Justia Mississippi Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

A former employee claimed he was discharged for reporting his employer’s illegal activity and sought to bring a wrongful-discharge claim under a public-policy exception to his at-will employment status. Because the former employee participated in the allegedly illegal activity, the Supreme Court held that he could not bring his suit, so it affirmed summary judgment on his wrongful-discharge claim. View "Galle v. Isle of Capri Casinos, Inc." on Justia Law

Kayla Vaughn appealed decisions of Mississippi’s Public Employees’ Retirement System (PERS), the Hinds County Circuit Court, and the Court of Appeals, in which she says she was denied the benefits due to a member of PERS. The retiree, Marjorie Kahn died prior to collecting benefits, and her beneficiary died prior to collecting all of the retiree’s benefits. As the surviving family member of the beneficiary, but not of the retiree, Kayla asserts that she was entitled to the remaining benefits. While PERS, the Hinds County Circuit Court, and the Court of Appeals erred by applying the current versions of the PERS statutes, rather than the version in force when the retiree made her elections, the Mississippi Supreme Court ultimately found that such error was harmless, and thus affirmed the judgments of each of these entities in result only. View "Vaughn v. Public Employees' Retirement System of Mississippi" on Justia Law

Wayne Kelly was killed while working at a construction site in Hattiesburg. His family sued, among other defendants, Hanco Corporation, Inc., the general contractor for the project on which Wayne Kelly had been working at the time he died, and American Air Specialists of Mississippi, Inc., the subcontractor that had leased the services of Kelly and his coworkers from Landrum Professional Employer Services, Inc. The Kellys and Hanco/American Air moved separately for summary judgment. The circuit court denied summary judgment to Hanco and American Air. Hanco filed a petition for interlocutory appeal and the Kellys filed a cross-petition for interlocutory appeal. The Supreme Court granted interlocutory appeal and consolidated the cases. After review, the Court affirmed the denial of summary judgment because Hanco waived its exclusive-remedy affirmative defense despite section 71-3-6 of the Mississippi Workers' Compensation Act provided an exclusive remedy to claimants for on-the-job injuries. View "Hanco Corporation v. Goldman" on Justia Law

The Mississippi Highway Safety Patrol (MHP) discharged Officer Sammy Ray for falsifying official state documents. Ray appealed to the Employee Appeals Board (EAB). The EAB conducted a hearing and upheld Ray's termination. On appeal, the Circuit Court affirmed. But the Court of Appeals reversed the circuit court judgment, concluding that Ray's due process rights were violated because the EAB's decision was based on conduct other than that for which he officially was charged. The Court of Appeals awarded Ray reinstatement and back pay. The Department of Public Safety appealed, arguing that the Court of Appeals improperly reweighed the evidence and failed to give sufficient deference to the EAB's findings. The Supreme Court agreed and reversed the Court of Appeals and reinstated and affirmed the trial court. View "Ray v. Mississippi Dept. of Pub. Safety" on Justia Law

In 2004, Luther McLain sued the Illinois Central Railroad, alleging that Illinois Central’s negligence caused his degenerative back injury. At trial, McLain had improper contact with a juror, committed perjury on the stand, and solicited a witness to commit perjury on the stand to corroborate his story. The trial judge reserved sanctioning McLain until after the jury verdict. The jury found for McLain, assessed his damages as $150,000, and judgment was entered accordingly. Thereafter, the trial judge sanctioned McLain $500 for juror contact and $10,000 for solicitation of a witness. Illinois Central filed a motion for additional sanctions, claiming that the sanctions were not harsh enough. Upon review, the Supreme Court affirmed the existing sanctions, but held that the trial judge abused her discretion in failing to impose further sanctions. Given the severity of committing perjury and solicitation and the cumulative effect of the violations taken as a whole, the Supreme Court reversed the judgment against Illinois Central, and rendered judgment in its favor. View "Illinois Central Gulf Railroad Co. v. McLain" on Justia Law

This case was an interlocutory appeal stemming from a law suit by Mautrice Vaughn’s estate and wrongful-death beneficiaries against The Service Companies Inc., (“FSS”), following Vaughn’s fatal heart attack at work. Plaintiffs Vaughn’s estate and wrongful-death beneficiaries sued for false imprisonment and intentional infliction of emotional distress. The plaintiffs alleged Vaughn’s supervisor would not let her leave work to see a doctor despite complaints of severe chest pain and a headache. Following the denial of its Motion for Summary Judgment, the Supreme Court granted FSS leave to bring this interlocutory appeal. FSS argued the circuit court erred by finding a factual dispute existed as to whether FSS had “an actual intent to injure” for purposes of determining whether the Mississippi Workers’ Compensation Act exclusively governed plaintiffs’ claims. Upon review, the Supreme Court found plaintiffs’ common-law false-imprisonment claim was insufficient to survive summary judgment because the plaintiffs did not produce evidence of intent to detain. "The plaintiffs may not merely rest on the pleadings and allegations alone." The Court found summary judgment in favor of FSS proper, reversed the trial court’s ruling denying summary judgment, rendered judgment in favor of FSS finally dismissing plaintiffs’ complaint and this action with prejudice. View "The Service Companies, Inc. v. The Estate of Mautrice Vaughn" on Justia Law

