Justia Mississippi Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

William Greenwood owned Antique Wood Company of Mississippi (Greenwood), which was in the business of buying salvage rights to old buildings for the purpose of stripping and selling the buildings’ lumber, bricks, and other materials. After a lawsuit was filed against Greenwood, Greenwood’s insurers, located in Rankin County and Grenada County, denied indemnity coverage. Greenwood sued the insurers in the Circuit Court of Hinds County, alleging breach of contract, conspiracy, and bad faith. Following a grant of a motion for change of venue to the defendants, Greenwood filed the instant petition for interlocutory appeal, which the Supreme Court granted. Greenwood asserted that venue was proper in Warren County. The Supreme Court agreed and reversed the judgment of the Circuit Court. The case was remanded for transfer to the Circuit Court of Warren County. View "Greenwood v. MESA Underwriters Specialty Ins. Co." on Justia Law

The State of Mississippi brought a civil action against generic pharmaceutical provider Sandoz, Inc., alleging that Sandoz impermissibly exploited Mississippi’s Medicaid reimbursement program by routinely and exponentially reporting fictitious “Average Wholesale Prices,” a key data factor in the federally supervised formula used by the Mississippi Division of Medicaid to reimburse pharmacies serviced by Sandoz. The trial court, sitting as fact-finder, found Sandoz in violation of the Mississippi Consumer Protection Act and liable for common-law fraud. Sandoz appealed, and the State cross-appealed. On a deferential standard of review, the Supreme Court affirmed the trial court in full. View "Sandoz, Inc. v. Mississippi" on Justia Law

"For more than one hundred and thirty years," the Mississippi Supreme Court has held that an insurance company may void a policy when the insured made material misrepresentations during the application process. While driving his mother’s 2003 Chevy Silverado in Rankin County, sixteen-year-old William Busby crashed into Kenneth Tarlton’s car, which in turn collided with a car driven by Katrice Jones-Smith. When William’s mother, Michelle, applied to Safeway Insurance Company for an insurance policy on the Silverado, the application required her to warrant that she had provided the names of all regular frequent drivers of the covered vehicles, as well as all residents of her household fourteen years old or older. Michelle failed to disclose that fifteen-year-old William resided in her home, and Safeway issued her a policy on the Silverado at a premium that was lower than the premium would have been had Safeway known about William. When Safeway learned that Michelle made a material misrepresentation when she applied for the motor-vehicle-liability policy at issue here, it had the policy declared void. The Supreme Court found no reason to disturb the trial court's grant of summary judgment in this case in favor of Safeway, so it affirmed. View "Jones-Smith v. Safeway Insurance Company" on Justia Law

Ray Dillard attempted to collect workers' compensation benefits from the president and majority shareholder of his employer. In 1997, The Commission held that Dillard suffered a compensable injury. After the mandate issues, one of Dillard's attorneys filed a lis pendens notice regarding several parcels of real property the company's president owned. Because none of that property belonged to the company itself, Dillard's attorney informed the president that it was asking the Commission to hold the president personally liable for Dillard's benefits because the company failed to carry workers' compensation insurance. Dillard died in 2005 while unresolved issues regarding who would ultimately be responsible for Dillard's benefits was pending before an administrative law judge. Dillard's estate filed a complaint at the circuit court against the president and company, claiming that the company was required to carry workers' compensation insurance but failed to do so. Therefore, the Estate argued the president was personally liable for Dillard's benefits. Among other things, the president argued that the Estate's claim was barred by the statute of limitations and the doctrine of res judicata. Eventually, the administrative law judge granted the Estate's renewed motion for summary judgment, and entered a judgment of approximately $223,000 against the president and the company "jointly and individually." The president appealed, and the case was assigned to the Court of Appeals. The appellate court held that Dillard's claim against the company president was barred by res judicata and the statute of limitations. The Supreme Court held the Court of Appeals erred in reaching that conclusion, reversed and reinstated the trial court's judgment in favor of Dillard. View "Jarrett v. Dillard" on Justia Law

