Justia Mississippi Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

Sherry Walker was denied disability benefits by the Public Employees’ Retirement System (PERS). The Circuit Court reversed PERS’s decision. The Court of Appeals reversed the circuit court, reinstating PERS’ denial of benefits. Upon review of the matter, the Supreme Court concluded PERS’ decision to deny Walker’s request for regular disability benefits was unsupported by substantial evidence. Accordingly, the Court reversed part of the appellate court's decision and reversed the Circuit Court's decision, and remanded the case with instructions to enter judgment in Walker’s favor on her regular disability benefits claim. View "Public Employees' Retirement System v. Walker" on Justia Law

The issue before the Supreme Court in this case arose from an alleged breach of contract and bad-faith denial of Dr. Jack and Margaret Hoover’s homeowner’s insurance claim against United Services Automobile Association (USAA) following Hurricane Katrina. The trial judge granted USAA’s motion for directed verdict as to the Hoovers’ claims for: (1) the unpaid portion of losses; (2) mental anguish and emotional distress; and (3) punitive damages. The trial court further determined that there were issues of fact for the jury as to whether the Hoovers’ roof structure was damaged, and as to the Hoovers’ claim for additional living expenses. The jury found for the Hoovers and granted compensatory damages. The Hoovers appealed and USAA cross-appealed. After its review of the record, the Supreme Court found that trial court applied an incorrect legal standard and improperly shifted a burden of proof to the Hoovers. Therefore the Court reversed the directed verdict as to the unpaid damages, and remanded the case for a jury to determine whether USAA proved by a preponderance of the evidence that the unpaid loss was caused by an excluded storm surge. The trial court did not err, however, in directing a verdict for USAA as to the Hoovers’ claims for mental anguish, emotional distress, and punitive damages. View "Hoover v. United Services Automobile Association" on Justia Law

Sweet Valley Missionary Baptist Church filed a complaint against its insurance carrier, Alfa Insurance Corporation. Based on Sweet Valley’s failure to cooperate in discovery, the trial court entered an order of dismissal. Sweet Valley then filed a motion to set aside judgment, or, in the alternative, a motion for new trial. The trial court denied the motion, and, in response, Sweet Valley filed a second complaint against Alfa the same day. The trial court dismissed the second claim based on the expiration of the statute of limitations. Sweet Valley appealed. On rehearing, the Court of Appeals reversed the trial court’s judgment and remanded for further proceedings. Alfa filed a petition for writ of certiorari, and the Supreme Court granted it. Upon review, the Supreme Court held that a motion filed pursuant to Mississippi Rule of Civil Procedure 59(e) tolls the applicable statute of limitations, and it reversed the decision of the trial court. View "Sweet Valley Missionary Baptist Church v. Alfa Insurance Corporation" on Justia Law

In an interlocutory appeal from the trial court's denial of defendant Vaughn Bowden, PA's motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim upon which relief could be granted. Plaintiffs Cherie Blackmore and Diane Young sued their former employer, Vaughn Bowden, regarding the presence of toxic mold in two of the firm's offices in which they worked. They also argued they were exposed to sewer gas and a natural gas leak. Plaintiffs also sued Lowry Development and its owner who owned a second building in which Blackmore and Young claimed they were injured. Upon review, the Supreme Court concluded that plaintiffs failed to allege any facts by defendants' which rose to the level of intent that would remove their claims from the exclusivity of the Mississippi Workers' Compensation Act. Plaintiffs' only avenue for relief against the firm was in workers' compensation. Accordingly, the Supreme Court affirmed the trial court in dismissing plaintiffs' complaint. View "Vaughn & Bowden, PA v. Young" on Justia Law

Defendants Pam Wood, David Wood, Justin Wood, Josh Wood and Jacob Wood filed an interlocutory appeal for the Supreme Court to determine whether the circuit court abused its discretion in denying their motion to transfer this case to another county. The underlying case involved a car accident in which a question arose over who was covered by an insurance policy. Defendant Pam Wood applied for the coverage in Covington County; the application was faxed from an insurance agent's office in Covington to Plaintiff Safeway Insurance Company's Rankin County office where it was approved. Safeway opposed the transfer of venue. Upon review, the Supreme Court concluded that Safeway could not demonstrate sufficient facts to support that venue was proper in Rankin County. Therefore the Court reversed the circuit court's order and remanded the case with instructions to transfer it to a permissible venue. View "Wood v. Safeway Insurance Co." on Justia Law

