Justia Mississippi Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

The issue before the Supreme Court in this case involved a dispute over custody of B.S. Diana Crosby, the child's maternal grandmother, claimed the Youth Curt erred in awarding custody of B.S. to the child's father, Robert Sims, Jr. Finding no error, the Supreme Court affirmed the Youth Court. View "In the Interest of B.S., a Minor" on Justia Law

Husband appealed the trial court's award of lump-sum alimony, temporary alimony, and interest to the wife. Upon review of the trial court record, the Supreme Court concluded that the chancellor examined all relevant factors in determining lump-sum alimony, and his determination was supported by the record. The chancellor was within his power to enforce the temporary order and continue the obligation of temporary alimony until the divorce was finalized. Furthermore, the chancellor did not err in awarding interest on monies owed to the wife that were more than a year past due. Because the chancellor did not err in any of these determinations, the Supreme Court affirmed the trial court in all respects. View "McFarland, Jr. v. McFarland" on Justia Law

In a divorce proceeding, the chancery court ordered the father and mother to pay certain specific college expenses which the father argued should include flight lessons associated with the child’s aviation-related major. The chancellor found for the father, held the mother in contempt, and awarded the father attorney’s fees. The Court of Appeals affirmed. After its review of the matter, in particular the terms of the divorce decree, the Supreme Court found that because the decree required payment for only “meals, tuition, books and room,” and reversed the judgments of the Court of Appeals and the chancery court in part and remanded the case for further proceedings. View "Zweber v. Zweber" on Justia Law

The Jackson County Court sitting as Youth Court exercised jurisdiction over two minors following allegations of abuse and neglect. The foster parents of the two minor children subsequently filed adoption proceedings in the Lincoln County Chancery Court. The Mississippi Department of Human Services ("MDHS") sought interlocutory appeal after unsuccessfully challenging the chancery court's jurisdiction to consider the adoption proceedings. Upon review, the Supreme Court found that the Chancery Court had jurisdiction over the adoption proceedings and affirmed the Chancery Court's judgment. View "Mississippi Dept. of Human Svcs. v. Watts" on Justia Law

Jonathan and Lea Ann Byrd were married in 1991. They had four children together. The issue before the Supreme Court in this appeal was the chancellor's financial awards of property division, alimony, and child support. Much of the dispute centered upon a Trust in which Jonathan was a one-third beneficiary and also was a cotrustee. All assets from the Trust will be distributed to Jonathan and his two brothers, Keith, and Barry in September 2014. Lea Ann raised numerous issues on appeal, all relating to the valuation of the marital property, taking into consideration Jonathan's interest in the trust. Upon review, the Supreme Court found that the chancellor erred in failing to take into account certain expenses for the children, and whether it was necessary that Jonathan maintain life insurance in order to protect the children in the event of his death. The Court affirmed the chancellor in all other respects. View "Byrd v. Byrd" on Justia Law

This matter came before the Supreme Court on appeal of a trial court's grant of an irreconcilable-differences divorce in late 2008. David and Helen Rogillio were married for eleven years, living in Vicksburg with their minor son. David filed for a divorce on the grounds of habitual cruel and inhumane treatment, or, in the alternative, irreconcilable differences. He filed an Amended Complaint listing habitual drug use and adultery as additional grounds for divorce. At trial, the parties ultimately consented to a divorce based on irreconcilable differences and entered an Agreed Order Allowing Withdrawal of Contested Allegations. The court entered a Final Judgment of Divorce, dividing the marital assets and awarding lump-sum alimony of $15,000 to Helen. Helen appealed arguing that she should have been awarded periodic-payment alimony. The Court of Appeals affirmed. Helen then petitioned to the Supreme Court, which held that the chancellor had abused her discretion through errors in her accounting of the marital assets. On remand, the chancellor found that the previous judgment did contain accounting errors. After recalculating the marital assets, the chancellor ordered David to pay Helen lump-sum alimony of $18,204, periodic-payment alimony in the amount of $1,500 per month, and $4,369.50 for her attorney fees. David appealed pro se arguing: (1) the chancery court erred in awarding periodic-payment alimony; and (2) the chancery court erred in ordering David to pay Helen’s attorney fees. Helen did not file a brief in response to David’s claims. Finding that the chancellor did not abuse her discretion, the Supreme Court affirmed the chancery court. View "Rogillio v. Rogillio" on Justia Law

