Justia Mississippi Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

Lewis and Lisa Shelby filed a medical-malpractice action on behalf of the wrongful death beneficiaries of their son, Terrance Shelby. Shortly before trial, the trial judge dismissed the Shelbys for discovery violations, but he allowed Terrance’s brother, Demario Ferguson, to be substituted as the new wrongful-death plaintiff. After being substituted in the action, Ferguson admitted during his deposition that he previously had signed a false affidavit while the trial court was considering appropriate sanctions for the Shelbys’ conduct. The trial judge then dismissed the entire action. Ferguson appealed the dismissal, but finding no reversible error, the Supreme Court affirmed. View "Ferguson v. University of Mississippi Medical Center" on Justia Law

John Doe initiated this action on behalf of his daughter, Jane Doe, after she was sexually assaulted on a Rankin County School District (RCSD) school bus, parked on the campus of Richland High School (RHS). After nineteen months of discovery, the circuit court granted RCSD’s motion for summary judgment against Doe based on governmental immunity under the Mississippi Tort Claims Act (MTCA). Doe moved for reconsideration, arguing RCSD had waived immunity through active participation in the litigation. The circuit court denied the motion. The Court of Appeals (COA) reversed the circuit court’s ruling. Applying the then-applicable, two-part, public-function test, the COA found that RCSD was entitled to discretionary-function immunity because: (1) RCSD’s duty to oversee student conduct and school safety involved an element of choice and/or judgment and (2) RCSD’s actions regarding implementation of school-safety measures and student discipline involved social and economic policy considerations. The COA, however, found that RCSD had waived immunity in this instance by actively participating in the litigation process and unreasonably delaying pursuit of its immunity defense for sixteen months. The Mississippi Supreme Court granted RCSD’s request certiorari review. Based on its recent decision in “Brantley v. City of Horn Lake,” (152 So.3d 1106 (Miss. 2014)), which established a new test for determining the application of discretionary-function immunity, the Supreme Court reversed both the COA’s and the trial court’s decisions and remanded to the trial court for the parties to present evidence in light of the new standard. View "Doe v. Rankin County School District" on Justia Law

Marcia Marie sued her rheumatologist for malpractice. In a “battle of the experts” case, the trial court first denied a motion in limine by Marcia and her husband Donald Marie to exclude entries made by Dr. Dennis Boulware, a consulting physician, in his medical records and then denied the Maries’ Motion for Judgment Notwithstanding the Verdict (JNOV) after a judgment was entered in favor of the rheumatologist, Dr. Heather North and Gulfshore Medical Consultants. Finding that the trial court did not err, the Supreme Court affirmed. View "Marie v. North" on Justia Law

This civil suit was filed by five alumni of Manchester Educational Foundation, Inc., after the dean of students, Richard Darden, admitted to viewing male students while they showered in his home. The five alumni attended Manchester at various times from 1997 until 2003. The trial court granted summary judgment in favor of Manchester, Dr. William Thompson, and The Yazoo City Medical Clinic, P.A., holding that the statute of limitations as to Plaintiffs' alleged claims was not tolled until Plaintiffs learned of Darden's confession to voyeurism, because the five alumni should have known, with due diligence, that they were injured by the activities they engaged in with Darden for several years. Finding that the trial court did not err in awarding summary judgment in favor of these defendants, the Supreme Court affirmed the trial court. View "Raddin v. Manchester Educational Foundation, Inc." on Justia Law

In this premises-liability case, the issue this case presented for the Supreme Court's review centered on whether the trial judge erred in holding, as a matter of law, that the owners and management of an apartment complex where Bobby Batiste murdered his roommate, Andreas Galanis, could not be held liable for failing to warn Galanis about Batiste's violent tendencies. According to the trial judge, a resident concern form describing Batiste's violent intent toward a former roommate "alone is insufficient to create a genuine issue of material fact" as to whether the complex management knew of Batiste's violent nature. When viewed in the light most favorable to the plaintiffs, the Supreme Court concluded this was sufficient to create a genuine issue of material fact. Therefore, the Court held that the trial court erred in granting summary judgment to the apartment complex, reverseed and remanded for trial. View "Galanis v. CMA Management Company" on Justia Law

This case was a latent-injury silicosis case filed against a Florida corporation that was dissolved. The issue this case presented for the Mississippi Supreme Court's review centered on whether the Florida corporate-survival statute applied to a Mississippi plaintiff, or whether the discovery rule for latent injuries permitted claims to be brought against the foreign corporation after dissolution. Sixteen plaintiffs sued Clark Sand Company, Inc. more than four years after the corporation’s dissolution. The circuit court judge sustained Clark Sand’s motion for summary judgment. "At common law, when a corporation dissolved, it no longer existed, and it could not be sued. But because of the harshness of this rule, Florida, like most states, has adopted a corporate-survival statute that allows plaintiffs to bring suit against a Florida corporation for up to four years after dissolution." Finding no error, the Supreme Court affirmed. View "Williams v. Clark Sand Company, Inc." on Justia Law

