Justia Mississippi Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

In 2007, fifteen-year-old Alexandria Miller and sixteen-year-old Kelly Garvin were traveling on a two-lane road when their vehicle collided with two horses that had escaped from a nearby property and were standing in the middle of the road. Garvin sued Miller alleging negligent operation of the vehicle. Garvin asserted claims of negligent entrustment against Miller’s mother and stepfather, Melanie and V. M. Cleveland, and Tupelo Furniture Market, Inc. (TFM), and a claim of negligent training/instruction against V. M. Cleveland. Garvin further asserted that Melanie and V. M. Cleveland were liable for Miller’s negligence because they had signed Miller’s driver’s license application. The circuit court granted summary judgment on the claims of negligent entrustment and negligent training/instruction in favor of the Clevelands and TFM. Garvin appealed. Upon review, the Supreme Court concluded the trial court properly granted summary judgment and accordingly affirmed that court's judgment. View "Guardianship of Kelly Garvin v. Tupelo Furniture Market, Inc." on Justia Law

In 2005, Edward Miles drove his pickup truck into an intersection in front of Virgil Burcham’s eighteen-wheel fuel truck. Miles died several hours following the accident. Virgil Burcham sued Edward Miles’s estate for negligence and negligence per se. Burcham received a $60,000 judgment, which the Miles estate appealed. Finding no reversible error, the Supreme Court affirmed the judgment as to liability, subject to remittitur. View "Estate of Edward Miles v. Burcham" on Justia Law

Larry Smith worked on various drilling rigs from the mid-1960s until the early 1990s. A heavy smoker, Larry smoked roughly two to three packs a day from at least the mid-1950s through at least 1986. He was diagnosed with lung cancer in August 2002 and died three months later. This case arose from a jury verdict that awarded his widow Elsie Smith and other wrongful death beneficiaries monetary damages for Larry's death. Elsie claimed that her husband’s proximity to working with these products led to his lung cancer because the drilling additives contained asbestos. After a jury verdict in favor of the beneficiaries, the defendant corporations filed a joint motion for a judgment notwithstanding the verdict (JNOV), which was granted by the trial judge. The beneficiaries appealed the grant of JNOV. Upon review, the Supreme Court concluded that the trial court erred when it granted JNOV by applying the the beneficiaries’ proof to the frequency, regularity, and proximity test rather than to the elements of the their negligent design claim sounding in products liability. Accordingly, the Court reversed and remanded. View "Smith v. Union Carbide Corporation" on Justia Law

Elise and Frank Noone were married, and jointly owned approximately sixty-seven acres of land as joint tenants with right of survivorship. Frank and Elise claimed a homestead exemption on the property. Elise filed for divorce, but the chancellor denied the divorce. The issue before the Supreme Court in this case centered on the interpretation of Mississippi Code Section 11-21-1(2) (Rev. 2004); specifically whether the statute prohibited one spouse from obtaining a partition of jointly owned property by chancery decree against the other. The chancellor held that Section 11-21-1 wholly prohibits the partitioning of spousal property by chancery decree, even to the extent that the property has a value greater than the $75,000 protected from creditors. Finding no error, the Supreme Court affirmed. View "Noone v. Noone" on Justia Law

Jessica Norton Jordan appealed a declaratory ruling that she was not entitled to a share of her adoptive father’s estate under Mississippi’s pretermitted heir statute. A certified copy of the trial court’s docket indicated that Jordan was still involved in the probate matter. Further, the declaratory judgment did not contain a Rule 54(b) certification or equivalent language. Because the order denying pretermitted heir status was not a final, appealable judgment, the appeal was dismissed. View "Jordan v. Booth" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court found that Chancellor D. Neil Harris abused his contempt powers, failed to recuse himself from contempt proceedings, and prevented those he charged with contempt from presenting any defense. This matter stemmed from Judge Harris' presiding over a 2010 case in which the State hired private process servers to pursue child-support and paternity proceedings. The Judge obtained information that suggested some of the parties had not been properly served with process, and that returns on the summonses were falsified. The Judge instituted contempt proceedings against five process services, the owner of the service company, and two notaries public. The Supreme Court found that appropriate sanctions were: a public reprimand, a $2,500 fine, and a $200 assessment of costs. View "Mississippi Comm'n on Judicial Perf. v. Harris" on Justia Law

