Justia Mississippi Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

This interlocutory appeal stemmed from a trial judge granting partial summary judgment, dismissing a claim of malicious prosecution. Richard and Victoria Wilbourn were in a longstanding domestic matter. Victoria accused Richard of misconduct towards their children, but the chancellor determined that the accusations were unfounded. Victoria went to the Ridgeland Police Department for help and filed an eight-page report against Richard, restating his alleged misconduct. The Ridgeland Police Department followed protocol, investigated, and referred the case to the district attorney’s office. The case was presented to a grand jury; the grand jury returned no bill. Notably, Richard was never charged, indicted, or arrested in connection with the investigation, and Victoria did not swear an affidavit against him. In the summer of 2016, Richard discovered the investigation and grand jury presentment and responded by filing suit, claiming malicious prosecution, intentional infliction of emotional distress, and negligent infliction of emotional distress. In response, Victoria moved for summary judgment. And after a hearing, the trial judge granted partial summary judgment, dismissing Richard’s claim of malicious prosecution but retaining the others. Definitively, the trial judge found that “no criminal proceedings were instituted and therefore [Richard] cannot satisfy the first element of his claim.” With no arrest or indictment, or Richard otherwise being subjected to oppressive litigation of criminal charges for the report that Victoria gave to the Ridgeland Police Department, the Mississippi Supreme Court concluded the trial court did not err in dismissing Richard's malicious-prosecution claim. The matter was remanded for further proceedings. View "Wilbourn v. Wilbourn" on Justia Law

Ashley Bionte Johnson filed a petition for presumption of death and requested that the chancellor presume her father, Audray Johnson, dead. She claimed that her father, Audray, had been gone from his physical body for more than seven years and should be presumed dead. Audray suffers from mental illness and has been treated for dissociative identity disorder. In 2017, Audray changed his name from Audray Johnson to Akecheta Andre Morningstar. In February 2020, a hearing was held on Ashley’s petition. Morningstar was present at the hearing and testified regarding Audray’s death. According to Morningstar, Audray’s spirit expired more than seven years ago, and Morningstar occupied Audray’s physical body. Morningstar testified that he was “an ambassador . . . a hybrid . . . part angel, part human” who originated “from the heavens.” He explained that he was “dispatched” to earth “to save the world.” Although Morningstar admitted he occupied Audray’s physical body, he asserted he “shouldn’t have the responsibility of taking care of a dead man’s family.” The chancellor denied Ashley’s petition, and Ashley timely appealed. The Mississippi Supreme Court determined Audray had not been absent from, and did not conceal himself in Mississippi for seven years, therefore the chancellor’s denial of the petition was affirmed. View "In the Matter of the Presumption of Death of Audray Johnson" on Justia Law

Christine Barton (Jorgensen) appealed a chancery court ruling, arguing it was an abuse of the court's discretion in failing to enter a final domestic-violence protection order and by failing to appoint a guardian ad litem. The pleadings revealed that Jorgensen not only failed to seek an extension of the temporary domestic-abuse protection order previously issued by a justice court judge but she also failed to request a final domestic-violence protection order. By statute, the justice court order expires thirty days after entry, as here, when the party seeking protection and the respondent have minor children in common. The Mississippi Supreme Court concluded there was no abuse of discretion and affirmed. View "Barton a/k/a Jorgensen v. Barton" on Justia Law

The Mississippi Department of Child Protection Services (MDCPS) sought to terminate involuntarily the parental rights of Jack Bynum, the putative father of a child in MDCPS' custody. The chancery court determined Bynum was both indigent and entitled to counsel. The chancellor appointed Bynum counsel and ordered MDCPS to pay his attorney's fees. MDCPS appealed. The agency argued Covington County should have paid for Bynum’s representation, just as it would if Bynum were an indigent criminal defendant. But the Mississippi Supreme Court found this was not a criminal case. "And the statutory scheme that directs the initiating county in criminal prosecutions to pay for indigent representation is expressly limited. It only applies to those 'charged with a felony, misdemeanor punishable by confinement for ninety (90) days or more, or commission of an act of delinquency.'” Thus, absent a legislative directive to assess an indigent parent’s attorney’s fees to Covington County, the chancery court did not abuse its legislatively conferred discretion by ordering MDCPS to pay Bynum’s attorney’s fees. View "Mississippi Department of Child Protection Services v. Bynum" on Justia Law

The chancery court tried this adoption case twice. After the first trial, the chancellor granted the adoption petition of the maternal grandparents, C.C.B. and S.R.B.; after the second trial, the chancellor granted the competing adoption petition of G.E.K. and G.R.K., the foster parents. The grandparents appealed, arguing for the first time that the chancery court lacked subject matter jurisdiction under the Mississippi Termination of Parental Rights Law (MTPRL) to terminate parental rights and adjudicate the adoption of S.A.B. Also, for the first time on appeal, they argued the chancery court lacked jurisdiction because it failed to order a home study as required by statute. After review, the Mississippi Supreme Court held the chancery court had jurisdiction under the MTPRL to accept the voluntary releases of parental rights filed by S.A.B.’s natural parents and to order S.A.B.’s adoption. Further, the Court held that, because the failure to order a home study did not implicate the chancery court’s subject matter jurisdiction, the issue could not be raised for the first time on appeal. Therefore, the Court affirmed. View "In the Matter of the Adoption of the Minor Identified in the Petition: C.C.B. and S.R.B. v. G.A.K. and G.R.K." on Justia Law

