Justia Mississippi Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

Articles Posted in Professional Malpractice & Ethics
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The Mississippi Commission on Judicial Performance issued a Formal Complaint against Chancellor David Shoemake, alleging judicial misconduct. The Complaint contained allegations that Judge Shoemake had contributed to the mismanagement of the conservatorship of Victoria Denise Newsome. After a formal hearing on March 12, 2015, the Commission recommended to the Supreme Court that Judge Shoemake be removed from office, fined $2,500, and assessed costs in the amount of $5,882.67. Judge Shoemake disputes the Commission’s findings and recommendation. After review, the Supreme Court held that Judge Shoemake improperly signed ex parte orders and contributed to the mismanagement of a ward’s estate. However, the Commission did not prove by clear and convincing evidence that Shoemake gave testimony that he knew or should have known would be misleading. The Court ordered that Judge Shoemake be publicly reprimanded, be suspended from office for thirty days without pay, pay a fine of $2,500, and pay costs in the amount of $5,882.67. View "Mississippi Comm'n on Judicial Performance v. Shoemake" on Justia Law

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Bobby Gibson filed a legal-malpractice action against Joe Montgomery and his law firm, Williams, Williams and Montgomery, P.A. (“WWM”), alleging wrongful conduct in connection with the administration of his late wife Debbie's estate. The trial court granted summary judgment to Montgomery and WWM. The Supreme Court reversed and remanded. Bobby timely filed his Notice of Appeal and raised four issues: 1) whether the doctrines of res judicata or collateral estoppel barred his claims, 2) whether judicial estoppel precluded his malpractice action, 3) whether the thirty-day period provided in Section 11-1-39 required dismissal, and 4) whether there remains a genuine issue of material fact as to the elements of his legal-malpractice and fiduciary-duty claims. After review, the Supreme Court concluded: Bobby's claims were not precluded by the doctrines of res judicata and collateral estoppel; judicial estoppel did not preclude Bobby's legal-malpractice action; there was no merit to Montgomery's Section 11-1-39 argument; and there remained a genuine issue of material fact as to whether an attorney-client relationship existed. View "Gibson v. Williams, Williams & Montgomery, P.A." on Justia Law

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In January 2003, Christopher Lyas died while receiving treatment at Pine Grove Behavioral Health Center, a subsidiary of Forrest General Hospital. Shortly after Christopher’s death, his widow, Madra Lyas was visited by an employee of the Forrest County Coroner’s Office who provided her a provisional Certificate of Death which listed the immediate cause of death as “pending” and a provisional autopsy report which listed the cause and manner of Christopher’s death as “pending toxicology,” but contained pathological diagnoses of “Hypertensive Heart Disease” and “Morbid Obesity.” The employee informed Madra that Christopher probably had died of a heart attack. Seven years later, after meeting in person with the Forrest County Coroner, Madra was given Christopher’s final Certificate of Death, which professed “[c]hanges consistent with meprobamate and carisoprodol overdose” as the immediate cause of Christopher’s death. She then filed suit against Pine Grove and Forrest General Hospital, alleging that Pine Grove had caused Christopher’s death negligently by means of a prescription drug overdose. The trial court granted summary judgment in favor of Forrest General and Pine Grove, holding that Madra had not filed suit within the one-year statute of limitations pursuant to the Mississippi Tort Claims Act. Madra appealed, arguing that the discovery rule tolled the applicable statute of limitations. Because Madra has produced evidence of her reasonable diligence during the statutory period, the Supreme Court found that a genuine issue of material fact existed on the issue of whether the statute of limitations was tolled. The Court therefore reversed the circuit court’s grant of summary judgment in favor of Forrest General and remand this case for a trial on the merits. View "Lyas v. Forrest General Hospital" on Justia Law

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The Mississippi Commission on Judicial Performance (the Commission) filed a “Formal Complaint” against Chancery Court Judge Joe Dale Walker alleging conduct prejudicial to the administration of justice which brings the judicial office into disrepute in violation of Section 177A of the Mississippi Constitution. The Commission recommended that Judge Walker be removed from office following various allegations regarding Judge Walker's mismanagement of a conservatorship. Due to various irregularities occurring in his handling of the conservatorship, the matter was investigated by the Federal Bureau of Investigation as well as the Commission. As a result of that investigation, a grand jury was convened and witnesses called to testify regarding the administration of the conservatorship. In association therewith, Judge Walker entered a guilty plea related to a charge of attempting to corruptly influence a witness subpoenaed to appear before a Federal Grand Jury proceeding and attempting to impede the provision of documents by the witness to the Federal Grand Jury with the intent to influence the outcome of the proceeding. "Due to the seriousness of his admitted criminal acts and judicial misconduct," the Mississippi Supreme Court removed Judge Joe Dale Walker from the office of Chancery Court Judge, Post Two, of the Thirteenth Chancery Court District of Mississippi. View "Mississippi Comm'n on Jud. Perf. v. Walker" on Justia Law

