Justia Mississippi Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

Anthony Cuccia (Tony) separated from his wife, Julie Anne Cuccia after eleven years of marriage. At some point near the end of the marriage, Julie Anne began allowing rottweiler and pitbull dogs to live in the home. Tony disagreed with Julie Anne’s decision, resulting in a dispute that led to Tony filing for divorce. A few months later, Tony filed an amended complaint for divorce, adding that he was entitled to a divorce on the grounds of habitual cruel and inhumane treatment. Julie Anne filed an answer and counterclaim in which she denied being guilty of habitual cruel and inhumane treatment but admitted that irreconcilable differences existed, arguing in the alternative that she was entitled to a divorce on the grounds of habitual cruel and inhuman treatment. Tony and Julie Anne consented to an irreconcilable-differences divorce, but left equitable distribution of property, child custody, and alimony for the chancery court to decide. After a trial on September 21, 2009, the chancery court issued its final divorce decree and order, granting custody to Julie Anne, dividing the marital estate, and awarding alimony. Tony appealed the divorce decree due to the nature of the award given to Julie Anne regarding child custody, alimony, and equitable distribution of marital property. On appeal, the Court of Appeals overturned several of the chancery court’s findings and remanded the issues for reexamination. As a result, Julie Anne petitioned the Supreme Court for certiorari to review the findings of the Court of Appeals and the chancery court. Upon review, the Supreme Court affirmed the judgment of the Court of Appeals in part and reversed in part. On remand, the chancery court was instructed to determine the demarcation date for dividing the marital property, consider marital debt in that division, consider whether alimony was appropriate after making that division, reevaluate the custody matter, and craft an appropriate custody arrangement with the best interest of the children in mind. View "Cuccia v. Cuccia" on Justia Law

Charlotte and Larry Wilson, parents of Crystal Wilson (deceased), filed an action requesting visitation with their grandchildren. The chancellor granted the request. Aggrieved, Stephen Smith, Crystal's former husband, and Melissa LuAnn Smith, Stephen's current wife, appealed the chancellor’s decision and challenged the constitutionality of Mississippi’s grandparent-visitation statutes. The Smiths raised four issues on appeal; the Supreme Court addressed each and held: (1) Mississippi's grandparent-visitation statute and the "Martin v. Coop" (693 So.2d 912(Miss. 1997)) factors do not violate the Constitution. (2) the chancellor did not err in applying the grandparent-visitation statutes, the "Martin" factors and "Troxel v. Granville" (530 U.S. 57 (2000)) to this case; (3) the chancellor properly applied the "Martin" factors; and (4) the Wilsons' visitation was not excessive. Thus, the Supreme Court affirmed the chancellor's judgment. View "Smith v. Wilson" on Justia Law

The issue before the Supreme Court concerned a custody dispute on interlocutory appeal. The Lauderdale County Youth Court denied Theresa and Ralph Anderson's Motion to Transfer Jurisdiction to the Chancery Court of Neshoba County in the matter involving neglected and abused minors. Aggrieved, the Andersons appealed, arguing that the youth court erred in retaining jurisdiction over the matter because chancery courts have jurisdiction over custody matters, and because the youth court previously terminated its jurisdiction over the minors involved. Upon review, the Supreme Court found no error and affirmed the order of the youth court denying the Motion to Transfer Jurisdiction. View "In the Interest of M.I. and T.I." on Justia Law

These three consolidated appeals (all springing from a divorce granted in 1994) presented thirty-eight issues including one of first impression. A judgment creditor served writs of execution on two corporations whose restricted stock was owned by the judgment debtor, who then sold his stock back to the corporations. The chancellor dismissed the writs, holding that the sale of stock rendered them moot. Upon review of the case, the Supreme Court held that statutory restrictions on the transfer of restricted shares of corporate stock apply to both voluntary and involuntary transfers of the shares; that after a judgment creditor serves a corporation with a writ of execution regarding one of its shareholders, repurchasing the shareholder’s shares will not excuse the corporation from responding to the writ of execution by filing the statutorily required sworn statement; and that the judgment creditor may (to the extent allowed by Mississippi statutes and other applicable law) execute on all benefits due the judgment debtor by the corporation, including the purchase price of the judgment debtor’s stock. Because the Court reversed the chancellor on three issues and remanded for a new trial, and because the chancellor's resolution of those issues may affect the outcome of others, the Court held that all issues not specifically resolved in this opinion could be presented by the parties to the chancellor for adjudication. View "West v. West" on Justia Law

This guardianship case began in the Youth Court for the City of Pearl. Petitioners Wanda Bell and Jane Dennis Morse requested that the case be transferred to the Rankin County Chancery Court. Later, Bell and Morse requested that the chancery court dismiss their petition, alleging that the court lacked subject-matter jurisdiction. In addition to dismissing the case with prejudice, the chancellor awarded custody of the child to Frances Cathryn Dennis Finnegan, the child’s natural mother. Aggrieved, Bell and Morse appealed raising two issues: (1) whether the youth court erred by transferring the case to chancery court; and (2) whether the chancellor erred by awarding custody to Finnegan. Upon review, the Supreme Court determined the chancellor properly had jurisdiction of the case. However, the chancellor erred by dismissing the case and awarding custody to Finnegan without any on-the-record findings. The case was remanded for further proceedings. View "In the Matter of the Guardianship of B.A.D." on Justia Law

