stolen vehicle. The trial court denied the County's motion for summary judgment based on its claim of sovereign immunity, and the County appealed. Finding no right to appeal a pretrial denial of sovereign immunity, the Supreme Court dismissed this appeal, finding "no compelling reason to abandon our current practice regarding interlocutory review of pretrial denials of sovereign immunity."

Defendant Virgil Johnson was convicted of aggravated assault and armed robbery by the circuit court. The Court of Appeals affirmed his conviction and sentence. On appeal, Defendant asserted that his right to a speedy trial was violated because 860 days passed between the time he was arrested and the date of his trial. Upon careful consideration of the trial court record and the applicable legal authority, the Supreme Court agreed with the appellate court, finding "no merit in [Defendant's] averment."

Responding to a 911 call in November 2008, police observed a male sitting in the driver's seat of a vehicle facing forward. The victim was suffering from a gunshot wound to the left side of his head, and did not appear to be breathing. Defendant Roy Page was tried for murder and sentenced to life in prison for the shooting. On appeal, Defendant challenged the sufficiency of the evidence against him. Upon careful consideration of the lengthy trial record and the applicable legal authority, the Supreme Court found that the evidence presented to the jury was sufficient to support Defendant's murder verdict. Furthermore, the overwhelming weight of the evidence also supported the verdict. Accordingly, the Court affirmed the judgment and sentence of the trial court.