Justia Mississippi Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

The case before the Supreme Court was a fifteen-year old contract dispute regarding the construction of Kevin Clark's house. During the litigation, the contractor and counter-plaintiff William Knesal, died. His defense attorney, provided to him by his insurance company upon commencement of the suit, filed a suggestion of death in the deceased's name. When no substitution motion was filed within the prescribed ninety-day period, Knesal's attorney moved to dismiss. Knesal filed the appropriate motion for substitution well after the mandatory ninety-day period, asserting that Knesal's attorney had no standing to submit a suggestion of death and that, additionally, he never received proper notice of the filing until the motion to dismiss was served. The trial court dismissed the action, and Clark appealed. The issue before the Court centered on determining who may file a suggestion of death with the trial court and what circumstances surrounding a failure to file an appropriate substitution motion within the statutory period constitute "excusable neglect." The Court found that the plain language of Mississippi Rule of Civil Procedure 25 permitted Knesal's attorney to file to suggestion of death without naming Knesal's successors or representatives. Similarly, there was no requirement under the rule that a motion to dismiss be filed at all prior to dismissal, so the fact that a motion to dismiss was filed by Knesal's attorneys did not provide grounds to overturn the trial court's decision. Furthermore, the Court found that the trial court did not abuse its discretion when it did not find Clark's delay in responding to the suggestion of death resulted from excusable neglect. Therefore, the decision of the trial court was affirmed. View "Clark v. Knesal" on Justia Law

Ronnie and Pamela Goss filed suit against defendants Rickey Wilkerson and Phenix Transportation, Inc. alleging that "Rickey Wilkerson fraudulently induced the plaintiffs to settle their workers' compensation claims and to release all claims against Phenix Transportation, Inc." in return for $65,000. The Gosses further alleged that Wilkerson knew, or should have known, that the checks would not clear due to insufficient funds. The Gosses did not allege any specific facts in their complaint nor did they present any cognizable evidence to establish venue in Smith County. Defendants timely answered the complaint, including in their answer a motion to dismiss or, alternatively, to transfer jurisdiction and venue. Defendants argued that the Gosses' claims were legal in nature and were improperly brought in chancery court. Defendants also argued that venue was not proper in Smith County because Wilkerson resides in Scott County and Phenix has its principal place of business in Scott County. Defendants further argued that venue was not proper because no substantial act or omission or substantial event that allegedly caused the injury occurred in Smith County. The Gosses never filed a response to Defendants' motion. The chancery court heard oral argument on Defendants' motion. No transcript exists of the hearing. The chancery court found that the settlement checks and other documents were sent to the Gosses in Smith County, and the Gosses attempted to negotiate the checks in Smith County. Therefore, the chancery court concluded that venue was proper in Smith County because the "cause of action occurred/accrued in Smith County." The chancery court also found that the Gosses' claims were "more legal than equitable in nature" and transferred the case to the Circuit Court of Smith County. On appeal, Defendants argued that the chancery court erred in denying their motion to transfer venue. Upon review, the Supreme Court concluded that the Chancery Court of Smith County erred in its interpretation of Mississippi Code Section 11-11-3 and in denying Defendants' motion to transfer venue. View "Wilkerson v. Goss" on Justia Law

Bobby Batiste was convicted of capital murder with the underlying felony of robbery for the slaying of his roommate, Andreas Galanis. After a sentencing hearing, the jury determined that Batiste should be sentenced to death. The Circuit Court denied Batiste's post-trial motions. Batiste appealed, raising fifteen assignments of error. After carefully reviewing the record and Batiste's arguments, the Supreme Court found no reversible error occurred and therefore affirmed Batiste's conviction and sentence. View "Batiste v. Mississippi" on Justia Law

After an administrative judge (AJ) ruled on a claimant's petition to controvert a workers' compensation claim, the claimant had twenty days to file a notice of appeal with the full Mississippi Workers' Compensation Commission. In this case, the issue before the Supreme Court was whether an AJ's order, handed down more than twenty days after the AJ's ruling and granting a claimant thirty additional days in which to prosecute her claim, should be given legal effect by the Commission so that the claimant's notice of appeal, filed within the additional thirty days, would be considered timely. Upon review, the Court found that, under the facts and circumstances presented, such an appeal was timely. View "Felter v. Floorserv, Inc." on Justia Law

