Justia Mississippi Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

Tammy and Dane Davenport were granted an irreconcilable-differences divorce in 2012. Tammy appealed the final judgment of divorce, arguing the trial court erred in dividing the couple's assets, and in excluding certain evidence, and not making certain on-record findings with regard to Tammy's ability to pay alimony awarded to Dane. Finding no error, the Supreme Court affirmed. View "Davenport v. Davenport" on Justia Law

Following his divorce, Vennit Mathis, individually and as next friend of his two minor children, sued Dr. Charles Brent for tortious interference of a marriage contract stemming from the relationship that Brent developed with Mathis' then-wife, Nicole, shortly after the doctor treated Mrs. Mathis for neck pain. Mr. Mathis also sued on grounds of alienation of affection, and reckless infliction of emotional distress. Brent moved for summary judgment on the children’s claims, but the trial court denied the motion. After a hearing, the trial court denied the motion. The judge let the parties discuss only standing (of the children) at the hearing. The order denying summary judgment consisted of one sentence, thus, there was no insight into the trial court's rationale on any issues. The Supreme Court granted Brent’s petition for interlocutory appeal. Brent argued that the minor children’s claim that he alienated the affection of their mother failed as a matter of law because the children lacked standing to bring such a claim: only an aggrieved spouse has standing to bring a claim of alienation of affection. This issue was of first impression; in every other case considered by the Mississippi Supreme Court, a husband or wife has brought the claim for alienation of affection. Mathis argued that "some of the earliest recognitions of alienation of affection involve claims having nothing to do with extra-marital affairs," but deal with intrusion into the family unit by an outside party. The Supreme Court was not persuaded: "[g]iven that Mississippi does not view marriage as a judicially enforced contract," the children’s claim for tortious interference with a marriage contract was dismissed. Furthermore, the children failed to produce sufficient evidence to support a claim of intention infliction of emotional distress. The trial court’s denial of Brent’s motion for summary judgment as to all of the minor children’s claims was reversed. View "Brent v. Mathis, II" on Justia Law

In a divorce and child-custody dispute between Shannon and Mary Jane Borden, the chancellor awarded custody of their two sons to father-Shannon. The Court of Appeals affirmed the judgment. Finding that the chancellor gave undue weight to Mary Jane’s misconduct under three separate "Albright" factors, and that the chancellor erred in rejecting the guardian ad litem’s recommendation without providing reasons and a summary of the guardian’s report, the Supreme Court reversed the judgments of the lower courts and remanded this case for further proceedings. View "Borden v. Borden" on Justia Law

John Ravenstein appealed a 2012 Chancery Court judgment appointing his ex-wife Elisha Ravenstein Hawkins as conservator for the couple’s adult son Ryan. John also appealed the court’s denial of his motions for relief from judgment and modification of child support, through which he attempted to terminate his duty to support Ryan financially. Upon review, the Supreme Court found that the chancellor correctly denied John’s motion for relief from the divorce judgment and motion for modification of child support. However, the Court found that the chancery court applied an incorrect legal standard for appointing a conservator for Ryan. Accordingly, it reversed the chancery court’s appointment of Elisha as Ryan’s conservator and remanded the case for further proceedings. View "Ravenstein v. Ravenstein (Hawkins)" on Justia Law

Andrea Gaiennie and Michael McMillin entered a divorce decree on the ground of irreconcilable differences. In conjunction with the divorce decree, the parties entered into a property-settlement agreement. At issue before the Supreme Court was whether the Chancery Court’s finding that Gaiennie was required to pay for one-half of her children’s private-school tuition, and a related contempt issue were in error. Upon review, the Supreme Court found that, because private-school tuition was not specified in the agreement, the chancellor’s holding requiring Gaiennie to pay for one-half of the children’s private-school tuition was in error. With respect to the contempt issue, the Court found the Chancery Court abused its discretion: under the terms of the property-settlement agreement, Gaiennie was required to contribute $500 annually to the “Mississippi Impact Fund.” Trial testimony established that no fund existed. Instead, McMillin’s father had established a “Mississippi Education Savings Program.” Neither party sought to modify the agreement to reflect the correct fund. It was impossible for her to comply with the agreement as written. Thus, it was an abuse of discretion to hold her in contempt. View "Gaiennie v. McMillin" on Justia Law

