Justia Mississippi Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

Defendants Arvind Kumar, individually and d/b/a Holiday Inn of Columbus, Tony Savage, and Tracey Savage appealed a circuit court's denial of their motion to set aside a default judgment which was entered against them based on a complaint filed by Plaintiff Shanna Loper. Before the complaint was filed, Defendants' attorney, Ed Pleasants, had written a letter to Plaintiff's attorney denying her claims. However, once the complaint was filed in circuit court, Defendants did not file a formal answer to the complaint. The only further communication Loper’s counsel received from Pleasants was a phone call stating that he would no longer be representing Defendants. After a default judgment as to liability was entered, without notice to Defendants, the circuit court set a date for a hearing to assess damages, again without notice to Defendants. The Court of Appeals found that, since Defendants clearly expressed their intent to defend against Plaintiff's claims, they were entitled to notice prior to the entry of the default judgment. The Court of Appeals reversed the judgment of the circuit court and remanded the case for further proceedings. Thereafter, the Supreme Court granted Plaintiff's petition for a writ of certiorari. Finding that the circuit court's denial of Defendants' motion to set aside the default was an abuse of discretion, the Court vacated the Court of Appeals and remanded the case back to the circuit court for further proceedings. View "Kumar v. Loper" on Justia Law

Pursuant to 42 United States Code Sections 2000e-5 and 1983, Appellee Shirley Johnson brought suit against Defendants the City of Belzoni, Police Chief Mickey Foxworth, and Officer David James. Appellee claimed she was sexually harassed at work by James for approximately a year. She reported the harassment to her supervisor Foxworth, but claimed insufficient action was taken to remedy the situation. The matter proceeded to trial, and a jury returned a unanimous verdict of $150,000–$50,000 against each Defendant, in favor of Appellee. Aggrieved, Defendants filed a motion for judgment notwithstanding the verdict, or in the alternative, a new trial. The motion was denied and the defendants appealed. Finding that the sufficiency and weight of the evidence supported the jury’s verdict, the Supreme Court affirmed the trial court's judgment. View "City of Belzoni v. Johnson" on Justia Law

In 2008, Rehab Solutions, PLLC (Rehab) received notice of tax liens assessed against its property. Thereafter, Chad Willis and Renee Willis (collectively, the Owners) employed the Nail McKinney Accounting firm to assess the financial viability of their business. As a result, numerous financial shortcomings of Rehab’s in-house accountant became apparent. When the inspection of Rehab’s finances began, the accountant left work and did not return. Rehab eventually sued the accountant in tort and in contract, seeking the return of one-half of his wages while employed by Rehab, as well as punitive damages. The jury returned a verdict in favor of Rehab and awarded Rehab $133,543.17 in compensatory damages and $50,000 in punitive damages. The accountant appealed the jury’s award, asserting that it was not supported by the evidence and that unjust enrichment was not the proper measure of damages. Additionally, the accountant contended that the trial court erred in finding that Rehab’s claims were not barred by the statute of limitations and for submitting the issue of punitive damages to the jury. After a thorough review of the record, the Supreme Court determined that there was not a viable cause of action against the accountant in this matter. Accordingly, the Court reversed the trial court and remanded the case for further proceedings. View "Willis v. Rehab Solutions, PLLC" on Justia Law

