Justia Mississippi Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

Martin and Star Pierce were married in Mississippi in 2000, and divorced in Washington state in 2007. Because the Washington court lacked personal jurisdiction over Star, it did not divide the parties' assets. Subsequently, Martin brought an action in Mississippi requesting sale of the parties' Biloxi home and determination of the parties' financial obligations incurred during the marriage. Star filed a counterclaim requesting equitable distribution of the marital assets, alimony, and attorney's fees. The chancellor equitably divided the parties' assets and awarded Star alimony and attorney's fees. Martin appealed the chancellor's judgment, and the Court of Appeals reversed the property division and remanded for further proceedings. On remand, Martin raised two jurisdictional challenges for the first time: (1) he argued that the Washington judgment was res judicata as to Star's claims for equitable distribution and alimony, therefore the chancery court lacked subject-matter jurisdiction to divide the parties' assets.; (2) he also argued that because he never consented to the chancery court's jurisdiction, the chancery court lacked personal jurisdiction to divide his military retirement benefits under the Federal Uniformed Services Former Spouse Protection Act. Upon review, the Supreme Court found no reversible error. Accordingly the Court affirmed the chancery court's decision. View "Pierce v. Pierce" on Justia Law

The Chancery Court appointed conservators over the person and estate of Stuart Irby. Approximately one year later, Karen Collins Irby, Stuart's ex-wife, filed pleadings to invalidate the conservatorship and set aside the transactions of the conservators. The chancery court denied Karen's petition, and she appealed. Finding no reversible error, the Supreme Court affirmed. View "Collins v. Pinnacle Trust" on Justia Law

William Andrew Short (Andy) and Kathryn Taylor Short were divorced in 2007. As part of the divorce judgment, the parties entered into a property, child-support, and child custody agreement stipulating that Andy would pay child support until the child began kindergarten; thereafter, he would pay fifteen percent of his adjusted gross income. In 2011, Kathryn filed a complaint for contempt, alleging that Andy had failed to make child-support payments. Andy filed a counter-complaint for custody and to modify child support. Andy alleged a material change in circumstances because of a significant reduction in his adjusted gross income, requiring a new child-support calculation. The chancellor found that no material change in circumstances had occurred and ordered Andy to continue paying the minimum requirement of child support, pursuant to the original child-support agreement. Andy appealed, arguing that the chancellor had disregarded statutory child-support guidelines, that the child-support provision in the parties’ agreement violated Mississippi law, and that the chancellor had erred in calculating Andy’s adjusted gross income. The Court of Appeals affirmed, finding no error. Andy filed a petition for writ of certiorari, arguing (among other things) that the Court of Appeals had failed to address his argument that the automatic child-support-calculation clause violated Mississippi law. The Supreme Court found that the chancellor erred in calculating Andy’s monthly income during his determination of whether a material change in circumstances existed. Further, the chancellor’s ruling erroneously indicated that the parties’ child-support agreement was nonmodifiable. Therefore, the judgments of both the Court of Appeals and the trial court were reversed and the case is remanded for further proceedings. View "Short v. Short" on Justia Law

Rosemary Finch filed a complaint for separate maintenance, and her husband Stewart Finch responded with a counterclaim for divorce. In the course of their divorce proceedings, Rosemary and Stewart were required by Mississippi Chancery Court Rule 8.05 to provide a comprehensive financial statement listing their individual incomes and expenses and their marital and nonmarital assets and liabilities. The chancellor retroactively reduced alimony from $4,000 to $2,000 per month based on Rosemary’s failure adequately to disclose social security payments, additional debts, and a joint account with her mother, and Stewart having to pay for both Rosemary’s and his daughter’s vehicles in order to transfer title pursuant to the divorce judgment. In addition, Stewart was paying more than $800 per month to satisfy the additional marital debts. The chancellor retroactively reduced child support from $1,300 to $900 per month and further relieved Stewart of the obligation to pay any of his son’s educational expenses. Rosemary appealed this judgment, and the Court of Appeals affirmed the chancery court. Based on the facts of this case, the Supreme Court reversed and remanded for further factual findings regarding Stewart’s income and for a recalculation of alimony and child support. View "Finch v. Finch" on Justia Law

Donald and Penny Brewer (through their respective attorneys) negotiated, agreed to, and signed off on a proposed order that changed custody of one of the parties’ two children, John, to Donald, and reduced his child-support obligation. Although the attorneys failed to present the order to the chancellor, the Brewers, believing it had been entered, complied with its terms for several years. But when the chancellor later learned that Donald had paid the reduced amount of child support, he refused to admit any evidence of the agreement, ordered Donald to pay the full amount of arrearage, and held him in contempt. Upon review, the Supreme Court held that Donald should not have been held in contempt; that he was entitled to credit for any payment of support he made directly to, or on behalf of, John; and that the chancellor should have granted Penny a judgment for past-due child support, reduced by the credit.View "Brewer v. Holliday" on Justia Law

In a custody dispute between the natural father and the maternal grandmother, the chancellor granted custody to the father, finding that the father had not deserted his child. Although the grandmother had stood in loco parentis to the child since the mother’s death, the chancellor correctly recognized that this alone could not overcome the natural-parent presumption. Finding no error, the Supreme Court affirmed the chancery court's judgment. View "Davis v. Vaughn" on Justia Law

Terence Jones appealed a Chancery Court's denial of his 2011 petition to disestablish paternity, which relied on Section 93-9-10(3)(c) of the Mississippi Code. Because Jones signed a stipulated agreement of paternity that was approved by court order in 2000, the chancery court properly denied Jones's petition as presented. Accordingly, the Supreme Court affirmed the chancery court's judgment denying Jones's petition. View "Jones v. Mallett" on Justia Law

Every divorce based on irreconcilable differences in Mississippi must proceed under either Section 93-5-2(2) or Section 93-5-2(3), but not both. In this case, the two subsections were conflated and confused. As a result, the Supreme Court reversed the Chancery Court's judgment and remanded the case for further proceedings. View "Sanford v. Sanford" on Justia Law

An interlocutory appeal stemmed from a circuit court's denial of Robert Germany’s motion to sever and transfer claims filed against him by his wife, Ginger Germany, to their pending divorce proceeding. Finding that many of Ginger’s claims against Robert were either equitable in nature or were related to divorce and alimony, the Supreme Court reversed the circuit court and remanded the case with instructions to sever and transfer those claims to the pending divorce action in the Chancery Court. View "Germany v. Germany" on Justia Law

Kenton McNeese appealed the dismissal of his Rule 60(b) Motion for Relief from Judgment and Other Relief. This Rule 60(b) motion was filed with respect to a judgment of divorce from which he already had perfected an appeal. At that time, his first appeal was pending with the Supreme Court. In response, his former wife Katherine (“Katye”), filed a motion to dismiss and requested that Kenton be required to pay attorneys’ fees. The trial court denied Kenton’s motion for relief and granted Katye’s motion to dismiss and request for attorneys’ fees. The trial court ruled that the Rule 60(b) motion was not timely and that the court lacked jurisdiction “due to the pendency of the case’s appeal to the Mississippi Supreme Court. . . .” The trial court also found that Kenton’s motion was frivolous and without substantial justification and that it was interposed for delay and harassment and, therefore, imposed a $1,000 sanction against Kenton to be applied toward Katye’s attorneys’ fees. Finding that the trial court erroneously ruled that it lacked jurisdiction to hear Kenton’s Rule 60(b) motion, but concluding that the trial court did not err in denying the motion, the Supreme Court affirmed in part and reversed in part. View "Kenton Hal McNeese v. Katherine J. McNeese (Graves)" on Justia Law