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The Mississippi Commission on Judicial Performance determined that Chancellor Talmadge Littlejohn has violated multiple Canons of Judicial Conduct. In March 2012, Chancellor Littlejohn modified a 2001 Agreed Order of Filiation and Support between Ronald Brooks and Janice Fields, and ordered Brooks to pay Fields $15,000 for an automobile for their child within ninety days, and $1,750 in attorney fees within sixty days. Brooks posted a supersedeas bond, which the chancery clerk approved, and appealed Chancellor Littlejohn’s order to this Court. Because he had posted the supersedeas bond, Brooks did not pay the sums ordered while the appeal was pending. Nevertheless, Fields filed a contempt complaint against Brooks. Chancellor Littlejohn acknowledged that Brooks had posted a supersedeas bond but nevertheless held him in contempt for his failure to pay and ordered him incarcerated until he paid the entire amount of $16,750. Brooks spent three days and two nights in jail. During his incarceration, he filed an emergency appeal with the Supreme Court, and the Court vacated the contempt finding and ordered Brooks released. The Commission filed its complaint against Chancellor Littlejohn, alleging violations of Canons 1, 2A, 3B(2), and 3B(8) of the Code of Judicial Conduct. After a formal hearing, the Commission concluded that Chancellor Littlejohn had committed misconduct, and it recommended that the Supreme Court impose a $500 fine and a public reprimand, and assess costs associated with this proceeding. While the Supreme Court agreed with the Commission that Chancellor Littlejohn committed misconduct, it did not adopt the recommended sanctions. The Court found that Chancellor Littlejohn refused to take responsibility for his misconduct, and the recommended sanctions were not commensurate with sanctions imposed for similar misconduct in past cases. The Court suspended Chancellor Littlejohn from office for thirty days without pay, fined him $1,000, order that he be publicly reprimanded, and taxed him with the costs of these proceedings. View "Miss. Comm'n on Judicial Perf. v. Littlejohn" on Justia Law

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The Commission on Judicial Performance filed a formal complaint against Rickey W. Thompson, Justice Court Judge, District 4, Lee County, charging him with judicial misconduct constituting violations of Canons 1, 2A, 2B, 3B(1), 3B(2), 3B(4), 3B(8), 3C(1), and 3C(2) of the Code of Judicial Conduct and constituting willful misconduct in office and conduct prejudicial to the administration of justice which brought the judicial office into disrepute in violation of Section 177A of the Mississippi Constitution of 1890, as amended. "We are concerned, and take into consideration, that Judge Thompson has not taken responsibility for his actions, and the likelihood of those actions being repeated in the future is great. Judge Thompson’s willful disregard for his past discipline 'illustrates the magnitude of the [offenses] and indifference to litigants and [the Commission and the Supreme] Court in continuing to engage in [misconduct].'" The Supreme Court agreed with the Commission's recommendation and ordered that Judge Thompson: (1) be removed from office; and (2) be assessed fines and costs of the proceedings. View "Mississippi Commission on Judicial Performance v. Thompson" on Justia Law

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James Forbes settled a personal-injury action while he was represented by Louis St. Martin. Forbes later sued St. Martin, challenging the validity of his contingency-fee arrangement and the associated attorneys’ fees. The Chancery Court granted summary judgment to St. Martin; the Court of Appeals reversed the chancery court’s decision and remanded the case for further proceedings. Upon review of the matter, the Supreme Court reversed the Court of Appeals’ judgment, finding that summary judgment in favor of St. Martin was proper. View "In the Matter of the Estate of Louis St. Martin, Deceased: Forbes v. Hixson" on Justia Law

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The Mississippi Commission on Judicial Performance filed a complaint charging Tate County Youth Court Referee, Drug Court Judge, and Family Master Leigh Ann Darby with judicial misconduct in office and conduct prejudicial to the administration of justice which brings the judicial office into disrepute in violation of Section 177A of the Mississippi Constitution. The Commission and Judge Darby entered into an “Agreed Statement of Facts and Proposed Recommendation” providing that Judge Darby had violated Canons 1, 2A, 3B(2), 3B(4), and 3B(8) of the Code of Judicial Conduct and Section 177A of the Mississippi Constitution, and recommended that she be removed from office, prohibited from holding judicial office in the future, and assessed costs of $200. The Commission unanimously accepted and adopted the “Agreed Statement of Facts and Proposed Recommendation.” In this latest incident, Judge Darby stipulated to multiple incidents in which she denied citizens their due-process rights. Between 2008 and 2010, she “unlawfully ordered the incarceration of” eight parents and denied each his or her “constitutional right of due process” prior to being “order[ed] . . . to jail for conduct allegedly occurring outside of court.” In 2011, three fifteen-year-old minors (two girls and one boy) were arrested by Senatobia police after a neighbor of one of the children complained that they had walked across her yard. Judge Darby, in her official capacity as youth court referee and youth court judge, but without authority of law, ordered that the three minors be drug-tested while in custody. Without conducting any hearings, Judge Darby ordered the minors to be taken into custody and transported to a detention facility in Alcorn County, Mississippi. Unrepresented by counsel and denied due process, the minors spent Friday until the following Monday in the detention facility. On October 3, 2011, the Tate County Board of Supervisors passed a “No Confidence Resolution” regarding Judge Darby. That resolution declared that it was not in the best of interest of Tate County that she continue in her judicial capacity and called upon the senior chancellor of the district to remove her from all Tate County judicial offices. Judge Darby was suspended from office for a period of sixty days. Thereafter, she tendered her resignation to the senior chancellor. The Supreme Court performed its mandated review of the Commission’s recommendation consistent with Miss. Const. art. 6, section 177A, Miss. Comm’n on Jud. Perf. R. 10, M.R.A.P. 16(a), and Mississippi case law. The Supreme Court concluded Judge Darby’s conduct violated Canons 1, 2A, 3B(2), 3B(4), and 3B(8) of the Mississippi Code of Judicial Conduct and Section 177A of the Mississippi Constitution. The Court ordered that Judge Darby be removed from office, fined $1,000, and assessed costs of $200. View "Mississippi Commission on Judicial Performance v. Darby" on Justia Law

