Justia Mississippi Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

Tanya and Hobson Sanderson divorced after seventeen years of marriage. When Tanya and Hobson married in 1994, Tanya signed a prenuptial agreement the day before their marriage, and upon divorce, the chancellor enforced the terms of the agreement. Tanya appealed. She argued the prenuptial agreement was procedurally and substantively unconscionable. Furthermore, she argued that the chancellor erred in not finding a joint bank account contained commingled, marital property. Upon review, the Supreme Court affirmed the trial court on its finding that the prenuptial agreement was not procedurally unconscionable. However, the Court reversed and remanded on whether the prenuptial agreement was substantively unconscionable. The Court also held that certain funds, used for familial purposes, kept in a joint bank account created after the marriage began, did not fall within the parameters of the prenuptial agreement. View "Sanderson v. Sanderson" on Justia Law

In 1999 the County Court of Lauderdale County determined that Brian Bronk was the natural father of Margaret Hobson's minor child. In that same judgment, the court granted sole custody to Hobson. Soon after the child's birth, the county court entered a judgment ordering Bronk to pay child support to Hobson in the amount of $400 per month. In 2013, Bronk presented an ore tenus motion in which he contended that all of the orders and judgments related to child custody were invalid because the county court never had jurisdiction to determine custody in the first place. Upon review of this matter, the Supreme Court agreed: county courts do not have jurisdiction to make child custody determinations ab initio. Accordingly, the Court reversed the custody determination of the County Court of Lauderdale County and remanded the case to the county court with instructions to transfer the proceedings to chancery court. View "Bronk v. Hobson" on Justia Law

Clayton Gutierrez appealed the Chancery Court's judgment which granted Clayton's wife Trisha lump-sum and periodic alimony incident to the divorce and found Clayton in contempt for failing to make court-ordered support payments to Trisha. Finding a lack of record support in the allocation of marital liabilities, the Supreme Court reversed the chancery court's judgment and remanded the case for further proceedings. View "Gutierrez v. Gutierrez" on Justia Law

Boyce Elmore died on November 5, 2000. More than ten years later, Cedric Williams (claiming to be Boyce’s son) filed a paternity action in an effort to recover under Boyce’s estate. After the chancellor held that Cedric’s action was timely, Boyce’s estate appealed and the Court of Appeals reversed. The Supreme Court agreed with the Court of Appeals that the chancellor’s decision should have been reversed. View "In the Matter of the Estate of Boyce Elmore, Deceased" on Justia Law

Tammy and Dane Davenport were granted an irreconcilable-differences divorce in 2012. Tammy appealed the final judgment of divorce, arguing the trial court erred in dividing the couple's assets, and in excluding certain evidence, and not making certain on-record findings with regard to Tammy's ability to pay alimony awarded to Dane. Finding no error, the Supreme Court affirmed. View "Davenport v. Davenport" on Justia Law

Following his divorce, Vennit Mathis, individually and as next friend of his two minor children, sued Dr. Charles Brent for tortious interference of a marriage contract stemming from the relationship that Brent developed with Mathis' then-wife, Nicole, shortly after the doctor treated Mrs. Mathis for neck pain. Mr. Mathis also sued on grounds of alienation of affection, and reckless infliction of emotional distress. Brent moved for summary judgment on the children’s claims, but the trial court denied the motion. After a hearing, the trial court denied the motion. The judge let the parties discuss only standing (of the children) at the hearing. The order denying summary judgment consisted of one sentence, thus, there was no insight into the trial court's rationale on any issues. The Supreme Court granted Brent’s petition for interlocutory appeal. Brent argued that the minor children’s claim that he alienated the affection of their mother failed as a matter of law because the children lacked standing to bring such a claim: only an aggrieved spouse has standing to bring a claim of alienation of affection. This issue was of first impression; in every other case considered by the Mississippi Supreme Court, a husband or wife has brought the claim for alienation of affection. Mathis argued that "some of the earliest recognitions of alienation of affection involve claims having nothing to do with extra-marital affairs," but deal with intrusion into the family unit by an outside party. The Supreme Court was not persuaded: "[g]iven that Mississippi does not view marriage as a judicially enforced contract," the children’s claim for tortious interference with a marriage contract was dismissed. Furthermore, the children failed to produce sufficient evidence to support a claim of intention infliction of emotional distress. The trial court’s denial of Brent’s motion for summary judgment as to all of the minor children’s claims was reversed. View "Brent v. Mathis, II" on Justia Law

In a divorce and child-custody dispute between Shannon and Mary Jane Borden, the chancellor awarded custody of their two sons to father-Shannon. The Court of Appeals affirmed the judgment. Finding that the chancellor gave undue weight to Mary Jane’s misconduct under three separate "Albright" factors, and that the chancellor erred in rejecting the guardian ad litem’s recommendation without providing reasons and a summary of the guardian’s report, the Supreme Court reversed the judgments of the lower courts and remanded this case for further proceedings. View "Borden v. Borden" on Justia Law

John Ravenstein appealed a 2012 Chancery Court judgment appointing his ex-wife Elisha Ravenstein Hawkins as conservator for the couple’s adult son Ryan. John also appealed the court’s denial of his motions for relief from judgment and modification of child support, through which he attempted to terminate his duty to support Ryan financially. Upon review, the Supreme Court found that the chancellor correctly denied John’s motion for relief from the divorce judgment and motion for modification of child support. However, the Court found that the chancery court applied an incorrect legal standard for appointing a conservator for Ryan. Accordingly, it reversed the chancery court’s appointment of Elisha as Ryan’s conservator and remanded the case for further proceedings. View "Ravenstein v. Ravenstein (Hawkins)" on Justia Law

Andrea Gaiennie and Michael McMillin entered a divorce decree on the ground of irreconcilable differences. In conjunction with the divorce decree, the parties entered into a property-settlement agreement. At issue before the Supreme Court was whether the Chancery Court’s finding that Gaiennie was required to pay for one-half of her children’s private-school tuition, and a related contempt issue were in error. Upon review, the Supreme Court found that, because private-school tuition was not specified in the agreement, the chancellor’s holding requiring Gaiennie to pay for one-half of the children’s private-school tuition was in error. With respect to the contempt issue, the Court found the Chancery Court abused its discretion: under the terms of the property-settlement agreement, Gaiennie was required to contribute $500 annually to the “Mississippi Impact Fund.” Trial testimony established that no fund existed. Instead, McMillin’s father had established a “Mississippi Education Savings Program.” Neither party sought to modify the agreement to reflect the correct fund. It was impossible for her to comply with the agreement as written. Thus, it was an abuse of discretion to hold her in contempt. View "Gaiennie v. McMillin" on Justia Law

Carla Darnell and William Duff Darnell (“Duff”) were married in 2004 and divorced in 2012. The couple had one child, a son, C.D., in 2006. While the divorce was pending, C.D. exhibited behaviors which may have suggested sexual abuse. Duff denied any abuse, and investigations by the Department of Human Services did not substantiate abuse. No charges were filed against Duff. Carla sought a temporary protective order and consulted with a child-abuse expert who determined that C.D. exhibited behaviors that were indicative of abuse. Carla sought sole physical custody of C.D. Instead, the chancellor granted physical custody of C.D. to Duff, stating that Carla had been the one pursuing the child-abuse allegations when it was clear that none had occurred and that the Albright factors weighed in favor of Duff. Carla appealed. Upon review, the Supreme Court reversed the chancellor’s decision and remanded the case for new findings of fact and conclusions of law which take into account some of C.D.’s statements, which were not admitted at trial. View "Darnell v. Darnell" on Justia Law