Justia Mississippi Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

The issue before the Supreme Court was whether the Mississippi Department of Health erred by denying the certificate-of-need (CON) application of St. Dominic-Jackson Memorial Hospital. In its application, St. Dominic sought to relocate seventy-one general acute-care beds from its Jackson location to a new facility in planned to build in Madison County. The Department found that St. Dominic's proposed project was actually a new hospital and not a relocation. Because St. Dominic did not meet the need criteria for a new hospital, the Department denied the request. The Madison County Chancery Court affirmed that decision. St. Dominic raised four issues on appeal. Taking each in turn, the Supreme Court concluded that the Department did not err by finding St. Dominic's project was actually a new hospital. Because St. Dominic could not meet the need criteria for a new hospital, the Department did not err by denying the CON application, and that the chancery court did not err by affirming that decision. View "St. Dominic-Jackson Memorial Hospital v. Mississippi State Department of Health" on Justia Law

Property owners (collectively, "the Rhalys") sued the City of Jackson for flooding to their properties allegedly caused by the City's failure to maintain a ditch. The Circuit Court of Hinds County struck the City's answer due to "gross indifference to its discovery obligations," based upon its failure to produce the "Streets, Bridges, and Drainage Division of the Public Works Department Operations and Maintenance Policy Manual." The court entered a default judgment in favor of the Rhalys. The Court of Appeals affirmed. The City appealed. Upon review, the Supreme Court concluded that the City indeed exhibited "gross indifference to its discovery obligations" and affirmed both the circuit court and the Court of Appeals. View "City of Jackson v. Rhaly" on Justia Law

After an insolvent employer's insurance company also became insolvent, the Mississippi Workers' Compensation Self-Insurers Guaranty Association (SIGA) made workers' compensation payments to an injured worker. SIGA sued the Mississippi Insurance Guaranty Association (MIGA) for reimbursement of those payments, and the trial court ordered reimbursement. The issue came before the Supreme Court who, after consideration, concluded that SIGA's claim against MIGA did not fall within the statutory definition of a "covered claim," and reversed the trial court’s reimbursement decision. View "Miss. Insurance Guaranty Ass'n v. Miss. Workers' Comp. Indv. Self-insurer Guaranty Ass'n" on Justia Law

In 2006, Petitioner Chander Khurana was audited by the Mississippi State Department of Revenue (MSDR) and assessed taxes. Petitioner appealed the assessments to the Board of Review and eventually the full State Tax Commission, both of which affirmed the assessment. In 2007, Petitioner filed his appeal of the assessments to the Chancery Court; however he did not pay the taxes or post a bond at the time he filed his petition as required by statute. MSDR filed a motion for summary judgment and dismissal, arguing Petitioner failed to perfect his appeal. The chancellor denied the motion and ultimately affirmed the assessments. Petitioner appealed to the Supreme Court claiming the full Commission and chancery court acted arbitrarily and capriciously. MSDR cross-appealed, claiming the chancellor erred in denying its motion for summary judgment and dismissal. Upon review, the Supreme Court concluded Petitioner failed to comply with the statutory requirements of paying the tax or bond. Therefore, the chancery court did not have appellate jurisdiction over Petitioner's appeal, and should have granted MSDR's motion for summary judgment and dismissal. The Court reversed the judgment of the chancery court and rendered judgment for the Mississippi Department of Revenue. Because the chancery court should not have reached the merits of the case, the chancery court's order affirming the assessments was vacated. The order of the Commission remained in effect. View "Khurana v. Mississippi Dept. of Revenue" on Justia Law

The Pascagoula School District (which contains a Chevron crude oil refinery and a Gulf liquified natural gas terminal) brought suit, seeking a declaration that a new law that mandated that revenue the District collected from ad valorem taxes levied on liquified natural gas terminals and crude oil refineries be distributed to all school districts in the county where the terminals and refineries were located was unconstitutional and requesting injunctive relief. All parties filed for summary judgment. After a hearing, the trial judge ruled that the law was constitutional, and the plaintiffs appealed that decision. Because the Supreme Court found the contested statute violated the constitutional mandate that a school district's taxes be used to maintain "its schools," it reversed and remanded the case for further proceedings. View "Pascagoula School District v. Tucker" on Justia Law

