Justia Mississippi Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

Frederick Griffin has sought to pass the Mississippi Bar Exam since 1992. Griffin appealed the failing result of his February 2011 bar exam, raising some issues surrounding his July 2010 exam. Griffin sat for, and failed, the July 2010 bar exam. Needing a score of 132 to pass, Griffin earned a score of 127.2 on the Essay Section and a score of 127.6 on the MBE, for a final score of 127.4. He appealed his score to the Board of Bar Admissions, which denied his petition. Griffin appealed the denial to the chancery court. The chancellor ultimately dismissed his appeal in March 2011, finding that it was moot in light of Griffin's choice to sit for the February 2011 exam. Griffin applied to use his July 2010 MBE score for the February 2011 bar exam. In response, the Board sent Griffin a letter cautioning that Griffin "should be aware that the use of this ‘below-passing' M.B.E. score could contribute to your failing the overall examination." On the February 2011 exam, he scored a 127.6 on the MBE and a 127.8 on the Essay Exam, for a total score of 127.7. He petitioned the Board for a review, and the Board affirmed his failing result. Griffin appealed the Board's ruling to the chancery court, arguing that the Board had raised the overall score required to pass the bar examination throughout the time he has attempted to pass it. Griffin alleged that the Supreme Court removed any minimum score requirement on the MBE in 1995, but that the Board's requirement of a score of 132 to pass the bar "has the effect of requiring 132 on both" the MBE and the Essay portion of the exam, essentially arguing that a required overall score of 132 is tantamount to requiring a minimum MBE score of 132. He argued that these issues have a disparate impact on minorities, and the Board is thus in violation of the Equal Protection Clause. On appeal to the Supreme Court, Griffin argued that the Board's grading and scoring, Rules, policies, and the "self serving statutes from which" it derives its powers have a negative and discriminatory impact on Griffin's ability to pass the bar exam. Upon review, the Supreme Court concluded that the Board's actions, which fully complied with Supreme Court precedent, were not arbitrary and capricious. Griffin did not allege a discriminatory purpose behind the Board's rules, policies, or actions. Thus, his Equal Protection Clause claims failed as a matter of law. Furthermore, the Court found that the Board did not require a minimum MBE score to pass the bar, thus Griffin's contention that it did was without merit. The Court affirmed the trial court in all respects. View "Griffin v. Mississippi Board of Bar Admissions" on Justia Law

Dwayne Boyd was convicted of the sale of marijuana, greater than thirty grams but less than one kilogram, within 1,500 feet of a school or within 1,000 feet of the real property of a school. He was sentenced, as a subsequent drug offender, to 120 years in the custody of the Mississippi Department of Corrections (MDOC), with sixty years to serve and five years of supervised post-release supervision. The Court of Appeals affirmed his conviction and sentence. Upon review of Boyd's arguments on appeal, the Supreme Court concluded that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in denying Boyd's motion for continuance to secure new counsel on the day of trial. But the Court did find that Boyd did not receive timely notice that the State would seek a post-conviction amendment to the indictment and such action constituted unfair surprise. Therefore, the Court affirmed Boyd's conviction, but vacated his sentence and remanded for resentencing. View "Boyd v. Mississippi" on Justia Law

Plaintiff Charles Honeycutt was injured in an automobile accident involving a Mississippi state trooper. He sued the state trooper and two automobile-insurance providers, Atlanta Casualty Company and American Premier Insurance Company. The trial court granted the defendants' motions for summary judgment. On appeal, the Court of Appeals affirmed the trial court's grant of summary judgment. Plaintiff filed a writ of certiorari, seeking to appeal the grant of summary judgment for American Premier: (1) whether the trial court and the Court of Appeals erred by finding an insurance agent does not have a duty to explain uninsured-motorist coverage; (2) whether summary judgment was granted improperly. The Supreme Court found that, in order to obtain a knowing and voluntary waiver of uninsured-motorist coverage (UM coverage), an insurance agent does have a duty to explain UM coverage to the insured. The Court also found that summary judgment was not proper in this case. Thus, the Court reversed both lower courts' judgments and remanded the case back to the trial court for further proceedings. View "Honeycutt v. Coleman" on Justia Law

In a conviction for driving under the influence first offense, speeding, and littering, the State lost key evidence prior to the defendant's de novo trial in county court, while it was under a court order to preserve the evidence. The State's actions violated the defendant's due process right to present a complete defense. Furthermore, the county court improperly admitted proof of the radar device's accuracy under the business records hearsay exception. However, there was sufficient evidence to support the defendant's speeding conviction in the officer's testimony regarding the defendant's speed. The Supreme Court reversed the DUI conviction, but affirmed the speeding conviction, because it is supported by sufficient evidence. The Court found defendant did not adequately contest the littering conviction; thus the Court affirmed that conviction. View "Freeman v. Mississippi" on Justia Law

