Justia Mississippi Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

Daniel Tewksbury and Bobbie Young were previously married and were the parents of two minor children, Lane and Emma. They divorced in May 2006, and Daniel was ordered to pay child support. Daniel stopped making child-support payments in 2008. Bobbie later married Gerald Young, Jr. Gerald filed a petition to adopt Lane and Emma. In the adoption, Daniel’s parental rights were terminated. As of the termination of his parental rights, Daniel owed Bobbie $34,759 for child support. On April 5, 2015, Daniel died in an automobile accident. The accident occurred while Daniel was in the course and scope of his employment with Air Masters Mechanical, Inc. Bobbie then filed a petition with the Workers’ Compensation Commission on behalf of Lane and Emma, claiming that the children were entitled to Daniel’s workers’ compensation death-benefit proceeds and sought the payment of the $34,759 in outstanding child support. The Workers’ Compensation Commission Administrative Judge (AJ) determined that the child-support lien of $34,759 was valid and payable under Section 71-3-129. Air Masters and Associated General Contractors filed a petition for review with the Commission. The Commission concluded that Lane and Emma were not entitled to Daniel’s death benefits because they were not his statutory dependents under Mississippi Code Section 71-3-25 (Supp. 2019). The Commission reversed the AJ’s order and dismissed Bobbie’s petition. On appeal, a divided Court of Appeals reversed the Commission’s decision, concluding the child-support lien was valid. The Mississippi Supreme Court reversed, finding Section 71-3-129 did not authorize a lien on death benefits payable directly to the deceased employee’s statutory dependents. Accordingly, the child-support lien did not apply to Daniel’s death benefits. Further, because Daniel had no statutory dependents, there were simply no benefits to which the lien can attach in this case. As a result, the Commission properly dismissed the claim. The judgment of the Court of Appeals was reversed. The judgment of the Mississippi Workers’ Compensation Commission was reinstated and affirmed. View "Young v. Air Masters Mechanical Inc." on Justia Law

Kimberly Carson Linley and Charles Carson were former spouses who shared a child together. Following their divorce, the Oktibbeha County Chancery Court entered a money judgment against Carson. Carson appealed the judgment to the Mississippi Supreme Court and filed an appeal bond. While the appeal was pending, Linley’s attorney executed the money judgment and had writs of garnishments issued by the Oktibbeha County Circuit Court. Once issued, Linley served the writs on Carson’s employer and bank. Carson sued Linley and Hurdle in Scott County, alleging that they conspired to seize his funds. Linley and Hurdle filed motions to transfer venue to Oktibbeha County. The Scott County Circuit Court granted the motions and transferred venue to the Circuit Court of Oktibbeha County. Carson filed an interlocutory appeal, arguing the Scott County Circuit Court had abused its discretion by transferring venue. Because the Scott County Circuit Court abused its discretion by transferring venue, the Mississippi Supreme Court reversed its ruling and remanded the matter for further proceedings. View "Carson v. Linley" on Justia Law

Karrah Wangler appealed a chancellor’s dismissal of her complaint for divorce on the ground of habitual cruel and inhuman treatment. Because Karrah failed to show sufficient evidence of habitual cruel and inhuman treatment, the Mississippi Supreme Court affirmed. View "Wangler v. Wangler" on Justia Law

Mark and Sylvia Barber divorced in 2008. The court awarded Mark Barber custody of the parties’ minor children. The trial court had appointed a guardian ad litem during the divorce proceedings to investigate allegations raised by Sylvia that Mark had abused their children. The chancellor, however, granted Mark’s motion to limit testimony of the guardian ad litem and to exclude a guardian ad litem report from evidence after finding Sylvia’s allegations of child abuse to be unsubstantiated. On appeal, Sylvia argued the trial court abused its discretion by not allowing the guardian ad litem to testify, or by not admitting into evidence a guardian ad litem report. She contended the exclusion impermissibly prevented the guardian ad litem from completing its court-appointed role and precluded admission of relevant and required findings regarding the alleged abuse and the best interest of the children. Mark contended the trial court did not err because a chancellor had the authority and the discretion to expand or limit the guardian ad litem’s role, and he argued the guardian ad litem’s findings contained inadmissible hearsay. The Mississippi Supreme Court determined the trial court did not abuse its discretion by limiting the guardian ad litem’s participation. But because the appointment was mandatory, the chancellor was required at least to consider the guardian ad litem’s report and recommendations, but declined to do so. Accordingly, the Supreme Court reversed the chancery court’s judgment, and remanded for the chancellor to make findings of fact and conclusions of law that take into consideration the guardian ad litem’s report and recommendations. View "Barber v. Barber" on Justia Law

