Justia Mississippi Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

Three and a half years after his divorce was final, Dr. Chad Wigington filed a complaint to reopen. He alleged that the divorce settlement agreement between him and his ex-wife, Dr. Laura McCalop, was procedurally and substantively unconscionable and specifically requested that the chancellor modify the child support and visitation provisions. After trial, the chancellor issued an opinion and order in which he declined to set aside the divorce settlement agreement, including the child support provisions, but in which he established a procedure by which Chad and the couple’s minor child, L.P., might be reunited and begin a father-child relationship. Chad appealed the chancellor’s decision to uphold the divorce settlement agreement provisions. Laura cross-appealed the chancellor’s order to modify the visitation arrangement. The Supreme Court dismissed these appeals and remanded, finding that because the chancellor retained jurisdiction to supervise the reunification process and to revisit the case in six months for further review, the order and opinion did not constitute a final, appealable judgment. View "Wigington v. McCalop" on Justia Law

The Hinds County Youth Court found that three-year-old J.T. had been sexually abused by her father, based on a statement she made which could describe either sexual abuse or innocent contact between a father and daughter. Because the State produced no evidence to show that the child’s facially ambiguous statement described abuse, and because the youth-court judge openly and admittedly disregarded the Mississippi Rules of Evidence throughout the adjudication, the Supreme Court reversed and remanded for further proceedings. View "In the Interest of: J.T." on Justia Law

In July 2006, John Blakeney and his wife Wanda were arrested for the murders of Willie Earl and Anita Kitchens, Wanda’s biological grandparents and legal parents. John confessed to the murders when he was arrested. John, Wanda, and their minor children A.B. and C.B. lived with Willie Earl and Anita at the time of the murders. According to John’s confession, Wanda decided to kill Willie Earl and Anita after getting into a dispute with them over money she owed them. Since John’s and Wanda’s arrests, A.B. and C.B. lived with Carolyn McRee and her husband Don McRee. Carolyn McRee was Wanda’s biological mother and Willie Earl’s and Anita’s biological daughter. John and Wanda had not seen their children since their arrests. John appealed a Chancery Court decision to grant Don and Carolyn McRee’s petition to adopt his minor children and terminating his parental rights. Finding no reversible error, the Supreme Court affirmed. View "Blakeney v. McRee" on Justia Law

This action began as a paternity and custody dispute between Concetter and James Wilson. James was adjudged to be Sha’Nyla Wilson's natural father. Concetter was awarded custody, and James was awarded visitation. Concetter died in 2011. When Concetter’s relatives would not return "Sha" to James, he filed a petition for modification and sought sole legal and physical custody of Sha. The chancellor entered an order that awarded the primary physical custody of Sha to Pearlean Davis, Sha’s maternal grandmother. The chancellor also awarded James liberal visitation. In the decision, the chancellor did not treat the issue as an initial custody dispute between a natural parent and grandparent. Instead, the chancellor considered the motion as a modification of child custody based on the prior custody determination between Concetter and James. The chancery court found that the natural parent presumption was rebutted, and, further, that the best interests of the child were served by remaining in the physical custody of the grandmother, while allowing the father liberal visitation. Because the evidence was insufficient to rebut the natural parent presumption, the Supreme Court reversed and remanded the case for further proceedings. View "Wilson v. Davis" on Justia Law

The issue this case presented for the Mississippi Supreme Court's review centered on the validity of a 1995 Florida divorce decree. Sarath Sapukotana (Sarath) and Palihawadanage Ramya Chandralatha Fernando (Fernando) were married in Sri Lanka in 1992. Sarath moved to the United States a year later. In 1995, a Florida court entered an uncontested divorce decree, dissolving the marriage of Sarath and Fernando. In 2004, Sarath then married Martha Gay Weaver Sapukotana (Martha) in Mississippi. Sarath died intestate in 2008 from injuries which led to a wrongful death suit. The trial court granted Martha’s petition to be named the administratrix of the estate, over the objection of Fernando, Sarath’s first wife. This allowed Martha to file, and later to settle, the wrongful death claim. Fernando claims that the 1995 Florida divorce decree was fraudulent and void for lack of service of process, and that she instead was the rightful beneficiary to Sarath’s estate and to the proceeds of the wrongful death action. Fernando filed a motion to vacate the chancery court’s decision to appoint Martha as administratrix of Sarath’s estate. The chancery court dismissed Fernando’s motion and held that Martha was the rightful beneficiary to Sarath’s estate. Fernando appealed. The Supreme Court affirmed the chancery court, finding that the chancery court lacked authority to vacate the 1995 Florida divorce decree. View "In Re: In the Matter of the Estate of Sarath Sapukotana" on Justia Law

