Justia Mississippi Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

Donald and Penny Brewer (through their respective attorneys) negotiated, agreed to, and signed off on a proposed order that changed custody of one of the parties’ two children, John, to Donald, and reduced his child-support obligation. Although the attorneys failed to present the order to the chancellor, the Brewers, believing it had been entered, complied with its terms for several years. But when the chancellor later learned that Donald had paid the reduced amount of child support, he refused to admit any evidence of the agreement, ordered Donald to pay the full amount of arrearage, and held him in contempt. Upon review, the Supreme Court held that Donald should not have been held in contempt; that he was entitled to credit for any payment of support he made directly to, or on behalf of, John; and that the chancellor should have granted Penny a judgment for past-due child support, reduced by the credit.View "Brewer v. Holliday" on Justia Law

Larry Hammett petitioned for statutory compensation under the legislative act for Compensation to Victims of Wrongful Conviction and Imprisonment. Hammett was found guilty of perjury by a jury in 1997, and was sentenced as a habitual offender to serve ten years in the custody of the Mississippi Department of Corrections (MDOC). In, 2001, having found the State had failed to prove its perjury case against Hammett with sufficient evidence, the Mississippi Court of Appeals reversed and rendered Hammett’s perjury conviction and vacated Hammett’s sentence. In 2009, the Legislature enacted Mississippi Code Section 11-44-1 et seq., which allows compensation for “innocent persons” wrongfully convicted “of one or more felonies and subsequently sentenced to a term of imprisonment,” and who have “served all or any part of the sentence[.]”In 2012, Hammett petitioned for compensation under this provision on the claim that he had spent five years in prison for a wrongful conviction. The trial court found that Hammett had filed his claim on October 5, 2012, and dismissed the claim because it found the claim time-barred. The Supreme Court reversed. Although Hammett did not file his complaint with the court, he contends that he filed it with prison officials, and the prison mailbox rule applies. The Supreme Court found that a question exists as to whether it did. Based on the record, Hammett submitted his petition for statutory compensation to prison officials for mailing on May 24, 2012. But he failed to include either a filing fee or an IFP affidavit along with it. On June 19, 2012, Hammett had an IFP affidavit notarized. But the record was inconclusive as to whether Hammett resubmitted his complaint along with the notarized IFP affidavit to prison officials for mailing to the Adams County Circuit Clerk’s office prior to the June 30, 2012, deadline. View "Hammett v. Mississippi" on Justia Law

Defendants Phillips Brothers, Kilby Brake Fisheries, LLC, and Harry Simmons appealed a judgment entered in favor of Ray Winstead on numerous shareholder and employment claims. In September 2009, Winstead filed a complaint against Kilby Brake, Harry Simmons, Chat Phillips, Simmons Farm Raised Catfish, Inc., Five Mile Fisheries, Inc., and H.D. Simmons Corp. and Phillips Brothers, LP. Winstead alleged that Simmons and Phillips Brothers had failed to pay him his agreed-upon salary, asserting claims of fraud, breach of fiduciary duty, corporate freeze-out, conversion, slander, slander per se, and tortious interference with business relations. He also requested an accounting and dissolution of the LLC. The issues raised by the three remaining defendants in this appeal fell into six categories: (1) whether the admission of testimony regarding an oral agreement for cash contributions violated the parol evidence rule; (2) whether there was sufficient evidence to support Winstead’s award for fraud; (3) whether there was sufficient evidence to support Winstead’s award for corporate freeze-out; (4) whether there was sufficient evidence to support Winstead’s award for breach of fiduciary duty; (5) whether Kilby Brake was entitled to a new trial; (6) whether Winstead met the requisite elements of slander per se. Finding multiple errors, the Supreme Court reversed and remanded in part; and remanded in part. View "Phillips Brothers v. Winstead" on Justia Law

Petitioner Stephen Johnson was arrested and convicted for driving on a suspended license (in the third degree). His license had been suspended for failing to pay a traffic fine. Johnson appealed his DWLS 3rd conviction, arguing: (1) the former RCW 46.20.342(1)(c)(iv) (2008) did not proscribe his continuing to drive after the suspension of his license for failing to pay a traffic fine; or alternatively, (2) that because he was indigent, the suspension was invalid under the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution's due process and equal protection clauses, which required the State to inquire into his ability to pay the fine before suspending his license. Furthermore, Johnson argued the trial court erred by denying him counsel to fight these charges, and wanted reimbursement for attorney fees spent in his defense. The Supreme Court rejected Johnson's arguments on appeal, but remanded the case for further proceedings to determine Johnson's right to reimbursement for attorney fees. The plain meaning of former RCW 46.20.342(1 )( c )(iv) allows the State to convict a driver for DWLS 3rd where the underlying license suspension occurred for failure to pay a fine. Johnson was not constitutionally indigent, but statutorily so; on remand, the Supreme Court instructed the district court to enter an order designating Johnson either as (1) indigent or (2) indigent and able to contribute. If Johnson is able to contribute, the district court would have to enter an order determining the costs he should bear for his appeal. View "Cade v. Beard" on Justia Law

