Justia Mississippi Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

In 2006, Lester Butler filed a personal-injury action against David Holmes and John Does 1-5. Later, he moved to amend his complaint to substitute a trucking company, D.P. Holmes Trucking, LLC, for Holmes or, in the alternative, to be allowed to file an amended complaint to add Holmes Trucking as a defendant. Both the circuit court and Holmes permitted Butler to amend his original complaint to add Holmes Trucking as a defendant; however, when filed, Butler had substituted Holmes Trucking for Holmes. After a responsive pleading had been filed, Butler filed a second amended complaint without leave of court and without permission of Holmes Trucking, identifying both Holmes and Holmes Trucking as defendants. Holmes Trucking responded with a motion to dismiss or, in the alternative, for summary judgment, but the circuit court allowed Butler to proceed, finding that the mistaken party name was a misnomer. Holmes Trucking filed notice of interlocutory appeal, requesting that the Supreme Court grant a dismissal with prejudice. The Supreme Court found misnomer did not apply in this case, and the circuit court erred in applying that doctrine. However, the court did not err in allowing Butler to amend his complaint. View "D.P. Holmes Trucking, LLC v. Butler" on Justia Law

In 1998, Barbara Lanier's two-year-old son Darrell Gill Jr. died while being treated at the University of Mississippi Medical Center (UMC) for a a rare genetic disorder – Chediak-Higashi Syndrome (CHS). Lanier filed a complaint against UMC alleging medical malpractice and wrongful death. In 2008, the case was resolved by bench trial in circuit court with a verdict in favor of Lanier of $250,000. UMC appealed, raising four issues for the Supreme Court's review: (1) whether the trial court erred by denying UMC's motion for summary judgment based on the statute of limitations; (2) whether the trial court erred by denying UMC's motion for directed verdict; (3) whether the verdict was against the overwhelming weight of the evidence; (4) whether the trial court erred by granting Lanier's motion to conform the pleadings to the evidence. Upon review, the Supreme Court found that the trial court erred by denying UMC's motion for a directed verdict. Because the Court reversed and rendered the case on that issue, the remaining issues were moot. View "University of Mississippi Medical Ctr. v. Lanier" on Justia Law

In September 2007, Henry Phillips murdered Doris Shavers in the home they shared. The heirs of Shavers sued the City of Jackson ("the City"), claiming the actions of its police officers caused Shavers's death. The City moved for summary judgment, claiming immunity under the Mississippi Tort Claims Act ("MTCA"). The circuit court denied the City's motion, and the City brought this interlocutory appeal. The question before the Supreme Court was whether there was a genuine issue of dispute that the City, through its police officers, acted in reckless disregard of Shavers's safety, thereby exposing the City to liability. The Supreme Court held that as a matter of law, the City did not act with reckless disregard. Accordingly, the Court reversed the circuit court's denial of summary judgment and rendered judgment in favor of the City. View "City of Jackson v. Shavers" on Justia Law

Robert Eastman claimed Mississippi Valley Silica Company, Inc. ("MVS"), the company that supplied sand to his employer Marathon LeTourneau, failed to warn him of the dangers posed by sandblasting. At trial, MVS requested a "sophisticated user/learned-intermediary" jury instruction. Although the requested instruction was an incomplete statement of the law, the trial judge refused the instruction for an erroneous reason and failed to instruct the jury properly on the submitted defense. The jury returned a verdict for Eastman, and MVS timely appealed, raising eight issues, including the trial judge's refusal to grant the sophisticated-user jury instruction. Upon review, the Supreme Court found that issue dispositive, and reversed and remanded for a new trial. View "Mississippi Valley Silica Company, Inc. v. Eastman" on Justia Law

