Justia Mississippi Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

Peggy Thornton filed a wrongful death action in 2007 against Woodall Electric Company, Inc. (her deceased husband's employer), as well as several fictitious defendants. Thornton later added Defendants Tanfield Group, PLC, Tanfield Engineering Systems, Inc. ("Tanfield Engineering"), and Bidgood Enterprises, Inc. After having served Tanfield Group, Thornton had an alias summons issued for Tanfield Engineering and served Tanfield Engineering via certified mail. Tanfield Engineering filed a Motion to Dismiss the First Amended Complaint based on the plaintiff's failure to serve process, pursuant to Mississippi Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(4)-(5). Thornton's response to the motion contended that Tanfield Group was the parent company of Tanfield Engineering; thus, according to Thornton, Tanfield Engineering had been put on notice of Thornton's claims because its parent company had been served in a timely manner. The trial court denied Tanfield Engineering's Motion to Dismiss based on a finding that Tanfield Engineering was an alter ego of Tanfield Group and that service upon Tanfield Group constituted effective service upon Tanfield Engineering. Tanfield Engineering filed a Petition for Interlocutory Appeal and a motion to stay proceedings in the trial court, both of which the Supreme Court granted. Upon review, the Court concluded that the trial court's decision was contrary to its precedent that classifies subsidiaries which are wholly owned by their parent corporations and share common officers with their parent corporations, as separate and distinct from their parent corporations. Accordingly, the Supreme Court vacated the court's order and remanded the case for further proceedings. View "Tanfield Engineering Systems, Inc. v. Thornton" on Justia Law

In late 2011, the Bolivar County prosecuting attorney filed a petition in the county Youth Court, seeking an adjudicatory hearing, after receiving a complaint that two minor girls, S.G.M. and C.D.M., ages thirteen and eleven, respectively, had been sexually abused by their father. The youth court conducted an adjudicatory hearing. Those present at the hearing, apart from the attorneys, were Jim Warrington, the guardian ad litem (GAL) assigned to the case; Johnnie Rushing, a social worker with the Department of Human Services; David Monroe, the girls' biological father; Peggy Monroe, the girls' stepmother; K.T.M., the girls' older brother, age fourteen; Tammy and Tawanda Latham, the girls' maternal aunts; and Marie Miller, the girls' maternal grandmother. At the time of the adjudicatory hearing, S.G.M., C.D.M., and K.T.M. were in the custody of Peggy, as David had allowed Peggy to obtain custody of the children sometime after the children's biological mother had passed away. Shortly into the hearing, the youth court became aware that only Tammy and Tawanda had been issued summonses to appear at the hearing. All others agreed to waive service of process, and the court allowed David to waive service of process for S.G.M., C.D.M., and K.T.M. At the conclusion of the hearing, the youth court found there was no basis to support the sexual-abuse allegation. The youth court then proceeded to conduct a disposition hearing. At that point, the prosecuting attorney informed the youth court that the court was without authority to conduct a disposition hearing because the two girls had not been adjudicated sexually abused. The youth court had this matter placed on the court docket and held a hearing in the court's chambers. Tammy, Tawanda, Marie, and Peggy were the only parties present. The youth court stated on the record that, during the adjudicatory hearing, it had ordered that S.G.M., C.D.M., and K.T.M. were to be placed in the custody and care of their maternal aunt Tammy. Both the county prosecutor and legal counsel for Peggy disputed that such an order had been issued by the youth court at the hearing. The youth court entered an adjudicatory order, placing all three minor children in the custody of Tammy. Peggy thereafter filed a notice of appeal, asserting that: (1) the youth court had no jurisdiction to conduct the adjudicatory hearing because of lack of service of process on the children; (2) the youth court had no jurisdiction to conduct a subsequent adjudicatory hearing because of failure to give proper notice of the hearing; (3) the youth court could not conduct a disposition hearing after finding that the abuse allegations were unsubstantiated; and (4) the order to remove the children from their home was not supported by the evidence. Upon review, the Supreme Court concluded that the children did not receive process, and accordingly vacated the youth court's order and remanded for further proceedings. View "In the Interest of S.G.M., C.D.M., and K.T.M." on Justia Law

