Justia Mississippi Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

A large sinkhole developed behind the property of T.L. Carraway. A culvert system failed, causing the hole. The culvert system drained Eastover Lake, which was maintained by the owners whose properties surrounded the Lake. Carraway filed suit against the Owners; the Owners filed third-party complaints for indemnity against the City of Jackson, alleging that the City's sewer line repairs caused the system failure and in turn, the sinkhole. The chancellor found the Owners and the City jointly and severally liable for the repair of the culvert system. All defendants appealed that decision. Upon review, the Supreme Court affirmed in part, finding no merit to the arguments made by the Owners and City. However the Court found the chancellor erred by ordering joint and several liability. The case was reversed and remanded for redetermination of defendants' respective allocations of fault as to be determined by the chancery court. View "Borne v. Estate of T. L. Carraway, Jr." on Justia Law

Honda Downs sued Dr. Peter Ackerman for her injuries after Ackerman rear-ended the vehicle she was driving. Ackerman admitted liability; the case went to trial on damages. The jury awarded Downs $20,000 but denied her motion for an additur or a new trial. Downs appealed, and the Court of Appeals found the jury's verdict was biased or otherwise against the overwhelming weight of the evidence. The case was reversed and remanded for an additur or new trial on damages. Ackerman appealed. Upon review, the Supreme Court found that the trial court did not abuse its discretion by denying the additur or new trial on damages. The appellate court's decision was reversed and the trial court's judgment was affirmed and reinstated. View "Downs v. Ackerman" on Justia Law

Defendants Pam Wood, David Wood, Justin Wood, Josh Wood and Jacob Wood filed an interlocutory appeal for the Supreme Court to determine whether the circuit court abused its discretion in denying their motion to transfer this case to another county. The underlying case involved a car accident in which a question arose over who was covered by an insurance policy. Defendant Pam Wood applied for the coverage in Covington County; the application was faxed from an insurance agent's office in Covington to Plaintiff Safeway Insurance Company's Rankin County office where it was approved. Safeway opposed the transfer of venue. Upon review, the Supreme Court concluded that Safeway could not demonstrate sufficient facts to support that venue was proper in Rankin County. Therefore the Court reversed the circuit court's order and remanded the case with instructions to transfer it to a permissible venue. View "Wood v. Safeway Insurance Co." on Justia Law

Plaintiff Charles Honeycutt was injured in an automobile accident involving a Mississippi state trooper. He sued the state trooper and two automobile-insurance providers, Atlanta Casualty Company and American Premier Insurance Company. The trial court granted the defendants' motions for summary judgment. On appeal, the Court of Appeals affirmed the trial court's grant of summary judgment. Plaintiff filed a writ of certiorari, seeking to appeal the grant of summary judgment for American Premier: (1) whether the trial court and the Court of Appeals erred by finding an insurance agent does not have a duty to explain uninsured-motorist coverage; (2) whether summary judgment was granted improperly. The Supreme Court found that, in order to obtain a knowing and voluntary waiver of uninsured-motorist coverage (UM coverage), an insurance agent does have a duty to explain UM coverage to the insured. The Court also found that summary judgment was not proper in this case. Thus, the Court reversed both lower courts' judgments and remanded the case back to the trial court for further proceedings. View "Honeycutt v. Coleman" on Justia Law

Ronnie and Pamela Goss filed suit against defendants Rickey Wilkerson and Phenix Transportation, Inc. alleging that "Rickey Wilkerson fraudulently induced the plaintiffs to settle their workers' compensation claims and to release all claims against Phenix Transportation, Inc." in return for $65,000. The Gosses further alleged that Wilkerson knew, or should have known, that the checks would not clear due to insufficient funds. The Gosses did not allege any specific facts in their complaint nor did they present any cognizable evidence to establish venue in Smith County. Defendants timely answered the complaint, including in their answer a motion to dismiss or, alternatively, to transfer jurisdiction and venue. Defendants argued that the Gosses' claims were legal in nature and were improperly brought in chancery court. Defendants also argued that venue was not proper in Smith County because Wilkerson resides in Scott County and Phenix has its principal place of business in Scott County. Defendants further argued that venue was not proper because no substantial act or omission or substantial event that allegedly caused the injury occurred in Smith County. The Gosses never filed a response to Defendants' motion. The chancery court heard oral argument on Defendants' motion. No transcript exists of the hearing. The chancery court found that the settlement checks and other documents were sent to the Gosses in Smith County, and the Gosses attempted to negotiate the checks in Smith County. Therefore, the chancery court concluded that venue was proper in Smith County because the "cause of action occurred/accrued in Smith County." The chancery court also found that the Gosses' claims were "more legal than equitable in nature" and transferred the case to the Circuit Court of Smith County. On appeal, Defendants argued that the chancery court erred in denying their motion to transfer venue. Upon review, the Supreme Court concluded that the Chancery Court of Smith County erred in its interpretation of Mississippi Code Section 11-11-3 and in denying Defendants' motion to transfer venue. View "Wilkerson v. Goss" on Justia Law

