Justia Mississippi Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

Five years following law enforcement's seizure of three cars and cash belonging to Willie Hampton in conjunction with his arrest, Tunica County's petition for forfeiture was granted. Hampton appealed, arguing that the delay violated his right to a speedy trial. The Court of Appeals remanded, instructing the trial court to establish a record. Upon review, the Supreme Court found that Hampton was incarcerated at the time of the forfeiture trial, and was therefore denied an opportunity to present evidence of prejudice. Accordingly, the Court reversed. View "One 1970 Mercury Cougar, VIN #0F9111545940 et. al. v. Tunica County" on Justia Law

Equifax, Inc. appealed the State Tax Commission's income tax assessment. Equifax contended its Mississippi taxable income was zero; after an audit, the Commission found that the standard apportionment method prescribed by regulation did not fairly reflect Equifax's business in the state. The Commission used an alternative method and then issued assessments against Equifax. After exhausting administrative remedies, Equifax petitioned the Chancery Court for relief. The Court affirmed the Commission's decision, but the Court of Appeals reversed. Upon review, the Supreme Court concluded that the Chancery Court did not err, and that the alternative apportionment method was not a violation of the State Administrative Procedures Act. Accordingly, the Court reversed the Court of Appeals and reinstated the Chancery Court's judgment. View "Equifax, Inc. v. Mississippi Department of Revenue" on Justia Law

Ground Control, LLC appealed the grant of summary judgment in favor of Capsco Industries, W.G. Yates & Sons Construction and Harrah's Entertainment, Inc. The parties contracted to build the "Margaritaville Spa and Hotel" in Biloxi. The circuit court held in part that Ground Control's failure to obtain a certificate of responsibility rendered its contract with Capsco null and void. After its review of the circuit court record, the Supreme Court agreed (and affirmed) that the lack of the certificate of responsibility rendered the contract null and void. However, the Court reversed the grant of summary judgment in part so that the circuit court could determine whether Ground Control was entitled to recover based on claims of unjust enrichment and/or quantum meruit. View "Ground Control, LLC v. Capsco Industries, Inc." on Justia Law

The issue before the Supreme Court in this case centered on whether federal law preempted state law from taxing medical equipment sold to individuals covered by the Federal Employees Health Benefits Plan or its participating insurance carriers. The Court concluded that the state tax on Mobility Medical Inc.'s gross sales was not a tax on the Plan or any other health-benefits plan. View "Mobility Medical, Inc. v. Mississippi Dept. of Revenue" on Justia Law

The Forrest County Board of Supervisors passed an ordinance requiring oil and gas facilities located within the county be fenced in. Delphi Oil, Inc. appealed a circuit court order that upheld the Board's ordinance, arguing that the regulatory authority of the State Oil and Gas Board (OGB) preempted any local regulations of oil and gas activity. The Supreme Court found the state law did not preempt the local ordinance, and affirmed. View "Delphi Oil, Inc. v. Forrest County Board of Supervisors" on Justia Law

Frederick Griffin has sought to pass the Mississippi Bar Exam since 1992. Griffin appealed the failing result of his February 2011 bar exam, raising some issues surrounding his July 2010 exam. Griffin sat for, and failed, the July 2010 bar exam. Needing a score of 132 to pass, Griffin earned a score of 127.2 on the Essay Section and a score of 127.6 on the MBE, for a final score of 127.4. He appealed his score to the Board of Bar Admissions, which denied his petition. Griffin appealed the denial to the chancery court. The chancellor ultimately dismissed his appeal in March 2011, finding that it was moot in light of Griffin's choice to sit for the February 2011 exam. Griffin applied to use his July 2010 MBE score for the February 2011 bar exam. In response, the Board sent Griffin a letter cautioning that Griffin "should be aware that the use of this ‘below-passing' M.B.E. score could contribute to your failing the overall examination." On the February 2011 exam, he scored a 127.6 on the MBE and a 127.8 on the Essay Exam, for a total score of 127.7. He petitioned the Board for a review, and the Board affirmed his failing result. Griffin appealed the Board's ruling to the chancery court, arguing that the Board had raised the overall score required to pass the bar examination throughout the time he has attempted to pass it. Griffin alleged that the Supreme Court removed any minimum score requirement on the MBE in 1995, but that the Board's requirement of a score of 132 to pass the bar "has the effect of requiring 132 on both" the MBE and the Essay portion of the exam, essentially arguing that a required overall score of 132 is tantamount to requiring a minimum MBE score of 132. He argued that these issues have a disparate impact on minorities, and the Board is thus in violation of the Equal Protection Clause. On appeal to the Supreme Court, Griffin argued that the Board's grading and scoring, Rules, policies, and the "self serving statutes from which" it derives its powers have a negative and discriminatory impact on Griffin's ability to pass the bar exam. Upon review, the Supreme Court concluded that the Board's actions, which fully complied with Supreme Court precedent, were not arbitrary and capricious. Griffin did not allege a discriminatory purpose behind the Board's rules, policies, or actions. Thus, his Equal Protection Clause claims failed as a matter of law. Furthermore, the Court found that the Board did not require a minimum MBE score to pass the bar, thus Griffin's contention that it did was without merit. The Court affirmed the trial court in all respects. View "Griffin v. Mississippi Board of Bar Admissions" on Justia Law