Roxco, Ltd., was hired as the general contractor for several public-construction projects for the State of Mississippi, including four building projects at the University of Mississippi, Jackson State University, and Alcorn State University. State law requires that a certain percentage of the cost of construction be retained to ensure completion. However, Mississippi Code Section 31-5-15 (Rev. 2010) allows the contractor to access that retainage by depositing with the State other acceptable security. Pursuant to Section 31-5-15, Roxco substituted securities valued at $1,055,000, deposited in a safekeeping account at Trustmark National Bank. Upon being notified of Roxco's default, the State instructed Trustmark to transfer the funds from the treasury bills into the state treasury account. By letter, Roxco directed Trustmark not to transfer the funds from the treasury bills to the State's account. Notwithstanding Roxco's letter, Trustmark deposited the funds into the State's account. Roxco filed suit against Trustmark for breach of contract and conversion. Trustmark argued that Section 31-5-15 permitted the release of the funds in the safekeeping account. A jury found in favor of Roxco and awarded $3,720,000 in damages. Aggrieved, Trustmark appealed. Finding that the trial court should have granted the motion for judgment notwithstanding the verdict, the Supreme Court reversed and remanded for further proceedings. View "Trustmark National Bank v. Roxco Ltd." on Justia Law

After Hurricane Katrina hit the Mississippi Gulf Coast in August 2005, W. C. Fore entered into a contract with Harrison County, Mississippi, to remove the large amount of debris that was left behind. The Mississippi State Tax Commission (MSTC) then assessed a fee of $1.00 per ton of debris removed. Fore appealed the assessment to the MSTC Board of Review, claiming that the fee did not apply to emergency waste removal. The Board of Review upheld the assessment. Fore appealed the Board of Review’s decision to the MSTC Full Commission, which also affirmed the assessment. Fore then appealed to the Harrison County Chancery Court, First Judicial District. The chancery court upheld the assessment, and Fore appealed to the Supreme Court. Finding that the MSTC's and chancery court's findings were supported by substantial evidence and that there was no misapprehension of the law, the Supreme Court affirmed. View "W. C. Fore, Inc. v. Miss. Dept. of Revenue" on Justia Law

This Mississippi Tort Claims Act case arose from an accident that occurred in Wayne County, Mississippi, between a school bus and a four-door passenger car. Following the accident, the driver of the car Ernestine Worsham, brought suit alleging negligence and negligence per se on behalf of the driver of the school bus, and negligence, negligence per se, and gross negligence on behalf of Wayne County School District. After a bench trial, the driver of the school bus Natasha Middleton, was dismissed from the suit. And despite evidence that a local county supervisor unilaterally had placed the speed-limit signs on County Farm Road, without a traffic investigation, approval by the Board, or passage of an ordinance, the trial court found Middleton's actions constituted negligence per se, and thus awarded judgment in favor of Worsham. Wayne County timely appealed. Because Mississippi Code 63-3-511 (Rev. 2004) requires that "[w]henever local authorities, including boards of supervisors . . . determine and declare, by ordinance, a reasonable and safe speed limit," that such determinations be made "upon the basis of an engineering and traffic investigation," the Supreme Court reversed and remanded for further proceedings. View "Wayne County Sch. Dist. v. Worsham" on Justia Law

This guardianship case began in the Youth Court for the City of Pearl. Petitioners Wanda Bell and Jane Dennis Morse requested that the case be transferred to the Rankin County Chancery Court. Later, Bell and Morse requested that the chancery court dismiss their petition, alleging that the court lacked subject-matter jurisdiction. In addition to dismissing the case with prejudice, the chancellor awarded custody of the child to Frances Cathryn Dennis Finnegan, the child’s natural mother. Aggrieved, Bell and Morse appealed raising two issues: (1) whether the youth court erred by transferring the case to chancery court; and (2) whether the chancellor erred by awarding custody to Finnegan. Upon review, the Supreme Court determined the chancellor properly had jurisdiction of the case. However, the chancellor erred by dismissing the case and awarding custody to Finnegan without any on-the-record findings. The case was remanded for further proceedings. View "In the Matter of the Guardianship of B.A.D." on Justia Law

The issue before the Supreme Court was whether the Court had the right, authority, and power to declare itself superior to and above both the other two branches of government in all matters of constitutional compliance. Attorney General Jim Hood asked the judicial branch of government to void several pardons, alleging that the applicants failed to publish notice as required by Section 124 of the Mississippi Constitution. After the Court received this appeal, Governor Barbour (who issued the pardons) submitted an amicus curiae brief, and the Court allowed his counsel to participate in oral argument. At oral argument, the Court asked Attorney General Hood to point out any pardon that was not facially valid, and he could not. The Court noted that the parties and Governor Barbour presented numerous issues for consideration, including: whether those who did not apply for a pardon were required to publish notice; whether the governor(and not the convicted felons) applied for some of the pardons; whether some of the pardons had any applicant at all; whether the publication provision requires four or five weekly publications; whether the governor, the attorney general, or the pardonees have the burden of proof; and whether the attorney general is estopped from objecting to the pardons. "No judicial duty is more central to the proper operation of our system of government than is [the Court's] duty to decide this issue correctly. . . . [the Court was] compelled to hold that – in each of the cases before us – it fell to the governor alone to decide whether the Constitution’s publication requirement was met."View "In Re: Charles Hooker, et. al." on Justia Law