Justia Mississippi Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

George Neville filed a petition for modification of a final judgment of divorce seeking to have his ex-wife, Tina Blitz, pay their daughter's college expenses. The chancellor ordered the parties to divide the college expenses equally, after scholarships and a monthly housing stipend from the Post-9/11 GI Bill were deducted. George, who had assigned his Post-9/11 GI Bill benefits to his daughter, appealed arguing the chancellor erred by dividing the monthly housing stipend between Tina and himself. The chancellor found that George should take credit for the payment of the daughter's tuition, fees, and books from the Post-9/11 GI Bill, but not the monthly housing stipend. He ordered that the housing stipend be taken off the top , along with the daughter's scholarships, before the remaining expenses were divided between George and Tina. Upon review, the Supreme Court held that the chancellor's allocation of the monthly housing stipend was a violation of 38 U.S.C. 3319(f)(3) because it constituted division of the benefit between parties in a civil proceeding. Accordingly, the Court reversed and remanded the case back to the chancellor to modify the order to give George credit for all benefits from the Post-9/11 GI Bill. View "Neville v. Blitz" on Justia Law

M.E.V. was a minor child whose biological mother lived in Mississippi, and whose biological father lived in Texas. The youth court removed M.E.V. from her mother’s custody. After several periodic reviews, the youth court judge issued a review order giving legal and physical custody of the child to her biological father in Texas on a trial basis. The mother wanted to appeal that review order. Because the review order was not a final judgment, the Supreme Court dismissed the appeal. View "In the Interest of M.E.V." on Justia Law

Thirteen years after the divorce was finalized, the Lamar County Chancery Court found that the former husband, Appellee John David Gatwood, was in arrears on certain financial obligations imposed by the divorce decree. Because of various extenuating circumstances, the chancellor ordered Gatwood to pay off his debt in monthly installments. More than a year after the chancery court judgment, the former wife's attorney, Jack Parsons, successfully filed a suggestion for writ of garnishment, significantly accelerating payment of Gatwood's financial obligations. Circumstances related to the manner in which the writ of garnishment was obtained resulted in sanctions against Parsons; the garnishment proceedings also gave rise to other rulings which were appealed to this Court. After review, the Supreme Court declined to find the trial court erred: evidence at trial supported that court's finding that attorney's fees and sanctions against Parsons and his client were appropriate. Accordingly, the circuit court's decision was affirmed. View "Cooper v. The Estate of William David Gatwood" on Justia Law

After being separated from her newborn infant for more than a year, Cirila Baltazar Cruz received an award of full legal and physical custody of her child from the Youth Court. The youth court further ordered that its proceedings and records remain confidential and that those present at the final hearing refrain from speaking to the media about the case. Cruz wanted to be able to discuss the case publicly and to share documents and transcripts from the proceedings and requested that the order of confidentiality be set aside. The youth court denied her motion. The court said that none of the parties had objected to the confidentiality order and found that it was not in Baby Doe's best interest to set aside that order absent some reason under Section 43-21-261 of the Mississippi Code. Cruz appealed the decision of the youth court to the Supreme Court. Upon review, the Supreme Court found that the youth court did not abuse its discretion in ordering that the youth-court records remain confidential; however, the youth court failed to apply the proper legal standard when it issued the gag order. Therefore, the Court affirmed in part and reversed and in part, and remanded the case for further proceedings. View "Cruz v. Jackson County Dept. of Human Services" on Justia Law

After filing for a no-fault divorce, Perry and Iretha Collins asked the chancery court to decide the questions of alimony, child support, attorney's fees, and the division of marital assets. Dissatisfied with the chancellor's decision, Perry appealed to the Court of Appeals, which affirmed the judgment of the trial court. Perry then petitioned the Supreme Court raising four issues; the Court granted certiorari to consider two: (1) the calculation of Perry's gross income for purposes of determining child support and (2) the designation of marital property. Finding that the Court of Appeals erred in affirming the trial court's decision regarding both issues, the Court affirmed in part and reversed and remand in part. View "Collins v. Collins" on Justia Law

Howard Carney III and Andrea Leigh Bell Carney obtained a divorce on the ground of irreconcilable differences. They asked the chancery court to determine child support, alimony, equitable distribution of assets, and attorney's fees. The chancery court determined child support, divided the marital estate, considered alimony but declined to award it, and ordered Howard to pay $5,000 toward Andrea's attorney's fees. Howard appealed and the Court of Appeals affirmed. Howard appealed, claiming that the Court of Appeals erred in affirming the chancery court judgment because the chancery court manifestly: (1) failed to divide the marital estate equitably and (2) erred by listing his unvalued social security benefits under his share of the equitable distribution. The Supreme Court agreed with Howard as to the first issue, thus reversed and remanded on that issue. The Court affirmed the Court of Appeals and the chancery court on the second issue. View "Carney v. Carney" on Justia Law