Sherry Walker was denied disability benefits by the Public Employees’ Retirement System (PERS). The Circuit Court reversed PERS’s decision. The Court of Appeals reversed the circuit court, reinstating PERS’ denial of benefits. Upon review of the matter, the Supreme Court concluded PERS’ decision to deny Walker’s request for regular disability benefits was unsupported by substantial evidence. Accordingly, the Court reversed part of the appellate court's decision and reversed the Circuit Court's decision, and remanded the case with instructions to enter judgment in Walker’s favor on her regular disability benefits claim. View "Public Employees' Retirement System v. Walker" on Justia Law

The Securities and Charities Division of the Mississippi Secretary of State Office brought charges against Marshall Wolfe and Jack Harrington for securities violations pertaining to their operation of SteadiVest, LLC. The Secretary of State found that Wolfe and Harrington had violated Mississippi securities laws, and fines were levied against them. Wolfe and Harrington appealed, and the Chancery Court affirmed. Wolfe and Harrington then appealed to the Supreme Court. After review of the Circuit and Chancery Court records, the Supreme Court found that the chancellor did not err in affirming the Secretary of State's finding that Wolfe and Harrington had violated Mississippi Code Section 75-71-501. The Secretary of State's decision was supported by substantial evidence, was not arbitrary or capricious, did not go beyond the Secretary of State's power, and did not violate Wolfe's or Harrington's statutory or constitutional rights. However, the Court found the method used to assess penalties against Wolfe and Harrington was improper, and reversed on that issue. View "Harrington v. Ofc. of Mississippi Sec'y of State" on Justia Law

Dr. Adolfo P. Morales sued Jackson HMA, LLC., d/b/a Central Mississippi Medical Center (Jackson HMA) for breach of contract. A jury awarded Morales substantial damages. Jackson HMA filed a "Motion for Judgment Notwithstanding the Verdict, and, in the alternative, For a New Trial" and a "Motion for Amendment of Judgment." The Circuit Court denied the post-trial motions and Jackson HMA filed this appeal. In 2004, a recruiter for Jacksom HMA sent Morales a "letter of intent" outlining Jackson HMA's proposed offer. The letter twice stated that the proposed offer required "preapproval" by "Corporate" (HMA). Although not requested or provided for, Morales signed and returned the letter. On it he wrote "I agree to all and accept the terms of your offer." At trial, Morales acknowledged that this letter was not a contract, as it "no doubt" required preapproval from the corporate office. Subsequently, Jackson HMA sought approval from corporate HMA, but corporate did not approve the terms. Jackson HMA's CEO impressed upon corporate the need for an ophthalmologist and suggested new terms to corporate which reduced the guaranteed amount and period by half. The CEO received approval of these reduced terms from an HMA vice-president for the eastern part of the United States. Thereafter, the recruiter sent Morales a second letter detailing the new "terms of our offer" which reflected the reduced guarantees approved by corporate HMA. The letter lacked the phrase "letter of intent" and also made no reference to a requirement of corporate approval of the terms. The letter included the language, "[b]y signing and returning this letter, you will confirm your commitment to entering into a contractual agreement . . . . Accordingly we will begin the process of assimilating contract documents for your review." Morales signed the document, but approval never arrived. In early March 2005, the recruiter informed Morales that the contract had not been approved. In late 2005, Morales filed suit alleging that Jackson HMA had breached its contract with him. The jury returned a verdict in favor of Morales. Jackson HMA appealed. After its review, the Supreme Court concluded that Morales presented sufficient evidence for the jury to find that a contract existed. However, Morales presented insufficient evidence to support the jury's damages award. The Court affirmed the judgment for Dr. Morales, but reversed on the issue of damages and remanded this case to the Circuit Court for a new trial solely on damages. View "Jackson HMA, LLC v. Morales" on Justia Law

Illinois Central Railroad Company appealed a jury verdict for Perry Brent awarded under the Federal Employers Liability Act (FELA) for injuries he sustained during his employment with Illinois Central. While the Supreme Court found that the trial court erred in failing to grant Illinois Central's motions for summary judgment and directed verdict on the FELA negligence per se claim, the Court affirmed the jury's general verdict based on Brent's FELA negligence claim. View "Illinois Central Railroad Company v. Brent" on Justia Law