Isaiah Robinson attacked Respondent Linda Knox in a Kroger parking lot, punching her several times and taking her purse. Claiming that Kroger had a duty to place an armed guard in its parking lot and that its breach of that duty lead to her injuries, Respondent sued the Kroger Company and Kroger Limited Partnership and recovered damages. Kroger appealed. Upon review, the Supreme Court concluded that unless Kroger was on notice of an atmosphere of violence in its parking lot, it had no duty to place an armed guard there. Respondent failed to present sufficient evidence on that point, so the Supreme Court reversed the trial court's decision and remanded the case for entry of dismissal. View "The Kroger Co. v. Knox" on Justia Law

The circuit court granted summary judgment in favor of Southern Health Corporation of Houston, Inc. d/b/a Trace Regional Hospital, and Marcia Morgan, a registered nurse. Aggrieved, Ruth Crosthwait appealed to the Supreme Court, which in turn assigned this case to the Court of Appeals. In a four-four plurality opinion (two judges not participating), the Court of Appeals affirmed the trial court’s grant of summary judgment. The case arose from a slip and fall incident at the hospital: Crosthwait was admitted to Trace Regional Hospital for treatment of fluctuating blood sugar stemming from diabetes. Crosthwait was eighty-two years old, lived alone, and generally could walk without assistance. While she was hospitalized, Crosthwait's attending physician instructed her to ring a bell to have a nurse assist her when she rose from her hospital bed. In 2008, Crosthwait was preparing to leave the hospital, and she decided to take a shower. Crosthwait called for Marcia Morgan to assist her with undressing. Crosthwait walked into the bathroom unassisted. Morgan offered Crosthwait a shower stool, which she accepted. Morgan then left and returned with a chair, which she placed in the shower. While Crosthwait showered, Morgan told Crosthwait she would have to leave to attend another patient. When Morgan returned, she turned off the shower and Crosthwait exited the shower. It was undisputed that the fall caused Crosthwait significant injury, including a broken hip and a loss of mobility and independence. Crosthwait filed suit against the hospital and Morgan. The hospital and Morgan filed a motion for summary judgment arguing that Crosthwait's action was for medical malpractice, and summary judgment was proper because, among other things, Crosthwait needed expert testimony to establish the duty of care owed to her by the hospital and to show whether that duty had been breached. Crosthwait responded that the claim was for ordinary negligence, for which expert testimony was not required. The circuit court granted the hospital’s motion, and Crosthwait appealed. Upon review, the Supreme Court agreed with the Court of Appeals and affirmed the trial court's grant of summary judgment. View "Crosthwait v. Southern Health Corporation of Houston, Inc." on Justia Law

Petitioner Troy Lofton alleged he suffered from asbestosis as a result of exposure to the Defendant's product, Flosal, during the course of his employment on various oil and gas drilling rigs. Petitioner filed suit in 2004, alleging two theories of product liability (design defect and inadequate warning), as well as claims for intentional and negligent infliction of emotional distress. Following trial, the jury returned a verdict in favor of Petitioner on his claims of design defect and negligent infliction of emotional distress, with one hundred percent of the liability assigned to Chevron Phillips Chemical Company LP, successor-in-interest to ConocoPhillips Company, formerly known as Phillips Petroleum Company, and Phillips 66 Company, formerly doing business as Drilling Specialties Company (CPChem) and total damages in the amount of $15,200,000. CPChem's motion for judgment notwithstanding the verdict and its motion for new trial and/or remittur were denied. Aggrieved, CPChem filed this appeal. Upon review, the Supreme Court reversed and remanded the case for a new trial due to the trial court's error in allowing Petitioner's counsel to read from drilling records that were not admitted into evidence during the cross-examination of CPChem’s expert pulmonologist. View "Phillips 66 Co. v. Lofton" on Justia Law