After being convicted by jury for statutory rape and resisting arrest, defendant Toney Jennings was sentenced to fifteen years: ten years to serve and five years suspended. Jennings received six months for resisting arrest. Jennings appealed the statutory-rape conviction. The Court of Appeals affirmed. The issue before the Supreme Court in this matter centered on whether the trial court erred in admitting Jennings’s arguably involuntary statement to police into evidence. After review, the Court concluded the State clearly failed to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that Jennings’s waiver and statement were voluntary, knowing, and intelligent, given the many problems surrounding the waiver and the "dearth" of evidence supporting its voluntariness. The Court reversed and remanded the case for a new trial and a new and reliable suppression hearing in which a specific determination regarding voluntariness could be made, and a record adequately developed. View "Jennings v. Mississippi" on Justia Law

Michael Ambrose was indicted for capital murder while in the commission of a robbery in Harrison County, Mississippi. After trial, the jury acquitted Ambrose of capital murder but found him guilty of deliberate design murder. The trial court sentenced Ambrose to life imprisonment. Ambrose appealed. Upon review, the Supreme Court affirmed Ambrose’s conviction and sentence, finding that the evidence was sufficient to support a murder verdict and the verdict was not against the overwhelming weight of the evidence. View "Ambrose v. Mississippi" on Justia Law

Helen Schroeder was a passenger in an automobile driven by her husband Harry, when a log truck collided with the rear of the automobile. Harry was killed, and Helen was severely injured. A consequence of the accident was that Helen suffered diminished mental capacity. In a federal lawsuit, Helen claimed the truck driver was at fault and denied that Harry was negligent. After the federal judge denied the defendant’s motion for summary judgment, Helen settled the federal suit. Helen then sued Harry’s estate in state court, claiming Harry was partially at fault. The circuit court granted summary judgment to the estate on judicial estoppel grounds. But, because the federal judge stated his denial of summary judgment was based on his finding of genuine issues of material fact as to the truck driver’s negligence, not “Harry Schroeder’s potential contributory negligence,” the Supreme Court reversed. View "Clark v. Neese" on Justia Law

The State indicted John Bartholomew Lowe on five counts of exploitation of a child, alleging that he had downloaded sexually explicit images and videos of children from the internet to his personal computer. The State had no direct evidence that Lowe had downloaded the images; its case depended on the opinions of its expert witness. On appeal of his eventual conviction, Lowe contended that several others had access to his computer, and that someone else had downloaded the material. He requested funds to hire an expert to help prepare his case to refute the State’s expert. The trial court denied Lowe’s request. The Supreme Court concluded that denial deprived Lowe of the opportunity to prepare an adequate defense. Therefore the Supreme Court reversed his conviction and remanded the case for a new trial. View "Lowe v. Mississippi" on Justia Law

Jason Hall was indicted and tried on an indictment for burglary of a building. After both sides rested, the State requested and was granted a jury instruction for accessory after the fact to burglary (in addition to the burglary instruction). The jury acquitted Hall of burglary but convicted him of accessory after the fact to burglary. Because Hall was convicted of a crime for which he was not indicted, nor did he waive indictment, the Supreme Court reversed the conviction and vacate Hall's sentence. View "Hall v. Mississippi" on Justia Law

The Jackson County Board of Supervisors terminated June Seaman, and she applied to the Mississippi Employment Security Commission (MESC) for unemployment benefits. A claims examiner, an administrative-law judge, and the Board of Review all determined that Seaman was entitled to unemployment benefits because Jackson County had failed to prove by clear and convincing, substantial evidence that Seaman had been terminated for misconduct. The circuit court affirmed the agency’s decision, but the Court of Appeals reversed, finding that the employer had proven misconduct by substantial evidence. After its review, the Supreme Court concluded the Court of Appeals improperly reweighed the evidence before the MESC. Therefore, the Supreme Court reversed the Court of Appeals and reinstated and affirmed the circuit court's judgment. View "Jackson County Board of Supervisors v. Mississippi Employment Security Commission" on Justia Law