George Ray, Sr., and Johnnita Ray were divorced on the ground of irreconcilable differences, and the chancery court decided issues of property settlement. George appealed, arguing that the chancellor erred by not crediting him for supporting Johnnita’s children, by finding him solely responsible for their joint debt, and by including his military-retirement income into the alimony determination. Finding no reversible error, the Mississippi Supreme Court affirmed the chancellor’s judgment. View "Ray v. Ray" on Justia Law

In 2016, Linda Alford filed for divorce from Cincinnatus (“Nat”) Alford III. The parties agreed to a divorce based on irreconcilable differences, allowing the chancery court to divide the marital assets and expenses and to make a determination regarding alimony. The chancellor awarded Linda $5,000 per month in periodic alimony, $5,000 in attorney fees, and $6,000 in expert witness fees. Nat appealed the chancellor’s judgment. The Mississippi Supreme Court assigned the case to the Court of Appeals, which reversed and remanded the chancellor’s alimony award and reversed and rendered the amount of attorney fees. The Supreme Court granted Linda's petition for certiorari because it had not answered whether a chancellor should have considered Social Security benefits when considering initial alimony awards. The Supreme Court found that consideration of derivative Social Security benefits should have been reserved for alimony modification proceedings. Accordingly, the Supreme Court reversed the Court of Appeals and reinstated the chancellor’s award of alimony. The Court of Appeals' decision to reverse and render the award of attorney fees was affirmed. View "Alford v. Alford" on Justia Law

On remand from the Mississippi Supreme Court, the chancellor granted Michael Gerty a divorce from Joesie Gerty on the ground of adultery. The chancellor revisited her prior holdings regarding visitation, division of martial assets, and alimony. Finding error only regarding the number of months the parties were married, the Supreme Court affirmed as to all other issues and remanded for entry of final judgment. View "Gerty v. Gerty" on Justia Law

Daniel Tewksbury and Bobbie Young were previously married and were the parents of two minor children, Lane and Emma. They divorced in May 2006, and Daniel was ordered to pay child support. Daniel stopped making child-support payments in 2008. Bobbie later married Gerald Young, Jr. Gerald filed a petition to adopt Lane and Emma. In the adoption, Daniel’s parental rights were terminated. As of the termination of his parental rights, Daniel owed Bobbie $34,759 for child support. On April 5, 2015, Daniel died in an automobile accident. The accident occurred while Daniel was in the course and scope of his employment with Air Masters Mechanical, Inc. Bobbie then filed a petition with the Workers’ Compensation Commission on behalf of Lane and Emma, claiming that the children were entitled to Daniel’s workers’ compensation death-benefit proceeds and sought the payment of the $34,759 in outstanding child support. The Workers’ Compensation Commission Administrative Judge (AJ) determined that the child-support lien of $34,759 was valid and payable under Section 71-3-129. Air Masters and Associated General Contractors filed a petition for review with the Commission. The Commission concluded that Lane and Emma were not entitled to Daniel’s death benefits because they were not his statutory dependents under Mississippi Code Section 71-3-25 (Supp. 2019). The Commission reversed the AJ’s order and dismissed Bobbie’s petition. On appeal, a divided Court of Appeals reversed the Commission’s decision, concluding the child-support lien was valid. The Mississippi Supreme Court reversed, finding Section 71-3-129 did not authorize a lien on death benefits payable directly to the deceased employee’s statutory dependents. Accordingly, the child-support lien did not apply to Daniel’s death benefits. Further, because Daniel had no statutory dependents, there were simply no benefits to which the lien can attach in this case. As a result, the Commission properly dismissed the claim. The judgment of the Court of Appeals was reversed. The judgment of the Mississippi Workers’ Compensation Commission was reinstated and affirmed. View "Young v. Air Masters Mechanical Inc." on Justia Law

Kimberly Carson Linley and Charles Carson were former spouses who shared a child together. Following their divorce, the Oktibbeha County Chancery Court entered a money judgment against Carson. Carson appealed the judgment to the Mississippi Supreme Court and filed an appeal bond. While the appeal was pending, Linley’s attorney executed the money judgment and had writs of garnishments issued by the Oktibbeha County Circuit Court. Once issued, Linley served the writs on Carson’s employer and bank. Carson sued Linley and Hurdle in Scott County, alleging that they conspired to seize his funds. Linley and Hurdle filed motions to transfer venue to Oktibbeha County. The Scott County Circuit Court granted the motions and transferred venue to the Circuit Court of Oktibbeha County. Carson filed an interlocutory appeal, arguing the Scott County Circuit Court had abused its discretion by transferring venue. Because the Scott County Circuit Court abused its discretion by transferring venue, the Mississippi Supreme Court reversed its ruling and remanded the matter for further proceedings. View "Carson v. Linley" on Justia Law