Dondrego Bolton was charged with burglary of a dwelling in 2010. He was found guilty and sentenced to twenty years in prison. Bolton's indictment originally charged him with breaking and entering a dwelling with the intent to commit larceny. At trial, the jury was instructed on burglary of a dwelling and the lesser-included offense of trespassing. The jury was told that if it found that Bolton had broken and entered into the home "[w]ith the intent to commit the crime of larceny or any other crime," he was guilty of burglary. Bolton did not object to the jury instructions at the time. The Court of Appeals found these jury instructions to be sufficient. Upon review, the Supreme Court concluded that under its recent holding in "Daniels v. State," (107 So. 3d 961 (Miss. 2013)), the jury did have to find that Bolton had intended to commit larceny, since that was the intended offense specified by the grand jury. Here, however, the Court of Appeals found it sufficient that "[t]he jury found beyond a reasonable doubt that Bolton intended to commit a crime in Vance's house . . . ." Bolton argued on appeal to the Supreme Court that the jury instructions were improper because they permitted the jury to convict him of burglary if it found that he had intended to commit any crime while inside the dwelling. Because the jury was improperly instructed on the essential elements of burglary consistent with the Court's recent decision in "Daniels," the Court reversed the decisions of the Court of Appeals and the Circuit Court and remanded the case to the trial court for further proceedings. View "Bolton v. Mississippi" on Justia Law

After filing for a no-fault divorce, Perry and Iretha Collins asked the chancery court to decide the questions of alimony, child support, attorney's fees, and the division of marital assets. Dissatisfied with the chancellor's decision, Perry appealed to the Court of Appeals, which affirmed the judgment of the trial court. Perry then petitioned the Supreme Court raising four issues; the Court granted certiorari to consider two: (1) the calculation of Perry's gross income for purposes of determining child support and (2) the designation of marital property. Finding that the Court of Appeals erred in affirming the trial court's decision regarding both issues, the Court affirmed in part and reversed and remand in part. View "Collins v. Collins" on Justia Law

Howard Carney III and Andrea Leigh Bell Carney obtained a divorce on the ground of irreconcilable differences. They asked the chancery court to determine child support, alimony, equitable distribution of assets, and attorney's fees. The chancery court determined child support, divided the marital estate, considered alimony but declined to award it, and ordered Howard to pay $5,000 toward Andrea's attorney's fees. Howard appealed and the Court of Appeals affirmed. Howard appealed, claiming that the Court of Appeals erred in affirming the chancery court judgment because the chancery court manifestly: (1) failed to divide the marital estate equitably and (2) erred by listing his unvalued social security benefits under his share of the equitable distribution. The Supreme Court agreed with Howard as to the first issue, thus reversed and remanded on that issue. The Court affirmed the Court of Appeals and the chancery court on the second issue. View "Carney v. Carney" on Justia Law

Carl Patterson Jr. sustained serious injuries in a single-vehicle motorcycle accident. He sued T. L. Wallace Construction, Inc. and Turtle Creek Development, Inc. for damages. T. L. Wallace and Turtle Creek both filed motions for summary judgment. The Circuit Court of Marion County granted each motion for summary judgment. The Court of Appeals, finding the circuit court erred by granting summary judgment, reversed and remanded for a trial. Both defendants filed writs of certiorari, which were granted. After considering the parties' arguments and applicable law, the Supreme Court reversed the Court of Appeals' judgment and reinstated and affirmed the Circuit Court's judgment. View "Patterson, Jr. v. T. L. Wallace Construction, Inc." on Justia Law

The issue before the Supreme Court in this case concerned the proper procedure by which a workers' compensation insurer may enforce a subrogation claim arising under Mississippi Code Section 71-3-71. Richard Shoemake was injured in Alabama but received workers' compensation benefits from Liberty Mutual Insurance Company under Mississippi law. He brought and settled a third-party action in Alabama state court and reimbursed Liberty Mutual only the amount it was entitled to under Alabama law. Liberty Mutual, which knew of but did not join or intervene in the Alabama lawsuit, then sued Shoemake in the Circuit Court of Newton County, seeking full reimbursement as allowed under Section 71-3-71. In granting Shoemake summary judgment, the circuit court held that Alabama law applied and further concluded that res judicata and Liberty Mutual's failure to intervene in the Alabama action barred Liberty Mutual's claim. The Court of Appeals reversed, holding that Mississippi law governed the amount of Liberty Mutual's subrogation claim and that Liberty Mutual was not required to intervene in the Alabama action to become entitled to reimbursement under Mississippi law. Because the Mississippi Supreme Court found that 71-3-71 requires a workers' compensation insurer to join or intervene in a third-party action to become entitled to reimbursement, it reversed the Court of Appeals and affirmed the circuit court. View "Liberty Mutual Insurance Company v. Shoemake" on Justia Law

Melvin Grayer was convicted of burglary and sentenced as a habitual offender to seven years without the possibility of parole or probation. Grayer appealed, claiming that he received ineffective assistance of counsel because his trial counsel failed to request a circumstantial-evidence jury instruction and that he was sentenced as a habitual offender without competent evidence of his prior felony convictions. Upon review, the Supreme Court affirmed Grayer's conviction and sentence of seven years, but vacated his habitual-offender sentence enhancement, because the State failed to prove Grayer was a habitual offender by competent evidence. View "Grayer v. Mississippi" on Justia Law