Justia Mississippi Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

The City of Horn Lake contracted with Phillips Construction Company and its owner Michael Phillips to work on a sewer project. Two employees of Phillips, Bertram Hill and David Mooneyhan, were working near the bottom of a trench that was seventeen feet deep when the walls of the trench suddenly collapsed. Mooneyhan was killed, and Hill was injured. Mooneyhan's beneficiaries and Hill (collectively "Plaintiffs") sued the City for Phillips' negligence under respondeat superior and also alleged that the City had negligently hired Phillips. The circuit court granted summary judgment in favor of the City. Plaintiffs appealed. Finding that the City only acted in a supervisory role over the project, the Supreme Court concluded that was not enough to trigger a master-servant relationship for the elements of respondeat superior. The Court found that the trial court's grant of summary judgment in favor of the City was proper, and therefore affirmed the judgment. View "Hill v. City of Horn Lake" on Justia Law

Democratic candidate Bobbie Miller successfully challenged independent incumbent Dimp Powell for the office of mayor of Isola. Prior to the election, the Municipal Election Commission of Isola approved the placement of Miller’s name on the ballot despite the fact that a Democratic Municipal Executive Committee was not in existence by the time of the qualifying deadline for candidates. Powell challenged the Election Commission’s decision in circuit court via a writ of mandamus, requesting the court to order the Commission not to place Miller’s name on the ballot or, in the alternative, to order that any votes cast for Miller not be counted. After an emergency evidentiary hearing, held the week prior to the election, the court denied relief. Powell appealed. The Mississippi Supreme Court held that the circuit court did not have jurisdiction to hear Powell’s challenge via a writ of mandamus. The appropriate procedural mechanism for challenging the decision of a municipal authority was through a bill of exceptions under Mississippi Code Section 11-51-75. The Court affirmed the outcome of the circuit court’s holding. Because the Court affirmed on jurisdictional grounds, it did not reach the merits of whether Miller’s name should not have been permitted on the ballot when there was no Democratic Municipal Executive Committee in existence at the time of the qualifying deadline. View "Powell v. Municipal Election Comm'n Town of Isola" on Justia Law

When Booneville Collision Repair (BCR) unknowingly purchased land that had been sold for delinquent municipal taxes, it redeemed the land and sued Prentiss County, the City of Booneville, and the municipal tax collector, Sheila Bolden, for the damages incurred from the failure to provide notice of the tax sales. BCR argued that it had not received notice because Bolden never filed with the chancery clerk the list of properties sold for taxes as required by Mississippi law. BCR appealed the dismissal of its claims against the City and Bolden, asserting that they may be found liable under the Mississippi Tort Claims Act (MTCA) and under Section 27-41-79. After review, the Supreme Court found that an action under Section 27-41-79 was a separate statutory action and not a tort action subject to the MTCA, and that BCR stated a claim under the statute. Furthermore, the Court found that, while BCR's negligence claim was subject to the MTCA, no immunity existed. Therefore, the Court reversed the grant of the motions to dismiss and remand for further proceedings. View "Booneville Collision Repair, Inc. v. City of Booneville" on Justia Law

An action was initiated by certain former members and the board of Mississippi Comp Choice Self-Insurers Fund. Comp Choice was a workers’ compensation group self-insurer operating under a certificate of authority granted by the Mississippi Workers’ Compensation Commission. Defendant Mississippi Workers’ Compensation Group Self-Insurer Guaranty Association (“GGA”) ordered a review of Comp Choice. Based on information revealed in the review, the Commission required Comp Choice to execute a Memorandum of Understanding outlining a plan to “strengthen the financial and operational aspects of the [Comp Choice] Fund under the control and guidance of the Commission.” Six months later, the Commission decided not to approve Comp Choice for future operation. Comp Choice voluntarily surrendered its certificate of authority to operate as a group self-insurer in January 2009. GGA stepped into the shoes of Comp Choice to protect claimants. Comp Choice a complaint against GGA, alleging, inter alia, gross negligence, breach of fiduciary duty, bad faith, conversion, and a demand for an accounting. GGA filed a motion to dismiss and claimed immunity under the Mississippi Tort Claims Act (MTCA) and the Mississippi Workers’ Compensation Self-Insurer Guaranty Association Law. The trial court granted the motion, finding that GGA was “covered” by the MTCA, sub silentio ruling that Plaintiffs could not pursue a “cause of action” as referenced in Mississippi Code Section 71-3-179. The trial court held that only the MTCA applied to suits against the Mississippi Workers’ Compensation Group Self Insurer Guaranty Association. The trial court dismissed all other claims, granting leave to amend the complaint for an MTCA action only. Comp argued on appeal to the Supreme Court: (1) the trial court erred in granting defendant's motion to dismiss based on whether GGA as an unincorporated legal entity, was covered by the Mississippi Tort Claims Act, and therefore, entitled to its various protections, immunities and exceptions pursuant to Miss. Code Ann. 11-46-7; and (2) the trial court erred in dismissing based on the determination that GGA as an unincorporated legal entity, was covered by the Mississippi Tort Claims Act, even where the immunity created in GGA in Miss. Code Ann. 71-3-179 abrogated the immunity afforded under the Mississippi Tort Claims Act in Miss. Code Ann. In the case sub judice, the Supreme Court determined that facts were still undeveloped, precluding the trial court and itself from determining whether Plaintiff’s claims, as alleged in its complaint, could be pursued only under the MTCA, as ordered by the trial court, and Plaintiff could not pursue a cause of action as contemplated by Section 71-3-151, et seq, or otherwise. "Absent factual development, no court at this stage of the proceedings could accurately discern whether GGA is an instrumentality of the Commission, vel non, as argued by GGA." View "The Former Board of Trustees and Members of Mississippi Comp Choice Self-Insurers Fund v. Mississippi Workers' Compensation Group Self-Insurer Guaranty Association" on Justia Law