In 2009, Plaintiff Charles McGraw filed a personal-injury action against four sand suppliers: Clark Sand Company, Inc.; Mississippi Valley Silica Co. Inc.; Precision Packaging, Inc.; and Custom Aggregates and Grinding, Inc. Plaintiff alleged the four defendants’ sand caused his lung disease. On the day of the trial, after the jury heard the parties’ opening statements, the court recessed, and the parties reached a settlement agreement. A few months later, Plaintiff filed a motion for leave to amend his complaint to add his wife as a plaintiff and to add additional defendants. In early 2010, the trial court granted Plaintiff’s amended motion and allowed him to add the five new defendants to the complaint. However, shortly after the court granted his leave to amend, Plaintiff added a sixth defendant without the court’s permission. All six defendants petitioned the Supreme Court for an interlocutory appeal concerning the trial court’s order that denied the defendants’ Motion for Summary Judgment, or Alternatively, Motion to Strike Second Amended Complaint and Dismiss First Amended Complaint. The defendants argued that, because the original parties settled with Plaintiff prior to his motions for leave to amend, the trial court improperly allowed the filing of the First Amended Complaint to add new parties. The defendants also argued that because Plaintiff did not seek court approval in filing his Second Amended Complaint, that complaint should be struck. Upon review, the Supreme Court found that the trial court abused its discretion in allowing Plaintiff to file his Second Amended Complaint, because he was required to obtain court approval. However, the trial court did comply with procedural rules when it allowed Plaintiff to file his First Amended Complaint, because McGraw filed his motion before all of the original parties were dismissed with prejudice. View "Lone Star Industries, Inc. v. McGraw" on Justia Law

Kristine Malouf took the drug Depakote to control her seizures both before and during her pregnancy. While Kristine gave birth to a seemingly healthy child in March 1997, she and her husband eventually discovered the child had brain damage. In 2002, the Maloufs filed a complaint in Hinds County against Dr. Ruth Fredericks, a neurologist; and in 2006, they filed an amended complaint adding Dr. J. Martin Tucker, Jr., an obstetrician-gynecologist (Defendants) alleging Kristine's treating physicians negligently caused their child's brain damage and other injuries. After the Maloufs joined Dr. Tucker, the Defendants moved to transfer venue to Rankin County. The trial court denied the motion to change venue, finding the Defendants had abandoned it. The Supreme Court granted Defendants' interlocutory appeal to determine whether the trial court erred in its ruling on venue. Upon review, the Court affirmed the trial court's finding that the Defendants abandoned their right to contest venue. View "Fredericks v. Malouf" on Justia Law

Plaintiffs Brian and David Knight each filed separate complaints against their uncle Defendant Benny Knight, alleging assault and battery. The trial court dismissed these cases without prejudice for want of prosecution nearly ten years later. Neither Plaintiff appealed the dismissal. In 2010, Brian and David refiled separate actions, but the trial court granted Benny's motions to dismiss both cases, finding that the one-year statute of limitations had run on both actions. Plaintiffs retained new counsel and tried to refile the cases. The court clerks' office notified counsel for Plaintiffs that per a local rule, separate complaints must be filed for each plaintiff. Plaintiffs then refiled their cases separately. In response, counsel for Benny argued that the statute of limitations should not toll for ten years and permit a plaintiff to refile a lawsuit after its dismissal for failure to prosecute, even if dismissed without prejudice. Upon review, the Supreme Court held that the local rule that required Plaintiffs to refile their cases separately to be in error, and also found that the statute of limitations was not tolled since the case was dismissed without prejudice for want of prosecution. The Court affirmed the trial court's judgment, but on alternate grounds. View "Knight v. Knight" on Justia Law

A fire destroyed a cotton-picking machine owned by Arcadia Farms Partnership. Though insurance coverage initially was denied, Audubon Insurance Company eventually paid Arcadia for the loss. Arcadia then filed suit against Audubon, asserting that Audubon's failure to submit prompt payment constituted a "bad faith breach of the policy terms." Audubon filed a motion for summary judgment. Audubon asserted that, since Arcadia had been paid on its claim prior to filing suit, Arcadia's only potential form of compensatory damages would be prejudgment interest. Yet according to Audubon, Section 75-17-7 of the Mississippi Code prohibited Arcadia from recovering prejudgment interest prior to the filing of the complaint. The trial court granted summary judgment for Audubon and denied Arcadia's motion for reconsideration or in the alternative, motion to amend its complaint to plead specifically for prejudgment interest. The Court of Appeals reversed, holding that Arcadia could seek prejudgment interest from the date of breach, prior to the filing of the complaint, and that the trial court had abused its discretion in denying Arcadia's motion to amend. Upon review, the Supreme Court agreed with the Court of Appeals, but granted certiorari to address some uncertainty in the law surrounding Section 75-17-7. The Supreme Court clarified that in contract cases, Section 75-17-7 does not restrict prejudgment interest to the post-complaint period; prevailing parties in a breach-of-contract suit may seek interest from the date of breach. View "Arcadia Farms Partnership v. Audubon Insurance Company" on Justia Law

