Justia Mississippi Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

Articles Posted in Family Law
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A natural mother filed a petition to set aside the adoption of her child, D.A.P., more than five years after the final adoption decree. She claimed that the adoption was based on fraudulent misrepresentations that it would be an "open" adoption, allowing her continued contact with the child. The adoption was finalized on July 6, 2017, and the mother alleged that she was misled into believing she would maintain contact with her child post-adoption.The Neshoba County Chancery Court denied the mother's request for access to adoption records in 2021, citing the statute of limitations and lack of good cause. In 2022, the mother filed a petition to set aside the adoption decree, claiming fraud, coercion, and misrepresentation. The court dismissed her petition, noting that the mother had not appealed the original adoption judgment and that setting aside the adoption would prejudice the adoptive parents and the child. The court found no evidence of fraud upon the court, as the adoption petition clearly stated the termination of the mother's parental rights.The Supreme Court of Mississippi reviewed the case and affirmed the chancery court's decision. The court held that the mother's petition was untimely, as it was filed more than six months after the adoption decree, which is the statutory limit for challenging an adoption in Mississippi. The court also found no fraud upon the court, as there was no sworn testimony or filing indicating an open adoption. The court emphasized the importance of finality in adoption proceedings to ensure stability and security for the child. View "In the Matter of the Adoption of D.A.S." on Justia Law

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The case involves Katherine Cassell (Kathy) and William Cassell (Bill), who were married in 1991 and separated in 2021. Prior to their marriage, Bill and his siblings inherited land in Mississippi from their mother and formed Waterloo Farms, Inc. (Waterloo), which held title to the inherited land. Waterloo also owned two tracts of land in Claiborne County. During their marriage, Bill began farming as Valley of the Moon Farms, LLC (VOM), which was owned 50% by Bill and 50% by Moon Planting Company, Inc. (MPC). MPC was formed by Bill’s father, who transferred 99% of MPC’s ownership to Kathy and 1% to Bill. Kathy and Bill maintained two bank accounts—one personal joint account and one account for VOM. Revenue from VOM was deposited into the VOM account and from there, money would be transferred into Kathy and Bill’s joint personal account for monthly expenses.The couple separated in 2021, and Kathy filed for divorce on the grounds of uncondoned adultery and, alternatively, habitual cruel and inhuman treatment and irreconcilable differences. Kathy sought an equitable division of the marital estate, permanent periodic alimony, lump sum alimony and for Bill to maintain her medical and dental insurance and his own life insurance for which she was the sole beneficiary. Kathy also requested reasonable attorneys’ fees. The chancery court entered a final judgment of divorce and his findings of fact and conclusions of law. The chancellor granted the divorce on the ground of uncondoned adultery. Among other assets, the chancellor classified Tract Two and the Turley Property as Bill’s separate property, and classified the Thompson Property and the VOM account as marital property. In total, Bill’s separate property was valued at $5,341,640.14. After classifying and equitably dividing the various marital assets applying the Ferguson factors, the chancellor considered Kathy’s alimony request weighing the Armstrong factors and awarded her permanent periodic alimony in the amount of $7,500 per month. In total, Kathy was awarded permanent periodic alimony and 40 percent of the marital estate, and the court ordered Bill to maintain life insurance for which Kathy was the sole beneficiary in the amount of $500,000 and to maintain Kathy’s health insurance until she turned sixty-five or was able to obtain Medicare. Kathy’s portion of the marital estate amounted to a lump sum payment of $667,557, whereas Bill’s portion of the marital estate was valued by the chancellor at $1,861,629.53. From this final judgment and findings of fact and conclusions of law, Kathy appeals.The Supreme Court of Mississippi affirmed the chancery court's decision. The court held that the burden of proof to rebut the presumption of marital property is by a preponderance of the evidence. Furthermore, the party claiming property excluded from marital property has been commingled and transformed into marital property bears the burden of proof, likewise by a preponderance of the evidence. Finally, the court overruled Cheatham insofar as it has any bearing on a chancellor’s decision to award alimony and reaffirmed the factors enumerated in Ferguson—awarding alimony during the division of the estate—and Armstrong—awarding alimony subsequent to the division of the estate—as the appropriate factors to be considered. View "Cassell v. Cassell" on Justia Law

