Justia Mississippi Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

Articles Posted in Injury Law
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The Workers' Compensation Commission dismissed applicant Matthew Ladner's petition to controvert and motion for payment of benefits because it found the statute of limitations had expired. Ladner appealed that decision to the Supreme Court. Upon review, the Supreme Court reversed the Commission's decision. View "Ladner v. Zachry Construction" on Justia Law

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Plaintiffs Bre’Annah Banks, Ladarius Harp, Kimberly Norris, Zerlanzeia Lambouths, and Lakedrick Reed filed suit against the Sherwin-Williams Company claiming products liability and negligence. After both sides elicited evidence from lay and expert witnesses supporting their arguments, the trial court entered an order granting summary judgment for Sherwin-Williams based on the plaintiffs’ failure to establish product identification, an essential element of their claim. Upon review of the matter, the Supreme Court held that, under the applicable standard for the consideration of summary judgment, the plaintiffs presented enough evidence to create an issue of material fact as to whether the paint in question came from Sherwin-Williams. Accordingly, the judgment was reversed and the case remanded for further proceedings. View "Banks v. Sherwin-Williams Company" on Justia Law

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Narjess Ghane, the mother of a deceased member of the Navy’s Sea, Air, and Land Force (SEAL) Team Five, brought a wrongful death action against a private military contractor. Along with other members of SEAL Team Five, SO2 Sharpoor Alexander (Alex) Ghane Jr. was engaged in a live-fire, close-quarters combat training exercise at Mid-South Institute of Self Defense when a bullet allegedly penetrated a ballistic wall, striking SO2 Ghane above his protective vest and killing him. Mid-South successfully moved for summary judgment on the ground that Mrs. Ghane’s claim would require the trial court to question military policy and operational decisions, thus raising a nonjusticiable political question. The defendants had previously unsuccessfully moved for summary judgment on the ground that SO2 Ghane had signed a valid waiver of liability. Upon review of the matter, the Supreme Court reversed the trial court’s grant of summary judgment pertaining to the political question doctrine, but affirmed the trial court’s previous denial of summary judgment regarding to the liability waiver. The Court determined defendants failed to demonstrate that adjudication of this claim would require reexamination of matters inextricable from military policy and operational decisions. View "Ghane v. Mid-South Institute of Self Defense Shooting, Inc." on Justia Law

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In a medical malpractice case, the defendant alleged the plaintiff’s discovery response concerning his expert was insufficient. The trial judge ordered the plaintiff to produce the expert for a deposition but, due to illness, the expert was unable to attend the scheduled deposition. Without addressing whether the plaintiff was at fault for failure to comply with the court’s order to produce the expert for deposition, the trial court ordered that the expert would not be allowed to testify. The Mississippi Court of Appeals affirmed. Upon review, the Supreme Court reversed and remanded for a hearing on that issue. View "Boyd v. Nunez" on Justia Law

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Petitioner Stephen Johnson was arrested and convicted for driving on a suspended license (in the third degree). His license had been suspended for failing to pay a traffic fine. Johnson appealed his DWLS 3rd conviction, arguing: (1) the former RCW 46.20.342(1)(c)(iv) (2008) did not proscribe his continuing to drive after the suspension of his license for failing to pay a traffic fine; or alternatively, (2) that because he was indigent, the suspension was invalid under the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution's due process and equal protection clauses, which required the State to inquire into his ability to pay the fine before suspending his license. Furthermore, Johnson argued the trial court erred by denying him counsel to fight these charges, and wanted reimbursement for attorney fees spent in his defense. The Supreme Court rejected Johnson's arguments on appeal, but remanded the case for further proceedings to determine Johnson's right to reimbursement for attorney fees. The plain meaning of former RCW 46.20.342(1 )( c )(iv) allows the State to convict a driver for DWLS 3rd where the underlying license suspension occurred for failure to pay a fine. Johnson was not constitutionally indigent, but statutorily so; on remand, the Supreme Court instructed the district court to enter an order designating Johnson either as (1) indigent or (2) indigent and able to contribute. If Johnson is able to contribute, the district court would have to enter an order determining the costs he should bear for his appeal. View "Cade v. Beard" on Justia Law