Dr. Jerry Pratt slipped and fell down a set of stairs at the Gulfport-Biloxi Regional Airport. Pratt filed suit against the Gulfport-Biloxi Regional Airport Authority (GBRAA) in the Circuit Court for the First Judicial District of Harrison County, alleging negligence and claiming he suffered injuries as a result of the fall. GBRAA moved for summary judgment, claiming immunity under the Mississippi Tort Claims Act (MTCA), and the circuit court granted the motion. Pratt appealed, and we assigned the case to the Court of Appeals. The Court of Appeals, finding that genuine issues of material fact existed, reversed the trial court's grant of summary judgment and remanded the case. GBRAA filed a petition for writ of certiorari, which the Supreme Court granted. Upon review, the Supreme Court found that GBRAA was entitled to immunity under the MTCA, and accordingly reversed the appellate court, reinstated and affirmed the trial court's grant of summary judgment in favor of GBRAA. View "Pratt v. Gulfport-Biloxi Regional Airport Authority" on Justia Law

Parham Pointe North, LLC and K. Wayne Rice & Associates together appealed, and Ballard Realty Company separately appealed, (collectively "Defendants") a decision from the Hinds County Circuit Court which awarded damages of $3,603,712 to apartment-complex tenants for loss of intellectual property and personal injuries arising from claims that the Defendants were negligent in maintaining and/or repairing a leaking pipe in their apartment. Upon review, the Supreme Court found that the trial court abused its discretion by admitting unreliable expert testimony, allowing a lay witness to give opinion testimony, and not excluding evidence of the cost of restoration where the fair market value of the property before it was damaged was not established. Furthermore, the Court found that the trial court abused its discretion by failing to grant a new trial on damages, as an award of lost profits without proof of past profits was not only contrary to the established law of this state, it was also contrary to the weight of evidence. Accordingly, the Court reversed the judgment and remand to the Hinds County Circuit Court for a new trial on damages. View "Ballard Realty Company, Inc. v. Ohazurike" on Justia Law

Twenty-year-old Xavier Zurndell Moore pled guilty to manslaughter for the shooting death of his mother's live-in boyfriend, Robert Williams. The fatal bullet had been purchased from the Walmart in Indianola, Mississippi. Robert's daughter and his estate filed a wrongful-death suit against Walmart, alleging that it unlawfully had sold ammunition to the underage Moore and that the sale proximately had caused Robert's death. The trial court granted summary judgment for Walmart based on this Court's decision in "Robinson v. Howard Brothers of Jackson, Mississippi," (372 So. 2d 1074 (Miss. 1979)). In that case, the Supreme Court held that, even though the store had violated federal law by selling a firearm and ammunition to a minor, the minor's subsequent murder of a third party had not been foreseeable; the seller, therefore, was not civilly liable for the death. Based on "Robinson," the Court found that Moore's criminal act was not foreseeable and that Walmart reasonably could assume that Moore would follow the law. Therefore, the Court affirmed the grant of summary judgment in favor of Walmart. View "Williams v. Wal-Mart Stores East, L.P." on Justia Law

n 1993, AT&T Corporation and affiliate corporations (collectively, AT&T) filed an affiliated group, Mississippi income tax return with the Mississippi Department of Revenue f/k/a Mississippi State Tax Commission, using the statutorily-permissible "combined method" of reporting. But from 1994 to 1996, AT&T filed its returns under the "consolidated method" of reporting, which was then statutorily available only to affiliated groups with members doing business and taxable solely in Mississippi, ostensibly to challenge the constitutionality of this distinction. Following an audit in 1997, the Commission issued an Assessment of Income Taxes of more than $5 million against AT&T. After unsuccessful administrative appeals before the Commission, AT&T filed a "Petition for Appeal of Additional Income Tax Assessment Ordered by State Tax Commission, For Declaratory and Injunctive Relief, and For Refund of Overpayment of Tax" in the Chancery Court of Hinds County. The Petition challenged the constitutionality of several tax statutes under the Commerce Clause of the United States Constitution and sought associated relief. But AT&T's Petition was not 'accompanied with a bond, to be approved by the clerk . . . , in a sum double the amount in controversy[,]" as then required by Mississippi Code Section 27-7-73. Rather, AT&T paid the Assessment, then filed the Petition. Preliminarily, the chancery court found that AT&T had "properly appealed" the full Commission's Order. The chancery court then held that the subject tax statutes violated the Commerce Clause; that the"offensive limitations" were to be struck so that AT&T was granted the "tax benefits" enjoyed by other taxpayers; and, based thereon, that AT&T was entitled to an award of $12,727,174. Thereafter, the Commission appealed those rulings, while AT&T appealed only the chancery court's interest calculations. Because AT&T did not follow the then-applicable procedure for appeal, the chancery court lacked jurisdiction to hear its appeal. The Supreme Court reversed the chancery court and reinstated the Commission's order. View "Mississippi Department of Revenue v. AT&T Corporation" on Justia Law

