Justia Mississippi Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

A.A. was electrocuted while playing on the farmland of David and Sherry Melton. Riley Berry, who worked for the Meltons, had parked a cotton picker under an allegedly sagging power line, which was owned by Entergy Mississippi, Inc. Ultimately, A.A. climbed onto the cotton picker, touched the power line, and was electrocuted. At the time of the accident, A.A.'s mother, Mary Bethanne Acey, was en route to Moon Lake, in Coahoma County with her son and Charles Graves. A 911 dispatcher called Graves to inform him of the accident. Graves immediately turned the car around to proceed to the Meltons' home. Acey then spoke with the dispatcher, who explained the gravity of the situation to Acey and informed her that A.A. had been "shocked." Emergency medical responders arrived shortly after Acey's arrival. A.A. suffered severe burns to both of her arms and her hip. A.A. subsequently was airlifted to Le Bonheur Children's Hospital in Memphis, Tennessee, and was later transferred to Shriners Hospitals for Children in Cincinnati, Ohio, which specializes in treating burn patients. Thereafter, Acey commenced legal action on behalf of A.A., and individually, against defendants Entergy, David and Sherry Melton, Melton Farms, Mary Mac, Inc., and Norfleet Investments, LP. Defendants settled all claims on behalf of A.A. Regarding Acey's individual bystander claims for emotional distress, Entergy moved for summary judgment and moved to strike the affidavits of Acey and Dr. William Hickerson. The trial court subsequently denied each motion. According to the trial court, based on the nature of A.A.'s injuries, this case "cries out for the expansion of" the factors provided by the California Supreme Court in "Dillon [v. Legg," 441 P. 2d 912, 920 (Cal. 1968)], adopted by the Mississippi Supreme Court in "Entex, Inc. v. McGuire,"(414 So. 2d 437 (Miss. 1982)). Thereafter, Entergy was granted interlocutory appeal. Because the Mississippi Court found that Entergy's motion for summary judgment should have been granted, the Court reversed and remanded the case for further proceedings. View "Entergy Mississippi, Inc. v. Acey" on Justia Law

Kenyatta Cheeks was entering an AutoZone store when he was struck by a vehicle driven by Jason Johnson. The jury returned a verdict for Cheeks in the amount of $2.5 million, finding that AutoZone was forty-five percent at fault and Johnson was fifty-five percent at fault. Later, the trial court granted AutoZone’s motion for judgment notwithstanding the verdict (JNOV). Cheeks appealed, arguing that granting AutoZone's motion was made in error. Viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to non-movant Cheeks, the jury had credible evidence to determine that an injury was reasonably foreseeable. The Supreme Court therefore reversed the trial court’s grant of JNOV in favor of AutoZone and remand the case to the trial court for further proceedings. View "Cheeks v. AutoZone, Inc." on Justia Law

While walking through the Imperial Palace Casino’s parking garage in the space between the garage wall and the front of the parking spaces Joseph Jones was injured when he tripped over a concrete parking bumper and fell to the concrete floor. Jones filed suit alleging that the parking bumper was misaligned, jutted into the path, and proximately caused both his fall and his injury. The trial judge granted Imperial Palace’s motion for summary judgment. Jones appealed, and the Mississippi Court of Appeals reversed, finding sufficient evidence to create a jury question as to whether Imperial possessed actual as well as constructive knowledge of the dangerous condition, and whether it had failed to conduct reasonable inspections. Imperial appealed, and the Supreme Court reversed, finding plaintiff presented insufficient evidence that the defendant created or knew of a dangerous condition on its premises. The trial court's judgment was reinstated and affirmed. View "Jones v. Imperial Palace of Mississippi, LLC" on Justia Law