The Mississippi Transportation Commission (MTC) procured some land from O.R. and Carylon Garretson via eminent domain in order to construct a bypass in Greene County. The Garretsons later filed a complaint against the Mississippi Department of Transportation (MDOT), alleging that the bypass construction had caused silt to flood onto their remaining land, damaging their timber. MDOT filed a motion for summary judgment and argued that it was immune under Mississippi Code Section 11-46-9(1), subsections (d) (discretionary-function immunity) and (p) (design immunity). The Supreme Court agreed that MDOT was immune from liability under subsection (p) and affirmed. View "Garretson v. Mississippi Department of Transportation" on Justia Law

The Circuit Court sentenced Glen Conley to life without parole. Conley sought review of the parole board’s refusal to give him a parole eligibility date. The Supreme Court concluded that the parole board lacked the authority to review his sentence of life without parole. Although under different reasoning, the Supreme Court affirmed the dismissal of his claim by the Circuit Court and the Court of Appeals. View "Conley v. Epps" on Justia Law

On June 24, 2014, Thad Cochran, a Republican nominee for United States Senator, won the Republican primary runoff. His opponent, Chris McDaniel, filed an election contest with the State Republican Executive Committee (SREC) on August 4, 2014 – forty-one days after the election. The SREC declined to consider McDaniel’s complaint, and McDaniel appealed. The trial judge found that McDaniel did not meet the twenty-day deadline to file his election contest and dismissed the case. On appeal, McDaniel argued that no deadline existed to contest a primary election. Under the doctrine of stare decisis, the Supreme Court found that there indeed was a deadline, and McDaniel failed to file his election contest within twenty days. The dismissal was affirmed. View "McDaniel v. Cochran" on Justia Law

Charlotte Perkins appealed a Circuit Court’s decision to dismiss her appeal claiming the Mississippi Department of Human Services (DHS) wrongly deprived her of receiving food stamps and that such deprivation was the result of a DHS hearing in which Perkins was deprived of procedural safeguards. The appeal was dismissed for lack of jurisdiction. The circuit court found no statutory authority created a right of appeal to the circuit court from an administrative decision by DHS regarding food-stamp qualification(s) or disqualification(s). The Supreme Court found that the circuit court was correct in dismissing the case for lack of jurisdiction. Mississippi caselaw provides, however, that where there is no statutory scheme for appeal from an agency decision and the injured party does not have a full, plain, complete and adequate remedy at law, the chancery court has jurisdiction for judicial review of the agency decision. Accordingly, the case was reversed and remanded with instructions to the circuit court to transfer the case to the Monroe County Chancery Court. View "Perkins v. Mississippi Department of Human Services" on Justia Law

The Mississippi Department of Revenue (MDOR) audited Mississippi Power Company and assessed use taxes attributed to Mississippi Power’s purchase and installation of low-NOx burners. After unsuccessfully pursuing administrative remedies, Mississippi Power appealed to the chancery court. The chancery court reversed and granted summary judgment in favor of Mississippi Power. The MDOR appealed, arguing: (1) the chancery court lacked jurisdiction over Mississippi Power’s amended petition for appeal and review; and (2) (assuming the chancery court had appellate jurisdiction over Mississippi Power’s appeal) the court erred in finding the definition of “pollution control equipment” in Mississippi Code Section 27-65-101(1)(w)) was unambiguous, and failed to afford deference to the MDOR’s interpretation of “pollution control equipment” in Mississippi Administrative Code 35.IV.7.03(302). The Supreme Court found: (1) the chancery court had jurisdiction over the appeal; and (2) the chancellor correctly concluded that Mississippi Administrative Code 35.IV.7.03(302) was an invalid regulation. The chancellor further was correct that the low-NOx burners qualified for the tax exemption under the plain language of Section 27-65-101(1)(w) and the evidence produced by Mississippi Power. Therefore, the chancellor correctly ordered that the MDOR refund Mississippi Power the use taxes assessed on the low-NOx burners, plus penalties and interest. View "Mississippi Department of Revenue v. Mississippi Power Company" on Justia Law

In a case of first impression, the issue this case presented to the Mississippi Supreme Court was whether money a corporation received as prepayment for future services was subject to franchise taxation during the year in which it was received. The Mississippi Department of Revenue (MDOR) assessed additional franchise tax against Fishbelt Feeds, Inc. for its failure to include a "deferred revenue" account, which represented money it had received through prepaid contracts, in its franchise tax base. Fishbelt appealed MDOR’s order to the chancery court, and the chancellor granted summary judgment to MDOR. On appeal to the Supreme Court, Fishbelt argued that the chancery court erred in granting summary judgment to MDOR and should have conducted a full evidentiary hearing on the issues presented. Fishbelt also argued that its "deferred revenue" account is excepted from franchise taxation. Finding no reversible error, the Supreme Court affirmed the award of summary judgment to MDOR. View "Fishbelt Feeds, Inc. v. Mississippi Department of Revenue" on Justia Law