In 2009, Charles Larry McGraw filed a personal-injury action against four sand suppliers: Clark Sand Company, Inc.; Mississippi Valley Silica Co., Inc.; Precision Packaging, Inc.; and Custom Aggregates and Grinding, Inc. McGraw alleged the four defendants' sand caused his lung disease, silicosis. On the day of the trial, after the jury had heard the parties' opening statements, the court recessed, and the parties reached a settlement agreement. Subsequently, McGraw filed a motion for leave to amend his complaint to add his wife as a plaintiff and American Optical Corporation as an additional defendant. He then filed an amended motion for leave to amend his complaint (First Amended Complaint) to modify his request to add four more defendants: Lonestar Industries, Inc.; Specialty Sand Company; Pearl Sands, Inc.; and Pearl Specialty Sand, Inc. In early 2010, the trial court granted McGraw's amended motion and allowed him to add the five new defendants to the complaint. McGraw later filed a Second Amended Complaint, which added a sixth defendant, Dependable Abrasives, Inc., without seeking leave of court. All six defendants petitioned the Supreme Court for interlocutory appeal concerning the trial court's order denying their Motion for Summary Judgment, or Alternatively, Motion to Strike Second Amended Complaint and Dismiss First Amended Complaint. The defendants argued that, because the original parties settled with McGraw prior to his motions for leave to amend, the trial court improperly allowed the filing of the First Amended Complaint to add new parties. The defendants also argue that, because McGraw did not seek court approval in filing his Second Amended Complaint, that complaint should be struck. Upon review, the Supreme Court found that the trial court abused its discretion in allowing McGraw to file his Second Amended Complaint, because he was required to obtain court approval. However, the Court found that the trial court did comply with the rules of procedure when it allowed McGraw to file his First Amended Complaint. The Court therefore affirmed the denial of the motion to dismiss the First Amended Complaint and reversed the denial of the motion to strike the Second Amended Complaint. View "Lone Star Industries, Inc. v. McGraw" on Justia Law

This interlocutory appeal challenged the dismissal of plaintiffs' Deborah and Harold Knapp's medical malpractice claim related to a slip and fall in a hospital bathroom. The Knapps sued the hospital after a 2006 incident that had her admitted. She slipped and fell on a wet bathroom floor, allegedly from a leaky toilet. She was transferred to the Behavioral Health Unit, and while there, was attacked by another patient. Based on these two events, the Knapps listed "negligence," "breach of warranty" and "gross negligence, punitive damages, etc." as grounds for their complaint. Finding that the claim at issue did not involve professional negligence, and that the trial court properly recognized the parties' discovery obligations, the Supreme Court affirmed the trial court's ruling and remanded the case for further proceedings. View "Knapp v. St. Dominic-Jackson Memorial Hospital" on Justia Law

Two appeals are were consolidated from chancery-court cases. In the first case, Diamondhead Country Club and Property Owners Association, Inc. sued Thomas R. Alfonso, III, and Anne Scafidi Cordova,1 d/b/a Bay Jourdan Publishing Co. (BJP) for breach of a contract to publish "The Diamondhead News." In 1997, the chancery court entered a preliminary injunction order preventing BJP from publishing "The Diamondhead News," selling advertising, collecting or disposing of advertising revenues derived from the publication the paper, and interfering with the printing, publication, or distribution of "The Diamondhead News." The chancery court also found that an arbitration clause in the publishing contract was inapplicable to the lawsuit. The chancery court denied BJP’s two subsequent motions to compel arbitration of the breach-of-contract dispute. BJP appealed the chancery court’s latest denial of arbitration. In the second case, BJP sued Diamondhead and Gulf Publishing Co., Inc., d/b/a "The Sun Herald" (“Gulf Publishing”), for intentional interference with the publishing contract. Gulf Publishing filed a motion for summary judgment. The court granted summary judgment to Gulf Publishing and directed the entry of a final judgment as to Gulf Publishing pursuant to Mississippi Rule of Civil Procedure 54(b). BJP appealed the grant of summary judgment. Upon review, the Supreme Court affirmed the chancery court’s order denying BJP’s third motion to compel arbitration because the issue was ruled upon previously, and no appeal was taken. Finding genuine issues of material fact for trial, the Court reversed the chancery court’s order granting summary judgment to Diamondhead and Gulf Publishing, and remanded the second case for further proceedings. View "Alfonso v. Gulf Publishing Co., Inc." on Justia Law