A wrongful-death beneficiary failed to prosecute this medical-malpractice case for four years, so, on the defendant’s motion, the circuit judge dismissed the complaint. The plaintiff refiled, and the defendant twice moved to dismiss, arguing that the statute of limitations had lapsed. Both motions were denied, and the Mississippi Supreme Court granted interlocutory appeal. Because the statute of limitations was not tolled when cases are dismissed for lack of prosecution, the second complaint was untimely. Accordingly, the Court reversed and remanded for dismissal. View "Thornhill v. Ingram" on Justia Law

Wayne Kelly was killed while working at a construction site in Hattiesburg. His family sued, among other defendants, Hanco Corporation, Inc., the general contractor for the project on which Wayne Kelly had been working at the time he died, and American Air Specialists of Mississippi, Inc., the subcontractor that had leased the services of Kelly and his coworkers from Landrum Professional Employer Services, Inc. The Kellys and Hanco/American Air moved separately for summary judgment. The circuit court denied summary judgment to Hanco and American Air. Hanco filed a petition for interlocutory appeal and the Kellys filed a cross-petition for interlocutory appeal. The Supreme Court granted interlocutory appeal and consolidated the cases. After review, the Court affirmed the denial of summary judgment because Hanco waived its exclusive-remedy affirmative defense despite section 71-3-6 of the Mississippi Workers' Compensation Act provided an exclusive remedy to claimants for on-the-job injuries. View "Hanco Corporation v. Goldman" on Justia Law

This negligence suit arose out of a single-car accident that allegedly occurred due to an improperly performed bridge repair. In 2011, the Logans were traveling south on Highway 49 in Tallahatchie County when they drove over a bridge that recently had undergone repairs. Both lanes were open, and no warning signs were present indicating ongoing repairs or a dangerous condition. Two protruding crisscrossed metal plates caught the undercarriage of their car, causing the car to spin out of control and to come to rest facing south in the northbound lane. According to MDOT, flat metal plates routinely are bolted to bridge decks during structural repairs temporarily to cover fresh concrete while the concrete cures, with the bolt head and steel plate not extending more than two inches above the bridge deck. The Logans alleged that these particular metal plates were not properly attached to the bridge, had bent upward and were projecting dangerously above the road surface. The Logans sued MDOT and the Mississippi Transportation Commission. The defendants moved for summary judgment, asserting immunity under multiple provisions of the Mississippi Tort Claims Act. The trial court granted summary judgment to the defendants, finding that the maintenance of the bridge is a discretionary function under Mississippi Code Section 11-46-9(1)(d) and that the defendants therefore were entitled to immunity. The Court of Appeals reversed the trial court’s grant of summary judgment on the failure-to-maintain claim, and affirmed the grant of summary judgment to the defendants on the failure-to-warn claim. The Supreme Court also affirmed in part and reversed in part, finding that the trial court and Court of Appeals erred in concluding that no disputed fact existed regarding the Logan’s failure-to-warn claim. The judgment was reversed and the case remanded for the trial court to perform a more detailed summary-judgment immunity analysis of the Logan’s failure-to-warn claim. View "Logan v. Miss. Dept. of Transp." on Justia Law

"For more than one hundred and thirty years," the Mississippi Supreme Court has held that an insurance company may void a policy when the insured made material misrepresentations during the application process. While driving his mother’s 2003 Chevy Silverado in Rankin County, sixteen-year-old William Busby crashed into Kenneth Tarlton’s car, which in turn collided with a car driven by Katrice Jones-Smith. When William’s mother, Michelle, applied to Safeway Insurance Company for an insurance policy on the Silverado, the application required her to warrant that she had provided the names of all regular frequent drivers of the covered vehicles, as well as all residents of her household fourteen years old or older. Michelle failed to disclose that fifteen-year-old William resided in her home, and Safeway issued her a policy on the Silverado at a premium that was lower than the premium would have been had Safeway known about William. When Safeway learned that Michelle made a material misrepresentation when she applied for the motor-vehicle-liability policy at issue here, it had the policy declared void. The Supreme Court found no reason to disturb the trial court's grant of summary judgment in this case in favor of Safeway, so it affirmed. View "Jones-Smith v. Safeway Insurance Company" on Justia Law