Plaintiffs, two shareholders of a closely held corporation, attempted to tender their shares to the corporation pursuant to a buy-sell agreement. Dissatisfied with the corporation's offer to purchase, the two shareholders sought relief in Chancery Court, and the court submitted the matter to binding arbitration to determine the stock's value as required by the contract. However, the chancellor rejected the arbitrator's valuations and ordered the corporation to buy the plaintiffs' stock at a much higher purchase price. The corporation appealed the chancellor's rejection of the arbitration award, and plaintiffs cross-appealed, claiming that they were entitled to additional damages, including prejudgment interest. Finding no legal basis for setting aside the arbitration award, the Supreme Court reversed the chancery court and reinstated the arbitration award. View "Bailey Brake Farms, Inc. v. Trout" on Justia Law

In 2011, Verina Childs was convicted of murdering her husband, Douglas Childs following a four-day jury trial. She was sentenced to life imprisonment in the custody of the Mississippi Department of Corrections (MDOC). After her conviction, Childs filed a motion for a new trial, which was denied. On appeal, Childs argued: (1) the State violated Childs' due-process rights by destroying evidence in violation of state law; (2) Childs was denied her fundamental right to alternative theories of defense; and (3) the State failed to prove deliberate-design murder. Because the Supreme Court found that the trial court did not err in its judgment of conviction, the Court affirmed on all three issues. View "Childs v. Mississippi" on Justia Law

After a jury trial, Randy Pauley was convicted of malicious mischief and sentenced to five years in the custody of the Mississippi Department of Corrections (MDOC) and to pay a fine, restitution, and court costs. He appealed, arguing that: (1) the trial court erred in sustaining the State's hearsay objection; (2) the trial court's denial of a continuance constituted an abuse of discretion, or, alternatively, he received ineffective assistance of counsel; (3) the trial court erred in sustaining the State's relevance objections; (4) the trial court erred in sustaining the State's objection to his redirect examination of Alicia Littlefield; (5) the indictment was fatally defective; and (6) he was entitled to a jury instruction on insanity. Finding no error, the Supreme Court affirmed. View "Pauley v. Mississippi" on Justia Law

The underlying annexation suit was voluntarily dismissed in 2008 with certain terms and conditions imposed on plaintiff James Frisby. Plaintiff owns property in Harrison County. In 2007, he filed a Petition for Inclusion, seeking to have his property annexed by the City of Biloxi. Biloxi responded and asked the court to grant plaintiff's petition. Gulfport objected to the inclusion of plaintiff's property within the City of Biloxi. Harrison County filed an answer as an interested party and also objected. Plaintiff sought clarification of the terms set forth in the order of dismissal. Upon review, the Supreme Court found that the case should have been dismissed as moot, because nothing remained to be decided on appeal. View "Frisby v. City of Gulfport" on Justia Law

David McLymont was convicted of capital murder and conspiracy to commit robbery. He filed a motion for judgment notwithstanding the verdict, or in the alternative, for a new trial, which the trial court denied. McLymont appealed the trial court's denial to the Supreme Court claiming his conviction was contrary to the overwhelming weight of the evidence. McLymont contended the jury relied on the testimony of a biased witness and a tape recording obtained by that witness to reach its verdict. Upon review, the Supreme Court concluded that contention was meritless. The State presented evidence against McLymont in addition to the witness and the tape recording in question. Accordingly, the trial court did not err when it denied McLymont's post-trial motion. View "McLymont v. Mississippi" on Justia Law

After being separated from her newborn infant for more than a year, Cirila Baltazar Cruz received an award of full legal and physical custody of her child from the Youth Court. The youth court further ordered that its proceedings and records remain confidential and that those present at the final hearing refrain from speaking to the media about the case. Cruz wanted to be able to discuss the case publicly and to share documents and transcripts from the proceedings and requested that the order of confidentiality be set aside. The youth court denied her motion. The court said that none of the parties had objected to the confidentiality order and found that it was not in Baby Doe's best interest to set aside that order absent some reason under Section 43-21-261 of the Mississippi Code. Cruz appealed the decision of the youth court to the Supreme Court. Upon review, the Supreme Court found that the youth court did not abuse its discretion in ordering that the youth-court records remain confidential; however, the youth court failed to apply the proper legal standard when it issued the gag order. Therefore, the Court affirmed in part and reversed and in part, and remanded the case for further proceedings. View "Cruz v. Jackson County Dept. of Human Services" on Justia Law