Edna Phillips filed suit against Tich K. Huynh, d/b/a Elegant Nails Salon, asserting negligence in operation, negligence in maintenance, and gross negligence against Elegant Nails based upon a corneal abrasion Phillips allegedly sustained when "something" hit her in the eye while she was having acrylic nails applied at Elegant Nails. Elegant Nails twice moved for summary judgment and twice was denied; the Supreme Court granted Elegant Nails's petition for interlocutory appeal after the second denial. Finding Phillips has not produced sufficient evidence to survive Elegant Nails' motion for summary judgment, the Court reversed the judgment of the circuit court and rendered judgment in favor of Elegant Nails. View "Elegant Nails v. Phillips" on Justia Law

James Mallard and Tonya Mallard (now Tonya Mallard Burkart) were divorced on in 2001. Incorporated into the Final Judgment of Divorce was the Child Custody and Support and Property Settlement Agreement executed by the parties. A significant portion of the financial settlement that Burkart received in the property settlement agreement consisted of forty percent of Mallard's "disposable military retirement pay" for ten years. Following the divorce, Mallard elected to adopt a sixty-percent disability rating as part of his retirement pay. Mallard did not provide any of these disability benefits to Burkart. When Mallard filed a Petition for Modification of Judgment of Divorce in chancery court pursuant to child-support and custody matters, Burkart filed a counterpetition for contempt, asserting that Mallard had structured his retirement in such a way as to defeat her forty-percent interest in the total retirement pay. The chancellor determined that Burkart was entitled to forty percent of the disability benefits, but he declined to find Mallard in contempt. Mallard appealed. Upon review, the Supreme Court found that since federal law preempts state law, state courts are precluded from allocating military disability benefits to a nonmilitary spouse; therefore, the Court reversed and remanded the case for further proceedings. View "Mallard v. Burkart" on Justia Law

Cecil Ben was convicted of rape and sentenced to life imprisonment by circuit court. The Court of Appeals affirmed his conviction and sentence. In his petition for writ of certiorari, Ben argued: (1) that his constitutional right to a speedy trial was violated; (2) that Otis Mingo's testimony was inadmissible due to a discovery violation by the State; (3) that the admission of Maurice Hines's hearsay testimony was not harmless error; (4) that the admission of Nurse Sharon Hockett's statement concerning Monica's veracity was improper; and (5) that the verdict was contrary to the weight and the sufficiency of the evidence. Finding no error, the Supreme Court affirmed Ben's conviction and sentence. View "Ben v. Mississippi" on Justia Law

Henry Taylor and Eddie Ray Jones were tried jointly for aggravated assault and possession of a firearm by a felon. Taylor was found guilty on both charges, and Jones was acquitted on the latter charge but convicted on the former charge. Jones appealed his aggravated-assault conviction, and the Court of Appeals affirmed Jones's conviction and sentence. After the Court of Appeals denied his motion for rehearing, Jones filed a petition for writ of certiorari which the Supreme Court granted to consider, inter alia, Jones's claims of inconsistent verdicts and erroneous jury instructions. The Court held that Jones's claims of error were without merit; thus the Court affirmed the judgments of the Court of Appeals and the circuit court. View "Jones v. Mississippi" on Justia Law