Plaintiff Charles Honeycutt was injured in an automobile accident involving a Mississippi state trooper. He sued the state trooper and two automobile-insurance providers, Atlanta Casualty Company and American Premier Insurance Company. The trial court granted the defendants' motions for summary judgment. On appeal, the Court of Appeals affirmed the trial court's grant of summary judgment. Plaintiff filed a writ of certiorari, seeking to appeal the grant of summary judgment for American Premier: (1) whether the trial court and the Court of Appeals erred by finding an insurance agent does not have a duty to explain uninsured-motorist coverage; (2) whether summary judgment was granted improperly. The Supreme Court found that, in order to obtain a knowing and voluntary waiver of uninsured-motorist coverage (UM coverage), an insurance agent does have a duty to explain UM coverage to the insured. The Court also found that summary judgment was not proper in this case. Thus, the Court reversed both lower courts' judgments and remanded the case back to the trial court for further proceedings. View "Honeycutt v. Coleman" on Justia Law

After an administrative judge (AJ) ruled on a claimant's petition to controvert a workers' compensation claim, the claimant had twenty days to file a notice of appeal with the full Mississippi Workers' Compensation Commission. In this case, the issue before the Supreme Court was whether an AJ's order, handed down more than twenty days after the AJ's ruling and granting a claimant thirty additional days in which to prosecute her claim, should be given legal effect by the Commission so that the claimant's notice of appeal, filed within the additional thirty days, would be considered timely. Upon review, the Court found that, under the facts and circumstances presented, such an appeal was timely. View "Felter v. Floorserv, Inc." on Justia Law

The issue before the Supreme Court in this case concerned the proper procedure by which a workers' compensation insurer may enforce a subrogation claim arising under Mississippi Code Section 71-3-71. Richard Shoemake was injured in Alabama but received workers' compensation benefits from Liberty Mutual Insurance Company under Mississippi law. He brought and settled a third-party action in Alabama state court and reimbursed Liberty Mutual only the amount it was entitled to under Alabama law. Liberty Mutual, which knew of but did not join or intervene in the Alabama lawsuit, then sued Shoemake in the Circuit Court of Newton County, seeking full reimbursement as allowed under Section 71-3-71. In granting Shoemake summary judgment, the circuit court held that Alabama law applied and further concluded that res judicata and Liberty Mutual's failure to intervene in the Alabama action barred Liberty Mutual's claim. The Court of Appeals reversed, holding that Mississippi law governed the amount of Liberty Mutual's subrogation claim and that Liberty Mutual was not required to intervene in the Alabama action to become entitled to reimbursement under Mississippi law. Because the Mississippi Supreme Court found that 71-3-71 requires a workers' compensation insurer to join or intervene in a third-party action to become entitled to reimbursement, it reversed the Court of Appeals and affirmed the circuit court. View "Liberty Mutual Insurance Company v. Shoemake" on Justia Law

KCC, Inc., d/b/a Vital Care of Meridian (Vital Care) filed a complaint against the Mississippi State and School Employees' Life and Health Plan ("the Plan") and the Plan’s pharmacy benefits manager, Catalyst Rx, alleging that the Plan and Catalyst had violated Mississippi Code Section 83-9-6 by designating Walgreens Pharmacy as the sole provider of specialty pharmacy services. Later, Vital Care moved for partial summary judgment on the question of whether Section 83-9-6 applied to the Plan. The Chancery Court granted Vital Care’s motion for partial summary judgment, and the Plan and Catalyst appealed. Upon review of the applicable statute, the Supreme Court found that Section 83-9-6 applied to the Plan because it applies to "all health benefit plans providing pharmaceutical services benefits, including prescription drugs, to any resident of Mississippi" and was not ambiguous. View "Mississippi State & School Employees' Life and Health Plan v. KCC, Inc." on Justia Law

The insureds in this case filed suit against their insurers claiming they were unaware their insurance policy had a $250,000 per-claim deductible and alleging that the insurer breached its insurance contract by refusing to provide a defense until the they paid the $250,000 deductible for each of five separate claims. The circuit court granted summary judgment for the insurers and the insureds appealed. Upon review of the circuit court record, the Supreme Court affirmed the circuit court’s grant of summary judgment. View "Southern Healthcare Services, Inc. v. Lloyd's of London" on Justia Law