The underlying annexation suit was voluntarily dismissed in 2008 with certain terms and conditions imposed on plaintiff James Frisby. Plaintiff owns property in Harrison County. In 2007, he filed a Petition for Inclusion, seeking to have his property annexed by the City of Biloxi. Biloxi responded and asked the court to grant plaintiff's petition. Gulfport objected to the inclusion of plaintiff's property within the City of Biloxi. Harrison County filed an answer as an interested party and also objected. Plaintiff sought clarification of the terms set forth in the order of dismissal. Upon review, the Supreme Court found that the case should have been dismissed as moot, because nothing remained to be decided on appeal. View "Frisby v. City of Gulfport" on Justia Law

After an administrative judge (AJ) ruled on a claimant's petition to controvert a workers' compensation claim, the claimant had twenty days to file a notice of appeal with the full Mississippi Workers' Compensation Commission. In this case, the issue before the Supreme Court was whether an AJ's order, handed down more than twenty days after the AJ's ruling and granting a claimant thirty additional days in which to prosecute her claim, should be given legal effect by the Commission so that the claimant's notice of appeal, filed within the additional thirty days, would be considered timely. Upon review, the Court found that, under the facts and circumstances presented, such an appeal was timely. View "Felter v. Floorserv, Inc." on Justia Law

Appellants raised a constitutional challenge to a fee legislated on cigarettes distributed through Mississippi for sale outside the state, claiming separate violations of the Commerce and Due-Process Clauses. In 2009, the Mississippi Legislature passed a law imposing a fee on the sale, purchase, and distribution in Mississippi of cigarettes manufactured by companies that did not enter into settlement agreements with the State as a result of a 1997 lawsuit (the "nonsettling manufacturer" or "NSM" law), "including cigarettes sold, purchased or otherwise distributed in this state for sale outside of this state." In October 2009, the chancery court entered a temporary restraining order enjoining the Commissioner of Revenue from assessing and collecting the challenged fee, and later ruled that the legislative amendment did not apply retroactively, denied Appellants' motion for reconsideration, and granted the Commissioner's motion for final judgment. However, the chancery court did not enter final judgment at that time. In 2011, the chancellor entered final judgment, which incorporated an August 2010 order (denying Appellants’ request for a permanent injunction and declaratory relief) and a May 2011 order (denying motion for rehearing and granting motion for final judgment). Appellants raised several issues on appeal; the Supreme Court found that the provision of the NSM law imposing a fee on NSM cigarettes distributed through Mississippi for sale outside the state was not internally consistent in violation of the Commerce Clause. The Court declined to address Appellants' due process argument. Furthermore, the Court found that the chancery court erred in granting claims for attorney fees asserted under 42 U.S.C. 1988 for Appellants' section 1983 challenge to the constitutionality of the NSM law. The Court found that all Appellants had an adequate remedy at state law (declaratory relief under Mississippi Rule of Civil Procedure 57), and as such, the chancery court should have "refrain[ed] from considering Section 1983 claims in tax cases, mooting Section 1988 claims for fees. That being said, no basis exist[ed] for a claim by Appellants for attorney fees." View "Commonwealth Brands, Inc. v. Morgan" on Justia Law

The issue before the Supreme Court in this case concerned an interlocutory appeal of the Mississippi Department of Transportation (MDOT) which sought review of the denial of its motion for summary judgment in a wrongful-death action filed by the beneficiaries of A.J. Cowart (Nosef). Cowart drove into an unmarked culvert and flipped his car. Cowart was taken to the hospital where he later died. Nosef filed this suit against MDOT, claiming that MDOT's failure to place warning signs around the culvert resulted in the accident that caused Cowart's death. MDOT claimed in its motion that it was immune from liability under the state Tort Claims Act. The circuit court denied the motion, finding that the law imposed a ministerial duty to place warning signs around highway culverts which had not been abrogated or repealed. Upon review, the Supreme Court agreed with the circuit court and affirmed the denial of summary judgment. View "Mississippi Dept. of Transportation v. Nosef" on Justia Law