Justia Mississippi Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

This appeal by Dorothy Knight arose from a 2011 circuit court order. In it, the circuit court affirmed an administrative decision by the Public Employees Retirement System (PERS) denying disability benefits. Upon review, a majority of the Supreme Court concluded that Knight met her burden, and that PERS' decision to deny her claim was not supported by substantial evidence. Accordingly, the Court reversed the appellate and circuit courts' rulings and remanded the case for further proceedings. View "Knight v. Public Employees' Retirement System of Mississippi" on Justia Law

After Mississippi Farm Bureau Casualty Insurance Co. (Farm Bureau) delayed payment of Robert Fulton's uninsured-motorist benefits, Fulton sued. The jury found Farm Bureau negligent for failing to timely investigate and pay Fulton's claim, awarding Fulton $10,000 in extracontractual damages. The jury did not find that Farm Bureau acted grossly negligent, reckless, or in bad faith and awarded no punitive damages. Following the jury's verdict, Fulton filed a post-judgment motion to amend, seeking $120,773 in attorney’s fees and expenses. The circuit court denied the motion, analyzing it under Mississippi Rule of Civil Procedure 59(e) and finding that Fulton had not shown reason to amend. Fulton appealed the denial of his motion, arguing that attorney's fees were collateral to the final judgment and outside the scope of Rule 59(e). The Court of Appeals agreed and reversed the circuit court, holding that the court at least should have considered awarding them. Upon review, the Supreme Court found that the Court of Appeals erred in classifying attorney’s fees as "collateral." Fulton had no post-judgment right to attorney's fees because the jury did not award punitive damages, and neither a statutory nor a contractual provision authorizes such fees. The circuit court, by properly applying a Rule 59(e) analysis, did not abuse its discretion in denying Fulton’s motion. Therefore, the Court reversed the Court of Appeals and reinstated and affirmed the circuit court's decision. View "Fulton v. Mississippi Farm Bureau Casualty Ins. Co. " on Justia Law

In July 2001, Kaye Hankins entered into a home-construction contract with Elite Homes, Inc. ("Elite"). An August 2001 soil-test report on the subject property recommended that "a stabilizing blanket of natural silty clays . . . and/or compacted fill soils having a maximum 7-foot thickness" was required "to minimize the Yazoo Clay . . . swell or heave potential to within limits tolerable to a strong slab foundation . . . ." Hankins received assurances from Elite that the Yazoo clay "was nothing to be concerned about." She moved into the new home in April 2002. During Hankins's first year in the home, she reported to Elite numerous cracks, leaks, and difficulties in closing doors and windows. In September 2009, Hankins filed a complaint against Elite averring "that the damage which has occurred to said house . . . would not have occurred except for the negligence" of Elite. Thereafter, a "Default Judgment" of was entered against Elite. In August 2010, Hankins filed a "Suggestion for Writ of Garnishment" against Elite's commercial general liability ("CGL") insurer, Maryland Casualty Company/Zurich American Insurance Company ("Maryland Casualty"). In October 2010, a default judgment was entered against Maryland Casualty. Subsequently, Maryland Casualty filed a "Motion to Suspend Execution of Default Judgment against Maryland Casualty and For Leave to File Answer to Writ of Garnishment," which argued, inter alia, that because its CGL policy "exclud[ed] coverage for property damage caused by earth movement," then it "has no property or effects in its possession belonging to" Elite. Maryland Casualty then filed a "Motion for Summary Judgment" on the same basis. The circuit court concluded that the "earth movement" endorsement "excludes the damages suffered by [Hankins] from coverage under the policy." Based thereon, the circuit court granted summary judgment in favor of the insurance company, and set aside the default judgment. Upon review, the Supreme Court found Maryland Casualty's "earth movement" endorsement was unambiguous and operated to exclude the property damage Hankins suffered from coverage under the CGL policy. Accordingly, the Court affirmed the circuit court's order granting summary judgment to the insurance company, and the setting aside of the default judgment. View "Hankins v. Maryland Casualty Company" on Justia Law