In 1988, Douglas Long, Jr. married Catherine A. Long. After the couple divorced, Douglas, a Mississippi resident, sued Pennsylvania resident David Vitkauskas, alleging alienation of affections. Douglas claimed that Vitkauskas’s wrongful and adulterous actions irreparably injured his marriage with Catherine. Douglas alleged that Vitkauskas’s intentional, wrongful conduct proximately caused his divorce. Vitkauskas responded with a motion to dismiss for lack of personal jurisdiction. The trial court granted Vitkauskas’s motion and dismissed Douglas’s complaint. Douglas appealed, arguing that the trial court erred by finding that Vitkauskas was not subject to personal jurisdiction and, alternatively, by refusing to allow limited discovery pertaining to personal jurisdiction. Finding no error, the Mississippi Supreme Court affirmed. View "Long v. Vitkauskas" on Justia Law

Nadia Alexis appealed a chancellor’s dismissal of her petition for domestic-abuse protection order and his assessment of the filing fee to her. Because sufficient evidence was not presented to support the issuance of a final domestic-abuse protection order, the trial court’s judgment was affirmed. View "Alexis v. Black" on Justia Law

April Garner appealed a chancellor’s custody modification, awarding custody of her minor child to the child’s uncle, awarding grandparent visitation to the child’s step-grandfather, finding of contempt, and assessing various fees and costs. Because the Mississippi Supreme Court found the chancellor properly modified custody and found April in contempt, but lacked the authority to award grandparent visitation to a step-grandparent, it affirmed in part and reversed in part and remanded for further proceedings. View "Garner v. Garner" on Justia Law

The Mississippi Supreme Court remanded this case for further proceedings to determine child custody. On remand, the chancery court awarded custody of the children to the father. Aggrieved, the mother appealed, arguing that the instructions given by the Mississippi Supreme Court were simply to review the determination of the mother's fitness without the hearsay evidence, not to conduct a new trial on custody. Finding that the chancellor was not manifestly wrong or clearly erroneous in granting custody of the three minor children to the father, the Supreme Court affirmed. View "Ballard v. Ballard" on Justia Law

D.C., a minor foster child, alleged that Jason Case, his foster parent, sexually abused him. The Mississippi Department of Human Services ("DHS") removed D.C. from Case’s home and a subsequent investigation substantiated the alleged abuse. DHS did not contest that Case abused D.C. In his complaint, D.C. alleged negligence and gross negligence on behalf of DHS and the Department's executive director, Richard Berry, in the licensing of the foster home and the lack of care and treatment to D.C., both during his placement and after DHS removed D.C. from the foster home. After a period of discovery, DHS filed a motion for summary judgment. It maintained that it was entitled to immunity under Mississippi Code Section 43-15-125 (Rev. 2015) and Mississippi Code Section 11-46-9(1)(d) (Rev. 2012). Without any noted reference to Section 43-15-125, the circuit court denied DHS’s motion for summary judgement. DHS filed a petition for interlocutory appeal, which a panel of the Mississippi Supreme Court granted. After review of the record, the Supreme Court affirmed in part and reversed in part the circuit court’s denial of summary judgment: the circuit court erred in denying DHS summary judgment for D.C.’s claims that stemmed from DHS’s licensing of the foster home, given the immunity DHS and its officers have under Section 43- 15-125. The circuit court, though, did not err in denying DHS summary judgment under Section 11-46-9(d)(1) of the Mississippi Tort Claims Act, because DHS did not meet its burden to show that no genuine issue as to any material fact existed. View "Mississippi Department of Human Services v. D.C." on Justia Law

Michele and Roger Latham divorced in 2016. In 2017, Michele filed a petition for contempt against Roger, claiming that he had failed to comply with the divorce judgment. After a hearing, the chancellor found Roger in constructive criminal contempt for failing to comply with several terms of the divorce judgment. Roger appealed, arguing that the chancellor erred because he did not recuse himself before finding Roger in constructive criminal contempt. Because Roger raised the argument for the first time on appeal, the Mississippi Supreme Court considered it waived. Accordingly, the chancellor’s judgment was affirmed. View "Latham v. Latham" on Justia Law