Milton Harper, the managing partner and president of Banks, Finley, White & Company of Mississippi (“Banks”), suffered a severe stroke in August 2000, and died of another stroke in July 2001. His dependents sued Banks for workers’ compensation benefits. The administrative law judge and the Workers’ Compensation Commission held that Harper’s injuries and death arose out of the scope and course of his employment at Banks. On appeal, the circuit court agreed that substantial evidence in the record supported the Commission’s conclusion that Harper’s stroke arose out of his employment, but that court held that Harper’s dependents were barred from recovering workers’ compensation benefits because Harper had failed to obtain workers’ compensation insurance for Banks. In turn, the Court of Appeals in "Harper v. Banks, Finley, White & Co. of Mississippi," (136 So. 3d 462 (Miss. Ct. App. 2014)), held that Harper’s dependents were not barred from recovery because Section 71-3-79 of the Mississippi Code allowed members of partnerships to exempt themselves from workers’ compensation coverage by giving notice in writing. Because Harper had not opted out of coverage in writing, the Court of Appeals held that Banks was required to provide workers’ compensation benefits to Harper’s beneficiaries. On writ of certiorari, the Supreme Court affirmed in part, and reversed in part. The Court held that the Court of Appeals erred in applying Section 71-3-79 of the Mississippi Code to the facts of this case. Because Banks did not have workers’ compensation insurance coverage, there was no coverage for Harper to opt out of in writing as contemplated by Section 71-3-79. Instead, the Court held that Section 71-3-52 of the Mississippi Code controlled the analysis of this case: because Banks had more than five employees, it was required to obtain workers’ compensation insurance and provide workers’ compensation benefits to its employees. The Court affirmed the Workers’ Compensation Commission’s finding that Harper suffered a fatal injury through the course of his employment at Banks was supported by substantial evidence. View "Harper v. Banks, Finley, White & Co. of Mississippi, P.C." on Justia Law

More than three years after learning his insurance policy had expired and his agent had not procured a replacement, Joe Tally sued his insurance agent, Ronald McMorris, claiming he “breached a standard of care recognized in the State of Mississippi to the insured for not notifying [him] of the cancellation of [his insurance] policy.” Because Tally failed to bring his claims within the three-year statute of limitations, his claims were time-barred. The Supreme Court therefore reversed the circuit court’s denial of McMorris’s motion for summary judgment and rendered judgment in his favor. View "McMorris v. Tally" on Justia Law

An action was initiated by certain former members and the board of Mississippi Comp Choice Self-Insurers Fund. Comp Choice was a workers’ compensation group self-insurer operating under a certificate of authority granted by the Mississippi Workers’ Compensation Commission. Defendant Mississippi Workers’ Compensation Group Self-Insurer Guaranty Association (“GGA”) ordered a review of Comp Choice. Based on information revealed in the review, the Commission required Comp Choice to execute a Memorandum of Understanding outlining a plan to “strengthen the financial and operational aspects of the [Comp Choice] Fund under the control and guidance of the Commission.” Six months later, the Commission decided not to approve Comp Choice for future operation. Comp Choice voluntarily surrendered its certificate of authority to operate as a group self-insurer in January 2009. GGA stepped into the shoes of Comp Choice to protect claimants. Comp Choice a complaint against GGA, alleging, inter alia, gross negligence, breach of fiduciary duty, bad faith, conversion, and a demand for an accounting. GGA filed a motion to dismiss and claimed immunity under the Mississippi Tort Claims Act (MTCA) and the Mississippi Workers’ Compensation Self-Insurer Guaranty Association Law. The trial court granted the motion, finding that GGA was “covered” by the MTCA, sub silentio ruling that Plaintiffs could not pursue a “cause of action” as referenced in Mississippi Code Section 71-3-179. The trial court held that only the MTCA applied to suits against the Mississippi Workers’ Compensation Group Self Insurer Guaranty Association. The trial court dismissed all other claims, granting leave to amend the complaint for an MTCA action only. Comp argued on appeal to the Supreme Court: (1) the trial court erred in granting defendant's motion to dismiss based on whether GGA as an unincorporated legal entity, was covered by the Mississippi Tort Claims Act, and therefore, entitled to its various protections, immunities and exceptions pursuant to Miss. Code Ann. 11-46-7; and (2) the trial court erred in dismissing based on the determination that GGA as an unincorporated legal entity, was covered by the Mississippi Tort Claims Act, even where the immunity created in GGA in Miss. Code Ann. 71-3-179 abrogated the immunity afforded under the Mississippi Tort Claims Act in Miss. Code Ann. In the case sub judice, the Supreme Court determined that facts were still undeveloped, precluding the trial court and itself from determining whether Plaintiff’s claims, as alleged in its complaint, could be pursued only under the MTCA, as ordered by the trial court, and Plaintiff could not pursue a cause of action as contemplated by Section 71-3-151, et seq, or otherwise. "Absent factual development, no court at this stage of the proceedings could accurately discern whether GGA is an instrumentality of the Commission, vel non, as argued by GGA." View "The Former Board of Trustees and Members of Mississippi Comp Choice Self-Insurers Fund v. Mississippi Workers' Compensation Group Self-Insurer Guaranty Association" on Justia Law