After an administrative judge (AJ) ruled on a claimant's petition to controvert a workers' compensation claim, the claimant had twenty days to file a notice of appeal with the full Mississippi Workers' Compensation Commission. In this case, the issue before the Supreme Court was whether an AJ's order, handed down more than twenty days after the AJ's ruling and granting a claimant thirty additional days in which to prosecute her claim, should be given legal effect by the Commission so that the claimant's notice of appeal, filed within the additional thirty days, would be considered timely. Upon review, the Court found that, under the facts and circumstances presented, such an appeal was timely. View "Felter v. Floorserv, Inc." on Justia Law

Carl Patterson Jr. sustained serious injuries in a single-vehicle motorcycle accident. He sued T. L. Wallace Construction, Inc. and Turtle Creek Development, Inc. for damages. T. L. Wallace and Turtle Creek both filed motions for summary judgment. The Circuit Court of Marion County granted each motion for summary judgment. The Court of Appeals, finding the circuit court erred by granting summary judgment, reversed and remanded for a trial. Both defendants filed writs of certiorari, which were granted. After considering the parties' arguments and applicable law, the Supreme Court reversed the Court of Appeals' judgment and reinstated and affirmed the Circuit Court's judgment. View "Patterson, Jr. v. T. L. Wallace Construction, Inc." on Justia Law

Elizabeth Swain and Mona Cates lived together from 2000 until 2006. After they severed their relationship, Swain filed an action seeking the repayment of funds she first had invested in a property in Washington State, which were then used to purchase a residence in Mississippi. The chancellor rejected Swain's claim of a constructive trust or a resulting trust. The chancellor found that Cates had been unjustly enriched by Swain's contributions and awarded Swain a judgment in that amount. The Court of Appeals affirmed the chancellor's rejection of the trust claim but reversed the decision of the chancellor, which was based on unjust enrichment. The Court of Appeals held that, because “cohabitation alone cannot form the basis of an equitable remedy between non-married cohabitants,” the remedy of unjust enrichment was outside the bounds of the chancery court's equitable powers. Upon review, the Supreme Court found that the chancellor was empowered to award relief on the basis of unjust enrichment. The Court affirmed the judgment of the Court of Appeals to the extent that it affirmed the chancellor's rejection of Swain's claim of a constructive trust or a resulting trust. The Court reversed the judgment of the Court of Appeals with regard to the unjust-enrichment award. Because the chancellor made a mathematical error in the calculation of the unjust-enrichment award, the Court vacated the chancellor's judgment in part, and remanded the case to the chancery court for entry of judgment in the correct amount. View "Cates v. Swain" on Justia Law

Martin Vance filed a medical-malpractice/wrongful-death action on behalf of Mamie Vance Hemphill, alleging that Dr. Charles H. Laney was negligent in his treatment of the decedent, Hemphill. Vance initially sued other medical providers, but all but Dr. Laney were dismissed. Trial was held; Dr. Laney was the sole defendant. The jury returned a verdict of $1,000,000 to Vance. In response, Dr. Laney filed this appeal, presenting three issues to the Supreme Court: (1) whether the trial court erred in remitting plaintiff's economic damage award to $103,688 when the substantial weight of the evidence proved that the award should have been zero; (2) whether the trial court erred in its jury instructions; and, (3) whether plaintiff's counsel made inappropriate comments, and, when taken with the erroneous jury instructions, should have warranted Dr. Laney a new trial. Because the trial judge committed reversible error in instructing the jury that they could consider the "value of life" of the deceased in awarding damages, and because counsel for Vance made improper and prejudicial comments to the jury during closing arguments, the Supreme Court reversed and remanded for a new trial. View "Laney v. Vance" on Justia Law

The issue before the Supreme Court in this case concerned premises liability in the context of a wrongful death action. The Court of Appeals affirmed the trial court's holding that the deceased was an invitee at the time of his death and that the plaintiff breached no duty to the deceased under the standard applied to those classified as invitees while on the property of another. Upon review, the Supreme Court agreed the grant of summary judgment was appropriate but disagreed with the trial court and the Court of Appeals as to the reason. The Court found that the injured party was not an invitee at the time of the incident, but a trespasser. Because both the Court of Appeals and the trial court incorrectly classified the decedent as an invitee, the Court affirmed only the result. View "Handy v. Nejam" on Justia Law