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The Supreme Court found that Chancellor D. Neil Harris abused his contempt powers, failed to recuse himself from contempt proceedings, and prevented those he charged with contempt from presenting any defense. This matter stemmed from Judge Harris' presiding over a 2010 case in which the State hired private process servers to pursue child-support and paternity proceedings. The Judge obtained information that suggested some of the parties had not been properly served with process, and that returns on the summonses were falsified. The Judge instituted contempt proceedings against five process services, the owner of the service company, and two notaries public. The Supreme Court found that appropriate sanctions were: a public reprimand, a $2,500 fine, and a $200 assessment of costs. View "Mississippi Comm'n on Judicial Perf. v. Harris" on Justia Law

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In 2008, Plaintiffs S. Lavon Evans Jr. and his companies S. Lavon Evans Jr. Operating Company, Inc.; S. Lavon Evans Jr. Drilling Ventures, LLC; and E & D Services, Inc. sued Defendants the law firm of Baker & McKenzie, LLP, and one of its partners, Joel Held. The complaint also named as defendants Laredo Energy Holdings, LLC, and its related subsidiaries S. Lavon Evans Operating Texas, LLC, and E & D Drilling Services, LLC. Plaintiffs listed seven causes of action in the complaint: counts one and seven charged the Baker Defendants with legal malpractice and breach of contract; counts two through six charged all the defendants with breach of fiduciary duty, negligent omission and misstatements of material facts, civil conspiracy, aiding and abetting, tortious interference, and breach of duty of good faith and fair dealing. Defendants Laredo Energy Holdings, LLC; S. Lavon Evans Operating Texas, LLC; and E&D Drilling Services filed a cross-claim against the Baker Defendants claiming legal malpractice, breach of contract, breach of duty of good faith and fair dealing, and breach of fiduciary duty. Evans asserted that in 2007, he lost access to his companies’ two largest assets (two oil drilling rigs) and was sued in Texas by the Baker Defendants on behalf of Reed Cagle (Evans’s business partner), who was acting on behalf of Laredo Energy Holdings, LLC. This triggered a flurry of liens and suits by vendors against Evans and his companies – all because, as Evans claims - he made decisions and entered agreements based on advice and recommendations from the Baker Defendants, who Evans believed to be his lawyers. Evans claimed that his businesses once were worth more than $50 million but now were accountable for debts exceeding $31 million as a result of the conduct by the Baker Defendants. The Mississippi case was tried, and the jury returned a verdict of $103,400,000 in actual damages for Plaintiffs and Cross-Plaintiffs. S. Lavon Evans Jr. was awarded $1 million from defendant Joel Held and $30 million from Baker & McKenzie. S. Lavon Evans Operating Company, Inc., was awarded $1 million from Joel Held and $29 million from Baker & McKenzie. E&D Services, LLC, was awarded $1 million from Joel Held and $19 million from Baker & McKenzie. The jury also assessed Evans, individually, with ten-percent comparative fault. And the trial court reduced the $31 million amount awarded to Evans, individually, by ten percent. The Cross-Plaintiffs were separately awarded $22.4 million from Joel Held and Baker & McKenzie, collectively. A divided jury awarded $75,000 in punitive damages to Plaintiffs and $75,000 in punitive damages to Cross-Plaintiffs. The trial court denied the Baker Defendants’ post-trial motions for judgment notwithstanding the verdict, new trial, and remittitur. This appeal followed. After careful consideration of the trial court record, the Supreme Court affirmed as to the Baker Defendants’ liability. But because the Court found the jury was not properly instructed, it reversed and remanded the case for a new trial on proximate cause and damages. View "Baker & McKenzie, LLP v. Evans, Jr." on Justia Law