Plaintiffs Charles Blackmon and Dexter Booth sued Malaco, Inc.; N.J. Pockets, Inc.; and Callop Hampton (owner of Hamp’s Place Night Club) on a premises-liability claim. Plaintiffs settled with Malaco. At trial, the jury returned a verdict in favor of Hampton. Hampton filed a post-trial motion, requesting the trial court to impose sanctions against Blackmon, Booth, and their attorney, Joe Tatum, for filing a frivolous lawsuit and to award attorney fees. The motion was denied, and Hampton appealed that judgment to this Court. Finding no reversible error, the Supreme Court affirmed. View "Hampton v. Blackmon" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court granted review of this personal-injury negligence action to clarify state law on the doctrine of claim-splitting. After new defendants were identified during discovery on her original complaint, Plaintiff Jeanette Carpenter filed a motion to amend her complaint to include the newly discovered defendants. A hearing could not be scheduled in time for the trial court to approve the amendment before the expiration of the three-year statute of limitations. In an effort to avoid losing the opportunity to bring the new defendants into the litigation, Carpenter filed a second action before the statute of limitations ran, based on the exact same set of facts, in the same court, and naming the same new defendants named in the motion to amend. The trial court dismissed both cases. The cases were consolidated for purpose of appeal. After review, the Supreme Court held that Carpenter’s procedural actions constituted impermissible claim-splitting as outlined in "Wilner v. White," (929 So. 2d 315 (Miss. 2006)). The Court reversed the Court of Appeals and affirmed the judgments of the Circuit Court. View "Carpenter v. Kenneth Thompson Builder, Inc." on Justia Law

Hattie Hawkins was a nursing assistant at Heritage House Nursing Center. Deserie Edwards, a resident at Heritage House, suffered injuries while under Hawkins’s care. An investigation revealed that Hawkins had lifted Edwards by herself, knowing that two people were required to lift Edwards. Hawkins then improperly placed Edwards into a lift/sling and left her unattended. Edwards fell from the sling and suffered injuries, but Hawkins did not call for assistance. Hawkins was indicted for simple assault of a vulnerable person. Several days before trial, defense counsel demurred to the indictment on the grounds that it did not comport with Mississippi Code Section 97-3-7(1) and was an improper statement of the law. The circuit court dismissed the case saying the indictment failed to state a cause of action against the defendant. The State filed a motion to reconsider, which was denied. The State appealed. Upon review, the Supreme Court held the indictment was sufficient and that the trial judge erred by granting the demurrer. View "State of Mississippi v. Hattie Hawkins a/k/a Hattie M. Hawkins" on Justia Law

David Ashmore and his wife Debra sued for injuries they alleged resulted from a motor-vehicle accident with a vehicle driven by an employee of the Mississippi Authority on Educational Television. David sought damages for personal injuries that he allegedly suffered to his right and left knees, back, neck, and upper arms. Debra sought damages for loss of David’s services, companionship, and consortium; rendering of nursing care and services to David; emotional distress; and loss of enjoyment of life. The trial court dismissed the Ashmores’ claims with prejudice for willful discovery violations. Finding no abuse of discretion, the Supreme Court affirmed. View "Ashmore v. Mississippi Authority on Educational Television" on Justia Law