The parties to this case cited irreconcilable differences as grounds for their divorce. One appealed the chancellor’s award of child support and the equitable distribution of marital property. Upon review of the matter, the Supreme Court found the chancellor’s award of child support was supported by the evidence, and affirmed in that respect. But because the chancellor’s property distribution rested on several factual findings unsupported by the evidence at trial, the case was reversed and remanded for a new property distribution. View "Burnham v. Burnham" on Justia Law

In this custody battle between a child's mother and grandparents, the chancellor heard evidence that the child's mother was sexually promiscuous, that she had failed drug tests, and that she planned to move with the child to Chicago to live with a convicted sex-offender. The chancellor also heard evidence to the contrary. Based on this evidence, and judging the credibility of the witnesses before him, the chancellor found that the natural-parent presumption had been overcome and, after conducting a proper "Albright" analysis, that the best interests of the child would be served by granting custody to the grandparents. The Supreme Court affirmed. View "Irle v. Foster" on Justia Law

Drake and Tonia (Lewis) Pagel were divorced in 2008. Drake filed an appeal challenging the chancellor's property division, and the Court of Appeals affirmed in part and reversed in part and remanded. The Supreme Court, on certiorari, modified the Court of Appeals' order on remand. During the appellate process, both parties filed motions for modification of child support and for contempt. After the remand, the chancellor held a hearing and entered an order addressing the property division in accordance with the instructions from the Supreme Court and the Court of Appeals. The chancellor entered a separate order modifying child support, finding Drake in contempt and awarding Tonia attorney's fees. Drake appealed all issues. After review, the Supreme Court affirmed the chancellor's findings on the value of Legacy Holdings, Inc. (a business the parties formed and each owned 50%), equitable distribution, and lump-sum alimony. But the Court reversed the chancellor's denial of Drake's motion to modify child support, and remanded for the chancellor to consider the impact of the removal of the loan repayment from Drake's income. The Court affirmed the finding of contempt and award of attorney's fees to Tonia. View "Lewis v. Pagel" on Justia Law

Rosie Jackson was granted a divorce from her husband Michael on the ground of cruel and inhuman treatment in 2012. After a trial, the chancellor found that Rosie had presented sufficient proof of habitual cruel and inhuman treatment. The chancellor then divided the marital estate and awarded Rosie lump-sum alimony. Michael appealed the chancellor's judgment. Michael raised three issues on appeal: "(1) the evidence was insufficient to support a divorce on the ground of habitual cruel and inhuman treatment, (2) the evidence relied upon by the chancellor was inadmissible, and (3) the equitable distribution and the alimony award were based on incorrect calculations." The Court of Appeals affirmed. Michael then filed a petition for writ of certiorari with the Supreme Court, essentially reasserting the same claims he raised before the Court of Appeals. The Supreme Court granted Michael's petition, and limited its review to Michael's claim that the chancellor miscalculated the value of Rosie's equitable distribution of the marital estate. Finding that the chancellor manifestly erred in his calculation of the marital assets and liabilities, the Supreme Court affirmed in part and reversed in part the chancellor's judgment and remanded this case for further proceedings. View "Jackson v. Jackson" on Justia Law

This case came before the Supreme Court on appeal of the financial portion of a bifurcated divorce trial. When Tanya Dale Wright Sanderson and Hobson Sanderson married in 1994, Tanya signed a prenuptial agreement the day before their marriage, and upon divorce, the chancellor enforced the terms of the agreement. Tanya appealed, arguing the prenuptial agreement was procedurally and substantively unconscionable. She also claimed, among other things, that the chancellor erred in not finding a joint bank account contained commingled, marital property. Upon review, the Supreme Court affirmed the trial court on its finding that the prenuptial agreement was not procedurally unconscionable. The Court reversed and remanded, however, on whether the prenuptial agreement was substantively unconscionable. The Court also held that certain funds, used for familial purposes, kept in a joint bank account created after the marriage began, did not fall within the parameters of the prenuptial agreement. View "Sanderson v. Sanderson" on Justia Law