In late 2011, the Bolivar County prosecuting attorney filed a petition in the county Youth Court, seeking an adjudicatory hearing, after receiving a complaint that two minor girls, S.G.M. and C.D.M., ages thirteen and eleven, respectively, had been sexually abused by their father. The youth court conducted an adjudicatory hearing. Those present at the hearing, apart from the attorneys, were Jim Warrington, the guardian ad litem (GAL) assigned to the case; Johnnie Rushing, a social worker with the Department of Human Services; David Monroe, the girls' biological father; Peggy Monroe, the girls' stepmother; K.T.M., the girls' older brother, age fourteen; Tammy and Tawanda Latham, the girls' maternal aunts; and Marie Miller, the girls' maternal grandmother. At the time of the adjudicatory hearing, S.G.M., C.D.M., and K.T.M. were in the custody of Peggy, as David had allowed Peggy to obtain custody of the children sometime after the children's biological mother had passed away. Shortly into the hearing, the youth court became aware that only Tammy and Tawanda had been issued summonses to appear at the hearing. All others agreed to waive service of process, and the court allowed David to waive service of process for S.G.M., C.D.M., and K.T.M. At the conclusion of the hearing, the youth court found there was no basis to support the sexual-abuse allegation. The youth court then proceeded to conduct a disposition hearing. At that point, the prosecuting attorney informed the youth court that the court was without authority to conduct a disposition hearing because the two girls had not been adjudicated sexually abused. The youth court had this matter placed on the court docket and held a hearing in the court's chambers. Tammy, Tawanda, Marie, and Peggy were the only parties present. The youth court stated on the record that, during the adjudicatory hearing, it had ordered that S.G.M., C.D.M., and K.T.M. were to be placed in the custody and care of their maternal aunt Tammy. Both the county prosecutor and legal counsel for Peggy disputed that such an order had been issued by the youth court at the hearing. The youth court entered an adjudicatory order, placing all three minor children in the custody of Tammy. Peggy thereafter filed a notice of appeal, asserting that: (1) the youth court had no jurisdiction to conduct the adjudicatory hearing because of lack of service of process on the children; (2) the youth court had no jurisdiction to conduct a subsequent adjudicatory hearing because of failure to give proper notice of the hearing; (3) the youth court could not conduct a disposition hearing after finding that the abuse allegations were unsubstantiated; and (4) the order to remove the children from their home was not supported by the evidence. Upon review, the Supreme Court concluded that the children did not receive process, and accordingly vacated the youth court's order and remanded for further proceedings. View "In the Interest of S.G.M., C.D.M., and K.T.M." on Justia Law

James Mallard and Tonya Mallard (now Tonya Mallard Burkart) were divorced on in 2001. Incorporated into the Final Judgment of Divorce was the Child Custody and Support and Property Settlement Agreement executed by the parties. A significant portion of the financial settlement that Burkart received in the property settlement agreement consisted of forty percent of Mallard's "disposable military retirement pay" for ten years. Following the divorce, Mallard elected to adopt a sixty-percent disability rating as part of his retirement pay. Mallard did not provide any of these disability benefits to Burkart. When Mallard filed a Petition for Modification of Judgment of Divorce in chancery court pursuant to child-support and custody matters, Burkart filed a counterpetition for contempt, asserting that Mallard had structured his retirement in such a way as to defeat her forty-percent interest in the total retirement pay. The chancellor determined that Burkart was entitled to forty percent of the disability benefits, but he declined to find Mallard in contempt. Mallard appealed. Upon review, the Supreme Court found that since federal law preempts state law, state courts are precluded from allocating military disability benefits to a nonmilitary spouse; therefore, the Court reversed and remanded the case for further proceedings. View "Mallard v. Burkart" on Justia Law