In June 2011, fourteen-year-old Jean-ah Leon was seriously injured while operating a Bad Boy Buggy ( an off-road vehicle used for outdoor recreation). A year later, Jean-ah’s parents, Vincent and Mandi Leon, filed a products liability and personal injury lawsuit in Louisiana against the owner of the Bad Boy Buggy, a Louisiana resident. They also named the owner’s insurer, the Textron Parties, and several other entities and individuals. Within a few days, the Leons dismissed all parties except the vehicle owner and his insurer from the Louisiana case. The Leons filed suit in Adams County, Mississippi, against the Textron Parties and the others previously named in the Louisiana suit, seeking damages of “an amount not yet determined” but greater than $10,000,000. The Leons served that complaint and summonses on the Textron Parties through their registered agents in Mississippi. They amended their complaint, adding claims for gross negligence and punitive damages. The Leons did not issue new summonses to the Textron Parties with the amended complaint; instead, they sent copies to the Textron Parties’ headquarters by certified mail with accompanying letters addressed “To Whom it May Concern.” The Textron Parties’ attorney in the Louisiana case also requested and received a copy of the amended complaint by email. The Textron Parties’ answer was due thirty days after they were served with the original complaint. They did not file an answer to the original complaint or the amended complaint. The Leons then sought a default judgment against the Textron Parties based on the amended complaint. An entry of default and default judgment were entered the same day. The issue this case presented for the Mississippi Supreme Court's review arose from that default judgment: the Textron Parties claimed that the default judgment was void and should have been set aside because they did not receive proper service of the amended complaint, they were not given notice of the default judgment, and the plaintiffs failed to state a claim against them. Additionally, the Textron Parties asserted that a three-pronged balancing test for relief from default judgments required that it be set aside because they had a colorable defense and the plaintiffs would not be prejudiced. The Supreme Court held that the default judgment was not void, but it should have been set aside under the three-pronged test. View "BB Buggies, Inc. v. Leon" on Justia Law

Machon Lyons suffered severe injuries as the result of an automobile accident. The accident occurred when a vehicle operated by Roderick Holliday left the road and collided with a tree. As a result, Lyons obtained a default judgment of $72,500 against Holliday. Holliday's mother, Daisy Lang, insured the vehicle through Direct General Insurance Company of Mississippi. Lang's policy included a provision specifically excluding Holliday from any coverage under the policy. Accordingly, Direct denied coverage for the judgment. Lyons sought a declaratory judgment, asking the Circuit Court to hold that Lang's policy covered the judgment against Holliday. Lyons acknowledged the policy exclusion, but argued that Lang's policy covered the judgment against Holliday because Mississippi law required minimum-liability coverage for all permissive drivers, and because Lang's insurance card failed to mention any permissive-driver exclusions. The circuit court granted summary judgment in favor of Direct, finding that the policy clearly and specifically excluded coverage of Holliday. The Court of Appeals reversed, finding that 63-15-4(2)(a) required liability insurance for all vehicles operated in Mississippi and that Mississippi Code Section 63-15-43 required that the liability insurance policy "pay on behalf of the named insured and any other person, as insured, using any such motor vehicle or motor vehicles with the express or implied permission of such named insured." Although the Court of Appeals reached the right result, it cited as its authority the incorrect statute, so the Supreme Court granted certiorari. The Court concluded the policy exclusion violated Mississippi law: even though Holliday was an excluded driver under the Direct General policy issued to Daisy Lang, the exclusion did not operate to eliminate liability coverage in the minimum amounts required by statute. The trial court's grant of summary judgment was reversed and the case remanded for further proceedings. View "Lyons v. Direct General Insurance Company of Mississippi " on Justia Law

In 2007, Plaintiff Chris Snopek proposed working on the concept of a multi-use sports complex to be built on land in Madison. The parties collaborated over the designs and plans for the complex, and entered into a letter of intent. The letter of intent expired, but Snopek alleged that the parties continued to move forward with the project. Years later, Snopek contacted D1 TN, a Tennessee company, with regard to working on the project. Snopek introduced D1 TN to St. Dominic. In late 2011, D1 TN published its collaboration with D1 TN in the building of the facility in Madison, with no mention of Snopek (or his companies, Joshua Properties, LLC and Performance Sports Academy, LLC). Snopek filed suit against St. Dominic, D1 TN, alleging breach of fiduciary duties, misappropriation of trade secrets, tortious interference with prospective advantage, unfair competition, civil conspiracy and usurpation of business opportunity. On interlocutory appeal to the Supreme Court, Snopek argued the trial court erred in dismissing D1 TN for lack of personal jurisdiction. Finding that personal jurisdiction existed over D1 TN, the Supreme Court reversed the trial court’s order. View "Joshua Properties, LLC v. D1 Sports Holdings, LLC" on Justia Law