After After Corey Lee failed to appear at his divorce hearing, the chancellor granted his wife's complaint for divorce and divided the marital property. On appeal, Mr. Lee argued, among other things, that the chancellor erred by not making the findings of fact and conclusions of law required by case law. The Court of Appeals affirmed, finding that Mr. Lee's claim was procedurally barred for failing to raise the issue before the chancellor. But because Mr. Lee did raise the issue, and because the chancellor's failure to make findings of fact and conclusions of law was manifest error, the Supreme Court reversed the appellate court's decision and remanded the case for further proceedings. View "Lee v. Lee" on Justia Law

The Hancock County Chancery Court granted Stacy Ruth Carambat a divorce from James Edward Carambat on the ground of habitual and excessive drug use. James appealed, arguing that the chancellor erred by granting the divorce, because his marijuana use did not affect the marriage, was not excessive, and was not akin to using opium, morphine, or other, like drugs. The couple married in 1993, and had twin boys in 1999. The couple separated in 2008 and Stacy filed for divorce later that year. Before the couple married, Stacy knew that James regularly smoked marijuana, and James admitted that he had been smoking marijuana since he was fourteen years old. James continued smoking marijuana throughout the marriage. Although the couple had conversations about James’s need to cease his marijuana use, James stated Stacy never asked him to quit. Stacy thought James would stop his drug use once the twins were born. Stacy alleged three grounds for divorce: irreconcilable differences, habitual cruel and inhuman treatment, and habitual and excessive drug use. She requested custody of the twins, child support, equitable distribution of the assets, alimony, and attorney’s fees. James answered Stacy’s complaint for divorce denying Stacy’s grounds for divorce, her claim that they had not cohabited since the separation, and her claim that she should have custody of the twins. Upon review of the chancery court's record, the Supreme Court found no error in its grant of the Carambats' divorce. View "Carambat v. Carambat" on Justia Law

Chancery Court granted James and Johnnie Irving a divorce. Mr. Irving filed a petition for modification of his child-support payments, based on a change of circumstances brought about by the loss of his job which had occurred three weeks prior to the entry of an order that upwardly modified his support obligations. The chancellor declared that res judicata prevented Mr. Irving from presenting evidence of his job loss before the entry of the court's order. Mr. Irving appealed, alleging the chancellor erred by ruling res judicata prohibited him from presenting the evidence. Upon review, the Supreme Court concluded the chancellor erred in its ruling in Mr. Irving's case. The Court reversed the chancellor's decision and remanded the case for further proceedings. View "Irving v. Irving" on Justia Law

This case stems from an interlocutory appeal by Kelly Blossom regarding the issuance of a protective order by the Rankin County Chancery Court that denied her attempt to take two depositions in her divorce case. In 2009, Michael Blossom filed a complaint and obtained a temporary restraining order, preliminary injunction and permanent injunction against Ms. Blossom enjoining her from any contact with their children. At the time the trial court issued the protective order, Ms. Blossom was being prosecuted for sexual battery in the circuit court. One of the witnesses was the minor victim in the criminal case. In the criminal case, Ms. Blossom eventually pled guilty to having committed sexual battery. The other potential deponent, another minor, was identified by Ms. Blossom as having knowledge about the the sexual battery from the criminal case. Upon review of the trial court record, the Supreme Court found that the chancellor of the court below erred by granting the protective orders without meeting the requirements set out in the Mississippi Rules of Civil Procedure: "the fact that a witness is an 'alleged minor victim of a crime' alone does not constitute sufficient grounds to deny a party the right to depose that witness." Therefore, the Court reversed the decision of the lower court and remanded the case back to the trial court for further proceedings.

Dr. Daniel Dare appealed a ruling of the Chancery Court that denied him the ability to intervene in the modification of a marital property agreement entered into by Paul and Sharon Stokes. Mr. and Mrs. Stokes were married in 1985. In 2007, Mrs. Stokes had an affair with Dr. Dare. Shortly after the affair began, Mr. Stokes filed for divorce. With the entry of a divorce decree, the Chancery Court incorporated a child-custody and property-settlement agreement that was "executed" by Mr. and Mrs. Stokes. Pertinent to the Supreme Court's review of this matter was a "covenant not to sue" included in the property agreement. Mr. Stokes filed a petition to modify the property agreement and sought to delete that part of the provision that barred him from bringing suit against "any other person for alienation or affection." Mrs. Stokes did not contest Mr. Stokes' petition, and the court deleted the term "any other person." Mr. Stokes then sued Dr. Dare for "alienation of affection." Dr. Dare sought to intervene in Mr. Stokes' modification matter. The court held that Dr. Dare was not a party to the divorce or the property agreement, and as such, had no legally cognizable interest in the divorce. Dr. Dare argued on appeal to the Supreme Court that the modified "covenant not to sue" implicitly targeted Dr. Dare as a party, and that he should be allowed to intervene in the modification proceedings. The Supreme Court agreed with the Chancery Court that Dr. Dare had no legally protected interest in the Stokes' divorce and affirmed the lower court's decision.