The "Child Custody, Support and Property Settlement Agreement" between A.M.L. and J.W.L., incorporated into their February 2002 "Final Judgment of Divorce," provided that they would share "joint legal custody" of their four daughters, with A.M.L. having "primary physical custody" and J.W.L. having frequent visitation. The Agreement also provided for, inter alia, child support, medical expenses and reimbursement, college expenses, and life insurance naming the children as beneficiaries. In the following years, J.W.L. became effectively estranged from his two oldest daughters, and ceased overnight and weekend visitation with both. In 2008, A.M.L. filed a "Petition for Modification and/or Clarification of Final Judgment of Divorce" and J.W.L. responded with a "Counterclaim for Modification of Custody and Other Relief." A.M.L.'s Petition requested full "legal and physical custody" of the children, an increase in child support, clarification of several Agreement provisions, contempt orders against J.W.L. for his alleged failure to comply with various Agreement provisions, and attorney fees. J.W.L.'s Counterclaim sought "full legal and physical custody" of their two youngest daughters, with attending modifications of Agreement provisions regarding child support, medical expenses, and college expenses. Following trial, the Chancery Court of Madison County, Mississippi, entered its "Opinion and Judgment on Petition for Modification and/or Clarification of Final Judgment of Divorce." Regarding child custody, the chancellor found a "material change in circumstances . . . which warrant[ed] modification of custody and the transfer of primary physical and legal custody of [the three youngest children] to [J.W.L.,]" based upon conduct of the children which was attributed to A.M.L. "impos[ing] little or no discipline." Yet the court delayed ordering custody modification, holding such ruling in abeyance, "subject to the parties adhering to" several court-imposed conditions. A.M.L. retained physical custody of the children. The "Opinion and Judgment" also modified J.W.L.'s child-support and college-expense obligations, and denied A.M.L.'s request for attorney fees. Following the denial of post-trial motions filed by A.M.L. and J.W.L. with respect to the rulings challenged on appeal, A.M.L. filed "Notice of Appeal" and J.W.L. filed "Notice of Cross-Appeal." Based upon this analysis, the Supreme Court affirmed the chancellor's findings: (1) that A.M.L. had not "actively engaged" in alienation efforts; (2) that there would be no "upward retroactive modification" in J.W.L.'s child-support obligations for C.D., W.X., and Y.Z.; (3) that J.W.L. did not act in contempt in failing to comply with the thirty-day, noncoveredmedical-and-dental-expenses reimbursement provision of the Agreement; (4) that J.W.L. did not act in contempt of the "written proof" requirement in the life-insurance provision of the Agreement; and (5) that A.M.L.'s request for contempt-related attorney fees should be denied. The Supreme Court reversed the chancellor's findings: (1) of child-custody modification, as there was no "material change in circumstances" in the custodial home and no "Albright" analysis at the time of the initial ruling; (2) of retroactively terminating J.W.L.'s child support obligations for A.B.; (3) of applying "Hambrick" to C.D. and, based thereon, limiting J.W.L.'s college-expense obligation for her; and (4) of denying A.M.L.'s modification-related attorney fees for failure to "timely introduce any evidence" thereon. View "A.M.L. v. J.W.L." on Justia Law

William and Sarah Smith are the grandparents of Jason Wells. Jason's mother, Tara Wells, is Sarah's daughter. The Smiths filed a petition for temporary and permanent custody of Jason. They later filed a separate petition for adoption and to terminate the parental rights of Tara and Robert Johnson, the biological father. The chancellor declined to terminate Tara's and Robert's parental rights but awarded the Smiths primary custody of Jason. In awarding the Smiths custody, the chancellor found that Tara had "by her long and continuous absences from [Jason] failed to exercise her parental rights and fulfill her parental responsibilities." He found that this had caused the Smiths to assume the role of parents to Jason for virtually his entire life and that the Smiths thus stood in loco parentis. The chancellor then conducted a best-interest, "Albright" analysis and concluded that Jason should remain with the Smiths. The issue before the Supreme Court was whether the chancellor found that the natural-parent presumption under "Albright" had been overcome based on the doctrine of loco parentis (which would have been in error), or based on a finding of desertion by Tara which necessitated the Smiths standing as in loco parentis for Jason. Upon review, the Supreme Court found the latter and therefore affirmed the judgment of the chancery court. View "In re Smith adoption of Minor Tara Wells" on Justia Law