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Arious Turner, the biological mother of a four-year-old girl (AT), was convicted of kidnapping her daughter. In June 2019, the Bolivar County chancery court had awarded Turner’s former step-mother, Sharetha Kimber, primary physical custody of AT, granting Turner limited visitation rights. In September 2020, Turner failed to return AT to Kimber after the court-ordered visitation period, and AT's whereabouts were unknown for forty-four days. U.S. Marshals located AT in Greenwood, Mississippi, with the help of an informant.The case was initially tried in the Bolivar County Circuit Court, where Turner was indicted for felony kidnapping under Mississippi Code Section 97-3-53. Turner sought a directed verdict after the State rested its case, but the trial judge denied her motion. After deliberation, the jury returned a guilty verdict. The trial judge sentenced Turner to a term of one year in the custody of the Mississippi Department of Corrections, suspended Turner’s incarceration, and reduced her sentence to one year of nonreporting probation. Turner filed a motion for judgment notwithstanding the verdict, or in the alternative, for a new trial, which were denied.The case was then appealed to the Supreme Court of Mississippi. The main issue on appeal was whether the State presented sufficient evidence to convict Turner of kidnapping. The court affirmed the lower court's decision, ruling that a rational juror could reasonably find each element of kidnapping beyond a reasonable doubt based on the evidence presented. The court rejected Turner's argument that the legislature did not intend for Section 97-3-53 to apply to her because she is AT’s natural parent, citing a precedent that a natural parent may be criminally liable for kidnapping their own child when a court decree denies them custody. View "Turner v. State" on Justia Law

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The case revolves around a custody dispute involving a minor child, J.B., born in March 2021. J.B. was placed in the custody of foster parents, John and Amy Caldwell, by the Mississippi Department of Child Protection Services (CPS) in June 2021. In October 2022, J.B.'s maternal great aunt, Wanda Hines, expressed interest in adopting J.B. Subsequently, the foster parents filed a petition for adoption in March 2023. In response, the relatives filed a motion to intervene and dismiss the adoption proceeding. CPS also filed a motion to dismiss, alleging that the foster parents violated their foster contract by pursuing an adoption action. The chancellor granted the relatives' motion to intervene and appointed a guardian ad litem to make a recommendation regarding the child’s best interest.The DeSoto County Chancery Court granted the foster parents durable legal and physical custody of J.B. in a temporary order until the final hearing on the merits of their adoption petition and dismissed CPS without a hearing. The relatives and CPS appealed this decision.The Supreme Court of Mississippi reversed the chancery court's decision, ruling that the chancellor erred by awarding permanent relief without a hearing. The court held that divesting and dismissing CPS from the case is permanent relief, which cannot be done without a hearing, even under the guise of a temporary order. The court also noted that durable legal custody is not an appropriate award after a termination of parental rights. The case was remanded for further proceedings. View "Hines v. Caldwell" on Justia Law

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In this case, the Supreme Court of Mississippi affirmed the conviction and sentence of Timothy Marbley for aggravated domestic violence. The case originated from an incident in April 2020, where officers responded to a disturbance at an apartment complex. They found Sherita Lynch, Marbley's girlfriend, with injuries and a trail of blood leading from the apartment. Marbley was not present at the scene. Lynch and Marbley both testified at the trial, providing different accounts of the incident.The court noted that Marbley's counsel had filed a brief asserting that there were no arguable issues for review and complied with the procedures set out in Lindsey v. State when an attorney believes there are no appealable issues. Despite being given an opportunity, Marbley did not file a pro se brief. After reviewing the entire record, the court concurred with Marbley's counsel and found no issues that warranted appellate review.Consequently, the court affirmed Marbley's conviction for aggravated domestic violence and his sentence of ten years, five of which were suspended with nonreporting, supervised probation. View "Marbley v. State of Mississippi" on Justia Law

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In the case at hand, the Supreme Court of Mississippi dealt with an appeal by George Hawkins who was convicted for sexual battery of a minor under Mississippi Code Section 97-3-95(2). This law requires the State to prove that the defendant was in a position of trust or authority over the minor when the crime was committed. Hawkins' appeal was based on the argument that the State failed to present sufficient evidence of him being in such a position over the victim, as he had no legal authority over her.In 2014, Hawkins began dating Tonya Ingram and gradually became a part of her and her children’s lives, to the point where they even considered themselves to be common-law married. In the spring of 2015, Tonya and her children moved into Hawkins's home "as a family". Hawkins and Tonya filed their taxes jointly, claimed Tonya’s children as dependents, and contributed equally to the family’s finances. The victim, Jane, one of Tonya's children, trusted Hawkins, which ended when he sexually assaulted her one night.The court found that while Hawkins did not possess any legal authority over Jane, a reasonable jury could have concluded that he was in a position of trust or authority over her based on the totality of the circumstances and their relationship. The court held that the list of individuals who are typically in positions of authority provided in Section 97-3-95(2) serves only as examples, and does not limit this to persons in positions of legal authority over the child. Therefore, the court affirmed Hawkins' conviction. View "Hawkins v. State of Mississippi" on Justia Law

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Child Protection Services (CPS) petitioned to terminate the parental rights of both parents of three minor children who were sexually abused by their father. The mother, S.F., objected and argued that she should not lose her parental rights. The trial court granted CPS’s petition and terminated the rights of both parents. S.F. appealed. The Mississippi Supreme Court found that through the totality of the circumstances and the evidence presented to the youth court satisfied the grounds for termination. Because S.F. lacked protective capacity toward her children, the youth court did not err by finding clear and convincing evidence that termination was appropriate. As such, the Court affirmed. View "S.F. v. Lamar County Department of Child Protection Services, et al." on Justia Law