In 1994, while en route to the scene of a fire, volunteer fireman James Hingle collided with a vehicle occupied by Sam and Ruby Anderson. Hingle was driving his personal vehicle at the time of the accident. The Andersons filed suit against Hingle, Marshall County, the volunteer fire department, and the Marshall County Board of Supervisors. The Andersons claimed that their injuries and damages amounted to $4,150,000. At the time of the accident, Hingle had two insurance policies with Guidant: personal automobile liability policy with limits of $250,000 per person and $500,000 per accident, and an umbrella protection policy with a $1,000,000 limit. Marshall County had a business automobile liability policy with a $300,000 limit through INA, which covered non-owned automobiles and provided coverage to the volunteer fire department. A dispute arose regarding which insurance company should defend the litigation and which provided primary coverage. INA filed a declaratory-judgment action against Guidant in the Circuit Court of Marshall County. INA asked for a judgment declaring, inter alia, that Guidant had a duty to defend all the defendants and INA did not have any duty to defend, and that Guidant's policies afforded primary coverage for all defendants, while INA provided excess coverage only. INA moved for summary judgment in the declaratory-judgment action, but the trial court held the motion in abeyance pending a final determination on the merits of the underlying lawsuit. Following that ruling, INA provided defense counsel to Marshall County and the fire department in the Anderson lawsuit. Guidant defended Hingle. INA appealed the trial court's decision on remand. Upon review, the Supreme Court affirmed in part, reversed in part, and remanded the case back to the trial court. The Court affirmed the trial court's denial of INA's Rule 56(f) motion for continuance and the denial of INA's request for prejudgment interest. The Court found that INA's claims of procedural errors warranting reversal were without merit. While the Court agreed with the trial court's finding that INA was required to contribute to the settlement, the Court reversed the trial court's determination that INA was required to contribute its policy limit. The Court held that Guidant was required to exhaust its $500,000 per-accident limit before INA's insurance was to be applied. View "Indemnity Insurance Company of North America v. Guidant Mutual Insurance Company" on Justia Law

A 2011 amendment to Section 71-3-51 provides that, "from and after July 1, 2011," decisions of the Mississippi Workers' Compensation Commission may be appealed directly to the Supreme Court, rather than to the circuit court, as required under the previous version of the statute. On July 1, 2011, the Commission denied Petitioner Joseph Dewayne Johnson’s claim for benefits, so he appealed to the Supreme Court. The ordered the parties to brief two issues: whether Section 71-3-51, as amended was constitutional; and whether the Court had appellate jurisdiction over direct appeals from the Commission. Upon review, the Court concluded that Section 71-3-51 was constitutional, and that the Court had appellate jurisdiction over direct appeals from the Commission. View "Johnson v. Sysco Food Sevcs." on Justia Law

After an insolvent employer's insurance company also became insolvent, the Mississippi Workers' Compensation Self-Insurers Guaranty Association (SIGA) made workers' compensation payments to an injured worker. SIGA sued the Mississippi Insurance Guaranty Association (MIGA) for reimbursement of those payments, and the trial court ordered reimbursement. The issue came before the Supreme Court who, after consideration, concluded that SIGA's claim against MIGA did not fall within the statutory definition of a "covered claim," and reversed the trial court’s reimbursement decision. View "Miss. Insurance Guaranty Ass'n v. Miss. Workers' Comp. Indv. Self-insurer Guaranty Ass'n" on Justia Law