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Helen Schroeder was a passenger in an automobile driven by her husband Harry, when a log truck collided with the rear of the automobile. Harry was killed, and Helen was severely injured. A consequence of the accident was that Helen suffered diminished mental capacity. In a federal lawsuit, Helen claimed the truck driver was at fault and denied that Harry was negligent. After the federal judge denied the defendant’s motion for summary judgment, Helen settled the federal suit. Helen then sued Harry’s estate in state court, claiming Harry was partially at fault. The circuit court granted summary judgment to the estate on judicial estoppel grounds. But, because the federal judge stated his denial of summary judgment was based on his finding of genuine issues of material fact as to the truck driver’s negligence, not “Harry Schroeder’s potential contributory negligence,” the Supreme Court reversed. View "Clark v. Neese" on Justia Law

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In 2007, fifteen-year-old Alexandria Miller and sixteen-year-old Kelly Garvin were traveling on a two-lane road when their vehicle collided with two horses that had escaped from a nearby property and were standing in the middle of the road. Garvin sued Miller alleging negligent operation of the vehicle. Garvin asserted claims of negligent entrustment against Miller’s mother and stepfather, Melanie and V. M. Cleveland, and Tupelo Furniture Market, Inc. (TFM), and a claim of negligent training/instruction against V. M. Cleveland. Garvin further asserted that Melanie and V. M. Cleveland were liable for Miller’s negligence because they had signed Miller’s driver’s license application. The circuit court granted summary judgment on the claims of negligent entrustment and negligent training/instruction in favor of the Clevelands and TFM. Garvin appealed. Upon review, the Supreme Court concluded the trial court properly granted summary judgment and accordingly affirmed that court's judgment. View "Guardianship of Kelly Garvin v. Tupelo Furniture Market, Inc." on Justia Law

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In 2005, Edward Miles drove his pickup truck into an intersection in front of Virgil Burcham’s eighteen-wheel fuel truck. Miles died several hours following the accident. Virgil Burcham sued Edward Miles’s estate for negligence and negligence per se. Burcham received a $60,000 judgment, which the Miles estate appealed. Finding no reversible error, the Supreme Court affirmed the judgment as to liability, subject to remittitur. View "Estate of Edward Miles v. Burcham" on Justia Law

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Larry Smith worked on various drilling rigs from the mid-1960s until the early 1990s. A heavy smoker, Larry smoked roughly two to three packs a day from at least the mid-1950s through at least 1986. He was diagnosed with lung cancer in August 2002 and died three months later. This case arose from a jury verdict that awarded his widow Elsie Smith and other wrongful death beneficiaries monetary damages for Larry's death. Elsie claimed that her husband’s proximity to working with these products led to his lung cancer because the drilling additives contained asbestos. After a jury verdict in favor of the beneficiaries, the defendant corporations filed a joint motion for a judgment notwithstanding the verdict (JNOV), which was granted by the trial judge. The beneficiaries appealed the grant of JNOV. Upon review, the Supreme Court concluded that the trial court erred when it granted JNOV by applying the the beneficiaries’ proof to the frequency, regularity, and proximity test rather than to the elements of the their negligent design claim sounding in products liability. Accordingly, the Court reversed and remanded. View "Smith v. Union Carbide Corporation" on Justia Law

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Sherry Walker was denied disability benefits by the Public Employees’ Retirement System (PERS). The Circuit Court reversed PERS’s decision. The Court of Appeals reversed the circuit court, reinstating PERS’ denial of benefits. Upon review of the matter, the Supreme Court concluded PERS’ decision to deny Walker’s request for regular disability benefits was unsupported by substantial evidence. Accordingly, the Court reversed part of the appellate court's decision and reversed the Circuit Court's decision, and remanded the case with instructions to enter judgment in Walker’s favor on her regular disability benefits claim. View "Public Employees' Retirement System v. Walker" on Justia Law