Carla Darnell and William Duff Darnell (“Duff”) were married in 2004 and divorced in 2012. The couple had one child, a son, C.D., in 2006. While the divorce was pending, C.D. exhibited behaviors which may have suggested sexual abuse. Duff denied any abuse, and investigations by the Department of Human Services did not substantiate abuse. No charges were filed against Duff. Carla sought a temporary protective order and consulted with a child-abuse expert who determined that C.D. exhibited behaviors that were indicative of abuse. Carla sought sole physical custody of C.D. Instead, the chancellor granted physical custody of C.D. to Duff, stating that Carla had been the one pursuing the child-abuse allegations when it was clear that none had occurred and that the Albright factors weighed in favor of Duff. Carla appealed. Upon review, the Supreme Court reversed the chancellor’s decision and remanded the case for new findings of fact and conclusions of law which take into account some of C.D.’s statements, which were not admitted at trial. View "Darnell v. Darnell" on Justia Law

Michael Huseth (Mike) appealed a Chancery Court judgment which granted his wife Tavia Huseth an award of separate maintenance, full physical custody of their son, and attorney fees. Tavia requested attorney fees on appeal equal to half of the fees she was awarded at trial. The Supreme Court affirmed the chancellor’s judgment in part, reversed in part and remanded the case to the chancery court, and the Court denied Tavia’s request for attorney fees on appeal. The chancellor’s grant of separate maintenance and child support was supported by substantial evidence and was not manifestly wrong. The chancellor’s determination of the amount of imputed income was not supported by sufficient findings by the chancellor, and in the absence of her specific computation of the amount, was reversed and remanded for specific findings detailing how the chancellor arrived at that amount, and upon what she relied. Because the Court reversed and remanded for a new finding of imputed income, the Court also reversed and remanded the chancellor’s determination of child support, in which the chancellor shall consider all of the facts and circumstances regarding the parties’ ability to support the child, rather than relying on the statutory guidelines. Further, the chancellor’s award of separate maintenance did not take into account Mike’s necessary living expenses, and therefore was reversed. The amount of separate maintenance may be based upon imputed income, but the amount of that income that goes towards living expenses must be considered. View "Huseth v. Huseth" on Justia Law

Leslie Shumake, Jr. and Katarina Shumake were granted a divorce in 2009. In the judgment, the chancellor ordered Leslie to pay Katarina $5,750 per month in periodic alimony. Shortly thereafter, Katarina filed a complaint for citation for contempt, claiming that Leslie had not paid the amount of alimony ordered by the chancellor. From the time Katarina filed her initial contempt complaint in 2009 until April 2012, the chancery court held hearings and entered various orders addressing the alimony and Leslie’s arrearage. In the end, the chancellor concluded that Leslie owed Katarina $58,550, plus interest, in arrearage. Leslie appealed the chancellor’s order. The Court of Appeals held, inter alia, that "on [the] unique facts [of the present case], we find that it would be fundamentally unfair and unjust to charge Leslie with a $58,550 arrearage." The Court of Appeals reversed and remanded that portion of the chancellor’s order. Katarina appealed. The Supreme Court concluded the appellate court erred in holding the arrearage award should have been reversed and remanded. The case was remanded for further proceedings. View "Shumake v. Shumake" on Justia Law

In this guardianship case, the ward's guardian petitioned for transfer of the guardianship to Louisiana, where the ward and guardian had moved. The chancellor denied both the request to transfer the guardianship and the guardian's proposed investment plan, and the guardian appealed. Finding no error, the Supreme Court affirmed.View "Deason v. Stinson" on Justia Law

A mother sued the Department of Human Services (DHS) after the death of her son in the home in which DHS placed him. Austin Watkins was removed from the home of his mother, Tammy Watkins, and placed in the home of his paternal grandmother, Janice Mowdy. Approximately a year and a half after Mowdy was awarded durable legal custody of Austin, Austin died from starvation. The trial court granted DHS’s motion for summary judgment, determining that DHS enjoyed sovereign immunity from liability for the acts alleged in the complaint. Upon review of the facts and circumstances of this case, the Supreme Court concluded the trial court erred in granting summary judgment. Accordingly, the Court reversed the trial court and remanded the case for further proceedings. View "Watkins v. Mississippi Dept. of Human Services" on Justia Law