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Litigation that had been ongoing for twenty years, went before the Mississippi Supreme Court for the third time. The direct appeal involved the West family-owned corporations, West Quality Food Services, Inc. (West Quality), and Coastal Express, Inc. (Coastal) (collectively, “West Entities”), and Deborah West (Debbie West), former wife of Charles Timothy West (Tim West). The major issue on direct appeal was whether the chancellor erred in his priority-of-liens analysis. On cross-appeal, which was brought by Tim West, the issue was whether the chancellor considered his claim for retroactive child support. While these issues were pending on appeal, Tim West filed a separate action to challenge the statute of limitations applicable to an underlying judgment and to writs of garnishment that had been entered against him. The chancellor determined that the statute of limitations had run and ordered that the judgment, the writs of garnishment, and the writs of execution be deemed null and void. Debbie West appealed, and the Supreme Court consolidated the two cases. Regarding the direct appeal, the Supreme Court reversed the trial court’s ruling and remanded for a determination of whether each of Tim West’s capital stock certificates were noted conspicuously with a bylaws restriction. If so, then the conspicuously noted stock certificate(s) should have priority over Debbie West’s valid equitable lien. If the stock certificate failed to conspicuously note the bylaws restriction on the stock certificate, then the 1994 equitable lien has priority over Tim West’s stock. Neither the Supreme Court nor the trial court addressed whether the penalty in Mississippi Code Section 13-3-129 was applicable in this case. As such, the Supreme Court remanded this issue for the chancellor to determine that question. As for the cross-appeal, the chancellor erred by failing to address Tim West’s retroactive child support claim. Thus, the Supreme Court remanded this issue for the chancellor to consider his claim in the first instance. Regarding the consolidated appeal, West v. West, No. 2022-CA-00147-SCT, the Supreme Court found that because Tim West engaged in claim splitting, the chancellor’s decision was reversed with orders to dismiss the case and reinstate the 2008 judgment, the writs of garnishment, and the writs of execution. View "West v. West, et al." on Justia Law

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Aggrieved by a chancellor’s decision, Pamela Brownlee (Pam) appeals to the Mississippi Supreme Court, averring that the chancellor erred by failing to extend in loco parentis visitation rights to her as a former live-in romantic partner. Jessica Powell had two children, A.M.P. and E.R.L., born to different fathers. A.M.P.’s father maintained no relationship with the child; E.R.L.’s father was an active parent in his child’s life. Pam and Jessica began their romantic relationship in early 2014, just before E.R.L.’s birth, and the couple lived together throughout their relationship until their breakup in 2019. Even though Pam and Jessica cohabited from 2014 to 2019, they did not marry. On December 19, 2019, approximately two months after the couple’s breakup in October 2019, Pam filed her Petition to Establish Custody and Visitation, in which Pam initially sought custody of E.R.L. and visitation with A.M.P. At the initial hearing in October 2020, Pam withdrew her request for custody of E.R.L., revising her request to seek only visitation with Jessica’s children under the doctrine of in loco parentis. Although the chancellor did not find any legal basis for Pam’s request, given her status as an unmarried non-parent and former live-in partner to the children’s natural mother. The Mississippi Supreme Court reversed: “we also recognize special circumstances exist…in which justice so requires and the child’s well-being demands a relationship with a person who has stood in loco parentis in his or her life. The floodgates are not open for any third party visitation if the circumstances do not rise to this level, but Pam deserves an opportunity, at least, to provide proof of whether she meets this ‘very limited, unique situation.’” View "Brownlee v. Powell, et al." on Justia Law

Posted in: Family Law
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Katy Blagodirova and Jose Schrock married in November 2006 and had one child, J.R., in October 2007. In 2013 the couple filed a joint complaint for divorce on the grounds of irreconcilable differences. The divorce agreement provided that Blagodirova had primary physical custody of the child subject to Schrock’s visitation. Schrock agreed to pay $500 monthly in child support payments. Following the divorce, Blagodirova began a romantic relationship with Andres Maldonado De La Rosa (Maldonado), J.R.’s soccer coach and an undocumented immigrant. Blagodirova and Maldonado married in August 2014, divorced in 2015 and remarried in 2018. While she worked, Blagodirova entrusted J.R.’s care to Maldonado. Maldonado testified that after remarrying Blagodirova, he obtained an illegal driver’s license to drive J.R. around. Blagodirova had not provided alternatives for childcare for J.R., and instead relied on Maldonado to care for the child despite her awareness that Maldonado could have been taken into custody and deported. Schrock filed to a modification of custody, requesting physical custody of J.R. and the termination of his child support obligation. He alleged there has been a material change in circumstances adverse to J.R.’s best interests. A chancery court granted Schrock’s petition, but the Court of Appeals reversed. Schrock appealed. Finding the chancellor’s decision to modify child custody was supported by substantial evidence, the Mississippi Supreme Court reversed the appeals court and reinstated the chancery court’s judgment. View "Blagodirova v. Schrock" on Justia Law

Posted in: Family Law