The plaintiff in this automobile-accident lawsuit sued her underinsured-motorist insurance carrier. Even though the UM carrier admitted liability and agreed to pay any damages awarded at trial that exceeded available liability coverage, plaintiff insisted on informing the jury of the insurance company’s status as a defendant. The trial judge refused to allow it. Finding no reversible error, the Supreme Court affirmed. View "Heflin v. Merrill" on Justia Law

The Circuit Court granted summary judgment in favor of Columbia Casualty Company and Continental Casualty Company, finding there was no wrongdoing in denying coverage to four former insureds (Ex-Agents) and Minnesota Mutual Life Insurance Company. The trial court also denied the Ex-Agents’ and Minnesota Life’s motion to strike certain affidavits and exhibits submitted by Columbia in support of its motions for summary judgment and in defense of the Ex-Agents’ and Minnesota Life’s summary judgment motions. The dispute arose over the Agents' purchase of Errors & Omissions insurance coverage. The Agents sold Minnesota Life insurance products, and found that one of their colleagues was embezzling funds from their agency. The Mississippi Secretary of State’s office began investigating the records of the Agency and, from that investigation, determined that an agent had misappropriated client funds. Cases were filed against the agent, the Agency, Minnesota Life, and the Ex-Agents. Each complaint alleged that the wrongful acts occurred while the Ex-Agents were employed by Minnesota Life. Each complaint alleged causes of action for breach of fiduciary duty, misrepresentation and concealment, breach of implied covenant of good faith, continuing breach of contract, negligence, negligent infliction of mental and emotional distress, misrepresentation, and malpractice. As to Minnesota Life, each complaint specifically alleged that Minnesota Life participated in and/or had knowledge of the intentional taking of monies. As to the Ex-Agents, the complaints specifically alleged that they should have known that Minnesota Life and/or the colleague were misappropriating funds. The agents and Minnesota Life made a claim on their E&O insurance policy to defend the suit. Upon review, the Supreme Court found that the trial court properly denied the motion to strike and properly granted summary judgment in favor of Columbia as to Minnesota Life’s claim but erred in granting summary judgment as to the Ex-Agents’ claims. Therefore, the Court affirmed in part and reversed in part and remanded. View "Minnesota Life Insurance Company v. Columbia Casualty Company" on Justia Law

When Monsanto Company sued Mitchell Scruggs and his various agricultural entities for patent infringement in federal court, Scruggs made a demand on his commercial general liability insurer, Farmland Mutual Insurance Company. Farmland denied coverage based on Scruggs's alleged intentional conduct. Scruggs then sued Farmland, Greg Bost (the insurance agent), and Nowell Insurance Agency in state court. The circuit court ultimately granted summary judgment for Bost and Nowell. Scruggs appealed to the Mississippi Supreme Court, arguing, among other things, that Bost and Nowell negligently failed to advise him that he needed to purchase patent infringement insurance. Because the Supreme Court found Scruggs's conduct was uninsurable as a matter of law, it affirmed. View "Scruggs v. Bost" on Justia Law