In 2002, Dung Thi Hoang Nguyen stopped behind Karen Thompson at a red light. In reaching for her purse, her foot slipped off the brake and her car bumped into Thompson's. Neither car was damaged. The two exchanged insurance information without calling the police. But after Thompson arrived at her parents' home, her father told her to get a police report for her insurance provider, so Thompson called Nguyen, who agreed to meet her at the police station that night. A few days later, Thompson visited her physician complaining of neck pain. An MRI of Thompson’s spine revealed a preexisting degenerative-disc disease associated with disc bulges. And despite ongoing therapy, Thompson continued to complain of headaches, insomnia, depression, and neck pain until, in 2004, she was referred to a neurosurgeon, who performed surgery in 2005, Thompson to treat her abnormal discs. Thompson filed suit against Nguyen, seeking $234,316.49 in compensation. Nguyen admitted liability but contested that the accident had caused Thompson that much damage. A jury awarded Thompson $9,131– the exact amount of her physical therapy bills, but she filed a motion for additur or a new trial on damages alone, which the circuit court denied. Thompson appealed, and the Court of Appeals reversed and remanded for a trial on damages. The jury awarded Thompson less than the amount requested. Thompson appealed the jury’s second award. Because causation was central to Thompson's argument for the new damages award, the Supreme Court found it a question of fact for the jury, and affirmed its award. View "Thompson v. Nguyen" on Justia Law

The issue on appeal to the Supreme Court was whether the circuit court erred in granting summary judgment for the Mississippi Insurance Guaranty Association (MIGA), and in denying a cross-motion for summary judgment for nursing homes and nursing-home residents. The circuit court found that MIGA was entitled to a credit, which would reduce the amount MIGA must pay to indemnify nursing-home owners and operators for damage claims of two nursing-home residents that were allegedly caused by a series of negligent acts and omissions over the course of many years. Upon review, the Court found "the factual and legal predicates necessary to formulate an opinion on coverage issues are lacking, which would preclude any court from rendering a valid ruling on coverage." The Court reversed the circuit court's judgment that granted MIGA's motion for summary judgment and that denied the cross-motions for summary judgment. View "Louisiana Extended Care Centers, Inc. v. Mississippi Insurance Guaranty Ass'n" on Justia Law

In July 2006, Respondent Paul Cook's workers' compensation claim was dismissed for failure to file a properly completed prehearing statement. In December 2006, his "Motion for an Order Re-Instating Claim" was denied for failing to "attach a properly completed prehearing statement . . . ." In August 2008, Respondent's "Amended Motion to Reinstate" was dismissed as barred under a one-year statute of limitations. The full Commission affirmed the dismissal, as did the circuit court and a unanimous Mississippi Court of Appeals. The Supreme Court granted Respondent's petition for certiorari and affirmed: "Cook's claim was properly dismissed. To hold otherwise would eviscerate the Commission's rules and rulings of their statutorily intended effect, since '[a] rule which is not enforced is no rule at all.'" View "Cook v. The Home Depot" on Justia Law

As a result of Hurricane Katrina, the Mississippi Windstorm Underwriting Association (MWUA) sustained great losses well in excess of its reinsurance. MWUA assessed its members to cover the loss. Members are required to share in MWUA’s expenses, profits, and losses based on their percentages of wind and hail insurance premiums written in the previous calendar year. After the initial assessments, several member companies complained that they had incorrectly reported the previous year's figures. The Board of Directors gave the members a one-time opportunity to submit corrected data (a true-up). Some members (most of whom did not submit corrected data) appealed the assessment following the true-up. The Board denied their appeals. The members appealed their claims to the Insurance Commissioner, and the Commissioner denied their requested relief. Thereafter, the members appealed the Commissioner’s decision to the chancery court, which granted the members relief on all but one issue. Aggrieved, MWUA appealed the chancery court's judgment, and the members filed a cross-appeal. MWUA presented eight issues on appeal to the Supreme Court. Upon review, the Supreme Court affirmed the chancellor's judgment on two issues: grouping and reinsurance allocation. But the Court reversed and remanded the chancellor's judgment on the remaining issues. View "Mississippi Windstorm Underwriting Assn. v. Union National Fire Ins. Co." on Justia Law