Following the destruction of their home in Hurricane Katrina, Michael and Mary Robichaux filed suit in October, 2006, in the circuit court against their insurers, Nationwide Mutual Fire Insurance Company (Nationwide) and their agent, Jay Fletcher Insurance (Fletcher Insurance). Plaintiffs sought declaratory and injunctive relief, including indemnity under the insurance contract, compensatory and punitive damages, specific performance of the insurance contract, attorneys' fees, and court costs and expenses for what they alleged were uncompensated, covered losses under their homeowners' policy. Also included in the complaint were claims of fraud and bad faith by the insurer and its agent. The trial court ultimately granted summary judgment in favor of Nationwide and Fletcher Insurance based on the Plaintiffs' failure to establish a genuine issue of material fact that the home was damaged by wind, which was covered by the subject policy, rather than its having been destroyed by flood, which the trial court found was excluded under the policy. Alternatively, the trial court found that Plaintiffs failed to show they had suffered uncompensated losses due to their having received compensation under their flood policy. Upon review of Plaintiffs' appeal, the Supreme Court found that the trial court erred in granting summary judgment on the issue of whether Plaintiffs suffered uncompensated, wind damage to structures other than their dwelling, and to personal property. Accordingly, the Court remanded the case for further proceedings. View " Robichaux v. Nationwide Mutual Fire Insurance Co." on Justia Law

In 2006, a fire consumed an apartment building rented by Plaintiffs Paul Whittington, Jr. and Westbrook Cooper. Mr. Whittington died from injuries he sustained in the fire, while Mr. Cooper was injured but survived. The building was owned by Defendant William Lipscomb, and it was located on the same property as Mr. Lipscomb's residence. Plaintiffs sued Mr. Lipscomb and amended their complaint to seek declaratory judgment against Lipscomb's insurer, the Automobile Insurance Company of Hartford, Connecticut (AIC), on the issue of coverage. AIC filed a motion to sever and a motion for summary judgment, which the trial court denied. AIC filed two separate petitions for interlocutory appeal and requested that the Court consolidate the two issues raised in the separate petitions. After reviewing the complaint, together with the insurance policy and the relevant deposition testimony, the Supreme Court determined there was no genuine issue of material fact as to the issue of coverage, and that AIC’s motion for summary judgment should have been granted. AIC was dismissed from the case with prejudice. View "Automobile Ins. Co. of Hartford v. Lipscomb " on Justia Law

Charles Phillips and RJK Investments, LLC, appealed a circuit court's order dismissing with prejudice all of its claims pursuant to a compromise and settlement order entered in the United States Bankruptcy Court. Phillips, through RJK, owned and managed a restaurant franchise. After a fire damaged the restaurant, Defendants Joey Kelley and other creditors attempted to seize control of the remaining assets. Phillips and RJK sued the creditors on multiple grounds. While this case was pending, Phillips individually filed for Chapter 7 bankruptcy. The bankruptcy court's order plainly directed the trustee to execute an Order of Dismissal as to all claims in this action. The order released the defendants from any further responsibility and liability, which necessarily would include any claims of RJK. Accordingly, the Supreme Court found that the trial court did not err in dismissing Phillips' and RJK's suit. View "Phillips v. Kelley" on Justia Law