Ray Dillard attempted to collect workers' compensation benefits from the president and majority shareholder of his employer. In 1997, The Commission held that Dillard suffered a compensable injury. After the mandate issues, one of Dillard's attorneys filed a lis pendens notice regarding several parcels of real property the company's president owned. Because none of that property belonged to the company itself, Dillard's attorney informed the president that it was asking the Commission to hold the president personally liable for Dillard's benefits because the company failed to carry workers' compensation insurance. Dillard died in 2005 while unresolved issues regarding who would ultimately be responsible for Dillard's benefits was pending before an administrative law judge. Dillard's estate filed a complaint at the circuit court against the president and company, claiming that the company was required to carry workers' compensation insurance but failed to do so. Therefore, the Estate argued the president was personally liable for Dillard's benefits. Among other things, the president argued that the Estate's claim was barred by the statute of limitations and the doctrine of res judicata. Eventually, the administrative law judge granted the Estate's renewed motion for summary judgment, and entered a judgment of approximately $223,000 against the president and the company "jointly and individually." The president appealed, and the case was assigned to the Court of Appeals. The appellate court held that Dillard's claim against the company president was barred by res judicata and the statute of limitations. The Supreme Court held the Court of Appeals erred in reaching that conclusion, reversed and reinstated the trial court's judgment in favor of Dillard. View "Jarrett v. Dillard" on Justia Law

Milton Harper, the managing partner and president of Banks, Finley, White & Company of Mississippi (“Banks”), suffered a severe stroke in August 2000, and died of another stroke in July 2001. His dependents sued Banks for workers’ compensation benefits. The administrative law judge and the Workers’ Compensation Commission held that Harper’s injuries and death arose out of the scope and course of his employment at Banks. On appeal, the circuit court agreed that substantial evidence in the record supported the Commission’s conclusion that Harper’s stroke arose out of his employment, but that court held that Harper’s dependents were barred from recovering workers’ compensation benefits because Harper had failed to obtain workers’ compensation insurance for Banks. In turn, the Court of Appeals in "Harper v. Banks, Finley, White & Co. of Mississippi," (136 So. 3d 462 (Miss. Ct. App. 2014)), held that Harper’s dependents were not barred from recovery because Section 71-3-79 of the Mississippi Code allowed members of partnerships to exempt themselves from workers’ compensation coverage by giving notice in writing. Because Harper had not opted out of coverage in writing, the Court of Appeals held that Banks was required to provide workers’ compensation benefits to Harper’s beneficiaries. On writ of certiorari, the Supreme Court affirmed in part, and reversed in part. The Court held that the Court of Appeals erred in applying Section 71-3-79 of the Mississippi Code to the facts of this case. Because Banks did not have workers’ compensation insurance coverage, there was no coverage for Harper to opt out of in writing as contemplated by Section 71-3-79. Instead, the Court held that Section 71-3-52 of the Mississippi Code controlled the analysis of this case: because Banks had more than five employees, it was required to obtain workers’ compensation insurance and provide workers’ compensation benefits to its employees. The Court affirmed the Workers’ Compensation Commission’s finding that Harper suffered a fatal injury through the course of his employment at Banks was supported by substantial evidence. View "Harper v. Banks, Finley, White & Co. of Mississippi, P.C." on Justia Law

A former employee claimed he was discharged for reporting his employer’s illegal activity. The employee sought to bring a wrongful-discharge claim under a public-policy exception to his at-will employment status. Because the former employee participated in the allegedly illegal activity, the Supreme Court held that he could not bring that claim, and affirmed summary judgment on his wrongful-discharge claim. View "Galle v. Isle of Capri Casinos, Inc." on Justia Law

Thirty-eight years after going to work for T.P. Groome, breaking up concrete culverts with a jackhammer, plaintiff Huey Holmes was diagnosed with silicosis. In six years that Homles worked for Groome, he was exposed to dusty work conditions. Groome provide a respirator that was manufactured by defendant Mine Safety Appliances (MSA). Holmes testified that, although he wore the mask, he often ingested so much dust while jackhammering that his mouth would fill with dirt and his spit would become black. Holmes filed a products-liability suit against MSA, claiming, among other things, that the respirator failed to protect him from overexposure to respirable silica. Holmes was dismissed from the suit without prejudice in light of the then-recent changes to Mississippi joinder rules. Holmes refiled his suit against MSA on May 16, 2007. In its answer, MSA asserted that Holmes filed his second suit after the statute of limitations had run. This case was a direct appeal of the trial court's judgment awarding Holmes, $875,000 for silicosis-related injuries allegedly caused by the respirator. After review, the Supreme Court agreed with the trial court’s ruling that the complaint was filed within the statute of limitations, and that Holmes was exposed to a harmful level of silica during the relevant time period. But the Court found that the trial judge erred in denying MSA’s motion for judgment notwithstanding the verdict (JNOV) regarding Holmes’s warnings claim. Additionally, the Court found MSA was entitled to a judgment as a matter of law regarding Holmes’s design-defect claim because misuse of the respirator materially changed the product’s condition after it left MSA’s control. The Court therefore reversed and remanded on these issues. View "Mine Safety Appliance Company v. Holmes" on Justia Law