Justia Mississippi Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

Peggy Thornton filed a wrongful death action in 2007 against Woodall Electric Company, Inc. (her deceased husband's employer), as well as several fictitious defendants. Thornton later added Defendants Tanfield Group, PLC, Tanfield Engineering Systems, Inc. ("Tanfield Engineering"), and Bidgood Enterprises, Inc. After having served Tanfield Group, Thornton had an alias summons issued for Tanfield Engineering and served Tanfield Engineering via certified mail. Tanfield Engineering filed a Motion to Dismiss the First Amended Complaint based on the plaintiff's failure to serve process, pursuant to Mississippi Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(4)-(5). Thornton's response to the motion contended that Tanfield Group was the parent company of Tanfield Engineering; thus, according to Thornton, Tanfield Engineering had been put on notice of Thornton's claims because its parent company had been served in a timely manner. The trial court denied Tanfield Engineering's Motion to Dismiss based on a finding that Tanfield Engineering was an alter ego of Tanfield Group and that service upon Tanfield Group constituted effective service upon Tanfield Engineering. Tanfield Engineering filed a Petition for Interlocutory Appeal and a motion to stay proceedings in the trial court, both of which the Supreme Court granted. Upon review, the Court concluded that the trial court's decision was contrary to its precedent that classifies subsidiaries which are wholly owned by their parent corporations and share common officers with their parent corporations, as separate and distinct from their parent corporations. Accordingly, the Supreme Court vacated the court's order and remanded the case for further proceedings. View "Tanfield Engineering Systems, Inc. v. Thornton" on Justia Law

Dr. Jerry Pratt slipped and fell down a set of stairs at the Gulfport-Biloxi Regional Airport. Pratt filed suit against the Gulfport-Biloxi Regional Airport Authority (GBRAA) in the Circuit Court for the First Judicial District of Harrison County, alleging negligence and claiming he suffered injuries as a result of the fall. GBRAA moved for summary judgment, claiming immunity under the Mississippi Tort Claims Act (MTCA), and the circuit court granted the motion. Pratt appealed, and we assigned the case to the Court of Appeals. The Court of Appeals, finding that genuine issues of material fact existed, reversed the trial court's grant of summary judgment and remanded the case. GBRAA filed a petition for writ of certiorari, which the Supreme Court granted. Upon review, the Supreme Court found that GBRAA was entitled to immunity under the MTCA, and accordingly reversed the appellate court, reinstated and affirmed the trial court's grant of summary judgment in favor of GBRAA. View "Pratt v. Gulfport-Biloxi Regional Airport Authority" on Justia Law

Parham Pointe North, LLC and K. Wayne Rice & Associates together appealed, and Ballard Realty Company separately appealed, (collectively "Defendants") a decision from the Hinds County Circuit Court which awarded damages of $3,603,712 to apartment-complex tenants for loss of intellectual property and personal injuries arising from claims that the Defendants were negligent in maintaining and/or repairing a leaking pipe in their apartment. Upon review, the Supreme Court found that the trial court abused its discretion by admitting unreliable expert testimony, allowing a lay witness to give opinion testimony, and not excluding evidence of the cost of restoration where the fair market value of the property before it was damaged was not established. Furthermore, the Court found that the trial court abused its discretion by failing to grant a new trial on damages, as an award of lost profits without proof of past profits was not only contrary to the established law of this state, it was also contrary to the weight of evidence. Accordingly, the Court reversed the judgment and remand to the Hinds County Circuit Court for a new trial on damages. View "Ballard Realty Company, Inc. v. Ohazurike" on Justia Law

Twenty-year-old Xavier Zurndell Moore pled guilty to manslaughter for the shooting death of his mother's live-in boyfriend, Robert Williams. The fatal bullet had been purchased from the Walmart in Indianola, Mississippi. Robert's daughter and his estate filed a wrongful-death suit against Walmart, alleging that it unlawfully had sold ammunition to the underage Moore and that the sale proximately had caused Robert's death. The trial court granted summary judgment for Walmart based on this Court's decision in "Robinson v. Howard Brothers of Jackson, Mississippi," (372 So. 2d 1074 (Miss. 1979)). In that case, the Supreme Court held that, even though the store had violated federal law by selling a firearm and ammunition to a minor, the minor's subsequent murder of a third party had not been foreseeable; the seller, therefore, was not civilly liable for the death. Based on "Robinson," the Court found that Moore's criminal act was not foreseeable and that Walmart reasonably could assume that Moore would follow the law. Therefore, the Court affirmed the grant of summary judgment in favor of Walmart. View "Williams v. Wal-Mart Stores East, L.P." on Justia Law

Edna Phillips filed suit against Tich K. Huynh, d/b/a Elegant Nails Salon, asserting negligence in operation, negligence in maintenance, and gross negligence against Elegant Nails based upon a corneal abrasion Phillips allegedly sustained when "something" hit her in the eye while she was having acrylic nails applied at Elegant Nails. Elegant Nails twice moved for summary judgment and twice was denied; the Supreme Court granted Elegant Nails's petition for interlocutory appeal after the second denial. Finding Phillips has not produced sufficient evidence to survive Elegant Nails' motion for summary judgment, the Court reversed the judgment of the circuit court and rendered judgment in favor of Elegant Nails. View "Elegant Nails v. Phillips" on Justia Law