Elizabeth Swain and Mona Cates lived together from 2000 until 2006. After they severed their relationship, Swain filed an action seeking the repayment of funds she first had invested in a property in Washington State, which were then used to purchase a residence in Mississippi. The chancellor rejected Swain's claim of a constructive trust or a resulting trust. The chancellor found that Cates had been unjustly enriched by Swain's contributions and awarded Swain a judgment in that amount. The Court of Appeals affirmed the chancellor's rejection of the trust claim but reversed the decision of the chancellor, which was based on unjust enrichment. The Court of Appeals held that, because “cohabitation alone cannot form the basis of an equitable remedy between non-married cohabitants,” the remedy of unjust enrichment was outside the bounds of the chancery court's equitable powers. Upon review, the Supreme Court found that the chancellor was empowered to award relief on the basis of unjust enrichment. The Court affirmed the judgment of the Court of Appeals to the extent that it affirmed the chancellor's rejection of Swain's claim of a constructive trust or a resulting trust. The Court reversed the judgment of the Court of Appeals with regard to the unjust-enrichment award. Because the chancellor made a mathematical error in the calculation of the unjust-enrichment award, the Court vacated the chancellor's judgment in part, and remanded the case to the chancery court for entry of judgment in the correct amount. View "Cates v. Swain" on Justia Law

Kenton and Katherine McNeese executed a consent agreement to an irreconcilable differences divorce, and the chancellor granted the divorce on that ground. Kenton filed a motion to reconsider, which was denied. Kenton appealed the denial of his post-trial motion to reconsider as well as the grant of divorce based on irreconcilable differences. Finding no error, the Supreme Court affirmed the chancery court. View "McNeese v. McNeese" on Justia Law

After a lengthy battle regarding child custody, visitation, and child support, a chancellor granted Frankie Reasor custody of his teenage daughter. But the chancellor found Reasor in arrears on child-support payments, held him in contempt, and entered a judgment in favor of Rose Jordan for back child support. The issue before the Supreme Court in this appeal concerned a subsequent hearing in which a second chancellor determined the amount of arrears, entered a fifty-five-percent withholding order to collect the judgment, and ordered Reasor to pay Jordan’s attorney’s fees. Reasor raised five issues on appeal. Upon review, the Supreme Court found that the chancellor erred by entering a fifty-five percent withholding order. The Court affirmed the chancellor in all other respects, and remanded the case for recalculation of the withholding. View "Frankie L. Reasor v. Rose M. Johnson Jordan" on Justia Law

Holly McKnight and Walter Jenkins were married from 1972 until 2004. The parties have one daughter. After the parties divorced in 2004, they initially shared joint legal custody of their child, with Holly having physical custody. After four years, Walter filed a Petition for Contempt, Modification of Custody and Temporary Visitation. Following a hearing in 2008, custody was modified to give legal and physical custody to Walter, with Holly having regular visitation. Two months after custody was modified, Walter filed a new Petition for Contempt, Modification of Visitation and Temporary Relief in which he accused Holly of not returning all of their child's belongings and sought to make Holly's visitation limited and supervised. As a result, the parties entered into an Agreed Preliminary Injunction, which indefinitely suspended Holly's visitation. A year after the agreed injunction, Holly moved to change physical and legal custody back to her, with Walter having visitation. A hearing was conducted on Walter's contempt petition and on Holly's petition to modify custody. After the hearing, the chancellor denied Holly's petition for modification of custody and child support, held her in contempt, and required her to pay Walter and the guardian ad litem. Holly appealed, alleging the chancellor erred by: (1) not modifying custody; (2) finding her in contempt; (3) not finding Walter in contempt; (4) not awarding her attorneys' fees and assessing her some of Walter's attorneys' fees and the guardian ad litem's fees; (5) excluding evidence preceding the October 2008 custody order; and (6) restricting certain witnesses' testimony. The Court of Appeals affirmed the chancellor on all issues. After review, the Supreme Court affirmed the Court of Appeals and the trial court on all issues except the contempt judgment against Holly and the related attorney's fees award. View "McKnight v. Jenkins" on Justia Law