In 2005, Appellant Lisa Learmonth received severe injuries in an auto/truck collision with a vehicle owned by Sears, Roebuck & Company and driven by its employee. She filed suit against Sears in federal district court. The jury returned a unanimous general verdict for Learmonth in the amount of $4 million. The "Special Interrogatory and Jury Verdict" form submitted to the jury did not instruct the jury to itemize the compensatory damages into separate categories. In Sears' Motion for New Trial, it contended that $2,218,905.60 of the jury verdict was for noneconomic damages. Learmonth used that same figure in post-trial responses. Sears' figure was accepted by both the district court and the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals in their respective analyses. Regarding Sears' Motion, the district court held, in pertinent part, that it "cannot conclude that the jury verdict is so excessive, so 'contrary to right reason,' as to warrant a new trial or remittitur." Sears appealed that judgment to the Fifth Circuit. Learmonth cross-appealed and challenged the constitutionality of Section 11-1-60(2)(b) (the statutory authority Sears used for its appellate argument) under the separation-of-powers and right-to-jury-trial provisions of the Mississippi Constitution. The Fifth Circuit found that this was an "important question of state law . . . for which there is no controlling precedent from the Supreme Court of Mississippi," and certified the question to the Mississippi Supreme Court: "[i]s Section 11-1-60(2) of the Mississippi Code, which generally limits non-economic damages to $1 million in civil cases, constitutional?" Upon review of the matter, the Supreme Court declined to respond: "post-trial pleadings and arguments based on Sears' hypotheses are not a sufficiently reliable basis for us to undertake a decision declaring Section 11-1-60(2)(b) constitutional or unconstitutional." View "Sears Roebuck & Company v. Learmonth" on Justia Law

Plaintiffs Diana Ladnier and Lawrence Ladnier appealed the judgment of the George County Circuit Court which granted summary judgment in favor of Defendant Joseph Hester. The Court of Appeals, in a six-three opinion, affirmed. The Court of Appeals denied the motion for rehearing filed by the Ladniers. The Ladniers then petitioned for a writ of certiorari, which the Supreme Court granted. Shortly after midnight on January 2, 2008, Diana Ladnier was driving her vehicle on River Road near Lucedale, returning home from her job as a correctional officer at a local facility, when three horses ran across the road. She struck the largest horse which weighed approximately 1,000 pounds. Diana claimed she was not speeding, and the road was unlit and dark. The horses were owned by Hester. Diana asserted that, because of the accident, she sustained serious personal injuries, resulting in medical bills in excess of $69,000. Diana also claimed damage to her vehicle. Diana and Lawrence Ladnier filed a personal-injury suit against Hester claiming she was entitled to damages because Hester was negligent for allowing his three horses to roam free on River Road, while Lawrence sued for loss of consortium. Upon review, the Supreme Court found that the circuit court erred in granting Hester's motion for summary judgment and that the Court of Appeals erred in affirming the judgment of the trial court. Thus, the Court reversed the judgments of both the Court of Appeals and the trial court, and remanded this case to the Circuit Court of George County for a trial on the merits. View "Ladnier v. Hester" on Justia Law

Robert Lee Kitchens, Jr., and his wife, Mary L. Kitchens, died as a result of injuries received in a collision between their automobile and a train owned and operated by Illinois Central Railroad Company ("Illinois Central"). The Administratrix and wrongful-death beneficiaries of the Kitchenses' estate filed a wrongful-death action against several parties, including the parent company of Illinois Central, Canadian National Railway Company. Canadian National moved to dismiss for lack of jurisdiction and for failure to state a claim. The circuit court granted the plaintiffs ninety days to conduct discovery "to justify piercing the corporate veil" and reserved ruling on the motion to dismiss pending completion of the discovery. Canadian National filed a petition for an interlocutory appeal, and the Supreme Court granted the petition. Upon review, the Court found that the plaintiffs did not allege with particularity the applicability of piercing the corporate veil to the facts of this case. Accordingly, the Court vacated the circuit court's order permitting further discovery, reversed the circuit court's failure to grant Canadian National's motion to dismiss for lack of jurisdiction, and remanded the case to the circuit court for the entry of a final order of dismissal without prejudice. View "Canadian National Railway Co. v. Waltman" on Justia Law

Dwight Robinson filed suit against Bailey Lumber & Supply Company for injuries and damages he allegedly sustained as a result of a fall on Bailey Lumber's premises. A jury returned a general verdict in favor of Robinson in the amount of $1,500,000. The trial court reduced the award to $1,070,341.42 in economic and noneconomic damages. Bailey Lumber appealed. Upon review, the Supreme Court reversed and remanded, finding that the trial court erred in allowing expert testimony regarding the cause of Robinson's need for hip-replacement surgery and future medical treatment. View "Bailey Lumber & Supply Co. v. Dwight Robinson" on Justia Law

This interlocutory appeal presented the issue of whether a volunteer fire department incorporated under the Mississippi Non-Profit Corporation Act is a "political subdivision" under the Mississippi Tort Claims Act (MTCA) and thus immune from liability. The volunteer fire department argued immunity for itself and its employee, asserting it was a "body corporate. . . responsible for governmental activities" under the MTCA's definition of "political subdivision." However, plaintiffs Milton and Brenda Spotts argued that the volunteer fire department was an independent contractor with Lowndes County and was not entitled to immunity. Upon review, the Supreme Court found that the volunteer fire department did not meet the definition of a political subdivision, as the term "body corporate" does not mean any corporate body, but a public corporate body. Furthermore, the Court found that the volunteer fire department was acting as an independent contractor with the county. Thus, the volunteer fire department and its employee did not have immunity for their alleged acts of negligence. View "Flye v. Spotts" on Justia Law